Russian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

RUSSIA/EAST ASIA: Growing presence?

SUBJECT: The evolution of Russia's East Asia policy.

SIGNIFICANCE: The importance of East Asia in Moscow's foreign
policy has risen along with its determination to use arms sales
and energy diplomacy to project its regional influence. This
policy reflects a more confident Russia, willing and able to
become more actively involved in a region that offers
opportunities for the realisation of Moscow's great power
aspirations.

ANALYSIS: Russia, in either its tsarist or its Soviet
incarnations, was rarely a full-fledged East Asian power, although
it traditionally maintained a regional presence. The internal
turmoil of the early post-Soviet years, combined with erratic and
incoherent foreign policy under former President Boris Yeltsin,
was symptomatic of Russia's 'declining power' status overall,
including in East Asia. A discernibly more East Asia-oriented
policy emerged in 1996, after Yevgeny Primakov took over as
foreign minister and later prime minister. Yet it was not until
recently that Moscow was able to add substance to its great power
rhetoric. This has been due to:

-- a growing economy buoyed by rising oil prices;

-- a growing interest on the part of some East Asian states to
diversify their political and economic relations, as well as
energy supplies;

-- a more active, coherent and pragmatic foreign policy
approach under President Vladimir Putin; and

-- the consolidation of strategic resources under state control
both for domestic and foreign policy purposes (see CISDB,
February 14, 2006, I.).

Eurasian identity. Policy statements towards East Asia emphasise
Russia's unique Eurasian identity, its geographical position and
geopolitical role. However, the Eurasian identity is frequently
used instrumentally, to secure recognition as a great power with a
right to participate in East Asian affairs. Moscow expects to be
admitted to regional structures, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum, the Association of South-east Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Regional Forum and the 'ASEAN plus three' East Asian
summits. Yet Russia's dual identity has hampered its
participation in EU Asia-Europe meetings, whose member states have
tended to regard Russia as neither European nor Asian.

Balanced policy. Russia's official policy calls for a balanced
approach to relations with both the East and the West, with equal
weight accorded to each. For much of the Yeltsin period,
relations with East Asia remained reactive, subject to relations
with the West. Overtures towards China, for example, were in part
based on Russia's dissatisfaction with the United States. NATO's
bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, and Washington's plans to abrogate
the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and build national and
theatre missile defence systems prompted concerted opposition from
Moscow and Beijing.

The outlook of much of the country's foreign policy elite remains
Western-centric, and relations with East Asia are still calculated
on the basis of progress made in Russia's relations with the West.
Nonetheless, growing segments of the elite now perceive East Asia
as significant in and of itself:

-- The military-industrial complex regards East Asia as an
important source of revenue.

-- Energy firms seek to establish themselves in the booming
East Asian market.

The Kremlin has encouraged the projection of Russia's influence
through arms and energy sales (see OADB, July 6, 2006, III.),
adding to the notion that the political elite is increasingly
willing to play an active role in East Asia. At the same time,
Moscow has occasionally used its energy policy towards East Asia
as a warning to Europe that it will acquire 'security of demand'
by supplying other regions.

Economic integration. Russia aspires to become part of East
Asia's dynamic economic growth. Economic integration is seen as
particularly important for the development of the Russian Far East
(RFE). In one initiative, Putin has advocated the use of Russia
as a 'land bridge' between Europe and Asia for the transit of
goods. This would help develop the RFE and strengthen Russia's
territorial integrity. Linking up the Trans-Siberian and
Trans-Korean railways could promote intra-Korean reconciliation
and enhance Russian influence on the peninsula. However, North
Korean suspicion and the underlying instability on the peninsula
have so far hampered implementation of the project.

Russia often understands economic integration with East Asia on
its own terms: reaping economic benefits without making sacrifices
in return:

-- Fortress mentality. The 'fortress mentality', still
prevalent among the federal and regional authorities, has
delayed the country's opening to foreign economic
activities. Russia's difficult investment climate has
undermined potentially significant investments from Japan
and South Korea, while fears of Chinese demographic
expansion have hampered the use of Asian labour for the
development of the depopulated RFE. Putin and other senior
officials have acknowledged the RFE's demographic problem,
but have until now failed to formulate a more inclusive
immigration policy, preferring instead to try to attract
ethnic Russians from the CIS (see CISDB, March 3, 2006, I.).

-- Projecting influence. Growing arms sales and energy
supplies will enhance Russia's economic role and influence
in East Asia, providing Moscow with some levers of influence
at the bilateral and regional level. Arms sales to China,
in particular, have been highly lucrative, though some
officials remain wary of a potential Chinese threat.
Moscow's drawn-out indecisiveness regarding the route of the
'Eastern pipeline' is in part an attempt to play off China
and Japan against each other, aimed at extracting maximum
political and economic benefits (see OADB, May 12, 2006,
IV.).

Multipolarity. Russia's advocacy of a multipolar world order has
become an element of its foreign policy. The implicit aim of this
policy is to act in concert with other powers to oppose a
US-dominated 'unipolar' world order. In this, it converges with
China, which has similar aims. However, Russia's strategic
calculations of maintaining multipolarity in East Asia are
complicated by:

-- the rise of China;

-- the possibility of Japan's remilitarisation;

-- the ASEAN factor; and

-- potential conflicts on the Korean peninsula and over Taiwan.

Maintaining status quo. Although the regional balance of power
may be precarious, Moscow has an interest in preserving it.
Maintaining status quo would help Russia pursue its own internal
development and play the role of a regional balancer, mobilising
whatever influence it still has in East Asia. Moscow recognises
that it cannot guarantee regional security alone, but opposes
actions that could destabilise the existing regional balance and
prompt an arms race. For instance, it fears that the
strengthening of the US-Japanese alliance and plans to deploy
theatre missile defence systems could provoke China to build up
nuclear arms to the extent that would place Russia at a strategic
disadvantage.

Strategic diversity. Russia's East Asia policy has been
predominantly Sino-centric, given China's long border with Russia,
its immense size and growing power. The Putin government
recognises the need to diversify Russia's strategic relations with
East Asian (and South-east Asian) states; and Japan (and India in
broader Asia) is seen as Russia's main partner to balance out
Russia's East Asia policy. However, the Kurils territorial
dispute will continue to mar relations, as demonstrated by the
flaring of tensions last month following the shooting of a
Japanese fisherman by Russian border guards.

CONCLUSION: Russia aspires to play a great power role in East
Asia, based not so much on its military might but on its growing
political and economic weight. Energy will become an increasingly
important foreign policy tool in the region, but its effective use
will depend on Russia's ability to unlock its vast East Siberian
reserves.

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By Sebastian Alison
Sept. 7 (Bloomberg) -- A fire on a Russian nuclear
submarine killed two members of the crew, Interfax said, citing
the information department of the country's Northern Fleet.
The fire, which broke out at about midnight last night,
posed no threat of nuclear pollution, Interfax said. The
emergency system to protect the ship's nuclear reactor had
worked and the submarine is returning to base, Interfax said.

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Finn McCool said:

Popeye, I would not be suprised if that situation turned into a real conflict in coming months or years. Georgia-Russia realtions have been deteriorating for a long time.

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bd popeye said:

Russians are protesting Georgian presence in Russia.

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Finn McCool said:

Sure its not the other way around? I didn't think there was a Georgian presence in Russia. But there is a Russian military presence in Georgia, obviously protecting the seperatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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