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ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Ballistic missiles have predictable boost phases. Intercepting them in this phase is near impossible because it would require you to "catch up to" to the missile and will require you to be very close to the launch site. Once the warhead/s are detached, this zone is where it's quite vulnerable as its target/s can be determined with realistic value assessment. US has considerable experience and success with variable of methods to intercept here. On re-entry, multiple warheads could have decoys to demand higher interceptor missile expenditure and they could also maneuvre. Maneuvring at hypersonic speeds makes them FAR more difficult to intercept than conventional AShM. Point is ballistic missiles (contrary to the name) are not simple high school kinematics problems. At least not modern BMs.

Those little improvements are little. Going from 100km range to 300km range and mach 1 to mach 3 (only final phase) in 40 years time is not just little improvement, it's near negligible because counter measures have improved as much. Blanket of lead works well. Tracking can handle far higher speeds. Processing power can handle hundreds incoming probably. Interceptor missiles have better range, P(hit), speed, g limits, vectored vanes etc. So yes, same old method most likely isn't going to work against USN. Need to apply more pressure from multiple points. AShBM is one of those new pressure points to increase and saturate workload.

What's stopping several carrier group's worth of F-35s and supporters along with F-22s from shooting down every single Tu-22? What's stopping the barrage of SM-2s and point defences from intercepting everey single cruise missile fired at the battle groups? The strength of the carrier group is in the air wing. The reality is it's almost impossible to even get close to the battle groups with or without supersonic bombers. Again what is the use of Tu-22s. Give me one realistic scenario where it is useful in a high level conflict which both sides are invested in.

Also it goes without saying that experimenting and testing is different to combat. Tu-22's firing cruise missiles are 100% same combat proven as AShBM. Both are absolute zero real combat experience and are unproven. Cruise missiles and supersonic bombers having existed for decades does NOT make them proven. It only makes them "reliable" as in this platform we understand well and have experience with them for a while in training and very limited combat against hopeless adversaries. Not ever against full USN effort. Both systems and methods have equal theoretical abilities ie both are passed testing while bomber + cruise missile function is more reliable. Now that semantics are sorted, I'm not saying AShBM will work or because it's been successfully demonstrated under test conditions, it will work as desired in combat. I thought that was clear but i suppose more disclaimer needed. It does however add as much credibility as bomber + cruise missile even if it is less reliable simple because it hasn't existed long enough to be called reliable. That is not a fault of the system.

Having AShBM does add another unpredictable dimension to the defence. Bombers and cruise missiles pay for their reliability by being predictable. And like during the Falklands war, the Russians could sell off the secrets to the Americans and help them counter Chinese Tu-22s. One way or another I'm willing to bet money China will not purchase Tu-22 for whatever reason. The idea is the absolute height of idiocy. I will leave sinodefenceforum if they do :p people have my word, just remind me if they do and i'll happily see myself out :)
 
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ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Let's simplify and apply some fair reasoning. Tu-22 is now how old? The supersonic bombers dropping air launched missiles (or anything) is how old? US was and is a leader in both aeronautics (bombers), engines, rockets, missiles, guidance, and military electronic technologies. These are pretty much indisputable facts and quite well known as well as accepted by even the most ardent US haters. Their knowledge of what Russia, China, or anyone can do in bomber + cruise missile tech is deep.

Can it stand to reason that such a sophisticated, well funded, well trained, well armed military force could have ignored such an effective threat against the beef of its naval force? Not just ignore the threat, but ignore it so insolently for 30 years or more? If several dozen or even a hundred modernized and improved Tu-22s launching an assortment of ordinance at a carrier battle group can wipe it out, then the USN is so easy and relatively cheap to defeat. I know this is not what Victor is suggesting, but the USN has had so long to plan, test, and perfect multiple fool proof ways of making this "threat" almost non-existent. Even if we ignore the hundreds of F-35s and supporting aircrafts, those ships sitting on the water, have enough missiles and bullets to defend themselves. That's how far the favour falls in the USN's field. So to even have a slight chance against it, one needs a competent navy with numerous platforms and a couple of curve balls to throw. Adding a 40 year old concept into the mix is a waste of money, waste of time to say the least.
 
D

Deleted member 13312

Guest
Ballistic missiles have predictable boost phases. Intercepting them in this phase is near impossible because it would require you to "catch up to" to the missile and will require you to be very close to the launch site. Once the warhead/s are detached, this zone is where it's quite vulnerable as its target/s can be determined with realistic value assessment. US has considerable experience and success with variable of methods to intercept here. On re-entry, multiple warheads could have decoys to demand higher interceptor missile expenditure and they could also maneuvre. Maneuvring at hypersonic speeds makes them FAR more difficult to intercept than conventional AShM. Point is ballistic missiles (contrary to the name) are not simple high school kinematics problems. At least not modern BMs.
It is not the boost phase that the USN has to worry about, as the missiles launched will very well be based well beyond the reach of even the longest range SAM's as you said. It is the terminal phase that they have to worry about. Every single advantage you attributed to the AShBM can be given to the AShM as well, the AShM can also have decoys, they can also have hypersonic maneuverability and they can also be launched in salvos. Ballistic missiles are not simple high school kinematics problem yes, but that is what makes them so difficult to utilize. Conventional BMs can be off target by miles with a single miscalculation, whereas hypersonic gliders trades a predictable flight path for slower and gradual reentry, which opens up other vulnerabilities

Those little improvements are little. Going from 100km range to 300km range and mach 1 to mach 3 (only final phase) in 40 years time is not just little improvement, it's near negligible because counter measures have improved as much. Blanket of lead works well. Tracking can handle far higher speeds. Processing power can handle hundreds incoming probably. Interceptor missiles have better range, P(hit), speed, g limits, vectored vanes etc. So yes, same old method most likely isn't going to work against USN. Need to apply more pressure from multiple points. AShBM is one of those new pressure points to increase and saturate workload.
CIWS (that blanket of lead) has the best probability of interception, but that is still below 50 % per missile. AA missiles like the SM-2 has even less probability, sea skimming reduce the range of which radar can track them until they cross the horizon which is with 40km of the ship. Then the ship will only have 40 seconds or less to react when the missiles goes hypersonic. Modern interception missiles have on average 200km range, the SM-6 stands as the outlier but even that will be eclipsed by missiles like the Kh-22M that has a stated range of 600KM, and Mach 3 is an average, average only. We got missiles like the Brahmos that goes at mach 4 to 5. And at no point does an interceptor missile does better Gs than a AShM missile of a same speed and comparable size .You are seriously underestimating the complexities these improvement brings.
AShM missile can be launched from multiple points to overwhelm defense. And again I am not excluding potential assets like torpedoes and AShBM from the mix, in fact I am accepting of them being one of the new pressure points. But it cannot be denies that AShMs still holds the premier spot of both a pressure applier and death stroke.

What's stopping several carrier group's worth of F-35s and supporters along with F-22s from shooting down every single Tu-22? What's stopping the barrage of SM-2s and point defences from intercepting everey single cruise missile fired at the battle groups? The strength of the carrier group is in the air wing. The reality is it's almost impossible to even get close to the battle groups with or without supersonic bombers. Again what is the use of Tu-22s. Give me one realistic scenario where it is useful in a high level conflict which both sides are invested in.

In the same breath, what is stopping several carrier group's worth of F-35s and supporters along with F-22s from shooting down every single reconnaissance platform to deny targeting data to the AShBMs ? What's stopping the barrage of SM-6s and point defences from intercepting every single ballistic missile fired at the battle groups or just simply being constantly mobile to deny a clear target ?That is a luxury that AShBMs do not readily have compared to AShMs, the ability to readily change flight plans in mid air.
There is are several ways to approach a CSG to land a strike but it requires considerable effort. Lets just make the assumption here that Russia is financially capable enough to procure 5th gen fighters at reasonable numbers. Su-57 can fly out to clear out the enemy air cover first, then the bombers can move into to attack. There will be losses yes, but to assume that a strike can be done against such a high value target without lost is sheer optimism bordering on naivety.
 
LOL I'll jump in here:
... Again what is the use of Tu-22s. Give me one realistic scenario where it is useful in a high level conflict which both sides are invested in.

...
but just with a historical perspective which is Soviet long-ranged AShMs-carrying bombers had been a central part of the strategy originating in 1950s meant to 'leapfrog' the Western naval strategy based on CVGBs
off top of my head, around the year of 1990 there had been eight (8) Naval Aviation Regiments, positioned all around the USSR, with Backfires; I'd expect five Squadrons in each = sixty (60) aircraft, each with up to X-22 AShMs ... in short, the point was a saturation attack (possibly using nuclear-tipped missiles)
 
D

Deleted member 13312

Guest
Let's simplify and apply some fair reasoning. Tu-22 is now how old? The supersonic bombers dropping air launched missiles (or anything) is how old? US was and is a leader in both aeronautics (bombers), engines, rockets, missiles, guidance, and military electronic technologies. These are pretty much indisputable facts and quite well known as well as accepted by even the most ardent US haters. Their knowledge of what Russia, China, or anyone can do in bomber + cruise missile tech is deep.

Can it stand to reason that such a sophisticated, well funded, well trained, well armed military force could have ignored such an effective threat against the beef of its naval force? Not just ignore the threat, but ignore it so insolently for 30 years or more? If several dozen or even a hundred modernized and improved Tu-22s launching an assortment of ordinance at a carrier battle group can wipe it out, then the USN is so easy and relatively cheap to defeat. I know this is not what Victor is suggesting, but the USN has had so long to plan, test, and perfect multiple fool proof ways of making this "threat" almost non-existent. Even if we ignore the hundreds of F-35s and supporting aircrafts, those ships sitting on the water, have enough missiles and bullets to defend themselves. That's how far the favour falls in the USN's field.
And for Pete's sake, I was never implying that the Tu-22 should be fielded in its current form for the future. Upgrades to it like increased payloads, better missiles, better range, better avionics and a certain level of stealth can make it go along way.
And again, old does not make something impotent. If that be the case then the bullet would have been stone age level barbarism considering how long its concept has been around. A thing is only obsolete if something that is conclusively better comes along to replace it. And as far as evidence and facts shows, the concept of the AShBM is in no way even near to replacing the AShM in its current form. You can deny this fact until the chickens come home but it will not change one iota.
And it is not like the USN had ignored the threat land based bombers had posed both during the Cold War and now, the F-14 as a designed with a great deal of the Tu-22s/Tu-160s in mind. They are by no means "insolent" if we follow your definition. Even today, studies are made highlighting the dangers of modern AShM fielded by Russia against US naval ships.
Plus "several hundred" Tu-22s are not cheap. The total price of this fleet would be the equivalent of the total defense budget of some nations. Even a mere several dozen Tu-22s fully modernized and loaded would cost up into the billions so stop this nonsensical claim.
And if AShMs fired from bombers are so obsolete as you claim, then why on earth is the PLAN still modernizing its bomber fleet to carry such weapons. And plans to field new bombers with such capabilities. Such actions defy every fiber of logic in your argument.

So to even have a slight chance against it, one needs a competent navy with numerous platforms and a couple of curve balls to throw. Adding a 40 year old concept into the mix is a waste of money, waste of time to say the least.
And somehow one can fire a AShBM off into the blue and hope that it hits a GSG ? Without a competent network of intelligence gathering and planning that rivals the requirement of a navy or air force of comparable capability ?
 
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LOL I'll jump in here:
but just with a historical perspective which is Soviet long-ranged AShMs-carrying bombers had been a central part of the strategy originating in 1950s meant to 'leapfrog' the Western naval strategy based on CVGBs
off top of my head, around the year of 1990 there had been eight (8) Naval Aviation Regiments, positioned all around the USSR, with Backfires; I'd expect five Squadrons in each = sixty (60) aircraft, each with up to X-22 AShMs ... in short, the point was a saturation attack (possibly using nuclear-tipped missiles)
now recalled, located Jan 8, 2014
... I just read (again) in a credible source that at the time of the breakdown of the USSR, just at the territory of Ukraine there were 1240 AS-4 "Kitchen" anti-ship missiles with as many as 416 nuclear warheads ready for them!)
 

ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
Hi,

Off course they did---. They had the israeli engineering helping them in all fields.

CAC had no experience with canard type frontline aircraft---. Suddenly from our of nowhere they manufacture two aircraft---the J10 and the J20---both very successful ventures---.

Miracles simply don't happen in the world of mechanical engineering if you do not have a history of manufacturing tier 1 product behind you.

It is not the boost phase that the USN has to worry about, as the missiles launched will very well be based well beyond the reach of even the longest range SAM's as you said. It is the terminal phase that they have to worry about. Every single advantage you attributed to the AShBM can be given to the AShM as well, the AShM can also have decoys, they can also have hypersonic maneuverability and they can also be launched in salvos. Ballistic missiles are not simple high school kinematics problem yes, but that is what makes them so difficult to utilize. Conventional BMs can be off target by miles with a single miscalculation, whereas hypersonic gliders trades a predictable flight path for slower and gradual reentry, which opens up other vulnerabilities


CIWS (that blanket of lead) has the best probability of interception, but that is still below 50 % per missile. AA missiles like the SM-2 has even less probability, sea skimming reduce the range of which radar can track them until they cross the horizon which is with 40km of the ship. Then the ship will only have 40 seconds or less to react when the missiles goes hypersonic. Modern interception missiles have on average 200km range, the SM-6 stands as the outlier but even that will be eclipsed by missiles like the Kh-22M that has a stated range of 600KM, and Mach 3 is an average, average only. We got missiles like the Brahmos that goes at mach 4 to 5. And at no point does an interceptor missile does better Gs than a AShM missile of a same speed and comparable size .You are seriously underestimating the complexities these improvement brings.
AShM missile can be launched from multiple points to overwhelm defense. And again I am not excluding potential assets like torpedoes and AShBM from the mix, in fact I am accepting of them being one of the new pressure points. But it cannot be denies that AShMs still holds the premier spot of both a pressure applier and death stroke.



In the same breath, what is stopping several carrier group's worth of F-35s and supporters along with F-22s from shooting down every single reconnaissance platform to deny targeting data to the AShBMs ? What's stopping the barrage of SM-6s and point defences from intercepting every single ballistic missile fired at the battle groups or just simply being constantly mobile to deny a clear target ?That is a luxury that AShBMs do not readily have compared to AShMs, the ability to readily change flight plans in mid air.
There is are several ways to approach a CSG to land a strike but it requires considerable effort. Lets just make the assumption here that Russia is financially capable enough to procure 5th gen fighters at reasonable numbers. Su-57 can fly out to clear out the enemy air cover first, then the bombers can move into to attack. There will be losses yes, but to assume that a strike can be done against such a high value target without lost is sheer optimism bordering on naivety.

Well first off yes AShM can employ similar decoys but they don't come in from the top and they don't come in at mach 7+. Intercepting top attacks are harder due to kinetic energy cost and range limits. Lateral intercepts are always faster speed and range. Conservation of energy law. So not entirely equal threats. Yes mastering BMs control is FAR more difficult but if they got it working, hey they got it working? jammers are at most as effective against BMs as conventional missiles although realistically missiles are far easier to jam and disrupt.

About your last paragraph. I agree. Not much stopping it except for a competent well equipped PLAAF that can meet it head on just like a PLAN that can meet USN. Tu-22 does not add value anywhere in these equations. That's the main argument. If PLAAF can meet those F-35s head on and make AShBM launches and targeting possible, they can make Tu-22 flight and launches possible. Also we should remember that AShBM targetig methods are unknown to us. It could just be a satellite, it could be a drone, it could be a whole network with many possible points of failure. Therefore we shoudn't assume it requires a good defence against F-35 and F-22s. But let's assume it does. Tu-22s with those cruise missiles are things USN knows well and can do well enough against. Even new stuff like Mig-35 and Kinzhal or AShBM can at least add new dimensions USN may not know well enough to guarantee safety from. Tu-22s and cruise missiles even if they get into launching ranges, are not going to be posing that much more of a threat. It's just piling things on. The time and money is better spend elsewhere since China has many hundreds of missiles to throw. Adding more is not going to change the outcome. Adding more angles may.
 
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ougoah

Brigadier
Registered Member
I'd like to leave this discussion here. It's already a pointless one. Also off-topic for this thread but we've each had a chance to make our points. Hopefully mine were well expressed enough to make readers understand my perspective.
 
D

Deleted member 13312

Guest
Well first off yes AShM can employ similar decoys but they don't come in from the top and they don't come in at mach 7+. Intercepting top attacks are harder due to kinetic energy cost and range limits. Lateral intercepts are always faster speed and range. Conservation of energy law. So not entirely equal threats. Yes mastering BMs control is FAR more difficult but if they got it working, hey they got it working? jammers are at most as effective against BMs as conventional missiles although realistically missiles are far easier to jam and disrupt.
First off, no that's not how it works. Just because you get a concept working does not mean it can suddenly be thrust into the real world. Getting a BM to hit a stationary target on a test site is one thing, getting it to work in a modern combat environment with jamming, missile defenses and constant targeting updates is a whole other kettle of fish.
Having AShMs coming in low and from the side is actually an advantage because 1) They can avoid radar detection until the last moment and 2) Most long range AA missiles fare poorly against sea skimming targets. Top attacks has the advantage of kinetic energy and range, but they also cannot hide from enemy detection at all.

About your last paragraph. I agree. Not much stopping it except for a competent well equipped PLAAF that can meet it head on just like a PLAN that can meet USN. Tu-22 does not add value anywhere in these equations. That's the main argument. If PLAAF can meet those F-35s head on and make AShBM launches and targeting possible, they can make Tu-22 flight and launches possible. But Tu-22s with those cruise missiles are things USN knows well and can do well enough against. Even new stuff like Mig-35 and Kinzhal or AShBM can at least add new dimensions USN may not know well enough to guarantee safety from. Tu-22s and cruise missiles even if they get into launching ranges, are not going to be posing that much more of a threat. It's just piling things on. The time and money is better spend elsewhere since China has many hundreds of missiles to throw. Adding more is not going to change the outcome. Adding more angles may.
This is the key error to your argument:
1)The USN has never professed a complete deterrence from AShMs, in fact they have consistently highlighted the threat it poses and their limitations in facing them.
2) While the USN may not know enough of the AShBM, they do know enough to know that such a system cannot function efficiently without the supporting systems and that such systems are still capable of being defeated.

Firing a hundred AShMs at a CSG can very well get what the attack force wants. The decimation or at the very least the crippling of the fleet in question.
 
sounds like you guys were talking Dong-Feng AShBM ... from what I figured, the main challenge would be for the reentry vehicle to acquire the target to be hit (moving relatively fast), but what do I know LOL
 
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