South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Blackstone · Oct 13, 2015

Brumby said:
I think this is the area where the room for miscalculation is the greatest. Sovereignty over a territory needs to be in substance and not just in form. China has made a claim of sovereignty and the source of authority either rest on its legality or in might. China cannot invoke the law because to-date its claim is nebulous and that leaves it with the only other option. The US is signalling its intention to challenge the claim via FON. Depending on how one views substance, shadowing the US warship(s) is hollow form in staking a claim through might. This is where I think miscalculation will potentially originate. There is a "face" issue for China and how it will resonate with the domestic audience if its actions are deemed too soft given its perceived growing strength and the general insufficient recognition of its intrinsic status by Western powers.

While "face" is a consideration among many, especially with the unyielding Chinese public, the underlaying issue is US primacy in Asia. How do we know that? Obama said several times it's about who sets the rules. On the other side, Xi Jinping wants a "new model of major country relations," and why would he say that if he's happy with the existing model? So, what does Xi want? Most likely China to lead in the long-run, but co-leadership for now.

If you look at the big picture, there's great power politics in Asia for the first time since Mao accepted US primacy, and FON, TPP, strengthening US alliances, RCEP, AIIB, Belt-Road, SCO, etc., are all pieces to answer Barack Obama's central question of who leads Asia, and in what capacity.

Blackstone · Oct 13, 2015

Jeff Head said:
I expect the US will sail through there with one or two ships, possible an LCS and a Burke. I expect further that they would get no close than 4 nm to any island.

I expect China to have a shadowing force of one or two FFGs probably...very similar to what happened the last time the US Navy went in there...issuing warnings not to get too close.

Afterwards both sides will claim that they met their interests.

Since this thread is about other nations' strategy in the SCS, it's proper to discuss that issue. I agree your scenario is the most likely probability, and both sides will claim they met their objectives. Unfortunately, China will probably gain more from the episode than the US. I say that because it's harder for the Washington to show sustained primacy than for Beijing to create doubt. Up to a few years ago, regional countries didn't have to consider that, and now they do. That fact alone tells us we're in a different world.

Brumby · Oct 13, 2015

Blackstone said:
While "face" is a consideration among many, especially with the unyielding Chinese public, the underlaying issue is US primacy in Asia. How do we know that? Obama said several times it's about who sets the rules. On the other side, Xi Jinping wants a "new model of major country relations," and why would he say that if he's happy with the existing model? So, what does Xi want? Most likely China to lead in the long-run, but co-leadership for now.

If you look at the big picture, there's great power politics in Asia for the first time since Mao accepted US primacy, and FON, TPP, strengthening US alliances, RCEP, AIIB, Belt-Road, SCO, etc., are all pieces to answer Barack Obama's central question of who leads Asia, and in what capacity.

If China aspires to assume leadership than it should start behaving like one and demonstrate under Chinese leadership what that world order might look like. Global security post WWII had been girded by rule of law, and transparency on what the structure and framework is meant to be. It is a more level playing field with lesser nations protected under a set of rules. Whilst these features do not always work in the ideal manner, there are overall prosperity across the world. Under Obama, we have seen what leading from behind means. With China, it is leading by ambiguity in the SCS. For example, it declares its claim its indisputable - period. To me, that is a world order that is lead by fiat. The rules are not known, subject to Chinese interpretation and changes if there is one, and no transparency because there isn't any. It is to me a recipe for chaos. You seriously think the rest of the world will sign onto this kind of leadership?

Jeff Head · Oct 13, 2015

Blackstone said:
I agree your scenario is the most likely probability, and both sides will claim they met their objectives. Unfortunately, China will probably gain more from the episode than the US. I say that because it's harder for the Washington to show sustained primacy than for Beijing to create doubt.

Well, the US is willing I to sail through there every few months for a prolonged period. This will be the third sailing in a few months, with a couple of fly-bys.

No doubt that Chinese bases are going to be there, exerting their influence constantly for long into the future.

But a couple of US Navy vessels, like an LCS and a Burk, sailing through there every three or four months will make the US point...and that's all they really want to do at this point.

Blackstone · Oct 13, 2015

Jeff Head said:
Well, the US is willing I to sail through there every few months for a prolonged period. This will be the third sailing in a few months, with a couple of fly-bys.

No doubt that Chinese bases are going to be there, exerting their influence constantly for long into the future.

But a couple of US Navy vessels, like an LCS and a Burk, sailing through there every three or four months will make the US point...and that's all they really want to do at this point.

I see US patrols the same as you on their constitution and purposes. Problem is the degrading optics; the stronger the Chinese military presence, relative to US patrols, the more Beijing calls into question current Asian security order based on US military primacy. It may not be what most Asian countries want, but it's the reality.

Brumby · Oct 13, 2015

Jeff Head said:
Well, the US is willing I to sail through there every few months for a prolonged period. This will be the third sailing in a few months, with a couple of fly-bys.

No doubt that Chinese bases are going to be there, exerting their influence constantly for long into the future.

But a couple of US Navy vessels, like an LCS and a Burk, sailing through there every three or four months will make the US point...and that's all they really want to do at this point.

Whilst I agree that is predominantly what the US intends to do but unfortunately plans do not always go the way that we think. Chinese statements and the Cowpen incident would suggest to me a scenario of a more muscular Chinese response is plausible. In this scenario I postulate that an LCS would actually attempt to transit within the 12 nm with a Burke staying out of the zone in support. Chinese military vessels (maybe two Type 54A) would attempt to impede the LCS transit and usher it out of the zone. I am not talking of any ramming but sufficient effort in effect to redirect its passage out of the zone. The LCS passage may temporarily stop to avoid potential collision but barring any satisfactory resolution could end in a Mexican standoff within the zone. The Scarborough incident tells me the Chinese has the patience to sit it out. What then?

Blackstone · Oct 13, 2015

Brumby said:
If China aspires to assume leadership than it should start behaving like one and demonstrate under Chinese leadership what that world order might look like. Global security post WWII had been girded by rule of law, and transparency on what the structure and framework is meant to be. It is a more level playing field with lesser nations protected under a set of rules. Whilst these features do not always work in the ideal manner, there are overall prosperity across the world. Under Obama, we have seen what leading from behind means. With China, it is leading by ambiguity in the SCS. For example, it declares its claim its indisputable - period. To me, that is a world order that is lead by fiat. The rules are not known, subject to Chinese interpretation and changes if there is one, and no transparency because there isn't any. It is to me a recipe for chaos. You seriously think the rest of the world will sign onto this kind of leadership?

I agree with every one of your points on SCS, and I have said pretty much the same things. Your last point on leadership deserves deeper discussions, and I highly recommend Henry Kissinger's recent book, New World Order, for reference. It's an excellent read! I don't see Asia voting for Chinese leadership, but I could see China's gravity pulling them into its orbit regardless of their preferences.

Blackstone · Oct 13, 2015

Brumby said:
Whilst I agree that is predominantly what the US intends to do but unfortunately plans do not always go the way that we think. Chinese statements and the Cowpen incident would suggest to me a scenario of a more muscular Chinese response is plausible. In this scenario I postulate that an LCS would actually attempt to transit within the 12 nm with a Burke staying out of the zone in support. Chinese military vessels (maybe two Type 54A) would attempt to impede the LCS transit and usher it out of the zone. I am not talking of any ramming but sufficient effort in effect to redirect its passage out of the zone. The LCS passage may temporarily stop to avoid potential collision but barring any satisfactory resolution could end in a Mexican standoff within the zone. The Scarborough incident tells me the Chinese has the patience to sit it out. What then?

Well said; exactly so. It's the "what then" that puts the point on the balance of resolve between China and the United States.

Jeff Head · Oct 13, 2015

Brumby said:
...incident would suggest to me a scenario of a more muscular Chinese response is plausible. In this scenario I postulate that an LCS would actually attempt to transit within the 12 nm with a Burke staying out of the zone in support. Chinese military vessels (maybe two Type 54A) would attempt to impede the LCS transit and usher it out of the zone. I am not talking of any ramming but sufficient effort in effect to redirect its passage out of the zone.

I do not see anything like that happening.

The LCS will avoid the 4-mile limit, and the PLAN will be aware of this beforehand.

Just how far the LCS would go into the zone between 12-mile and 4-mile, we do not know, and neither would the PLAN, or at what point the LCS would do so.

I believe any physical attempt to force the LCS to a maintain 12 mile limit will be viewed by the international community as a gross over-reaction that could easily, and needlessly, lead to a escalating scenario that the PRC does not want, and given the speed and maneuverability of the LCS, would not succeed in any case, short of firing on it.

Brumby · Oct 13, 2015

Jeff Head said:
I do not see anything like that happening.

The LCS will avoid the 4-mile limit, and the PLAN will be aware of this beforehand.

Just how far the LCS would go into the zone between 12-mile and 4-mile, we do not know, and neither would the PLAN, or at what point the LCS would do so.

I believe any physical attempt to force the LCS to a maintain 12 mile limit will be viewed by the international community as a gross over-reaction that could easily, and needlessly, lead to a escalating scenario that the PRC does not want, and given the speed and maneuverability of the LCS, would not succeed in any case, short of firing on it.

What is the significance of the 4nm limit?

South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Blackstone

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Blackstone

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Brumby

Major

Jeff Head

General

Blackstone

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Brumby

Major

Blackstone

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Blackstone

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Jeff Head

General

Brumby

Major