what do you think of the 1942-1944 Yan’an Rectification Movement ? the CCP's important commanders were so free to leave the battle areas to stay for long periods in Yan'an ? they weren’t busy fighting the Japanese ?
抗日戰爭勝利後，韩被任命海南岛防卫司令官。他暗中执行周恩来的指示，保护中國共產黨的琼崖纵队，後任桂系四十六軍軍長，被调往山东与华东野战军作战。1947年萊蕪戰役（又稱吐絲口戰役）期间，他向解放军提供軍事情報，並運用軍長職權延誤軍機，使部隊陷入包圍，並臨時故意將四十六軍，交給該軍三位師長中資歷最淺的188師師長莫敵代理其軍長，造成另一位師長不服，產生混亂、使解放軍一舉消滅46軍以及73軍（前77師）六萬余人，生俘李仙洲，使膠東、魯南的國軍失聯。[3]
Han Liancheng gave victory on a plate to the CCP in that battle. it's well known, in many battles, the CCP developed its strategy and made its plans, using the KMT’s plans as references. that significantly increased the CCP’s chances of victory.
the KMT larger forces’ advantage was often futile because the CCP knew how to make effective use of its lesser forces to attack the KMT’s weaker positions due to the accurate intelligence information.
First, the communist forces were using guerilla warfare. That means small companies of independently commanded units. This places importance on company and regiment commanders, while the strategic commanders decided the overall direction of the campaign. So it is not surprising that the top commanders did not have to be present in the operational areas. This is quite typical of guerilla warfare everywhere.
Second, to take your own example, the PLA was able to wipe out a better equipped, numerically superior foe just by disrupting its top-level command hierarchy. That demonstrates a highly skilled and experienced fighting force.
I don’t deny the CCP’s military competence. the result was because of the complex interacting factors. I am just pointing out the spies' significance.
you earlier pointed out a "CIA report 1948" which stated there was little evidence that the Soviet Union was supplying military aid to the CCP whatever. you may like to read "CIA - Implementation of Soviet objectives in China 1947" which stated there was some evidence that the Soviet Union provided concealed aid to the CCP, and the North Korean troops had joined the Communist army to fight against the Nationalist forces.
if the Communists had 800,000 troops in 1944, that was 1/5 of the Nationalists. if you want to use the argument that the Communists had much lesser troops so they of course fought much fewer battles. if that's the case then they can’t claim to be the main fighting force. if they had the large number of troops then they should have fought some conventional battles against the Japanese. a repeat of Hundred Regiment Battle on the Japanese controlled Jinpu Railway would provide useful contribution toward China’s war efforts. but they fought no notable battles for the last 4 years of the war. are you familiar with the Pan Hannian story ?
Here's a question: where would the communists have gained their military competence if they were not fighting the Japanese? The NRA was fighting the Japanese constantly, so why were the communists so much more combat effective shortly after WW2? Where, in your opinion, did they magically gain this competence?
Having large numbers mean nothing if you don't have the weapons and ammunition to equip them. It is well known that the Eighth Route Army suffered from severe equipment shortage, to the point of one rifle shared among several troops, and each rifle had only a couple of bullets. They had no artillery pieces, and extremely limited amounts of heavy weapons.
You need to stop making straw man arguments and making misleading assumptions. Nobody on this forum has claimed that the communists were the main fighting force.
The communist force grew larger toward the end of the war, but they numbered far fewer during the majority of the war. The Hundred Regiment Battle was the biggest offensive the Eighth Route Army could carry out, and the resulting retaliation decimated them. Mao rightly pointed out that they could not afford another Hundred Regiment Battle, which is why the communists stuck to their guerilla tactics thereafter.
