I'm curious also.
Is this implying that JMSDF is effective at detecting PLAN Submarines such that PLAN subs will be quickly neutralized during open conflict?
If so, that would seem to be very worrying to the PLAN....
PLAN ASW Capability
- Thread starter shen
- Start date
I'm curious also.
Is this implying that JMSDF is effective at detecting PLAN Submarines such that PLAN subs will be quickly neutralized during open conflict?
If so, that would seem to be very worrying to the PLAN....
Being able to position assets without the enemy's knowledge before hostilities begin is a very important advantage.
it however still means that while more expensive stuff does, the absolute majority of things are still not moved by air.
Moving torpedoes to clients isn't an urgent business, as is forming submarine lines for shaping sea operations.
With no threat of immediate enemy detection, SSK can cruise at reasonable speeds as well(comparable to a fast convoy, i.e. meed teens).
The fact stands that SSK is still a massively cheaper, quieter & usually smaller ship, giving a different set of qualities. Maximalism is a massive detrement here.
At all the normal SSK combat speeds, its physical fields are significantly lower than any contemporary SSN, even when the latter is acting sneaky. To the point when it easily breaks national technological boundaries. I could have understood if China was a world leader in SSN by a generation and/or could "outsource" SSK production to a set of capable junior partners with well-established submarine capability, but China is in the opposite position.
Well, they are indeed, and in this, they are drastically different to much more "cruiser"-like SSNs.
It's just better not forget that together with sea mines without mobility, those are the deadliest naval weapons of the modern era.
lcloo
Captain
It was true when dealing with previous generation of PLAN submarines like type 091, 092, 035. Not so sure about latest PLAN subs.
Submarines can also work under protection of surface ships and aircraft, as well as underwater surveillence network, so it is not easy to neutralise them. However, if the subs are outside these protection umbrella, the scenario would be different.
The JMSDF has been the protegee of the USN since the beginning of the Cold War when it comes to the ASW domain. The geography of the Japanese major islands means that they naturally become perfect chokepoints to guard against Soviet subs from freely entering the Pacific in case of war. Japanese warships and aircraft procurement too has historically been tailored with significant focus on the ASW domain, in order to further piling on such advantages.
Just take a look at the number of P-3s and P-1s they operate, for instance. Not even China has that many KQ-200s, in comparison (which hopefully can change in the coming years as China looks further into the "true blue" Pacific).
The JMSDF earned the nickname "The ASW squadron of the US 7th Fleet" for this reason. Needless to say, the JMSDF's expertise and sophistication in this field is second only to the likes of the USN.
And given the considerable disparity in terms of size and capabilities of the PLA and JSDF in the naval domain, especially in the underwater and counter-underwater domain for a long time until rather recently - It isn't really surprising to hear things like this either.
Remember, China today still operates a nuclear submarine fleet which isn't just small in size relative to the overall size of the PLAN, but also primarily consists of subs that are at least one or two levels below their American and Russian counterparts, if not more.
The much-anticipated effects from the massive "black fish breeding" activities at Huludao won't bear fruit until the second half of this decade, so there's that.
As mentioned by others above, the PLA today has much greater means to mitigate the threats posed by JMSDF assets against PLAN subs than ever before. If the JSDF cannot station their assets in and close to China's vicinity due to the acute dangers posed by various other assets of the PLA, their ASW capability can be seriously degraded - Hence giving more breathing spaces for PLAN subs to operate around.
Furthermore, I do think we need be thankful that we aren't left with the PLA from the 1990s, 2000s or even in the early-2010s - Those times were indeed bad, if not desperate (or even outright hopeless).
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ASW is mostly a contest of whose home turf you're on. In a straight up ASW contest, China is going to be significantly better than Japan, due to differences in funding, numbers and technology level.
But if China moves subs very close to the Japanese coastline, there's no guarantee it wouldn't end badly for the subs. Unfamiliar territory, Japanese land/coast based sensors, enemy air close at hand and friendly screens far away. So not unbelievable that when operating near home islands, it's an environment Japan has the upper hand in.
Conversely, the same also applies to US undersea forces challenging China in the 1st island chain. Even if you deleted all the highly advanced SSKs that are China's undersea mainstay and force them to rely on the 688i era nuke fleet, the sheer number of seafloor sensor, screening ships/planes etc would make operating there difficult if not impossible.
Home turf advantage greatly neutralize technology difference in ASW.
But if China moves subs very close to the Japanese coastline, there's no guarantee it wouldn't end badly for the subs. Unfamiliar territory, Japanese land/coast based sensors, enemy air close at hand and friendly screens far away. So not unbelievable that when operating near home islands, it's an environment Japan has the upper hand in.
Conversely, the same also applies to US undersea forces challenging China in the 1st island chain. Even if you deleted all the highly advanced SSKs that are China's undersea mainstay and force them to rely on the 688i era nuke fleet, the sheer number of seafloor sensor, screening ships/planes etc would make operating there difficult if not impossible.
Home turf advantage greatly neutralize technology difference in ASW.
The inherent differences in capability between SSKs and SSNs, which even you do acknowledge, has some relevance to the existing PLAN subsurface fleet whose competitive submarines are in the SSK category rather than the SSN category.
That just means it doesn't make sense for the existing PLAN subsurface fleet to pursue meaningful operations at 2IC distances in a contemporary high intensity conflict scenario.
Putting it another way, if we want to discuss any meaningful PLAN subsurface operations with credibility in a high intensity conflict, then it by definition should require a capable and competitive PLAN SSN fleet first, so the discussion would naturally follow onto when and how such a force would emerge.
Well, if the idea that not contesting enemy communications with submarines is an idea making sense, when one has a suitable&numerous instrument for contesting it - it's very obviously wrong.
Apart from screening operations(which also may go beyond 1 IC), submarines shall be there, where they bring the most operational harm(within their reach). It's very obviously exactly 2nd IC and beyond, if necessary. Large ~3.5k boats are built for it.
(1)With all due respect - a claim that a modern SSK fleet has no credibility in a high-intensity conflict by itself is an incredible one. They're ships most useful in high-intensity conflict in the first place, their other roles being deeply secondary (and indeed often inferior to SSNs).
(2)Any credible larger-scale fleet operations involve subsurface operations - it's one of very few ways to shape the naval theater of operations beyond what basic geography can provide.
If the implication is that PLAN won't be a competitive formation for at least a decade to come (Even at 2023 tempo, a competitively-sized SSN force will take at least half a decade, plus at least several cycles of yearly maneuvers) - even mine views are different, I admit it.