South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

Yesterday at 7:27 AM

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and more of this:
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... and for now is over as
U.S. Navy concludes South China Sea patrols
U.S. Navy’s carrier strike group has concluded South China Sea patrols and moved into the Philippine Sea through the Luzon Strait, the Navy said on March 7.

The John C. Stennis Strike Group (JCSSG) operated in the South China Sea, March 1 through March 6.

It was the crew’s first time operating there since their regularly scheduled deployment began January 15.

The JCSSG conducted daily flight operations and a replenishment-at-sea during their transit, receiving advanced bio fuel, aviation fuel, and supplies from USNS Rainier (T-AOE 7).

While operating in the South China Sea, the crew sharpened their skills in one of the most heavily trafficked areas in the world. Roughly $5 trillion in trade is shipped through the South China Sea every year.

Additionally, People’s Liberation Army (Navy) ships remained in the vicinity of Stennis during its time in the South China Sea. All bridge-to-bridge interactions between the Sailors of both navies were professional.

Commander Tom Ogden, commanding officer of USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), said: “Based on the bridge-to-bridge communications USS Chung-Hoon had with the PLA(N) ships, it is clear that the Chinese Navy prides itself on professional communications and interactions.”

Rear Adm. Ronald Boxall, JCSSG’s commander, said he is not surprised by other countries’ interests in the strike group: “We’re exercising our right to operate in international waters. Our presence here promotes peace and stability in the region.”

The strike group is comprised of Stennis with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 9 and Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 21 embarked, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93), USS Stockdale (DDG 106), USS William P. Lawrence (DDG 110), and Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53).
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Despite the literal "China threat" title this is a voice of reason calling out the China threat propaganda and actions that can only be detrimental for the region.

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China’s Threat to Commercial Shipping in the South China Sea
The Soviet precedent.
By
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for The Diplomat
March 07, 2016

What does U.S intelligence analysis of the Soviet threat to commercial shipping in Asia or the Atlantic tell us about the way in which some Western governments today exaggerate China’s potential threat to commercial shipping in the South China Sea arising from action in the Spratly and Paracel Islands?

The two situations are very different geopolitically but there are interesting comparisons to be made in terms of military mission priorities, not least given that the Soviet Pacific Fleet at its peak between 1977 and 1986 was at least broadly comparable in size to the entire Chinese Navy today, and given that the Soviet armed forces as whole were immensely more powerful than the Chinese armed forces are today.

Bearing in mind that numerical comparisons of naval ship numbers are highly problematic, for
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, here is a comparison of the
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and the
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in platform types in 2015:

Soviet Pacific Fleet 1977 Chinese Navy 2015
Attack Submarines 75 68
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SSBNs 25 4
Major Surface Combatants 58 78
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Numbers do count in an antishipping campaign. In World War II, in part because of its interest in attacking commercial shipping in the Atlantic, and in part because of Allied success in defeating the war on seaborne commerce, Germany built and lost over 700 submarines between 1939 and 1945. Now that is militarization — but even so, Germany could not stop the U.K.-bound trans-Atlantic shipping. It had lost the War in the Atlantic by 1943. In the month of May 1943 alone, Germany lost over 40 submarines, equivalent to the entire complement of today’s Chinese navy fleet of modern attack submarines.

But it is to mission analysis rather than numbers that we could more usefully look, not least because weapons systems count more than platforms and we would need war gaming to allow any realistic comparisons of the interaction of platforms and weapons systems.

On the subject of naval missions, the
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, at the height of Reagan era campaign for military preparedness against the Soviet Union, that attacks on merchant shipping were not a high priority for the Soviet navy in a war with NATO, and if they did attack shipping it would be in port or the approaches through mining or aerial attack (not in open ocean areas). The assessment cited several reasons, including the existence of higher priority military missions and the low likelihood of success in an ant-shipping campaign if the NATO alliance was determined to oppose Soviet actions.

In a Budget Brief in 1977, the
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, particularly of oil to Japan, as one of the “purported” rationales for U.S. general purpose forces there: “it is the attack submarine component of the Soviet Navy’s Pacific Fleet that is of principal concern to the Japanese because of the threat that those submarines pose to merchant vessels.” But the report went on to discuss what I see as probably the main reason why the United States was keen to use the commercial shipping argument: “Perhaps the most important U.S. interest in Asia is in the continued orientation of Japan toward the West.” It was to bind Japan to the United States that American officials repeatedly canvassed in public the potential or putative Soviet threat because the Japanese felt highly vulnerable to it. But even then the threat to Japanese shipping was, according to U.S. agencies, never in the open ocean areas in the unlikely event it were ever to manifest itself, but in close-in areas in easy reach of Soviet land-based air assets.

In the Soviet case, when asked to describe the main missions of the Red navy, senior U.S. officials almost never referred to attacks on commercial shipping as a mission for which it trained or planned. It is the same today with the U.S. official statements on the missions of the PLA Navy.

On the contrary, in 2015, the Office of Naval Intelligence
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that China is keen to protect international shipping (which surely means not attack it): “With a heavy reliance on maritime commerce, Beijing now has a vested interest in ensuring the security of international trade.” China also says in its
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that protection of seaborne trade is a high priority for it.

The 2015 ONI report identified the two highest priority naval missions for China as being prepared to fight in a Taiwan-related conflict and maintaining the security of territorial sovereignty. It identified protection of commercial shipping, not attacking it, as a third priority.

In a military crisis with Taiwan, China would almost certainly consider some sort of naval blockade against it, including an implied threat to commercial shipping. But if any military action was taken against commercial shipping, it would be in areas close to Taiwan, not in areas affected by a small Chinese military presence in the Spratly Islands or the Paracel Islands. Such a blockade would most likely be a naval quarantine exercise (blockade) not a war on shipping that saw China sinking Japanese, American, Singaporean, and Australian commercial ships or cargoes. A war between China and Taiwan has become less likely in that past 20 years, not more likely.

There are many reasons why China’s actions in the territorial disputes over the Spratly and Paracel Islands do not pose a threat to commercial shipping in the open areas of the South China Sea (3.5 million square kilometers), as I argued in the
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. There are also many reasons why certain countries might seek to misrepresent the threat. Some of these reasons may seem to be defensible. But the impact on regional stability and peace of exaggerating or inventing threats from China is on balance almost certainly negative.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Despite the literal "China threat" title this is a voice of reason calling out the China threat propaganda and actions that can only be detrimental for the region.

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I don't know what US policymakers expect to achieve with recent actions in the SCS. If it's to scare China into backing down, then the ploy has failed, because China shows no signs of backing down. If it's making friends and allies in the region feel safe, then confrontations with no end in sight will do the opposite. And if it's to rally the region against China, then Abbott's denial of Australia basing B1 bombers, Abe stopping base building in Okinawa, and Obama's failure to unite ASEAN in Sunnyland doomed that gambit. So, the question remains, what is US trying to achieve?
 
I don't know what US policymakers expect to achieve with recent actions in the SCS. If it's to scare China into backing down, then the ploy has failed, because China shows no signs of backing down. If it's making friends and allies in the region feel safe, then confrontations with no end in sight will do the opposite. And if it's to rally the region against China, then Abbott's denial of Australia basing B1 bombers, Abe stopping base building in Okinawa, and Obama's failure to unite ASEAN in Sunnyland doomed that gambit. So, the question remains, what is US trying to achieve?

Re-establishing a US presence at Subic Bay, roping Japan into the SCS thereby grouping together China's ECS and SCS territorial disputes' opponents making resolution more difficult and probably more disadvantageous for China, and very loudly proclaiming the US will remain involved in the region are all something. I think it is unnecessarily hostile and a throwback to colonial gunboat diplomacy and divide and conquer but it does the job making sure everyone knows who's the boss and sticking around.
 

Blackstone

Brigadier
Re-establishing a US presence at Subic Bay, roping Japan into the SCS thereby grouping together China's ECS and SCS territorial disputes' opponents making resolution more difficult and probably more disadvantageous for China, and very loudly proclaiming the US will remain involved in the region are all something. I think it is unnecessarily hostile and a throwback to colonial gunboat diplomacy and divide and conquer but it does the job making sure everyone knows who's the boss and sticking around.
For clarity, are you saying US intentions with SCS and ECS actions is to double down on its primacy in Asia and refusing China co-leadership?
 

Air Force Brat

Brigadier
Super Moderator
I don't know what US policymakers expect to achieve with recent actions in the SCS. If it's to scare China into backing down, then the ploy has failed, because China shows no signs of backing down. If it's making friends and allies in the region feel safe, then confrontations with no end in sight will do the opposite. And if it's to rally the region against China, then Abbott's denial of Australia basing B1 bombers, Abe stopping base building in Okinawa, and Obama's failure to unite ASEAN in Sunnyland doomed that gambit. So, the question remains, what is US trying to achieve?

All the questions??? I think its rather obvious that everyone?? (possible exception Pakistan, and US haters), would prefer that China not build up disputed islands and reefs and fill them with weapons?? The US pivot is in response to China's aggressive expansion and deployment of forces in the SCS. While Australia and Japan go to great lengths to avoid offending China and becoming a target.

US is simply there to be a buffer, and to counter that intimidation with stability, and assurance to our allies in the region that we R a buffer. Its obvious that China will not be deterred from their mission to take control in the SCS, nor will the US be discouraged from their mission in light of that threat.

As long as everyone minds their manners, there is NO problem! I am certain that many of our allies are confident in the US, and many of our enemies wish we weren't there?? simple
 

Brumby

Major
Japanese submarine to visit Philippines: sources

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A Japanese submarine will visit the Philippines for the first time in 15 years, along with two warships that will then sail on to Vietnam, in a show of support for nations opposed to Beijing's ambitions in the South China Sea, a person familiar with the matter said.

The Japanese submarine, which is used for training, and the destroyers will arrive in the Philippines in April. The escort vessels will later sail to Vietnam's strategic Cam Ranh Bay base on the South China Sea, the source said.

"It sends a message. It is important for Japan to show its presence," the person with knowledge of the plan said on Monday. He asked not to be identified because he was not authorized to talk to the media.

A Japanese Ministry of Defence spokesman declined to comment on any submarine visit but said the navy normally conducted training voyages in March and April.

"But we are still in the planning stage so are unable to provide details," he said.

The visits were first reported by Japanese media, including the Sankei newspaper, on Sunday.

Asked about the visits, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Japan occupied the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea during World War Two so China was on "high alert" for Japan's military moves there.

"The cooperation of relevant countries should benefit regional stability and should not be directed at third parties or harm another country's sovereignty or security interests," he told a daily news briefing in Beijing.

Of the countries bordering the South China Sea, the Philippines and Vietnam are most opposed to China expanding its influence in the region by building bases on reclaimed islands.

The Philippine military had not received any official notification of a visit by a Japanese submarine, a military spokesman said, though a visit to the Subic Bay naval base was expected.

"Informally, we know a Japanese submarine is visiting Subic in April," said the Philippine spokesman, Brigadier-General Restituto Padilla.
 

SamuraiBlue

Captain
I hear after visiting the Philippines they are going through SCS to make a port call in Vietnam.
Two birds with one stone. How's that for freedom of navigation operations.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
All the questions??? I think its rather obvious that everyone?? (possible exception Pakistan, and US haters)

So, anyone who doesn't share your interpretation is a US hater? Come on! You are better than that!

would prefer that China not build up disputed islands and reefs and fill them with weapons??

The question is, how has anything the US done so far done anything positive to prevent that? Cause and effect. US sends in Warships, China deploys weapons. USN FON has positively encouraged Chinese militarisation of the islands.

The US pivot is in response to China's aggressive expansion and deployment of forces in the SCS.

Nice party line rhetoric. Too bad facts and history prove its all BS.

Cause and effect. The US pivot started long before the disputes flared up. Indeed, it can be shown that the disputes flared up AFTER the US declared its pivot.

Those disputes are nothing new. They have been simmering for decades and nothing of note happened. US declares pivot with behind-the-scenes diplomatic manoeuvres and everything suddenly blows up. Suspicious no?

Doubly so since the sudden flare up to tensions provided the perfect justification and pretext for the pivot to the point where no one in the US is questioning the need for it.

As long as everyone minds their manners, there is NO problem! I am certain that many of our allies are confident in the US, and many of our enemies wish we weren't there?? simple

So gunboat diplomacy is minding manners now? Wonder why the Brits are so miffed when the Russians fly bombers in international airspace near their home islands then? :rolleyes:

And you are dead wrong when you say the enemies of the US wish you were not sticking your nose in the SCS. They positively love it! They wish you start a war down there so you would easy off on drone striking them.

China is not an enemy of the US, but elements within the US seems determined to change that. Don't be an unthinking puppet of those people who just want a new cold war to line their pockets with that sweet sweet military spending profits.
 

flyzies

Junior Member
The US pivot is in response to China's aggressive expansion and deployment of forces in the SCS. While Australia and Japan go to great lengths to avoid offending China and becoming a target.

US is simply there to be a buffer, and to counter that intimidation with stability, and assurance to our allies in the region that we R a buffer. Its obvious that China will not be deterred from their mission to take control in the SCS, nor will the US be discouraged from their mission in light of that threat.

US pivot to Asia was announced in 2012. Now when did China's "aggressive" expansion of islands in SCS start?

In fact it's clear that it was the US that intimidated China first with its Pivot, to which China countered with its current SCS program.

So no, the US is not a stabilising factor in the SCS in its current environment. The SCS is unstable right now simply because of America's actions.
 
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