CHAPER IV – Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and China’s National Psyche
The national psyche is made up of a combination of factors which includes national perspectives, intentions, characteristics and other elements which underline a country’s domestic and international behaviour. For the PRC, it is heavily influenced by a rich traditional history stretching back several millennia and a period of foreign domination known as the “Century of Humiliation.” Historically, China’s size granted it comfortable relations with its regional neighbours, allowing a paternal instinct to flourish with a focus on unifying its respective territories under a centralised Chinese authority. However, interactions between the international superpowers of Great Britain and Imperial Japan during the “Century of Humiliation,” starting with the First Opium War in 1839, have structured the national psyche in a manner reflective in its international behaviour. According to Allison Kaufman, “the tale of loss and redemption, in which modern China was forged out of a crucible of suffering and shame at the hands of foreign powers has become part of the PRC’s founding narrative,” and serves as a strong historical lesson regarding vulnerability at the hands of international powers (2011:2). Since the CCP’s Civil War victory in 1950, the PRC has struggled to overcome its past, but a focus on rapid economic development and a series of diplomatic victories signalled its repair. However, just as the China was beginning to assert its presence more as a regional power fitting of its economic status, it was dealt a significant blow by the reality of the United States’ military hegemony in the Pacific.
Before the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s naval ambitions were limited to active coastal defence, focusing on “green-water” capabilities through shore-based artillery, guided missiles, and aircraft (Sakhuja, 2000). However since the incident, there has been a considerable push for naval modernisation, most visibly with the introduction of the Liaoning aircraft carrier, following from the Chinese domestic audience for a more assertive presence internationally. Western preconceptions about China’s national psyche are often described in an ahistorical manner which makes misleading and decontextualized assumptions about the intentions of Chinese behaviour. This chapter will discuss the importance of identity, agency and structure, and change in relation to recent developments concerning China’s national psyche. Using a constructivist lens, the Third Taiwan Strait crisis will be broken down to access the damages inflicted upon the Chinese national psyche with an awareness of how such developments have contributed to generating support for the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier programme.
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996)
It is no surprise that maintaining a centralised government over a country with the expansive territorial size and 1.3 billion population of the PRC is an overwhelming challenge. A brief overview of its history indicates that China has been bound by a long series of attempts to join its proclaimed territories under a consolidated rule. The Dynasty Wars marked centuries of bloody campaigns aimed at achieving this seemingly fabled vision of a unified China. Even today, the Taiwan issue is just one of several separatist movements which plague the mainland. Western provinces far from Beijing, such as Tibet, South Mongol, and Uyghurstan continue to pressure the capital over independence; as tensions rise, some have turned increasingly violent (Kaufman, 2010). The recent 2014 Kunming Rail Station Massacre, that left 30 civilians dead and many more injured, has been directly linked to the Xinjiang conflict which has been ongoing since the late 1960s (BBC, 2014). Taiwan, though often holding centre stage due to its entanglement with the United States, is one of many continuous disputes over sovereignty in China.
Often referred as “the task of the century,” reunification with Taiwan is of particular symbolic and strategic significance to mainland China, serving as an ideological point of leadership for the CCP and a pivot for power projection into the South China Sea (Hao and Su, 2005, Ross, 2002). Taiwan’s ruling political party, the Kuomintang (KMT), is an ever present reminder of unfinished business from the Chinese Civil War, and with most Chinese genuinely believing that Taiwan is indeed part of China, interference by the United is perceived as an invasion of the PRC’s sovereign rights. Extreme political sensitivity has earmarked China’s dealings with Taiwan, as the risk of military escalation with the US and other regional powers threatens economic growth. Thus, the CCP has to strike a careful balance between underlying ideological party guidelines which demand a visible effort to reunite, and the international relationships which enable economic prosperity and CCP legitimacy (Chu, 2005:245-46). Managing Taiwan is an incredibly important point of contention for the PRC’s government, but maintaining economic prosperity is undeniably the priority.
In contrast to the First (1954-1955) and Second (1958) Taiwan Strait crises, which were focused on expelling the Chinese Nationalists from the mainland, the Third broke out as a result of PRC efforts to influence Taiwan’s government and public over upcoming general election. The standing president and KTM’s candidate, Lee Teng-hui, was a staunch independence advocate and the antithesis of what the PRC wanted in a leadership position (Ross, 2002). The US’ decision to allow Lee to speak as an alumnus at Cornell University through the granting of a special visa in 1995, despite officially recognising the “One China” policy, compromised years of carefully fostered US-Sino relations. In addition to providing a legitimising platform to the Taiwanese president, the United States had yet to invite its Chinese counterparts for an official visit since the Tiananmen incident in 1989. In response, and after recalling its ambassadors in the US, the PRC began a series of missile tests over the Taiwan Strait “that were equal parts military deterrent and political theatre” (Kissinger, 2011:473). The advanced missiles, capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads, were launched for several days and targeted into the ocean well within view of Taiwan’s coast. Although largely symbolic, they served as a warning to Taiwanese officials and voters through the demonstration of Chinese capabilities; although Taiwan’s unruly period may be temporarily tolerated by the mainland, outright movements for independence would not.
Under the pretence of avoiding bad weather, the United States sent two Aircraft Carriers towards the Taiwan Strait in its most significant show of force directed at China since the Cold War (Ibid.:476). The USS Nimitz and the USS Independence, each with a combined crew of 10,000 men and a fleet of up to 180 fighter jets, threw a considerable amount of weight behind Taiwan, and sent a strong message to the PRC regarding US commitment to Asian security (Ross, 2002:55-56). With dialogue prevented in the absence of ambassadors, signalling through military muscle flexing became to most effective communication tool in the diplomatic exchange. According to the principle of brinkmanship in naval diplomacy, as discussed in Chapter II, diplomatic advantage lies with the navy not forced into striking first. The provocateur risks losing legitimacy in the international community by being labelled an aggressor, and gives their opponent justification to use more lethal force – potentially nuclear – in defence. Because it is easier interpret an airborne missile as intended strike than a platform of fighter jets, the United States aircraft carrier capability was able to diplomatically trump China in the standoff without having to enter the Taiwan Strait.
Although briefly flirted with, escalation between the United States and China over the Taiwan issue was as undesired as it was potentially devastating – this remains true today. However, the most significant development from the Crisis was not seemingly renewed tensions in the Pacific, in fact relations between the US and China normalised relatively quickly with both sides backing down with the aim of focusing on a more cooperative relationship. Rather, the incident served as a wakeup call to the PRC’s subservience to foreign forces and a crushing blow to the Chinese national self-esteem despite its economic progress. Just as British gunships inflicted a series of humiliating defeats in the mid-1800s at the dawn of the Century of Humiliation, the US aircraft carrier presence was a cruel reminder of foreign domination in China. Turning to the constructivist perspective, this chapter will access the social factors that have been involved in the developments concerning the Chinese national psyche and their influence on the PLA Navy’s modernisation.
Identity
Constructivism explains that identity is the product of interactions between actors with social systems; gathering characteristics through process, interest emerge and patterns of behaviour become compounded (Hurd, 2008). This explanation of identity is important to the discussion on the Chinese national psyche during the Taiwan Strait crisis because it helps unpack the PRC’s perception of the event and provides context for its ensuing behaviour. China’s interactions with foreign powers from the beginning of the First Opium War have been underlined by hostility and exploitation, however since taking power, the CCP has focused on uniting its populace under a common identity that prioritises the unification of the Chinese state against foreign oppression (Kaufman, 2010). Despite altering its ideological focus away from its communist roots towards nationalism after the Cold War, the embracement of the Century of Humiliation continues to be integral in the construction of China’s national identity. Providing lessons for future generations about the dangers of vulnerability, and legitimisation of the CCP for turning the tables of national misfortunes, the insecurities developed during the period can often be seen as key motivators in Chinese foreign policy. The shame experienced is thus
“reframed from an irrational emotion that needs to be cured, through social psychology, to a social practice that needs to be understood in terms of political and historical narratives” (Callahan, 2004:201).
Following the emergence of the PRC, its first major test abroad came with the Korean War (1950-1953), where its military involvement played a significant part in driving back US-led United Nations forces. Accordingly, its leadership in the face of adversity has become “a key legitimiser for CCP rule, because the CCP is portrayed as the only modern Chinese political party that was able to successfully stand up to foreign aggression” (Kaufman, 2011:3).
When the US challenged the PRC over Taiwan in 1996, the incident carried significant symbolic repercussions because it challenged a Chinese identity built on resistance to foreign powers. The US’ sale of F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan in 1992, for example, drew a far less heated response than Lee’s Cornell visit because the US’ recognition of a dissentient leader was indicative of a fundamental disrespect for the PRC’s unification interests (Scobell, 1999:230-31). A nationalistic identity, carved out of the Century of Humiliation and typified by resistance to foreign powers, demanded a strong show of force to communicate to the United States that China was serious about unification. The PRC’s ensuing missile strikes, however, lacked the diplomatic leverage and flexibility held by the US’ carrier fleets and failed to prevent an American intrusion into what it considered a domestic affair. Just as Mao Zedong’s decision to take the country towards nuclear status after the First Taiwan Strait crisis in 1955, the PRC’s development of an aircraft carrier fleet through the Liaoning, is indicative of the desire to acquire the necessary machinery to prevent foreign domination. The Chinese identity reveals an interesting dynamic between nationalism and foreign policy, where past periods of shame are sources of motivation for the militaristic element to its behaviour in the South China Sea. A Chinese aircraft carrier capability is thus a crucial element of the PRC’s road to recovery from the Century of Humiliation.
Agency-Structure
The interplay between agents and social structures in the consideration of China’s national psyche has a dramatic effect on the formation of Chinese foreign policy. Constructivist theory asserts that the relative influences of agencies and structures are mutually determined. The extent to which agents can act independently of structures, and conversely the degree to which structures control agent behaviour, is realised through practice rather than being predetermined either way (Checkel, 1998). Numerous agents within China – primarily the high ranking officials of the CCP, officers of the PLA, and the commerce-minded entrepreneurs and industrialists – act within various structures – such as paternally minded governance, regional security statuses, and international trade arrangements. Despite sharp contrast between the Chinese governments from the ancient imperial system to the modern day, China has a long history of hierarchical-based domestic governance (Wong, 1997). Moreover, there still exists a sense among actors that this structure holds certain parental responsibilities regarding the maintenance of social and economic security: “in both imperial and contemporary times, people have expected the state to intervene on their behalf” (Ibid.:194-95). Therefore, the PRC is so unwilling to relent on the issue of Taiwanese independence because its paternal instinct won’t let it, and China’s attempts to bring the island back under its protection and leadership are telling of the social structures which have emerged with the development of the national psyche. Between agency and structure, nationalism is a commonly occurring theme that is often used as a legitimising tool within the PRC to pander to the national psyche. Zhidong Hao explains the dynamics between agency and structure in China
“as a double edged sword, [where] nationalism makes it possible for individual groups to assert their interests, but it also sets boundaries between groups and nations which impede communication and hinder relationships” (Hao, 2005:143).
By prioritising economic growth, the CCP has enabled its business focused agents to prosper in the modern era; meanwhile, these agents permit the government superstructures the position of leadership so long as economic progress is sustained.
The combined influences of the agencies and social structures in question cannot accept an outbreak of conflict with the United States because of the risks posed to the privileged position of Chinas economic status; however, they also cannot abide foreign intervention in their domestic affairs nor an accept any proposition of Taiwanese independence. The resulting paradox presents a seemingly impossible task for the Chinese. In order to maintain the favourable status quo, the solution has been for the PRC to, while maintaining an assertive stance, not force the issue. The development of aircraft carrier machinery in reaction to the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis is reflective of the co-constitution of the agency and structure within China. A carrier capability grants the PRC the capacity to satisfy the nationalist and commercial interests of agents demanding a strong but non-disruptive – in terms of trade – Chinese presence in the South China Seas, as well providing the PRC the ability to assert itself more flexibly within the normative confines of the Asian security structure.
Change
Since its conception, the PRC has experienced dramatic periods of change within its domestic society from a strict communist order reinforced by the Cultural Revolution and isolationism to an increasingly globalised society characterised by booming international trade (Deng and Wang, 2005, Swaine, 1995). Under Mao, Chinese foreign policy was heavily centralised within the political elite, but as the general population has gained greater pluralisation, more actors, particularly non- and quasi-governmental officials, have become involved in the decision making process. For example, economic interactions between non-state actors abroad in industry, commerce, trade, agriculture, and banking had led to the build-up of more vested interests abroad, and thus a greater desire for Chinese foreign policy to reflect certain behaviour (Deng and Wang, 2005). The growing influence of media and think tanks had led to increase information distribution; with more relevant, accurate, and timely information available to the public, it has become impossible for the CCP to ignore and censor the spread of news to its citizens. The CCP thus has to be considerably more sensitive to independent media outlets and its more educated public. For example, following the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Operation Nobel Anvil in 1999, riots across China marked a dramatic shift in public opinion which transgressed into China’s more aggressive foreign policy stance towards the United States. The influence of more energetic youths, as opposed to their quelling during the Tiananmen protests of 1989, became more preeminent and indicative of the younger generation’s desire to compete with their American counterparts (Li, 2005:51).
The Chinese audience understands that military conflict would be harmful to the more immediate economic interests of the PRC, but nationalist sentiments embedded in the national psyche have given to public cries for more aggressive foreign policy (Swaine, 1995:50). Many regular citizens thus heavily favour the acquisition of military hardware that will allow the PRC to assert itself in international affairs, while not being pressured unfairly as they were in the past. This applies directly to the tremendous public support of the PLA Navy’s aircraft carrier development programme as a means of achieving Chinese interests from trade agreements to sovereignty over Taiwan and other territories. Changes within the PRC’s domestic structure have granted the general populace an increased influence, albeit indirect, in the direction of Beijing’s international relationships. Reflecting a national psyche that fosters memories of past suffering during the Century of Humiliation, public support has grown considerable for the acceleration of military development.
Concluding Comments
Having examined the development of PRC’s national psyche and the role it played in the interpretation of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, it is evident that domestic factors heavily influenced China’s perception of foreign encroachment. Chinese desire to reverse the “humiliation of Western and Japanese imperialism [by] ending foreign interference in its domestic affairs,” experienced a significant setback in its face-off with the United States (Ross, 2002:54). With both sides holding steadfast to their convictions over the future of Taipei, the dispute illustrates how modern foreign policy draws against domestic interests to transform a relationship recently typified by economic cooperation into one of rising tensions and stakes around the world (Kissinger, 2011:478). A constructivist approach to identity, agency and structure, and change elements in the Chinese national psyche sheds light on the impact of domestic forces in the PRC’s assertive foreign posturing. The decision to initiate an aircraft carrier programme, like its previous decision to obtain a nuclear capability, was a thus natural step natural step for a government whose legitimacy is based on its ability to preserve the state’s sovereign integrity. In the following chapter, the PRC’s aircraft carrier programme to date, with particular attention to the launching of the Liaoning, will be examined in relation to China’s rising economic status and its desire to be recognised as a global power.
CHAPTER V – China’s Aircraft Carrier and World Power Ambitions
The examination of China’ national psyche in the previous chapter revealed that many internal characteristics and identities collected over an expansive history have contributed to the PRC’s decision to develop an aircraft carrier capability. However, as the country continues its unprecedented economic growth and more active engagement in international relations, it becomes clear that its aspirations stretch far beyond simple recovery from the Century of Humiliation. Many analysts have observed that
“China’s cooperative and constructive foreign policy [reflects] an increasingly positive and confident evaluation of not only the regional and international orders, but also its own role within them” (Deng and Wang, 2005:4).
As the PRC continues to grab headlines as state destined to dominate the 21st century, the PLA Navy’s plans to integrate an aircraft carrier capability into its maritime forces are reflective of a public eager achieve international recognition as a global power in proportion with its economic status and on par with the United States.
The Taiwan Strait crisis demonstrated that despite its economic status and rising international influence, the PRC still lacked the machinery to back up its diplomatic efforts within regional and domestic affairs. Just as it embraced lessons from the Century of Humiliation, the Taiwan Strait crisis taught the PRC that without an aircraft carrier capability, it would not be able to reach its dream of becoming an established world power with the ability to influence regional and international affairs. Providing global reach, diplomatic persuasion, military flexibility, the US’ aircraft carriers were the envy of the PLA Navy. This chapter aims to explain how the PRC’s obsession with achieving world power status on par with the United States has been a key driver in the development of its aircraft carrier programme. First, it will examine the rapid progress made by the PLA Navy in the modernisation of its forces around a carrier capability since the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the status of its operations today. Using the same theoretical framework of Chapter 4, the constructivist approach to explaining identity, agency and structure, and change, will be applied to the Chinese ambition to become recognised as a global power.
Aircraft Carrier Development and Blue Water Assertiveness
After the fall of the USSR, former Soviet satellites’ inclination to offload expensive military projects was met by Chinese desire to modernise its forces through the acquisition of foreign technology and machinery. Originally claiming that the Admiral Kuznetsov-class carrier was to be reformatted into a casino, despite the intended port being too shallow and no gambling application being filed in China, the Varyag was purchased by supposedly private investors from the Ukrainian government in 1998. Shrouded in controversy, the vessel was not permitted to exit the Black Sea by Turkish officials due to the dangers of canal crossing until a $360 million USD economic package – compared to its $20 million price tag – was agreed between the Chinese and Turkish governments (Storey and Ji, 2004:82-84). Officially starting sea trials in August 2011, many observers consider the Liaoning as a “starter carrier” for the PLA Navy, using the vessel as a training device for integrating airborne competencies into its blue water naval plans (O’Rourke, 2010:20-23). Leveraging lessons learned from observing the US Pacific Fleet, and beginning with more advanced technology, the Chinese will hope to develop a viable capability within the next two to three years. Moreover, PLA Navy press releases have several times asserted its plans to construct a series of indigenous aircraft carriers, while expressing a desire for larger vessels to carry more fighters and even nuclear powered engines within the decade (Ibid.:20-23). However, the operational significance of the Chinese carrier depends on the PLA Navy’s ability to effectively conduct joint military operations; it will likely be decades before the PRC is able to compete with the US Navy in terms of size and proficiency.
Sea trials of the Liaoning and the PRC’s expressed desire to accelerate its aircraft carrier programme have occurred in the backdrop of heighted tensions in the South China Sea due to growing Chinese blue-water assertiveness. Disputes over island chains with several states in the Pacific region over natural resources and defensive perimeters have shed considerable spotlight on China’s naval build up. A confrontation with the Philippines, ongoing since 2011 over fishing rights near the Spratlys islands, has typified the trend of Chinese encroachment in other states’ Excusive Economic Zones (EEZs), despite demarcations ratified by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and effective since 1994 (Al Jazeera, 2014) . In light of its desire to establish itself as a world power, such developments draw attention to the PRC’s inability to influence events abroad to suit their national interests in the same manner the United States has dictated the state of play within the Pacific since the end of WWII. For example, an unfortunate by-product of China’s meteoric economic rise has been energy insecurity with an increasing reliance on sources imported from the Middle East through the Strait of Malacca between Malaysia and Singapore to fuel its industrial needs. What former Chinese President Hu Jintao identified as the “Malacca dilemma,” the PRC has developed a “fundamental economic dependence on energy imported through maritime straits under the control of other navies” (Jones et al., 2014:11). Increasing political and price instability of these import zones has revealed China’s lack of influence abroad, and thus spurred them to develop the type of blue-water capability that would enable them to manipulate foreign affairs far from their borders.
In November 2013, the PRC outlined a new “air-defence identification zone” within the South China Sea and demand any aircraft entering the zone comply certain rules or risk “emergency defence measures” (BBC, 2013). Encompassing several of these disputed island chains – most notably the Senakuku Islands which are claimed by Japan and Taiwan, as well as China – the new boundaries have received highly vocalised criticism. Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Fleet, condemned the manoeuvre as a “witches’ brew for miscalculations,” arguing that the “aggressive growth of the Chinese military, the lack of transparency and a pattern of increasingly assertive behaviour,” are serving only undermine regional securing (Wroe, 2014). Many states within the region, especially Japan and South Korea, are entered into defence agreements with the United States and rely on the hegemon to maintain regional security and protect the status quo. However, the PRC has been making strides to directly confront the American naval presence in an attempt to unnerve the US’ role in the South China Sea.
A curious encounter between the USS Cowpens missile cruiser and a small vessel escorting the Liaoning in international waters in December 2013 marked one of the first direct confrontations between the PLA Navy and its American counterpart. After the US cruiser ignored demands to leave the area, the Chinese ship steered itself straight in front of the Cowpens’ pathway forcing it to radically alter its course to avoid a collision. A subsequent radio conversation between respective officers ended with the US leaving the area thwarted and confused (Holmes, 2013). The incident was an immense symbolic victory for the PRC who successfully managed to bar one of the US’ most sophisticated surface ships from entering an area in its presence without having to fire a shot. Likely to be the first of many standoffs, confrontation is reflective of China’s craving to be taken more seriously as an authority within the South China Sea, and have its national interests respected in light of its newfound military hardware. Returning with a constructivist lens, this chapter will examine the social aspects of China’s desire to assert itself as a world power and how this has encouraged the modernisation of its navy around an aircraft carrier capability.
Identity
The neorealist position that pre-set identity dynamics based on the assumption of systemic anarchy make conflict an unavoidable feature of international relations, is as misleading as it is pessimistic (Gries, 2006:311). Constructivism asserts that because domestic behaviour is not solely dictated by self-help government interests, identities of actors within the state system are an integral component to determining the drivers of foreign policy decision making. Identity formation, as viewed through the constructivist lens, occurs through interaction with certain interests becoming confounded by repeated practice (Hopf, 1998). In his examination of rising tensions in Sino-American relations, Peter Gries argues that individuals tend to identify with their state in a positive manner; when it is challenged, as with China over the sovereignty of Taiwan, nationalist attitudes may create a theatre of competition which build up conflict with the challenger (Gries, 2006:311-12). In the case of China and its burgeoning obsession with achieving world status, exchanges with the United States in particular have fuelled an inferiority complex within the Chinese public. In addition to the Taiwan Strait Crisis, several other factors led to the re-emergence of anti-American sentiment throughout China during the 1990s. US opposition to Beijing as a host of the 2000 Olympic games, invitations of Taiwan’s president to speak at universities, joined with a history of confrontation with the United States have merged into a national desire to confront the western bully (Li, 2005:51). Furthermore, despite the proclaimed miracle of its phenomenal rise, a Chinese national has yet to be awarded a Nobel Prize within the field of economics. To add further insult to injury, the first Chinese winner was the dissident writer Gao Xingjian, prompting nationalist resentment of the West’s overinflated ego (Gries, 2006). An unpleasant reminder of unfair treatment during the Century of Humiliation, failure of the PRC to receive formalised reaffirmation from the outside world has led China to take measures into its own hands.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and one of the few holders of nuclear weapons, the aircraft carrier club remained one of the few elite groups symbolising great power status that China was not yet part of. With their extraordinary cost, most countries struggle to justify spending tax revenue on aircraft carriers. For China, however, obtaining national backing to bear the burden of funding was a less a question of asking, but rather responding to demand (Storey and Ji, 2004). In addition to the defensive purpose served to a country increasingly aware of its own self-worth, an aircraft carrier presence is exactly the type of political symbol desired to cement its rightful place in the global order. Before the Liaoning, even the competing emerging powers of Brazil and India had naval airborne capabilities. Thus, the Chinese people were eager to put themselves on par with foreign competitors and be more assertive against perceived injustices from around the world. Chinese identities, underlined by nationalism and growing confidence, have pushed the PRC to take measures to focus on shows of strength to increase recognition from abroad, revealing motivations to use an aircraft carrier as a symbol of its deserved place as a world power.
Agency and Structure
The co-composition of the agency-structure spectrum in the PRC regarding its desire to be recognised as a leader among nations has played a significant role in prioritising its aircraft carrier programme. Mainstream international relations theories, with assumptions concerning the inherent anarchic nature of international relations, approach the agency-structure debate by leaning heavily towards the influence of either individual actors or overhanging social structures in the determination of behaviour. Constructivism, however, contends that because competing identities and interests are always in competition for recognition, the balance between the relative sway of agents and structures is mutually determined (Checkel, 1998, Hurd, 2008). The effect to which agents can act independently of structural influences, for example, is the product of the interplay between the entities; actors involved in the PRC’s economic position share a reciprocal relationship with government superstructures. As Dali Yang contends, “while the Chinese state has played an important role in expanding the market, market expansion has, in turn helped prepare the ground for the rationalisation of the state” (cited in Pieke, 2004:517). Economic policies since the 1980s have undoubtedly been pivotal in facilitating the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule in China, but they have also empowered its domestic audience with leverage over government behaviour. In order to appease these greater interests abroad, the CCP has had to lessen its central grip and integrate “horizontal linkage between institutions in the Chinese foreign policy community” (Hao and Su, 2005:7). The resulting practice of policy coordination and consensus building has led official international decisions to be consulted between a panel of delegated departments – including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade, and other national security and defence organisations – and demonstrates the increasing realisation within the Chinese government of the multiplicity of foreign policy considerations (Ibid.).
After President Jian Zemin launched the “go out” trade policy in the 1990s, China’s international trade boomed by almost 600 percent between 2001 and 2007, with thousands of Chinese firms operating overseas in resource-rich developing countries (Economy, 2010:145). Increasingly aware of its global footprint, particularly after emerging relatively unscathed by the 2009 Recession in comparison to the West, the Chinese public raised its expectations regarding how it should be respected by other states and how its government should behave accordingly. As the result of “expanding national interests created by deeper integration into the world economy,” China’s naval modernisation, with particular attention to its aircraft carrier ambitions, sets out to cement its position as a global power in proportion to its economic strength (Glosny et al., 2010:161). Domestic agents in China have surmounted previous structural barriers to significantly enhance their role in determining the direction of the PRC’s foreign policy, demanding an aircraft carrier capability to reinforce its bid to garner global power prestige
Change
Explaining major systemic change has proved to be a major struggle for most international relations scholars. Constructivists propose that because there is a continuous contest for meanings within social groups, previously subdued interests gain relevance and momentum towards altering the status quo (Adler, 1997). Transformations in the direction of the PRC’s foreign policy since 1996, especially its shift to prioritise offensive rather than defensive naval capabilities, are reflective of developments within the Chinese domestic audience. In 2010, China overtook the United States as the world largest consumer of energy, and with urbanisation steadily on the rise, the country is likely to continue to look beyond its borders for natural resources (Economy, 2010:146). With growing awareness of its interconnected relationships with the outside world, actors within China demonstrate a deep concern for how its government behaves abroad. Suggestive of the Chinese desire to command responsibility as a global power during times of crisis, China’s carrier ambitions stretch beyond warfighting and to participate in an array of operations from disaster relief to peacekeeping. In 2008, the PRC deployed a taskforce of four ships to take part in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia, demonstrating how “even a limited power-projection capability could pay international dividends”(Glosny, et al., 2010:167) If the PRC was solely concerned with using an aircraft carrier for non-traditional naval missions – such as humanitarian aid – in order to address certain great power responsibilities, it could have followed Japan in constructing a relatively inexpensive helicopter platform. However, nationalist pressure from China’s domestic audience and military elites have steered the PRC way from a cheaper and potentially more effective option. As Ross contends, the Chinese “are seeking international prestige, rather than simply the ability to fulfil China’s reputed humanitarian responsibilities” (2010:173).
Capitalising on nationalist momentum, the PRC’s military elites also hope to garner support for a more entrepreneurial blue-water force. Having endured decades of domination from superior US ships, members of the PLA Navy seek the machinery that will enable them to assert what they believe is their rightful place in the international security balance. Despite the cryptic nature of the PLA Navy’s press releases, many analysts predict China’s naval expansion to occur in three phases: firstly securing a defensive first island chain within the South China Sea, secondly extending naval capacity outwards into the Pacific region, and finally achieving a global capability by 2050 (Economy, 2010:149, O’Rourke, 2010). With its foreign policy operating under “a new pattern characterised by increasing domestic restraints,” the governing CCP has had two evolve with the demands of infernal actors in order to preserve its leadership of the PRC (Hao and Su, 2005:2). Following a national yearning for global prestige, in light of recent the embarrassment of US superiority during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, have fuelled a dramatic change from China’s previous focus on coastline defensive to long ranging blue water naval capabilities fitting of a world power.
Concluding Comments
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis revealed that despite the PRC’s increasingly pivotal position in the world economy, it still failed to command the respect it felt deserved of a world power. As China continues its great internal expansion, actors within the state are recognising the interconnected nature of the PRC’s relationships with the outside, while growing in confidence about their position within the international system. Henry Kissinger’s works, for example, has always been highly admired by the Chinese because rather than belittling their accomplishments with a wary threat perception, they recognize China as a rising and future power and emphasize the need for collaboration (Gries, 2006:320). Its reactions to imbalanced views about western superiority, typified by the “Nobel Prize complex,” characterise China’s discontent with its subservient position in world affairs and reveal its motivation to pursue the machinery that could garner more authority and respect. A close examination of forces contributing to developments in identity, agency and structure, and change as they relate China’s aim of world power recognition exposes the underlying forces driving PLA Navy modernisation. Reflective of its goal to “democratise the US hegemonic order,” and vault over a history of grievances over unfair treatment, Chinese aircraft carrier ambitions have been integral to the countries plans to establish itself as a leading figure in international relations (Holmes, 2013).
CHAPTER VI – CONCLUSION
After millennia of inward focus, China’s destiny appears to be inextricably linked to the outside world, and its aircraft carrier ambitions are an interesting aspect of the PRC’s struggle to define itself in the twenty-first century. As Roy Bin Wong illustrates, “the symbol of China’s traditional culture is the yellow soil of the agrarian past; the symbol of China’s future is the blue ocean connecting China to the vast world beyond its borders” (Wong, 1997:197). Although fears over what Chinese aircraft carrier development implies to the current international balance of power are not entirely unfounded, solely basing key foreign policy decisions on what certain capabilities imply for self-help intentions sets a counterproductive precedent to future diplomatic efforts.
It seems only a matter of time before the United States’ hegemonic status is coherently challenged by emerging powers like the People’s Republic of China. Therefore, understanding the country’s motivations, particularly when it comes to military considerations, is incredibly important in the management of relations and negotiation of crises in the years to come. This dissertation has attempted to explain the underlying domestic factors that have contributed to the PRC’s decision to invest in an aircraft carrier capability. The constructivist approach was used because of its relevant assumptions about the multifaceted nature of international relations and recognition of domestic audiences as key instigators to international affairs. By analysing the Chinese public, this paper has revealed that the Liaoning and its predecessors are a reflection of China’s yearning for greater recognition and respect, rather than retribution, in a world that it is growing increasingly apart of. A national psyche, heavily influenced by previous traumas inflicted by foreign superpowers during the Century of Humiliation, was a key contributor to Chinese insecurities following the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Outmuscled by the United States of an issue considered fundamentally a concern of Chinese sovereignty, national outcry was instrumental to generating support for to bear the financial burden of aircraft carrier development. Moving forward, the PRC’s growing confidence regarding its status in relation to other nations has led its domestic audience to demand a more assertive presence abroad and fitting of its economic might. The symbolic power represented by the aircraft carrier was central to China’s public demand to gain an aircraft carrier capability and reflective of internal desires to achieve world power prestige.
Further areas of research could include the influence of other domestic factors, such as the significance of shipbuilding industries or historical naval traditions, and hold the potential to further unravel the fixation on aircraft carrier proliferation. Moreover, although China tends to grab more headlines, India’s naval developments in recent years have been arguably the more aggressive of the two. Knowledge of the social elements driving Indian naval policy could prove invaluable to future international relations, particularly in light of its ever-present tensions with Pakistan and its proximity to crucial sea lanes connecting the Middle East and Africa to Asia. Nonetheless, considering the importance of previously overlooked social determinants of state behaviour has led to a greater understanding of the motivations underlying China’s foreign policy. The Chinese dragon is not a volatile beast committed to uprooting the current international system, but rather an intricate creature composed of multiple identities and interests and eager to increase its role in international affairs.
