PLAN Naval Helicopter & ASW Capability II

Totoro said:

I don't think Z-15 was ever mentioned as a military project, let alone a PLAN platform. While, of course, it may happen sometime in the future, so far there don't seem to be any plans for such a helicopter. All we had was Z-15 being "a helicopter" of nice enough class that many people just jumped to conlusion with that it's definitely going to be military helo. Maybe, some day. But not soon.

As for Z-20, we definitely know it's being developed as a military helo, but for now all we've seen is a PLA utility variant. A PLAN variant would need certain changes. Again, it may be in the pipeline but it may be several years in the future, if it happens.

Even if Z-20 or Z-15 (i really doubt both would be used within PLAN, as they're too close in capability) get their naval variant and production starts - it would take at least another decade of production until produced volume gets to satisfactory level and most Z9 are replaced.

With all the above, I'd say PLAN very, very much counts on Z9 being its most numerous ASW helicopter for at least next 10-15 years, and plans to use Z9 (even if by then other models get used in greater numbers) for the next 20-25 years.

Which brings me to the new mystery missile - alleged winged torpedo carrying missile. Layout and size points to a long range, fairly long loiter torpedo carrying platform. That itself is a very strange concept - as usually a helicopter carrying torpedos is more efficient. BUT, usually, ASW helicopter isn't a tiny Z9. Z9 is very, very much limited by its size. It can carry the full sensor package and full fuel. Or it can carry almost full fuel and one torpedo. Or it can save further on fuel and carry two torpedoes. It's loiter time over target area is quite small and probably unsatisfactory for modern ASW combat. Which is maybe why we're seeing the new mystery missile- to completement Z9 and alleviate their limitations. Z9 could then carry no torpedoes and stay in air for a fairly long time, using their sensors, and other platforms can fire the torpedoes when needed, even have them stay in air and loiter near the target (For quick reaction) if situation requires it.

Click to expand...

Z-9 was the best that China can get in terms of helicopter platform of such weight class and size, but everyone knows how lacking it is for a good blend of endurance and loadout potential, but the Z-8 series is too large. Thus back in the day when the Z-20 is nothing more than a rough model displayed in airshow, but the Z-15 is officially announced as a Sino-France joint project, people begin to pin their hope onto the Z-15, even when the nature of Z-15 project would make a military variant difficult to materialise.

Now, though, with the Z-20 moving ahead, a pure-bred military helicopter platform has moved into flight testing stages, hopes for a more capable, navalised helicopter for the PLAN, one that can operate from almost all flight deck in the PLAN fleet (tight for 056 perhaps?),becomes very hopeful for the first time.

Of course, not necessary would it mean that the Z-20 will replace all Z-9 airframe immediately, probably we can expect some Z-9s that still has good amount of airframe lifespan would be re-assigned to other roles. But I don't expect that to happen before 2020, somewhere near mid-2020s is my estimation.

The 056 has the same sized flight deck as the much bigger 054A. An early sign of how much it's designers valued its ability to conduct air operations, and one of the reasons I said from day 1 that they will have a heavy ASW emphasis.

They lack a hanger, but that's just the nature of their small size. To fit a full hanger would require other aspects to be trimmed back.

But I think LHDs are high on the PLAN's shopping list, so once those start coming online, expect those to fill the role of escort carrier for PLAN task groups, where they carry a heavy complement of ASW helos, which will use 056s as FOBs to resupply and refuel for fleet wide ASW coverage.

plawolf said:

The 056 has the same sized flight deck as the much bigger 054A. An early sign of how much it's designers valued its ability to conduct air operations, and one of the reasons I said from day 1 that they will have a heavy ASW emphasis.

They lack a hanger, but that's just the nature of their small size. To fit a full hanger would require other aspects to be trimmed back.

But I think LHDs are high on the PLAN's shopping list, so once those start coming online, expect those to fill the role of escort carrier for PLAN task groups, where they carry a heavy complement of ASW helos, which will use 056s as FOBs to resupply and refuel for fleet wide ASW coverage.

Click to expand...

The 056 can in no way have the same sized flight deck as the 054A if simply because its beam is smaller at 11m vs 054A's 16m. Even if the flight decks are the same length, that's still a flight deck that's only 69% the size of the 054A's.

The 056 is also not an ASW asset and does not have an ASW emphasis, especially lacking a VDS and/or TAS like the 056A; its torpedo launchers are self-defense weapons and its bow sonar is about as puny as it gets. Not only that, even if you put the new slant-launched ASW missile on the 056 it has no way to locate enemy subs out to any significant distance that would make the missile truly useful. If the 056 is an ASW asset then pretty much every major surface combatant in the PLAN is an ASW asset. The 056 should be seen as having a general purpose patrol role definitively distinct from that of the 056A, which is a ship with a true ASW "emphasis" by virtue of its suped-up sensors combined with the ASW missile, and of course its helo embarkation capability.

Iron Man said:

The 056 can in no way have the same sized flight deck as the 054A if simply because its beam is smaller at 11m vs 054A's 16m. Even if the flight decks are the same length, that's still a flight deck that's only 69% the size of the 054A's.

The 056 is also not an ASW asset and does not have an ASW emphasis, especially lacking a VDS and/or TAS like the 056A; its torpedo launchers are self-defense weapons and its bow sonar is about as puny as it gets. Not only that, even if you put the new slant-launched ASW missile on the 056 it has no way to locate enemy subs out to any significant distance that would make the missile truly useful. If the 056 is an ASW asset then pretty much every major surface combatant in the PLAN is an ASW asset. The 056 should be seen as having a general purpose patrol role definitively distinct from that of the 056A, which is a ship with a true ASW "emphasis" by virtue of its suped-up sensors combined with the ASW missile, and of course its helo embarkation capability.

Click to expand...

If they are not an ASW asset, then I don't see the need for 60 of them.

plawolf said:

But I think LHDs are high on the PLAN's shopping list, so once those start coming online, expect those to fill the role of escort carrier for PLAN task groups, where they carry a heavy complement of ASW helos, which will use 056s as FOBs to resupply and refuel for fleet wide ASW coverage.

Click to expand...

I don't think so.

Why?

Because, if they are on so high place on list, probably the PLAN would allready build at least one of them. But they didn't.

Also, PLAN currently has two most important tasks:

a) win in any fight around Taiwan and sucessfully make invasion on Taiwan. For that, you don't need LHD. LPDs like Type 071, LSTs, LCAC and helicopters are more than enough. LHD is just big juicy target in Taiwan Strait.

b) support Chinese naval/political program in the SCS. They don't need LHD for that. Sure, it would be handy to have them, but not so important, they can do the trick with LPDs and LSTs.

One day in future, PLAN will need them to serve the same role as in USN, as core of Chinese amphibious operations in far-away regions ( Indian ocean etc. ). But, without a carrier support, against any semi-capable foe, LHD is just big juicy target. So, until China doesen't build at least 3 carriers ( so that they can have one deployed in Indian Ocean or somewhere else far away from China ), China has no big need for LHDs.

abc123 said:

I don't think so.

Why?

Because, if they are on so high place on list, probably the PLAN would allready build at least one of them. But they didn't.

Also, PLAN currently has two most important tasks:

a) win in any fight around Taiwan and sucessfully make invasion on Taiwan. For that, you don't need LHD. LPDs like Type 071, LSTs, LCAC and helicopters are more than enough. LHD is just big juicy target in Taiwan Strait.

b) support Chinese naval/political program in the SCS. They don't need LHD for that. Sure, it would be handy to have them, but not so important, they can do the trick with LPDs and LSTs.

One day in future, PLAN will need them to serve the same role as in USN, as core of Chinese amphibious operations in far-away regions ( Indian ocean etc. ). But, without a carrier support, against any semi-capable foe, LHD is just big juicy target. So, until China doesen't build at least 3 carriers ( so that they can have one deployed in Indian Ocean or somewhere else far away from China ), China has no big need for LHDs.

Click to expand...

China needs more large ships for MOOTW which also happen to be missions where there is often great need for helicopter operations. While the PLAN has several hospital ships and LPDs these cannot support as intense and diversified helicopter operations as LHDs. Building one or two LHDs now will round out the PLAN's assets both to practice for conflict as well as to lend help and generate goodwill internationally and domestically when applicable situations arise. China needs to develop both hard and soft power, LHDs can contribute to both.

PanAsian said:

China needs more large ships for MOOTW which also happen to be missions where there is often great need for helicopter operations. While the PLAN has several hospital ships and LPDs these cannot support as intense and diversified helicopter operations as LHDs. Building one or two LHDs now will round out the PLAN's assets both to practice for conflict as well as to lend help and generate goodwill internationally and domestically when applicable situations arise. China needs to develop both hard and soft power, LHDs can contribute to both.

Click to expand...

I'm not saying that the PLAN don't need LHDs. Of course that they need them. But that's low priority IMHO. If they get 3 by say 2030- I would be very pleased. Until Taiwan isn't neutralised ( not literally, but reincorporated into China or puppetised ) they don't need more than few.

Bltizo said:

Whoops, I misread that, my mistake.
That said, the same principle about 056A not being a stopgap also applies to 054A+ not being a stopgap for the Navy's ASW capabilities, considering the definition of the word "stopgap".

Click to expand...

"Stopgaps" temporarily do a job, the asset itself can move on to other jobs once it is not needed for that particular job.

If they are caught in a situation where they are forced to fight in a high intensity environment and/or if they are subject to attack by a qualitatively or quantitatively superior opponent then that means the deployment of these has either been done incorrectly or a war is not going China's way.

To increase the ship's survivability or weapons suite/defence capabilities would mean trade offs in other assets (such as possibly helipad, ASW sensor suite, and/or others) if the ship's displacement is to be maintained -- or if you want to keep everything then it would result in a larger ship as well which would then have knock on effects about the cost and number of 056/As that could be purchased.

The problem is that all the ships you list are either quite different in displacement to 056/A or they are not even corvettes to begin with.

Gepard: a corvette which is nearly five hundred tons heavier than 056/A at full
Tuo Chiang: more of an FAC/missile boat, not a corvette like 056/A
Bung Tomo: a corvette, nearly five hundred tons heavier than 056/A at full
Abukuma: this ship displaces nearly a thousand tons more than 056/A at full
Ulsan: this ship displaces nearly seven hundred tons more than 056/A at full
Kasturi: displaces about four hundred tons more than 056/A at full/ Laksamana: more of a missile boat than a corvette, note its much lower displacement
Victory: more of a missile boat than a corvette, note its much lower displacement
Bora: are we comparing 056s to a hovercraft FAC now? Buyna/M: a smaller ship than 056/A and makes other design/capability sacrifices in favour of its configuration (e.g.: no helipad, reduced capability ASW suite) / Steregushky: eight hundred tons bigger than 056/A / Gepard: five hundred tons heavier than 056/A
LCS/FF: are you really comparing the 1400 ton 056/A with the 3000+ ton LCS/FF?

Let's be fair here -- out of all the ships in the region that exist with a similar displacement and role orientation to the 056/A, it would be the Indonesia Navy's Sigma 9113... and funnily enough its armament is very close and equivalent to that of 056/A...
If I take your way of looking at things I could say the 022 and the 053H3 are both more heavily armed ships than the 056/A as well, but they are also ships in completely different categories with different capabilities.

So I rest my case that on any fair comparison between 056/A and its "true" contemporaries (ships of similar role and displacement), its armament and configuration fares quite well.

If you want to compare 056/A with other FACs, or large corvettes/light frigates in the region because you think those are the potential foes that they will face, then I can understand that choice, but then it becomes not a question about 056/A vs other nation's vessels but about China's navy versus another nation's navy in a given contingency/scenario, in which case we need to consider the total quantity of ship types that each side may deploy there. Frigates and destroyers would also have to be roped in, not to mention air and subsurface assets. It does not simply become a question of "056/A vs opponents FACs or corvettes/frigates".

If you want to judge 056/A only by its ability to withstand a "surprise attack" by an enemy, then its performance in such a situation is simply the result of the choices that the Navy has made regarding their balance of capability/displacement vs cost/quantity, and in such a scenario the fault would lie not with the 056/A vs its foes but with the Navy's assessment of its opponent which attacked this 056/A in this hypothetical situation in the first place.

At the end of the day the 056/A is a specific design meant for the Chinese Navy's own requirements. If it has to be compared with other ships, the only fair way is to compare it with ships that have a similar configuration/role and a similar displacement.
If it is to be judged based on its survivability/performance in a situation where it is not intended for, then that is just the trade off that needs to be made vs how good it can perform in the situations it is intended for.

If you want a ship that can fulfill all of those categories and requirements and outmatch the ships you've listed... well the 054A class does exist.

Click to expand...

The missions, roles, and classes are all fluid and arbitrary. That the 056/A is unlikely to survive and unable to do its job in high intensity environments is a major flaw, having it be more heavily armed or have the capacity to be more heavily armed is a simple and viable solution to that flaw.

There is a huge 2500 ton gap between the 056/A and the 054A+. Doubling the 056/A short range SAM count and increasing its main missile armament to 6 or 8 missiles may be feasible with the existing 056/A with a minimal tonnage increase. Even replacing the two autocannons with a gun CIWS will not increase tonnage by that much though the ship's layout would be affected. Having such heavier armament or having the capacity to be uparmed as such would have allowed the 056/A to be more survivable in high intensity environments, thereby likely being a better deal despite slightly increased costs.

One factor against such uparming would be if the 056/A's speed and endurance will be significantly compromised, or a more powerful engine and additional fuel needed to offset that, but this should only be an issue with the CIWS. One characteristic of the existing 056/A is that it clearly leans towards defense rather than offense so it should not contribute to fears of a Chinese offense.

PanAsian said:

"Stopgaps" temporarily do a job, the asset itself can move on to other jobs once it is not needed for that particular job.

Click to expand...

Yes.
For that definition to work for 054A+, it would mean that 054A+ would no longer participate in ASW missions in a meaningful way once other assets that you mentioned before were developed.

I'm saying that regardless of what other assets will be likely developed in coming years, 054A+s will still remain an important part of the Navy's ASW capability.

The missions, roles, and classes are all fluid and arbitrary. That the 056/A is unlikely to survive and unable to do its job in high intensity environments is a major flaw, having it be more heavily armed or have the capacity to be more heavily armed is a simple and viable solution to that flaw.

Click to expand...

Actually the 056/A should not be reasonably expected to survive in a high intensity environment without meaningful offboard support.
I call that not a major flaw but rather a part of its design choice.

There is a huge 2500 ton gap between the 056/A and the 054A+.

Click to expand...

You seem to be interested in producing a ship that has the capability of 054As in the displacement of 056 based on your previous post.
But I agree, part of point my comparing 056/As to 054As was to demonstrate that any attempts to seriously compare 056/A to its "contemporaries" must compare them where the ships are of similar displacement and similar role. A similar displacement is especially important for comparing smaller combatants because a difference of a few hundred tons between small combatants can mean a significant difference in terms of capability.

Doubling the 056/A short range SAM count and increasing its main missile armament to 6 or 8 missiles may be feasible with the existing 056/A with a minimal tonnage increase. Even replacing the two autocannons with a gun CIWS will not increase tonnage by that much though the ship's layout would be affected. Having such heavier armament or having the capacity to be uparmed as such would have allowed the 056/A to be more survivable in high intensity environments, thereby likely being a better deal despite slightly increased costs.

One factor against such uparming would be if the 056/A's speed and endurance will be significantly compromised, or a more powerful engine and additional fuel needed to offset that, but this should only be an issue with the CIWS. One characteristic of the existing 056/A is that it clearly leans towards defense rather than offense so it should not contribute to fears of a Chinese offense.

Click to expand...

Or... maybe the current configuration of its weapons systems is based on a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis where the Navy recognizes that adding a couple of extra AShMs and a few extra HQ-10s would not significantly enhance its survivability given the ship's inherently small size, its inherently limited radar capabilities, and also recognize that these ships would operate either in a low intensity/friendly environment without need for offboard support, or if it has to operate in a high intensity environment it would rely on offboard support??
Maybe the Navy recognized that what they needed was not a ship that had a few more AShMs or a slightly more capable CIWS given they already had a large number of FACs, frigates and destroyers, but rather they needed a cheap, mass producible, relatively short range and short endurance multipurpose and ASW oriented patrol vessel/corvette to replace their large number of much older many 037 variant patrol vessels, and that such a ship would not be expected to survive in a high intensity environment alone?


I also think you greatly underestimate what a high intensity environment entails in terms of the capabilities that a ship would face, or maybe we disagree as to what it means.
I perceive a high intensity environment (for ships, in the AShM domain) being one which includes a number of airborne, shipboard and land based anti ship missile threats with significant over the horizon capability that can be relayed by offboard sensor platforms (MPA, AEW&C, even fighters and helicopters etc) and launched in coordinated strikes against a given platform.

For this kind of relatively high intensity environment you need at the very least a few air defence frigates like 054As to be able to have a good chance of your task force surviving, preferably even an aegis type destroyer, and even a single lone 054A will probably not be capable of withstanding a very heavy and coordinated attack by a determined foe in this environment.

It goes without saying that two or four more AShMs to 056/A and adding a few more HQ-10s won't meaningfully increase a single 056/As survivability in any sort of environment that can be described as high intensity.

OTOH if 056/As are forced to operate in a high intensity environment, they would operate as part of a system, a task force made up of much more capable friendly warships to do the heavy lifting.


If you really want a ship that can survive in a high intensity environment without offboard support, then simply put 056/A isn't the ship for the job and it is pretty unreasonable to expect this ship to be able to do so given its displacement and configuration.
There are of course ways of making this ship significantly more survivable, such as the 2000 ton Sa'ar 6 which will be one of the most well equipped ships for its weight class, but then you have to accept it will be a much more expensive ship given the subsystems it fields not to mention a larger ship to accommodate the sort of subsystems needed to survive a high intensity environment (APAR, VLS etc).


If you want to argue that you think 056/As should have a few more AShMs or HQ-10s in a general sense then I don't have a big of a problem with that.
A few more AShMs or HQ-10s won't increase the ship's survivability in a high intensity environment.
But it would allow a ship to be able to conduct more sustained and persistent operations in a low to medium environment if they are repeatedly attacked by a small number of low-medium threats.

However I would also argue that the benefit of a few additional AShMs or increasing the number of HQ-10 missiles would be an investment of dubious value considering the large number of other FACs, frigates and destroyers that an 056/A would operate with or very close to in any sort of environment that is remotely hostile.

abc123 said:

win in any fight around Taiwan and sucessfully make invasion on Taiwan.

Click to expand...

The time for a war to conquer Taiwan has passed. There won't be an invasion. Taiwan is too puny.