Political and Military Analysis on China

Conflict with China: Prospects, Consequences, and Strategies for Deterrence


This paper presents some scenarios that, if they were to come to pass, could result in military conflict with China over the next thirty years. The authors begin by exploring different plausible sources of conflict — whether it be the collapse of North Korea, possible dwindling relations between Taiwan and China, or other contingencies involving Japan or India. They discuss the operational implications each might present the United States and then turn to the requirements for defense and deterrence. Although China's military capabilities lag far behind those of the United States, it has — or will gain — local superiority, first in and around Taiwan and then at greater distances. As a result, direct defense of contested assets in the region will become increasingly difficult and would likely escalate geographically or into the cyber and economic realms. Enabling capabilities and buttressing the resolve of China's neighbors is one means for improving U.S. prospects for direct defense while reducing the necessity for escalation. In parallel to that strategy, efforts to draw China into cooperative security endeavors should be proffered. The far-reaching specter of economic mayhem that would be a consequence of any Sino-American conflict, in effect a form of mutual assured economic destruction, also acts as a powerful mutual deterrent.

Red Wings Ascendant: The Chinese Air Force Contribution to Antiaccess


During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States intervened by deploying two carrier groups in response to Chinese missile tests near major Taiwanese ports. These tests were a means of coercively influencing pro-independence elements during the Taiwan presidential election and were considered by China to be an "internal" matter. The U.S. action therefore triggered enormous nationalistic resentment, rooted largely in historical humiliations and infringements on Chinese sovereignty by foreign powers. They also fueled a determined drive to mitigate or prevent such infringements on Chinese sovereignty in the future.

U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of China and Russia


US competition with Iran has become the equivalent of a game of three-dimensional chess, but a game where each side can modify at least some of the rules with each move. It is also a game that has been going on for some three decades. It is clear that it is also a game that is unlikely to be ended by better dialog and mutual understanding, and that Iran’s version of “democracy” is unlikely to change the way it is played in the foreseeable future.

Protecting Chinese Citizens Abroad: What next?


The dramatic rise in overseas travel and expatriate work by Chinese was punctuated by the recent kidnappings of Chinese workers in Sudan and Egypt. "Overseas Chinese protection" (haiwai gongmin baohu) has been a critical priority since deadly attacks killed 14 Chinese workers in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2004. Between 2006 and 2010, 6,000 Chinese citizens were evacuated to China from upheavals in the Solomon Islands, East Timor, Lebanon, Tonga, Chad, Thailand, Haiti and Kyrgyzstan.

U.S.-China Relations: No Need to Fight


Paranoia about China could push the United States toward unwarranted belief that conflict and even war with the PRC is inescapable. In fact, China is just another aspiring country despite its size and historical baggage, and economic forces are at work that will slow its rise and perhaps reverse it. Beijing’s emergence as a peer military competitor appears doomed by a variety of domestic and technological factors. At best it seems destined to be a regional power; thus it needs be neither an adversary nor partner. Yet various shared interests call for engagement, which Washington should pursue without trepidation, seeking its “traditional” interest in maintaining the balance of power in Asia and working to reduce tensions. Conflict is not inevitable.

Assessing Chinese Intentions for the Military Use of the Space Domain


Americans and others have misgivings about Chinese space initiatives that were further inflated by China’s 2007 antisatellite test. Others argue that Beijing’s aims are benevolent. Examining prevalent trends in China’s military thinking is the key to exposing its real motivations. China is not monolithic but has competing views. It may challenge U.S. hegemony in space as elsewhere someday, but its present capabilities in technology, doctrine, and organization suggest that is a long way off. Washington will be best served for the time being by understanding the Local War school of thought, using strategic communications not to convey belligerent messages, and carefully managing its reliance on space systems in light of China’s discovery of U.S. vulnerabilities in that realm.

Sun Tzu, Nuclear Weapons and China's Grand Strategy


Nuclear weapons served as the centerpiece of superpower Cold War military deterrent strategies since they burst on the scene in the last century. To the credit of the five charter members of the slowly-growing "Nuclear Club" (NC), or the "nuclear weapon State Parties" as they are identified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), no in bello use of such weapons has occurred since the Empire of Japan experienced their effects in August 1945. Nuclear tests, however, were subsequently conducted by the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) ...

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The rare foreign visitor to China during the Cultural Revolution often saw a huge placard at the airport boasting the farcical claim, "We have friends all over the world." In truth, Maoist China -- a rogue state exporting revolution and armed struggle around the world, and a bitter foe of the West and the former Soviet bloc -- was extremely isolated. It had a few friendships with countries like Ceausescu's Romania and Pol Pot's Cambodia; for a few bleak years, China's only true ally was tiny Albania. Forty years later, a powerful and assertive Beijing has a lot more friends. Its economic presence is warmly welcomed by many governments (though not necessarily people) in Africa; European countries regard China as a "strategic partner," and China has forged new bonds with leading emerging economies like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa. Yet besides Pakistan, which depends on China for military and economic assistance, and which China supports mainly as a counterweight against India, Beijing has a shocking lack of real allies...

Chinese Views on Deterrence


The issue of Chinese views of deterrence and its role within Chinese security policy has become increasingly important in analyses of future East Asian security developments. In considering Beijing's views, three considerations should be kept in mind:

* There is no bolt-out-of-the-blue experience in the history of the People's Republic of China (PRC) comparable to Pearl Harbor or Operation Barbarossa.
* The People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not seem to exhibit nearly the same degree of concern with inadvertent wars or the lessons from World War I as is common among American decisionmakers.
* The PRC view of deterrence is not bilateral, but more multilateral, as China has been concerned with a range of threats on its periphery.

Each of these issues affects China's views of deterrence.

Coping with a Conflicted China


2009—2010 will be remembered as the years in which China became difficult for the world to deal with, as Beijing exhibited increasingly tough and truculent behavior toward many of its neighbors in Asia, as well as the United States and the European Union. Even its ties in Africa and Latin America became somewhat strained, adding to its declining global image since 2007. Beijing’s disturbing behavior has many observers wondering how long its new toughness will last. Is it a temporary or secular trend? If it is a longer-term and qualitative shift toward greater assertiveness and arrogance, how should other nations respond?