South China Sea Strategies for other nations (Not China)

SamuraiBlue

Captain
There is no suggested evidence from the recent FONOP by USSCurtis Wilbur that is consistent with your view.

Although in different words, yes he does concur;

to restrict navigation rights and freedoms around the features they claim by policies that require prior permission or notification of transit within territorial seas

Basically he is insinuating that the US does not acknowledge their claim of territorial seas in the region.
He also confirms that there are restrictive rights by policy that the US abide by so the US military will not barge into Mainland china's shores unannounced and/or uninvited.
 
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Blackstone

Brigadier
according to NavyTimes
South China Sea standoff: 'Both sides need to step back'

source:
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Q. Why is the United States so interested in what goes on in the South China Sea?

A. Officially, the United States holds that freedom of navigation is important. But I think fundamentally the United States will not allow a challenger to replace it, either regionally or globally. So I think the objective here is to prevent the rise of a challenger, and China is challenging the region.
This is the real reason Washington is making trouble for Beijing in the SCS and FONOPs are just one set of tools to sustain US-alliance military primacy in the region. Problem is, as China gets stronger economically, politically, and militarily, the alliance's tool chest shrinks and provides fewer good options for all sides.

Meanwhile, Washington mouths ad nauseam it doesn't want adversarial relations with Beijing, but its actions show just the opposite. Hopefully, it ends with the four great powers accommodating each other (US shares power, China embraces strong US presence, Indian and Japan invited to the club) but in the meantime we'll see lots of useless rancor.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
This is the real reason Washington is making trouble for Beijing in the SCS and FONOPs are just one set of tools to sustain US-alliance military primacy in the region. Problem is, as China gets stronger economically, politically, and militarily, the alliance's tool chest shrinks and provides fewer good options for all sides.

Meanwhile, Washington mouths ad nauseam it doesn't want adversarial relations with Beijing, but its actions show just the opposite. Hopefully, it ends with the four great powers accommodating each other (US shares power, China embraces strong US presence, Indian and Japan invited to the club) but in the meantime we'll see lots of useless rancor.

Other problems being that the cats paws the US uses have their own agendas and schemes.

The US is also in too deep, and those nations knows it, so the US cannot even really yank on their chain any more without risking their house of cards collapsing around their ears. So you are increasingly looking at instance where the tail is starting to wag the dog.

If the likes of the Philippines, emboldened with assumed American support, makes a foolish overreach/overreaction like Turkey did when it shot down the Russian Su24, the US will feel compelled to back them irrespective of the merits and facts behind the actual event, because it has made too big of a deal of its role as security guarantor, so any case where China publicly slaps down its vassal, with the US doing nothing of substance to stop it, is going to be seen by many as a sign that the US is writing blank cheques and hasn't the means or wills to provide the security it promises.

Without that last pillar, the foundation of US primacy and position, in South East Asia at least, risks collapsing.

Basically the US has already badly misplayed its cards by needlessly picking a fight with China on this issue, where frankly, the overwhelming majority of Americans couldn't give a toss no matter how much media spin and propaganda they are force fed.

If the chips are down, and especially if it looks like it was the Philippines who started it, there would be precious little public support for direct US military intervention if and when China decides to take retaliatory military action.

That will put the US government in a real bind. Do nothing and risk their allies changing side en mass, or go to war on the other side of the world for someone else over something almost no Americans are willing to fight, never mind die, for.

I think our American friends will be more familiar with the implications of the naval war of 1812 between the fledging US Navy and the British Royal Navy than most. Suffice to say, even though the British had the indisputably superior fleet and emerged with complete command of the oceans, a few small victories for the US, in what was really little more than skirmishes, was sufficient to provide a sufficient fulcrum on which world historical trajectories and the fortunes of Empires changed.

I can see a similar situation arising with the SCS dispute, only with the US taking on the role of established dominant power, while China plays the rising challenger, and you can bet the strategists of the PLAN see that as well. The US would do well not to place itself in a position of vulnerability and tempt China too much.

The SCS isn't Taiwan, worst case scenario, Beijing can survive a military defeat there with relatively little lasting damage to China's long term strategic position, a small conflict there is also unlikely to spill onto the Chinese mainland as all sides would be keen to avoid escalation.

So, given the relatively smaller risks/costs and potentially game changing gains, I think you will see China far more prepared to risk direct, open confrontation if America over-extends itself there, and it will ensure America fires the first shot.

Me pointing this out isn't gloating or warmongering, quite the opposite, as its highlighting a potential pitfall for the US that could easily lead to unintended consequences for us all in the hopes that if enough Americans see sense, they could maybe alter the course America is currently on.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
An important point of distinction however, is that the USN FON Patrols are publicly described by administration and service personnel as a 'challenge'. Those statements are out there. Whereas the example you provided of Chinese transit through arctic waters was just that, transit. China did not claim their ships passage as intending to challenge US territorial claims and warn the US to expect more of the same.

I saw the difference anyhow, so I can only imagine the Chinese would see it the same way per that example and each sides stated intent with these actions.
Many people at the time that China sailed through the Bering Straits called it a direct challenge to the US.

Just as many people are calling this FON in the SCS a challenge to the PRC.

I simply see both as two parties exercising their rights in international waters.

Nothing more or nothing less.

Some folks in the US...including the government...may not have liked it. but there was not intention or desire by the Chinese at the time to engage in or cause military conflict. Therefore, IMHO< by definition it was not gunboat diplomacy.

The same is true for what the US did.

Seriously...I believe this is a tempest being made in a tea pot. As I have said numerous times.

Short of conflict which neither side wants, and neither side is willing to engage in over these activities (and the reason why is because there is no premise or reason to), the PRC will continue to develop its holdings in the SCS, and the US will continue to exercise FON there.
 
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Zool

Junior Member
Whether It is similar or different is solely dependent on the reaction of the counter party and not the passage itself and I believe that was Jeff's point.

I just don't see much support for an argument against the point of distinction I noted in reply to Jeff's example.
No, Freedom of Navigation is not Gunboat diplomacy.

It is exactly what it says it is...Freedom to Navigate in international waters.

The Chinese did the same through the Bearing Straits recently and that is fine.

The difference being the intent of the activity which for the USN is a specific mission and plotted course to issue a challenge. I'm sure you will recall the Chinese transit and presence in the arctic was a result of exercises with the Russian Navy. It was not a proclaimed challenge to US territory or interests and indeed reporting on it came from US sources, not the Chinese. So a significant difference in scenarios and intent behind each parties activity. I cannot highlight the distinction any clearer than I have and forgive me but I will not belabor this particular point a fourth time.

Do you have a view as to the basis of the Chinese position because I see it simply as brute force reasoning in the absence of any sound reasoning.

A proper answer to this question is complex, but I will attempt to provide an overview on the basis of the Chinese position, as I see it:

China is acting first and foremost in response to perceived changes in its security environment. China's view of established security post Nixon exchange and 1979 normalization of relations, was radically altered when the US directly intervened and sent two CBG's into the Taiwan Strait during the 90's. China seriously began to question US neutrality after this event and military sales to Taiwan only enhanced those concerns. China began a massive undertaking to modernize its forces around this time, signing major deals with Russia for aircraft and warships, while the US stepped up aerial and naval surveillance along China's periphery.

The situation for China has gotten worse since then, strategically, with Japan nationalizing the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and pursuing changes to its pacifist constitution (I will elaborate a bit on Japan and the island chains next). The TPP has also come about, to the exclusion of China, and is viewed as the economic arm of containment.

I believe China appreciates the US strategy of Forward Defence, where forces are positioned near points of potential conflict and battle is fought over enemy or allied territory and away from the CONUS, thereby protecting essential industry and population centers. I think China see's the island chains as both a threat to the mainland if not controlled, and opportunity if controlled to establish its own buffer between the mainland and areas of conflict. This in my view explains China's island development work.

China intercepting spy planes, spy ships and protesting FON challenges by foreign warships all relate back to security concerns. China distinguishes between Military & Civilian transit within 12nm and indeed some cases within the 200nm EEZ, as a matter of security. There is a vulnerability the Chinese feel which they seem to be attempting to mitigate. Warship challenges in the context of other regional events past and present, seem to be enhancing that Chinese perception and corresponding response.

That's as brief a summary as I can provide on my interpretation of the Chinese position. I've commented on the primacy of national interests before and it applies here to both Chinese and US activities in the region. I know you tend to proceed from a strictly legal view but that excludes much of the depth and understanding of intent behind these events, which is critical to resolution.

If you are referring to the Israeli blockade then that doesn't fall under UNCLOS but law of armed conflict and is legal under international law.

Well the blockade of Gaza has been in effect for many years now; I think specifically I had referred to the Turkish flotilla that was boarded while still in international waters and some of the passengers killed. Since then I believe both the boarding action in international waters and blockade of Gaza itself remain debated as to the legality. I am aware of the US vetoing at least one UN resolution that went against Israel on this subject. Not much more to say here without getting too far OT. I should also probably be posting this on the China SCS thread since its largely my take on China's position, but here is where our conversation has played out...

Two questions for you Brumby:
- Why do you believe China takes issue with warships approaching its coastlines and do you think it is a reasonable concern?
- Do you think there is a mutually acceptable compromise that can be had between China, the US, Japan etc, taking into consideration each parties interests? If so what do you think that would look like?
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
As I said above, many people at the time that China sailed through the Bering Straits called it a direct challenge to the US.

Just as many people are calling this FON in the SCS a challenge to the PRC.

I simply see both as two parties exercising their rights in international waters.

Nothing more or nothing less.

Some folks in the US...including the government...may not have liked it. but there was not intention or desire by the Chinese at the time to engage in or cause military conflict. Therefore, IMHO< by definition it was not gunboat diplomacy.

The same is true for what the US did.

Seriously...I believe this is a tempest being made in a tea pot. As I have said numerous times.

Short of conflict which neither side wants, and neither side is willing to engage in over these activities (and the reason why is because there is no premise or reason to), the PRC will continue to develop its holdings in the SCS, and the US will continue to exercise FON there.
 

Brumby

Major
A proper answer to this question is complex, but I will attempt to provide an overview on the basis of the Chinese position, as I see it:

China is acting first and foremost in response to perceived changes in its security environment. China's view of established security post Nixon exchange and 1979 normalization of relations, was radically altered when the US directly intervened and sent two CBG's into the Taiwan Strait during the 90's. China seriously began to question US neutrality after this event and military sales to Taiwan only enhanced those concerns. China began a massive undertaking to modernize its forces around this time, signing major deals with Russia for aircraft and warships, while the US stepped up aerial and naval surveillance along China's periphery.

The situation for China has gotten worse since then, strategically, with Japan nationalizing the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands and pursuing changes to its pacifist constitution (I will elaborate a bit on Japan and the island chains next). The TPP has also come about, to the exclusion of China, and is viewed as the economic arm of containment.

I believe China appreciates the US strategy of Forward Defence, where forces are positioned near points of potential conflict and battle is fought over enemy or allied territory and away from the CONUS, thereby protecting essential industry and population centers. I think China see's the island chains as both a threat to the mainland if not controlled, and opportunity if controlled to establish its own buffer between the mainland and areas of conflict. This in my view explains China's island development work.

China intercepting spy planes, spy ships and protesting FON challenges by foreign warships all relate back to security concerns. China distinguishes between Military & Civilian transit within 12nm and indeed some cases within the 200nm EEZ, as a matter of security. There is a vulnerability the Chinese feel which they seem to be attempting to mitigate. Warship challenges in the context of other regional events past and present, seem to be enhancing that Chinese perception and corresponding response.

That's as brief a summary as I can provide on my interpretation of the Chinese position. I've commented on the primacy of national interests before and it applies here to both Chinese and US activities in the region. I know you tend to proceed from a strictly legal view but that excludes much of the depth and understanding of intent behind these events, which is critical to resolution.
Thanks for putting your thoughts into words. The notion of building security depth is something I can both accept and appreciate in terms of China's own national interest. The problem I have is in the policy execution and the manner in which China attempts to explain away its actions. In my view it is unbecoming of a nation aspiring to take leadership and very disconcerting to other nations regarding China's attitude towards the rule of law. Such actions doesn't project peace but chaos ahead.

Well the blockade of Gaza has been in effect for many years now; I think specifically I had referred to the Turkish flotilla that was boarded while still in international waters and some of the passengers killed. Since then I believe both the boarding action in international waters and blockade of Gaza itself remain debated as to the legality. I am aware of the US vetoing at least one UN resolution that went against Israel on this subject. Not much more to say here without getting too far OT. I should also probably be posting this on the China SCS thread since its largely my take on China's position, but here is where our conversation has played out...
Gaza is a messy piece of affair. It is not an issue I can offer an intelligent input because there is a story to both sides.

Two questions for you Brumby:
- Why do you believe China takes issue with warships approaching its coastlines and do you think it is a reasonable concern?
It is not for me to say whether the concern is reasonable but I would believe it is for China in terms of reaction and so I would concur. Having said that, China needs to learn to deal with issues through the proper manner. This being more transparent with its policies with its nine dash line claims; being consistent between its actions and its complains and not operating with a double standard; and seriously make an effort to explain its actions and not hide behind the usual bellicose nationalistic statements.

- Do you think there is a mutually acceptable compromise that can be had between China, the US, Japan etc, taking into consideration each parties interests? If so what do you think that would look like?
I used to believe that the SCS claims was simply opportunistic historic claims due to potential economic value. If this was the sole reason, then avenue to resolve the disputes are high e.g. joint development. However it is increasingly clear to me the island chains are China's core national interest to build strategic depth. China will not drop such claims short of war. The problem I see is that China's island claims are not sound against competing claims and so has resorted to ambiguity given the alternatives. Therefore I don't see any resolution ahead but the inevitable clash. I think China is playing the wrong cards. Until the island grab, the US do not have a foothold to get involved. Chinese actions have encourage the other claimants and the region closer to the US orbit. Therefor China instead of enhancing its own national interest is winning less friends. Eventually when push come to shove between security and economic interest, the choice of the observing nations would gravitate towards the former. just look at Japan's changed posture on defence for the effect.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
The difference being the intent of the activity which for the USN is a specific mission and plotted course to issue a challenge. I'm sure you will recall the Chinese transit and presence in the arctic was a result of exercises with the Russian Navy. It was not a proclaimed challenge to US territory or interests and indeed reporting on it came from US sources, not the Chinese. So a significant difference in scenarios and intent behind each parties activity. I cannot highlight the distinction any clearer than I have and forgive me but I will not belabor this particular point a fourth time.

I would add that another major difference between the situations is that China does not have anywhere near the tonnage of ships, aircraft and firepower within equivalent range of major US population centres, industrial and economic centres as the US does to China.

It is one thing to sail a small flotilla of ships under the explanation of innocent passage within territorial waters when those few ships do not have any back up within 4000km away, and another thing entirely when sailing ships when there are forward deployed CSGs, airbases filled with stealth fighters, stealth bombers, strike aircraft and a AEW&C and ELINT/SIGINT aircraft many of which are a few hundred km away from the area in question and many of which are also a few hundred more km away from virtually all of a nation's major population, industrial and economic centres.


Therefore, I think whenever we consider how one side may interpret the "threat" or "intent" of a particular action we must not only look at the legality or even intent of the action itself but we must consider the overall strategic picture and force disposition within the theater in which the action is being conducted and which assets, forces, and centres may or may not be under threat.
 

Jeff Head

General
Registered Member
If the world is silent on Japan's action, then China could do the same. It's called what's good for the goose is good for the gander. If the West say China can't do the same just because it is China, then it's might makes right.
Well, there are some significant differences.

Japan is not creating an island...only a marker. No base associated with it.

In addition, folks (Including DiggoSSA)...this is well out into the Philippine Sea...not even close to either the South China Sea which this thread is about...so all of these posts are completely Off Topic and being moved to the Japanese Military News Thread.

If you are looking for the discussion...look there.

DO NOT RESPOND TO THE MODERATION.
 
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