Political and Military Analysis on China

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Article 57 of China's constitution stipulates, "The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China is the highest organ of state power." [1]

But this is largely on paper. In reality, state power is in firmly the hands of the Chinese Communist Party. By and large, the NPC, though called China's parliament, is to endorse and, to a certain extent, elaborate policy principles set by the CCP.

Still, in China's political system, the NPC remains a symbol of power and privilege given its constitutional status. From this perspective, who is and is not being named an NPC deputy can often tell us who is in power and/or belongs to the privileged class. Officials in certain positions, such as regional leaders and heads of local legislatures, automatically become deputies to the NPC.

In the era of Mao Zedong, especially during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, there were more non-official deputies to the NPC than there are now, and most of these were model workers, peasants and soldiers, who were considered by the Great Helmsman as the "main revolutionary forces" in the class struggle against the bourgeoisie. For instance, the fourth NPC (1975-78) had 2,885 deputies, 72% of whom were workers, peasants or soldiers.

But today, they have been replaced by the newly rich and famous - entrepreneurs and celebrities, representing vested interest groups emerging in past three decades who benefited from Deng Xiaoping's capitalist-style economic reforms and opening up. In addition, more and more party and government officials in various positions - relevant or irrelevant to lawmaking - have also found their way to becoming NPC deputies.

Before the current NPC opened its annual session on March 5, Bloomberg dispatched a report saying: "The richest 70 members of China's legislature added more to their wealth last year than the combined net worth of all 535 members of the US Congress, the president and his cabinet, and the nine Supreme Court justices."

The net worth of the 70 richest delegates in the NPC rose to 565.8 billion yuan (about US$89 billion) in 2011, a gain of $11.5 billion from 2010, according to figures from the Hurun Report, which tracks the country's wealthy. "That compares [with] the $7.5 billion net worth of all 660 top officials in the three branches of the US government," Bloomberg said.

The income gain by NPC members reflects the imbalances in economic growth in China, where per capita annual income in 2010 was $2,425, less than in Belarus and a fraction of the $37,527 in the US. The disparity points to the challenges that China’s new generation of leaders, to be named this year, faces in countering a rise in social unrest fueled by illegal land grabs and corruption.

"It is extraordinary to see this degree of a marriage of wealth and politics," said Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L Thornton China Center at Washington's Brookings Institution. "It certainly lends vivid texture to the widespread complaints in China about an extreme inequality of wealth in the country now."

Hurun, the Chinese name of Englishman Rupert Hoogewerf, who now lives in Shanghai, is publisher of the Hurun Report magazine about rich Chinese and Chinese luxury consumers.

The current 11th NPC (2008-13) has 2,987 deputies. According to statistics, 70% of them are party or government officials at all levels, and another 20%-plus are board chairman or general managers of large state-owned enterprises or rich private entrepreneurs. Fewer than 10% are intellectuals or working people who have neither official titles nor wealth. [3]

Wang Guixiu, a professor at the Beijing-based Central Party School - the CCP's training center for senior officials - has slammed the current NPC as having degenerated into a "house of representatives of officials and businesspeople".

Outspoken property tycoon Ren Zhiqiang, chairman of Hua Yuan Real Estate Group, also reportedly complained recently that most of those who "have found their way into the NPC are either wealthy or powerful. They are guards of vested interests. The rest are mostly lickspittles. There are only a handful of outspoken deputies, who are placed there to stage a show for the media and public."

No wonder the NPC seems to have turned a deaf ear to public appeals for considering more effective anti-graft legislation such as introducing a Sunshine Law to force officials to publicize their wealth and their families'. Such a law would put them under public supervision, which would severely harm their vested interests. To ask them to enact such a law is like asking them to raise themselves into the air by pulling their own hair.

For the same reason, any proposed reform to increase the representativeness of the NPC, such as allowing more deputies to be directly elected by the people they are supposed to represent (currently most deputies by and large are appointed), is bound to meet strong resistance of the vested-interest groups.

Not long ago, Liu Chuanzhi, chairman of Lenovo Group, who was also a deputy to the 10th NPC (2003-08), expressed his fear that "if right now we had 'one person one vote', then everyone would agree on having high social-welfare benefits and on division of wealth ... There absolutely is such possibility, which then would drag China into an eternal impasse." [4] And Liu is considered a liberal-minded entrepreneur in China!

Clearly, the CCP is not solely to be blamed for reluctance to start political reforms. It is also joined and supported in this by the vested-interest groups outside the party.

In any case, the above-mentioned and similar reports about wealthy NPC deputies have drawn public attention - from another perspective - to this year's annual sessions of the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference: how they would show off their wealth. The NPC and CPPCC always hold their annual sessions concurrently.

Chinese netizens have kept a close watch on the clothes, jewelry, and even footwear of the entrepreneur-deputies and tried to find out their prices. These deputies have not let them down. Some of their "discoveries" follow:

Li Xiaolin, daughter of former Chinese premier Li Peng, who is chief executive officer of Hong Kong-listed China Power International Development, wore a pink Emilio Pucci suit said to be worth 12,000 yuan and a Chanel pearl necklace that was difficult to price. Song Zuying, a popular singer with the People's Liberation Army, wore a Piaget watch worth 400,000 yuan. Xu Jiayin, chairman of Evergrande Real Estate Group, wore a 6,000-yuan waist belt.

All this resulted in the political gathering being joked about as a "show of name-brand goods" or a "wealth-showing-off party".

And it could have become a fashion show or a beauty pageant, too. Female deputies of the Zhejiang delegation to the NPC had planned to show up at the opening of the annual session clad in qipao (also known as the cheongsam or mandarin gown) to show "Oriental-style beauty". But eventually they had to abort this plan because of strong objections (mostly likely from higher authorities) that such a move was unsuitable for such a serious occasion.

It may be true that the NPC tends to be seriously conservative politically, dominated by interest groups. But at least its annual session this year seems to be more delightfully entertaining than ever before.

From The Jamestown Foundation


* Beijing Denies Russion Rumors of Su-35 Purchase; Evaluating China's Intelligence Penetration of Taiwan
* Sino-Indian Border Negotiations: Problems and Prospects
* Coal to Newcastle? Understanding China’s Coal Importing Behavior
* Pivot and Parry: China's Response to America's New Defense Strategy
* The PLA’s Three-Pronged Approach to Achieving Jointness in Command and Control

After reading only the part about the border conflict, I'd say that, although it is quite obviously very angled from the Indian side, it gives a nice summary of recent developments, and was relatively enlightening.

Buy, Build, or Steal: China’s Quest for Advanced Military Aviation Technologies


Although China continues to lag approximately two decades behind the world’s most sophisticated air forces in terms of its ability to develop and produce fighter aircraft and other complex aerospace systems, it has moved over time from absolute reliance on other countries for military aviation technology to a position where a more diverse array of strategies can be pursued. Steps taken in the late 1990s to reform China’s military aviation sector demonstrated an understanding of the problems inherent in high-technology acquisition, and an effort to move forward. However, a decade later it remains unclear how effective these reforms have been. Where are the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and China’s military aviation industry headed? What obstacles must be overcome for China to join the exclusive ranks of those nations possessing sophisticated air forces and aviation industries capable of producing world-class aircraft?


The Empire's Newest New Clothes: Overrating China


China is widely proclaimed as the latest power that will drive the West and especially America into oblivion, but the United States continues to grow economically and demographically. Simultaneously, despite successes, China confronts economic challenges that will slow its expansion and reveal its threat as overrated. Moreover, Chinese leaders are retreating from the free-market reforms that brought success. An economically stable China is more apt to adopt peaceful political reforms, so Washington should seek policies that will benefit its trading partners, including Beijing, as well as itself. America need not assists China out of benevolent altruism. It is simply good business and sound politics to work toward free-market solutions that will keep a merely disagreeable relationship from turning hostile.

China’s Economic Environment: Implications for Military Development


The U.S.-China relationship will be central to international relations in the twenty-first century, as the two great Asia-Pacific powers compete, coexist, and cooperate across the full spectrum of national capabilities. While they share many important interests and are increasingly interdependent, particularly in the economic realm, Beijing and Washington regrettably retain presently-irreconcilable differences regarding important security issues. While this friction can likely be managed, albeit at the cost of tremendous effort and patience on both sides, occasional crises are likely, and conflict cannot be ruled out completely if wisdom and diligence prove insufficient. The best way to avoid conflict is to understand its potential nature and cost. To that end, this four-part series will examine four major issues:

–China’s Near Seas military focus and capabilities

–China’s economic environment and implications for military development

–Chinese energy and resource imports and their potential to drive naval expansion

–China’s conflict triggers and mitigating factors, particularly economic interdependence

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About 20 years ago, Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping headed south from Beijing to Shanghai, where he was delivering a key speech as part of his famous southern tour. This was considered a prelude to the second wave of reforms in China. Following the first wave of reforms, which were launched in 1978, the second wave called for Chinese officials to be bolder and more innovative in pushing China’s development.

The most important point highlighted by Deng was that the market and planned economies were not about choosing capitalism or socialism. From around this time onwards, China embarked on a journey of true market reform.

Since then, the country’s outlook and standard of living has undergone tremendous change. Last year, China’s economy surpassed Japan’s to become the world’s second largest. China’s per capita GDP has also passed $3,000. And even as the outlook for the economies in the United States and Europe remained bleak, many Chinese were still intently focused on luxury items.

And yet, although China weathered the global economic crisis relatively well, there has been one example after another of domestic social unrest. The most notorious was what happened in Wukan in Guangdong Province, where villagers extracted pledges from Communist Party officials to allow local polls to be held in an open manner.

News has travelled fast on social media, such as microblog Weibo, about these developments – faster even, it seems, than the government is able to respond through official state-run media. This is all ultimately tied to the reforms unleashed three decades ago. And it raises the question of whether China can expect even more far-reaching changes as a result of the leadership transition later this year.

With no Deng-like strongman to lead the way, though, the answer looks to be no. Instead, this third wave of reforms will likely be less about economics and more about politics. There are already some indicators of what to expect from the 18th Party Congress scheduled to be held in October.

Certainly, this is a turbulent time, both domestically and internationally. It’s this reality, perhaps, that has prompted a number of senior Communist Party officials to take the unusual step of together calling for political reform. During China’s recent parliamentary sessions, a senior official from Guangdong called for reform led by the party’s leaders, a sentiment echoed by a senior official from Shaanxi.

Meanwhile, a report released by Tsinghua University has highlighted the emergence of China’s social contradictions, and called for a broad political push to remedy the situation. It said that China is caught between the extremes of misguided socialism and crony capitalism. The publication of the report was seen by the media as an effort by some of the country’s elites to push back against the status quo.

A third point on what to expect in China is tied to the international system. The Arab Spring and the mass demonstrations against the rule of Vladimir Putin have undoubtedly worried the Communist Party, and helped it realize that reform is a must. Indeed, although policing of Weibo has been strict, the government hasn’t tried to ban it outright, suggesting at least some flexibility on the issue of change. In the long run, greater freedom of expression, including criticism of the government, will actually encourage and enable the government to improve. An early sign of the acceptance of this reality came recently, when the Communist Party-controlled People’s Daily admitted microblogging is important for promoting social democracy and openness.

A fourth point is that although differences remain within the Communist Party, there’s also some consensus between the various factions, whether they are left-leaning or right-leaning, that some kind of reform – including of governance – is probably necessary. Both sides believe that unless change is implemented, the much-treasured stability could crumble, which would pose a significant threat to the Party’s rule. After all, it’s better to cede some power than have all of it taken away.

Political reform is necessary for China. Over the next five years, if presumed President and Premier Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang can’t achieve a breakthrough, then Chinese society faces a genuine danger of collapse – something that would threaten the huge economic progress that the country has made over the past few decades.

The Emergence of China in the Middle East


During the 9th century, Arab traders regularly plied lucrative maritime routes that connected the Persian Gulf to southern China by way of the Indian Ocean. This commercial activity, which mostly involved jade, silk, and other luxury goods, went on for centuries and became part of what is now known as the Silk Road. In some ways, the world is now witnessing a restoration of that ancient trading relationship between two civilizations—except that oil and consumer goods have replaced jade and silk.

Chinese Military Transparency: Evaluating the 2010 Defense White Paper


The People’s Republic of China (PRC) State Council Information Office released the seventh edition of its biennial defense white paper,
“China’s National Defense in 2010,” on March 31, 2011. This document aims to communicate the latest information on China’s military development, strategy, capabilities, and intentions. China began publishing defense white papers in 1998, partly as a means of increasing transparency in response to regional concerns about the growing capabilities and actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Despite the systematic release of these documents, many of China’s neighbors and other regional powers continue to express concerns
about China’s lack of military transparency. The Chinese maintain that they are becoming more open over time and highlight the importance of transparency about strategic intentions rather than capabilities.

Getting Beyond Taiwan? Chinese Foreign Policy and PLA Modernization


Since the mid-1990s, China’s military modernization has focused on deterring Taiwan independence and preparing for a military response if deterrence fails. Given China’s assumption of U.S. intervention in a Taiwan conflict, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been developing military capabilities to deter, delay, and disrupt U.S. military support operations. The 2008 election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, however, has contributed to improved cross-strait economic and political cooperation and dramatically reduced the
threat of Taiwan independence and war across the Taiwan Strait. Cooperation has included full restoration of direct shipping, flights, and mail across the strait, Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly, regularized cross-strait negotiation mechanisms that have already reached several agreements, and the recent signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement.


Updating the China Model

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It is the biggest scandal to hit China in nearly a decade, but it is much more than that. The fall of Bo Xilai, Communist Party chief of Chongqing (a megalopolis of more than 30 million inhabitants) and member of the Politburo, who was removed from office last Thursday - March 15 - could be the turning point in China's difficult road to political reform.

His removal occurred on the anniversary of the most important "political reform" of ancient Western civilization. On the Ides, the 15th, of March 44 BC, Julius Caesar was murdered in Rome, paving the way for the end of the Republic and the beginning of the Empire.

It is the end of Bo's rule in Chongqing and of the idea he touted, that China could still find inspiration of some sort from the bad old days of Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution. It is concrete evidence that China is really turning the page, as Bo's dismissal came just one day after Premier Wen Jiabao announced the necessity of political reforms.

In fact, in just a few days Hong Kong will experiment with some form of democratic elections, and as that city for decades represented China's ultimate model of economic reforms, it is not unlikely that it will also be its model for political reforms.

The Bo Xilai affair sheds light on the new political dynamic within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which in some ways marks a departure from the political struggles of the past.

The rise of Bo in the first place was a departure from the ordinary path of communist ascent. When he arrived in Chongqing five years ago, he seemed to have reached his pinnacle as a politician. Even his promotion from trade minister to head of Chongqing had been difficult, and each additional step, culminating with his ambition to get into the party's top leadership, the Standing Committee of the Politburo - the nine most powerful politicians in China - seemed impossible. Bo changed the situation, by launching the first political campaign in the history of post-revolution mainland China.

He attacked the mafia gangs that dominated the life of the metropolis, and returned to the "leftist" principles and egalitarian spirit of the Cultural Revolution (the movement launched by Mao Zedong from 1966 to 1976), and recruited and organized a number of intellectuals to advise him . His initiatives were dangerous because they involved actions that had not been previously sanctioned by Beijing. But he had an anchor of safety because in China the conservative group is the "left", and it's hard to attack someone for conservative policies. Even more, he gained support from common people, something that, although not paramount, remains important in Chinese politics. Moreover, anti-mafia campaigns and addressing social inequalities were and are among principles advocated by Beijing.

But he gave them a new relevance, combining them into a kind of modern neo-Maoism, and in so doing he created the "Chongqing model" that at one point seemed destined to spread across the country like wildfire.

The model, however, also included elements that seemed bizarre considering the growth of China over the past 30 years. Private enterprises in Chongqing did not have an easy time - Bo preferred state enterprises and promoted competition between them. As a sign of the new climate, local television carried no commercials.

But the country's growth over the past three decades was driven by private enterprise. Limiting private opportunities in the medium and long terms would stifle China's development, an absolute strategic priority for the people and their leaders.

Also, limiting the development of private enterprises reduces opportunities for social advancement to a single channel: the bureaucracy, which dominates both the government and state enterprises. In the medium and long terms, this would have been catastrophic, because private enterprise is now also a form of social promotion. Many outstanding people, left out of the bureaucracy, would remain cut off and thus could stir up trouble.

In the short term, however, Bo's policies won popular support. In China, ordinary people accept the dominance of the state or its companies, but resent the arrogance of the new rich - those who made a fortune "somehow". Fighting corruption, the mafia, and the new rich became an attractive populist platform in a country with growing social differences and resentment to be fanned, but undermined the very basis of Chinese growth: a state that is small and interferes little in business.

Against this model stood Guangdong, the southern province that encouraged private enterprise and led by Bo's predecessor in Chongqing, Wang Yang. Wang encouraged a growth model that was more liberal, more pro-market, and opposed strong state intervention.

Thus the removal of Bo from Chongqing's government highlights an important aspect of economic policy, because his replacement is Zhang Dejiang, a deputy premier who was in charge of industrial policy and was the Guangdong party secretary before Wang.

In other words, Beijing is stating that the fight against the mafia and efforts to reduce social differences cannot undermine the market and the reforms that further it. On the contrary, the leadership believes that these should be expanded and supported. That is why Bo had to be eliminated, as the political figure who - along with the Chongqing model - had become a threat to the reforms themselves.

However, this decision brings China to a conundrum. Bo was popular, and pro-market political reforms are in some sense dictated against popular sentiment. That is, the liberal system of economy and politics beloved of the West is promulgated in China to some extent against the will of the people. In fact, if there were free elections in Chongqing and Bo could freely campaign, he probably would win.

China faces the problem of demagoguery through democracy, leading to the well-known trade-off in Western systems between short-term gains (in this case, a more equitable system) against long-term advantages (in this case, China's rapid development). This trade-off in the West, when it doesn't find a suitable compromise and balance, can stall political decision-making or fuel regressive policies. In the Chinese case, political reforms may in the short term run up against the will of the majority, as Chongqing already regrets Bo's departure, according to some local observers.

As in the case of Julius Caesar more than 2,000 years ago, the biggest danger is a conservative backlash. The death of Caesar provoked a new civil war in Rome and in the end didn't guarantee the survival of the republic, but instead brought Caesar's nephew, Augustus, to absolute power. In Rome the historical trend led to a dictatorial concentration of power, anticipated by the vicious civil wars before Augustus' rise. Today in China, and in the world, the trend is for liberal and democratic reforms. But this can't protect the country from political backlash, especially since democracy and a backward-looking, leftist populism are closely linked.

The next test for China's political reform - Hong Kong's chief-executive election next weekend - thus becomes crucial as an indication of how the mainland wants to move toward democracy. The selection of three candidates by Beijing can not only be a way to make sure the city government doesn't become the hotbed of opposition to Beijing, but also a way to curb populist tendencies that could undermine the local liberal and pluralistic atmosphere. That seems the ultimate irony, from a superficial perspective - liberal reforms could be imposed against popular, democratic will.

It could also be the lesson to draw from all of this. As economic reforms are creating greater social differences and conflicting interest groups with different agendas, these interests are trying to find a political expression. Although the situations in Chongqing and Hong Kong are different, they are both occasions of following some kind of experiment. As Sun Liping said, there were real issues raised in Chongqing, although the solution offered was deeply unsatisfactory.

This delicate moment of transition will test the maturity of the CCP. For the Chongqing affair to lead to more reform rather than less, the side that trumped the leftists should not gloat, and the leftists should not contest their defeat. A liberal system works only when an ethical agreement underpins it - all parties accept the rules of the game.

No political system is totally fair and square. In the 2000 US presidential election, Al Gore could have pressed ahead with his request to recast the Florida ballots, but this would have undermined America's political system. He gave up and conceded defeat because he cared for his country more than for his political career and because he realized he had too much to lose if he went ahead with his requests.

In a similar way, the Catholic Church differentiates between Francis of Assisi and Martin Luther in their approaches to the unity of the Church. Both were right, Catholic theologians now admit, but when pressed to bow to Rome, the first agreed the second rebelled. At the moment of controversy with the pope, Francis didn't want to break the unity of the Church and thus nuanced his positions; Luther didn't care to uphold the unity of the Church and made his ideas even stronger.

They were two different historical times and with different social and political forces behind them. But the first case, Catholic theologians believe, brought a huge renewal to the Church and Western society, while the second broke apart Western Christianity forever. The interest in and the significance of holding together a system can be more important than affirming one's righteousness.

On the other hand, as Sun Liping underscored, the victor has to recognize the true issues of the defeated agenda. Now, a break in its solidarity is the biggest danger for the CCP, and for a country beloved of stability. This is especially so if, as Wen announced, China is embarking on a difficult voyage in the uncharted waters of political reforms.

One is worried whether a unitary spirit exists in China's politics.

"When asked which of the other two candidates [for the post of chief executive in Hong Kong] he'd vote for, if forced to choose, Mr [Albert] Ho paused. 'Both are unacceptable,' he said. 'If I really have to make a choice [between them], that's like putting a gun to my head. And I'd say, 'Shoot.'"

Albert Ho, chairman of the Hong Kong Democratic Party, certainly knows he has no chance of victory in next Sunday's election for chief executive. So what is he suggesting, that Hong Kong people should kill themselves, or that he will commit suicide after the ballot? Either choice goes against the very grain of liberal democracy, which often picks not the best option but the least bad one, and accepts a loss to uphold the unity of the system.

China's political and economic transition seems too unruly and is occurring in a country too big and at same time too old (the thousands of years of civilization separated from the West) and too new (the true renewal of the country started only 30 years ago) for democracy to produce reliable outcomes. Democracy could devolve into demagoguery, as has happened many times in history. Then the ruling party has to act as the leader in a republic in the absence of popular democracy, to guide the country eventually to democracy by fostering a liberal society.

The task is huge and very delicate. Many things can go wrong. The choices of men and policy to be made at the next party congress in the autumn will show to China and the world whether this leadership is up to the mission.