Russian President Vladimir Putin is to approve the weapons program for 2007-2015 in the coming days. Its places priority on naval strategic forces. Twice the amount of funds are being allotted to the construction of nuclear submarines as to shipbuilding. This is the continuation of a tendency in recent years that has brought the Russian shipbuilding industry to a state where it cannot even produce small military craft on schedule, never mind large-scale projects.
Missile Kings
Nuclear submarines have long been the love of the Russian military. Even with a shortage of floating forces, the Defense Ministry insistently favors submarines in budgeting. In the 2006 state defense order, about 8 billion rubles were allotted to the construction of nuclear submarines, while shipbuilding received 4 billion rubles. Minister Vladislav Putilin, deputy chairman of the Military Industrial Commission told Kommersant that the construction of five missile-bearing nuclear submarines in planned in the next nine years. They will be 995-Borei models and carry new Bulava 30 missiles.
There is some doubt about how realistic those plans are. The lead ship in the Borei project, the Yury Dolgoruky, was laid down on November 2, 1996, and was supposed to be launched in 2002. Other craft, submarines whose construction was frozen in the mid-1990s, were cannibalized to speed up the process. Nonetheless, the Yury Dolgoruky is still in the wharves at Sevmashpredpriyatie, were it is estimated to be about 60-percent complete.
Sevmashpredpriyatie general director Vladimir Pastuykhov said that be prepared to be taken out of the wharf this year. A month ago, chief commander of the Russian Navy Adm. Vladimir Masorin promised that the Yury Dolgoruky would be in the Northern Fleet and combat-ready by 2008.
Other Boreis have fared no better. A second one, called the Alexander Nevsky, was laid down at Sevmashpredpriyatie on March 19, 2004, and on the same date this year, a third Borei, the Vladimir Monomakh, was laid down there. They are to go into service in 2009 and 2011, but not even the Navy is entire certain that that is possible. Nonetheless, another Borei will be started next year. In the industry, the reason for the delay in the completion of the craft is considered a lack of state funding. Bureaucrats hotly deny that.
“Costs are rising needlessly,” Putilin said. “The price of the third ship from the 955 is several times greater than that of the first. While the ships are being built, the enterprise lives of them, a long-playing order is profitable and turning out the ship is death. So the submarines may be under construction for eternity.”
While construction of the Boreis is being drawn out, testing of the Bulava 30 missile is also proceeding at a leisurely pace. The TK208 model nuclear submarine Dmitry Donskoi was modernized at Sevmashpredpriyatie under Project 941UM so that it could be used for test launches. It now occasionally goes into the North Sea from Severodvinsk and launches Bulavas. There have been four such tests so far. Masorin says that the test program should be completed in 2007, when the first Borei is to be ready. But monetary problems may affect the testing of the Bulavas as well. “The Bulava missile is very expensive, therefore we will try to optimize testing and reduce the maximal number of launches,” Masorin has said. Putilin has stated that preparations are already being made for the mass production of the Bulava 30, and 5 billion rubles will be allotted form the state budget for that purpose.
The multipurpose Severodvinsk nuclear submarine program, being built under the 855-Yasen Program, is in no better shape. The craft was to carry eight launching devices with 24 P-100 Onyx high-precision stealth anti-ship cruise missiles. It was laid down on the Severodvinsk at Sevmashpredpriyatie on January 22, 1993, with a completion date of 2000. However, practically no funds have been allotted for it in the 2006 state defense order, so the future of the project is in question. Originally, the military planned to build another six of the craft. They were to receive a significant portion of the non-nuclear deterrence – the submarine was to be the “aircraft carrier killer.” At present, the Defense Ministry does not consider it necessary to invest in more Yasens and prefers to concentrate its finances on the Boreis.
Big Boats and Little Boats
On December 26, 1997, the lead ship of the fourth generation of the St. Petersburg series of non-nuclear submarines of the 677 Lada Project developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Naval Equipment was laid down at the Admiralty Wharves in St. Petersburg. However, due to delays in supplies of new models of equipment and weapons by a number of ancillary suppliers, it did not remain in its pilings for long. Data from the Audit Chamber show that costs of components for the St. Petersburg rose by 180 percent between 1997 and 2002, and the costs of weapons for it tripled.
The lead Lada was to be set afloat in 2003 for the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, but the launch occurred in 2004. In 2006, 450 million rubles were allotted for its completion so that it could be handed over to the fleet. A number of its operational systems have yet to be completed, such as the hydroacoustic system and, according to unofficial sources, the tactical data system. “Now we are several years short on time to bring the product to completion, so it will be delivered and then we will complete it jointly with the fleet under our management,” Rubin head Igor Spassky told Kommersant.
Similar problems have been encountered with other submarine projects. The first Guard corvette (that is the classification of a small patrol craft in older military terminology) was laid down at the Northern Wharf in St. Petersburg in 2001, followed by one in 2003 and another in 2005. A fourth is to be laid down in the fourth quarter of this year. The corvettes are being built for the Baltic Fleet. Last December, the Amur Shipbuilding Plant won a tender to build one for the Pacific Ocean Fleet and was supposed to lay it down on June 30.
Project 20380 was called “a corvette for the 21st century” in the press. The naval command called it an undetectable craft with the latest stealth-technology weaponry. But experts had questions about Project 20380 from the very beginning. In particular, it was not clear what function it was to serve. The craft have an obvious anti-ship design that the naval command intended as a full replacement for the old patrol vessels of the Northern and Pacific Fleets that cover the areas where nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles enter and depart. The only opponent that could realistically threaten the Russian nuclear missile carriers is the United States, whose floating and flying forces are many times greater and considered the main strike force against carrier aviation. Corvettes would be powerless against them.
The Project 20380 corvettes are planned for use in the Baltic and Black Seas as well, where their anti-ship mission is completely unrealistic. There the corvettes will face an opponent with a strike force of light, fast units of floating vessels with a threat of mines. The will operate under conditions of superior airpower on the opponent's side. The craft are intended to use their missiles in battles with groups of small combat boats and with large warships, to strike targets on land with their missiles and fend off mass attacks of anti-ship missiles and air strikes and to mine the waters. Experts doubt that Project 20380 corvettes will be capable of realizing any one of those tasks. They have weak propulsion, relatively weak missiles, no chance of hitting targets on land, little capacity for setting a serious quantity of mines and poor antiaircraft defenses. A recent publication under the editorship of Boris Kuzyk, former head of the Northern Wharf who had extensive experience with the construction of corvettes, states, “The construction of new corvettes using outdated weapons (developed 20 years ago), while the naval fleet has a large quantity of similar vessels that need only repairs and remodeling, is surprising.”
Eternal Projects
Independent experts examining military shipbuilding in recent years have concluded that the Russian shipbuilding industry is incapable of building even small craft on schedule. The patrol boat The Unapproachable was laid down for the Baltic Fleet in 1988 at the Yantar plant in Kaliningrad under Project 11540. It was the second ship in its series. The first, The Undaunted, was built between 1987 and 1993. The second ship, renamed Yaroslav the Wise in 1995, has not been completed in 18 years, although it is 80-percent ready.
In 2006, the Defense Ministry allotted Yantar 1.2 billion rubles, of which 1 billion rubles were to go to the construction of the Yaroslav the Wise. To keep its construction costs down, it was reclassified from large anti-ship vessel (a first-rank ship) to patrol vessel (second-rank ship). Trials of it are scheduled for 2007 and delivery for 2008. The Russian Navy will thus receive a ship that has long been out-of-date.
The patrol boat Novik was laid down at Yantar on July 27, 2997, under Project 12441 Grom. Chief commander of the Russian Navy at the time Adm. Felix Gromov also called the Novik “the ship of the 21st century.” However, after spending 2.5 billion rubles on the construction of the ship, it was abandoned in 2001 due to a number of insurmountable technical problems. Now that the Ministry of Defense has budget funds for it, it has been decided to complete the ship, which has been renamed Borodino, as a training vessel.
Another small patrol boat, the Project 11660 Gepard, was developed by the Zelenodolsk Project Design Bureau in the early 1980s. The lead ship was laid down at the Zelenodolsk plant in 1988 and its skeleton was disassembled in 1989 in the course of military cutbacks.
In 1992, the Russian government ordered four patrol boats of a simplified Project 11661 Gepard-1 design for export. But they found no customers for them and the Navy criticized the design for its low ratio of weapon load to water displacement. Thanks to the efforts of the government of Tatarstan, an even more simplified version was built for the Caspian Fleet and called the Tatarstan.
Adm. Masorin has promised a second ship for the Caspian Fleet in 2007, the Dagestan. In the 2006 state defense order, 500 million rubles have been allotted for its construction. Attempts were made to sell the two skeletons at the Zelenodolsk plant to the Federal Border Service, but now a buyer for them is being sought in Vietnam.
The state of affairs is similar for the construction even still lighter craft. A Project 02668 minesweeper was laid down at the Sredne-Nevsk shipbuilding plant in St. Petersburg in 2000. A Project 10750 harbor minesweeper is also being built there. The former is to be delivered in 2010, and the delivery date of the latter is unknown.
In the last state weapons program, instituted in 2000, there was no serial procurement of military technology. In the new program, the basic expenses go for the equipping of the army, including the fleet, with new-model weapons. However, it is not yet known how that will affect the floating forces. If even three or four nuclear missile carrying submarines will be completed more-or-less on schedule, it will be insufficient.
Naval Defense
There are about 50 large surface ships now in the Russian naval fleet. That is one aircraft carrier, four Project 1144 and 1164 missile cruisers (with two more Project 1144 cruisers laid up), ten Project 956 destroyers, 12 large antisubmarine ships and 25 large amphibious ships. Not all of them are combat-ready. Some of them are under repair or awaiting major overhauls.
No new vessels larger than frigates are expected to be added to the naval forces before 2010 or 2011. The lead frigate of Project 22350 was laid down at the Northern Wharf on February1, 2006. Its completion date was announced as 2009, but it already looks as though it will be finished in 2011. Only 100 million rubles was allotted in the 2006 state defense order for it.
There are 45 nuclear submarines and 20 diesel submarines in the Russian fleet. On paper, the fleet includes three Project 941 nuclear strategic missile carrying submarines. But the Dmitry Donskoi is a test pad for the Bulava missile and cannot carry out real military missions. The Severstal missile carrier is under renovation and the Arkhangelsk has no missiles. As a result, the main nuclear deterrent is six Project 667BDRM missile carrying submarines, one of which is under renovation, and six Project 667BDR vessels. The Russian Navy also has nine Project 959A submarines (two of which are under renovation) with anti-ship missiles and 21 Projects 971, 945 and 671RTMK nuclear torpedo submarines, of which at least six are under renovation.
Of the 20 Project 636, 877 and 641B diesel submarines, only 12 are actually combat-ready. In spite of Adm. Masorin's statements that “Russia will fully update its nuclear submarine fleet by 2010,” the best-case scenario is most likely that there will be five or six Project 667BDRM ballistic missile carrying nuclear submarines and one or two new Project 955 submarines equipped. Taking the retirement of vessels into account and the guaranteed delays in the launch of new ones, the total number of submarines will be reduced to 35-40.
Alexandra Gritskova, Konstantin Lantratov
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