Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

Zichan

Junior Member
Registered Member
A wild guess here, as a devil's advocate, in favor of Russia's claim.

As I mentioned above, high sea states can significantly impair the ability of ships to launch missiles and fire guns.

What if the Slava fired its S-300 missile, but due to an unfortunate roll of the ship in high sea state the missile impacted the superstructure, fell down on deck and caused a fire? The fire spread and detonated the S-300 missiles deep in the hull, compromising the sea tightness of the ship's hull.
 

gelgoog

Lieutenant General
Registered Member
A fundamental weakness of this "analysis" is the assumption that the ship was operating alone. Even if some of its radar systems were down for scheduled radar maintenance, there would be other ships in the theater to provide cover.
Yes. Supposedly at least one Admiral Grigorovich frigate was operating near the cruiser not that long ago.

And I refuse to get into an argument with Deino about what caused the sinking. It is quite clear the Russians do not want to speculate on the cause yet without further evidence. They know there was an explosion but they do not want to say what caused it without proof and an investigation. And we have no corroborating evidence on the Ukrainian side other than take their word for it. I do not dismiss the possibility it was a cruise missile, a Neptune one even, and I already said as much. But trying to clobber people into accepting the Ukrainian side of the argument as gospel truth is, I think, premature. And I do not like these kinds of false arguments anyway. I posted a link here to an ex-Soviet Navy guy's blog who quite likely knows this stuff better than we do. And he said as much. His theory is it was an AK-130 ammo detonation. And because of (known) malfunctioning sprinkler system of this old ship the fire was not put out and the ship went down eventually. He also thinks a cruise missile strike is unlikely and believes either sabotage or sappers to be more likely. And this is the guy who spends his time glorifying cruise missiles in his books as the end all and bugbear of all surface navies.
 

enroger

Junior Member
Registered Member
Normally the early warning radar onboard would have been able to filter out most of the clutter using MTI processing. and separate fast moving target from it. The thing is that, Earth is not flat while missiles can fly low. The Moskva have Earth working against her. The following is coverage of her radar.

The legend is at lower right of the image. The green circle depicts coverage of her Top Pair radar against target flying at 7 m ASL, Yellow is 10 m while Orange is 40 m, Red 500 m and Blue is conventional aircraft altitude.

in my previous post i said that Neptun may share similar feature as Uran of being able to go sea-skimming as low as 4 m. and i argued against this as when she was attacked the sea state was high about 6-7 where wave might hit the missile. But that doesn't mean the missile can't be set to fly bit higher yet still offer lowest chance of detection. tho i dont really know if such setting exist.

Notice that for sea skimming target, her coverage is -Less- than 50 Km. The earliest opportunity to detect however would rise when the missile "pitch up" to search and lock on target before dive in again back to sea skimming phase. This might occur somewhere in 50 km.

View attachment 87131

The detection range, at least from what i gather from Janes for MR-500 is about 200 Km for fighter sized target. In S-band. Which correspond to RCS of 2 sqm. At the moment i have no model of Uran or Neptun but from my modeling on other type of conventional subsonic missile. RCS as low as 0.048 sqm can be expected in S-band for a small conventional axisymmetric airframe anti ship missile in frontal aspect. Which looks something like this in graphics.

View attachment 87134

Using 4th Root rules for that value of RCS and with the established figure for the Radar yielded detection range of 75.2 Km. But as demonstrated the coverage against sea skimming target is NOT that far. The earliest possible detection range would be less, maybe 50 or 40 Km and only for few seconds as the missile needs only short amount of time to get a lock and fix its INS.

Is that all ? No Her problem is not finished yet. It has another thing working against her namely Path propagation factor. Earth is not only flat but also have soils and waters, These materials AFFECTS propagation of radar wave, other than creating clutter the wave will also interact with the materials and creates interference. If you ever see Range-Height coverage diagram of a radar, you would see that it is lobing like this


View attachment 87135

Target flying at certain altitude may end up being in the "null" of the lobe and thus undetected. Modeling it is complex but there is simple model which takes account on a simple smooth reflective surface which similar as sea-water. The smoothness here is depending on the wavelength of the radar NOT what visually observed. The equation is as follows :

View attachment 87136

The modeling result in an path propagation factor which can then Multiplied by "free space" RCS calculated earlier to yield "Effective RCS" This effective RCS is the RCS of the target taking account of the path propagation factor.

Now let the flight altitude be 50 m and range is some 50 km, The altitude where Neptun probably climb to search for target.

View attachment 87137

The Effective RCS is 0.6 sqm Thus Moskva might get early detection of the missile at that range, But if the missile only takes like few seconds to get a lock and go back to sea skimming phase, the operator would probably considered the missile as false contact or bird.

Once the missile got back into Sea skimming. It essentially undetectable due to Path propagation advantage, as depicted here.

View attachment 87138

Notice at 7 meter sea skimming. The missile's Effective RCS drops so much. She will not stand a chance to detect the missile.

This is why Surface scan radars are mostly in X or C band. as those bands have propagation advantages. It may still lost low altitude contact but can quickly regain it. Something of lower frequencies like S or L doesn't have. They're more suited for high-medium altitude area defense.

Hope my explanation make sense.

This is a very informative post, thank you for the effort. I have a problem with your conclusion though, you're saying due to path propagation factor the missile at 7m height is near invisible to radar. However you need to take into account 1/R^4 gain as target get closer and closer:

Assume your figure radar detect 0.048m^2 at 75km, then the detection distance R corrected by path propagation factor is:

(R/75000)^4 = 16*sin(2pi*7*20/0.1R)^4

solve eqt by plotting the graphs, R is approximately 36km. Feel free to check the result as I may make mistakes

So Slava should still be able to engage the target at 36km from this very simplified calculation.
 

Stealthflanker

Senior Member
Registered Member
This is a very informative post, thank you for the effort. I have a problem with your conclusion though, you're saying due to path propagation factor the missile at 7m height is near invisible to radar. However you need to take into account 1/R^4 gain as target get closer and closer:

Assume your figure radar detect 0.048m^2 at 75km, then the detection distance R corrected by path propagation factor is:

(R/75000)^4 = 16*sin(2pi*7*20/0.1R)^4

solve eqt by plotting the graphs, R is approximately 36km. Feel free to check the result as I may make mistakes

So Slava should still be able to engage the target at 36km from this very simplified calculation.

Ah yeah. my plot however indicates something shorter about 20 km. My plot only includes the F4 factor, and when it reach at least 1 the target is considered "detectable" while value of 0 means the target is gone/no contact.


Early detection-Sband.png

With speed of around 900 km/h like what subsonic missile does it left about 80 seconds of time for reaction. It can be questioned tho whether there would be enough time to engage. e.g slewing the S-300F's radar or to provide the OSA or AK-630's target designation.
 

enroger

Junior Member
Registered Member
Ah yeah. my plot however indicates something shorter about 20 km. My plot only includes the F4 factor, and when it reach at least 1 the target is considered "detectable" while value of 0 means the target is gone/no contact.


View attachment 87140

With speed of around 900 km/h like what subsonic missile does it left about 80 seconds of time for reaction. It can be questioned tho whether there would be enough time to engage. e.g slewing the S-300F's radar or to provide the OSA or AK-630's target designation.

Problem is your plot only consider F4 factor, it does not take into account the fact that return signal gets stronger as target gets closer (the 1/R^4 factor).

Roughly speaking

Radar Return Power = Emitted Power * (Effective RCS / R^4) * (a bunch of constants)

So while F4 factor can reduce effective RCS, shorter distance leads to greater (1/R^4) can compensate the reduction of RCS and give a return signal strong enough to be detected.

Therefore, the question is at what distance will 1/R^4 factor trump F4 factor? From your post we can assume the 0.048m^2 target is detectable at 75km

Let P75 be the return radar power received by the antenna of target 0.048m^2 RCS at 75km in free space

at 38km, F4 = 0.0548 (antenna h = 20m, target h = 7m, wavelength = 0.1m)

Let P36_eff be the F4 factor corrected received power of same target at 38km:

P36_eff = 0.0548 * (75/36)^4 * P75 = 1.03 * P75

Therefore target is detectable at 36km even when its effective RCS is reduced to about 1/18 of its original value by F4
 
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