The Georgian Army is still basically a conscript force, as of course is the Russian Army; but "conscript" versus "volunteer" comparisons can be misleading, it's the quality of leadership, discipline, and training that is the basis of "professionalism". Conscript" and "Volunteer" do not automatically translate into inferior and superior, respectively. It takes many months of recruit/basic training (ie. for Infantry, at least 5 or 6 - the Russians give theirs only 30 days) just to get a recruit properly ready for service in a unit, and then it still takes two or three years for a simple soldier to fully master his trade; NCOs and officers take many years to mature. Even so, few Armies really get combined-arms warfare right, especially at the tactical level. Many Armies figure on at least 4 months of Unit- and Formation-level training to reach basic competency in combined-arms operations, preferably more; really, they need two or even three times amount of time just to get the basics down pat, never mind really become masters of combined-arms warfare. The 58th Army had gotten at least 3 or 4 months before war broke out, and the Georgians next to none. Moreover, the Russians, being rather clever in their own way, try to do an end-run around the difficulties of achieving tactical mastery by concentrating on the operational level of war and just going for the bare-bones lowest-common denominator necessities at the tactical level; it worked against the tactically superior Germans in WWII, and they've emphasized it ever since.
Both Armies were still essentially Soviet in substance as well as form, with rigid command and control, discouragement of personal initiative, and very formal control of information. The Soviet system also tries to create tactical predictability through the simplest tactics executed by the simplest means in order to produce critical mass multiplied by velocity; it is at the operational level of war, where all ways and means (tactics, intelligence, psychological/information warfare, special operations, etc.) are brought together to achieve the political object, that the Soviet system excells. Western Armies try to excell at the tactical level, but have tended to have some trouble at the operational level; and when they do get it right, they tend to copy off the Russian approach (the German approach to operational art has been too difficult for most Western Armies to really emulate).
The Russian 58th Army also has a fair bit of warfighting experience, both conventional and unconventional, mainly in Chechnya. It has also enjoyed being able to engage in large-scale conventional warfare exercises starting back in the Spring; the Georgians have received comparatively little training (and much of it COIN-related for use in both Iraq and against Chechen guerrillas at home), perhaps aside from some combat support and SF units. Simply put, the Russians were more or less ready for war and the Georgians weren't. But as Utelore notes, the Georgians managed to not only withdraw the bulk of their force to the vicinity of Tblisi after having been defeated in and around Tshkavili, but indeed to get probably most of their heavy stuff (armour and artillery) out as well. The Russians didn't advance on Tbilisi for a reason, even though their ultimate objective was the removal of the present Georgian Government. We can argue over and speculate on whether or not Moscow considered the risks (military, political, etc.) involved in militarily overthrowing the Georgian Government to be too high, or not, but the only thing materially stopping them was the withdrawn and re-grouped Georgian Army around Tblisi. Given that the Russians continue to demand the removal of the present Georgian Government (and not without some justification given the events in South Ossetia), and are even threatening to occupy the Adjara capital of Batumi (and the last Georgian "major" entry port for bulk supplies), it seems only a matter of time before the Georgian Government is throttled one way or the other. Unless the US or NATO really make this a test of wills with the Russians a la Berlin 1948 or 1961.
Both Armies were still essentially Soviet in substance as well as form, with rigid command and control, discouragement of personal initiative, and very formal control of information. The Soviet system also tries to create tactical predictability through the simplest tactics executed by the simplest means in order to produce critical mass multiplied by velocity; it is at the operational level of war, where all ways and means (tactics, intelligence, psychological/information warfare, special operations, etc.) are brought together to achieve the political object, that the Soviet system excells. Western Armies try to excell at the tactical level, but have tended to have some trouble at the operational level; and when they do get it right, they tend to copy off the Russian approach (the German approach to operational art has been too difficult for most Western Armies to really emulate).
The Russian 58th Army also has a fair bit of warfighting experience, both conventional and unconventional, mainly in Chechnya. It has also enjoyed being able to engage in large-scale conventional warfare exercises starting back in the Spring; the Georgians have received comparatively little training (and much of it COIN-related for use in both Iraq and against Chechen guerrillas at home), perhaps aside from some combat support and SF units. Simply put, the Russians were more or less ready for war and the Georgians weren't. But as Utelore notes, the Georgians managed to not only withdraw the bulk of their force to the vicinity of Tblisi after having been defeated in and around Tshkavili, but indeed to get probably most of their heavy stuff (armour and artillery) out as well. The Russians didn't advance on Tbilisi for a reason, even though their ultimate objective was the removal of the present Georgian Government. We can argue over and speculate on whether or not Moscow considered the risks (military, political, etc.) involved in militarily overthrowing the Georgian Government to be too high, or not, but the only thing materially stopping them was the withdrawn and re-grouped Georgian Army around Tblisi. Given that the Russians continue to demand the removal of the present Georgian Government (and not without some justification given the events in South Ossetia), and are even threatening to occupy the Adjara capital of Batumi (and the last Georgian "major" entry port for bulk supplies), it seems only a matter of time before the Georgian Government is throttled one way or the other. Unless the US or NATO really make this a test of wills with the Russians a la Berlin 1948 or 1961.
