Old but still relevant article apparently this island is not as vulnerable as some western media make it to believe
CHINA’S ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS ARE BIGGER (AND A BIGGER DEAL) THAN YOU THINK
Surely you have heard the news — China has been dredging up coral reefs and creating artificial islands in the South China Sea with the purpose of enforcing their claims to
, and has defiantly
by the Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration. While the
and other nations to China’s island-building campaign have been vocal, some U.S. analysts and experts have been largely dismissive of the new islands’ potential effects on the regional balance of power. A
stated:
[T]hese facilities could host a handful of SAMs and fighter aircraft…[but] they are unlikely to be a significant factor in high-intensity military operations against U.S. forces beyond the first hours of a conflict.
Another analyst
the possibility of that these new bases could alter the balance of power, stating that, “In the age of precision strike, any and almost all fixed targets can be destroyed with ease.” But the potential combination of China’s premier anti-ship and anti-air capabilities — along with the sheer, breathtaking scale of China’s island-building — call for serious consideration of the faux islands’ potential impact to U.S. diplomacy and contingency planning, as well as the need to take all possible measures to prevent their full militarization.
Going Big in the Spratly Islands: China’s New Airfields Point Major Commitment of Forces
While the Chinese government has consistently claimed that its land reclamation projects
, and Chinese President Xi has
, recent imagery shows large-scale construction of airfields and base facilities. The most significant base-building has been concentrated at what I term the “big three”: Fiery Cross, Subi, and Mischief Reef. All three of these new islands will have
, deep water harbors, and enough reinforced hangars to house
as bombers, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft. Just as significant are the other airfield support facilities China appears to be constructing. As an example, a rough comparison of the size of Fiery Cross’s airfield areas with those of a mainland Chinese fighter base (
, see Figure 1) shows that this facility is probably being constructed to support a unit the size of a Chinese fighter regiment (of note, China is in the process of
, but this analysis of scale should hold for now). One can see on all three major islands the presence of 400-meter running tracks along with tennis and basketball courts, as well as block after block of what will likely be barracks, headquarters, workshops, and warehouses. China is even openly discussing plans to construct
to provide electrical power to the islands. With more than 24 hangars under construction on each of the “big three” bases, this would allow all of a typical Chinese regiment’s fighters to be maintained indoors on each island. These do not seem intended as small airfields for occasional visiting aircraft. They look like major fighter bases in the making.
Figure 1: Fiery Cross Reef (upper) compared to Suixi Air Base (lower) — home to a regiment of PLAAF Flanker fighters. (same approximate scale).
One might think that China, surely, does not plan to base aircraft on these islands with the intent of using them to counter a U.S. intervention. After all, “
” But if that is
not the intent, then
why build three? Even before building the islands, China could easily have overwhelmed its regional competitors with naval surface action groups, an aircraft carrier, and land-based aircraft. If China had built just
one island base with dozens of aircraft, it would have enjoyed an even greater overmatch against local rivals. But instead, China built
three islands, each with facilities that appear large enough to host a fighter regiment (or brigade) and support aircraft. To put that in perspective, three such air regiments on the three islands would add up to a fighter
division, a formation consisting of about
, and a commitment indicating that China perhaps has a larger foe in mind.
Shields Up: A Deployment of China’s A2/AD systems Could Happen Overnight.
If China
is building the “big three” to be able to deter or counter a U.S. regional intervention, its plans would likely include deployment of the “counter-intervention” (China’s term) anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) system-of-systems that has already
Given recent deployments to Woody Island (China’s outpost in the Paracel Islands) of
(SAMs, see Figure 2),
(ASCMs), and
, one could expect such deployments to the “big three” as well, perhaps joined by the precision-strike ballistic surface-to-surface (SSM) and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) of the PLA Rocket Forces (
). A look at the resulting effective range arcs (see Figure 3) shows that in a stroke, China would have an interlocking and mutually-supporting SAM umbrella over most of the Spratlys, as well as ASCM coverage over the heart of the South China Sea. Also, where the U.S. military could previously
, China would now be able to strike, with either DF-21C land-attack ballistic missiles or CJ-10 cruise missiles, U.S. and allied facilities and airfields
throughout the Philippines and even to Singapore.
Figure 2: HQ-9 SAM battery deployed to Woody Island. Note the extensive newly-built land area and structures in the northeastern part of the island.
Figure 3: Range arcs depicting potential coverage of HQ-9 SAMs, YJ-62 ASCMs, and DF-21 ballistic missiles from China’s larger South China Sea island bases.
so:
