Arguments against the arms budget point out (rightly so) that if Taiwan puts all of its defense eggs into arms that will not be deployed until the distant future (Confirmed to be at least 2010 or after) there is a disturbing chance that they will not be relevant in the event that they are actually needed (Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense and the DPP’s (the current ruling political party) Department of Chinese Affairs (2003), all unanimously predicted that between 2006 and 2010 the military balance between Mainland China and Taiwan will tip against Taiwan and the potential for war will reach a critical point. ) and also might prevent other more effective purchases from materializing. (Because of cost, among other factors)
Historically, arms purchaes have been solely within the decision-making power of Taiwan's president. However, an arguable point is that since Taiwan is now a democracy (a relatively recent turn of events, arms purchases wise), decisions should be initiated by Taiwan and decided in a democratic matter.
Taiwan's government should strongly reconsider the current arms budget, for the below reasons.
--Taiwan cannot survive in a prolonged arms race with China
--The weapons are not the best suited for defense
--The deal is too fucking expensive
It is still arguable that Taiwan will still need defensive arms considering China's stance on not rejecting use of military force to unite the two countries, so it's obvious that we can't just scrap the idea of buying arms. So what would be a better deal considering the financial situation and effectiveness?
From a purely defensive military standpoint, the submarines (which happen to be the most expensive item on the shopping list) would have to go. US apprehensions regarding capability and America's nuclear submarine-based strategy aside, the main reason would be that as of now it is hard to find a manufacturing country, and the extended delivery team (estimated minimum of at least 8 years) would mean that the submarines wouldn't be around to do the job that they're needed for. Even more discouraging is the probability that they would in fact be of little use against PRC forces.
Using the same concerns, the P-3 anti-submarine aircraft might be considered, but there probably ought to be a reduction in terms of both numbers and (more importantly) price. The current 40 billion NT price tag is far too high for the limited number of aircraft provided. Other defense weapons that could be a better deal for the money include rapid response helicopters, anti-ship mines, land based anti-ship missiles and SAMs are all legitimate useful defensive weapons and should also be taken under careful consideration.
Alternately, the money could also be spent on the strengthening of important military structures, such as airfield runways, fighter shelters, ammo and oil depots, communications, control centers, and other vital military assets. The cost of doing this kind of preparation would be relatively low, but would also serve to strengthen Taiwan's ability to survive a potentially crippling first strike. What's more this money could be spent domestically, helping the economy. (Although this is a lame excuse, as argued by myself against myself on this blog. God I do hate shooting myself in the foot.)
This kind of mindset is more oriented towards "defensive defense" and would arguably be a better direction for Taiwan's government to take.
Now what is the lame sounding "soft power" that I noted in the title, and what does it have to do with Taiwan's future national security?
Soft power encompasses several different but equally important elements. First off, Taiwan is well suited to serve as a bridge among China, Japan, and the US. With its advantageous geographic location, Taiwan can also be a hub for maritime and continental cultures. Something that is somewhat unique and is worthy of mention is the familiarity of the general Taiwanese population towards Chinese, Japanese, and American culture and language, making Taiwan the least disliked member among the China-America-Japan-Taiwan structure. (Albeit 3 big and 1 small)
Other sifnificant attributes to Taiwan's potential "soft power" is its (relatively) well functioning democratic system, free market economy, and arguably liberal society. If Taiwan plays its cards right the economy will flourish for a long time to come.
And most people probably wouldn't disagree that official negotiations between Taiwan and the PRC would probably be more effective in easing cross-strait tensions and improving national security than the procurement of weapons.
Taiwan's future niche depends more on the growing of "soft power", although it is indeed absolutely necessary that Taiwan maintain a certain degree of "hard power" (Which is where the "defensive defense" part comes in. The best route for Taiwan to take in defending against the PRC is to preserve air superiority over the island after surviving a quick and sudden strike, as opposed to anti-amphibious or aerial landing. If the PRC does not have confidence in achieving a quick and painless success in a first strike, the likelihood of one happening diminishes. (Note I say here diminishes as opposed to disappears.)
In conclusion, based on the above thinking, Taiwan's military procurement should not be limited to the 3 items proposed in the 18.3 billion arms package, especially given that the current package is void of immediate practicality. The MND and other qualified defense specialists should explore and consider an appropriate mix if weaponry that is more economical, and pragmatic in the defense of Taiwan.
