PLAN 2nd & 3rd Aircraft Carrier wager & planning

delft

Brigadier
Liaoning was built in three years and there is no reason to believe that DL is less competent than the Nikolaev shipyard was in the early '80's. So as the talk is that three flattops will be built and that PLAN will want to spread the introduction of these large vessels, but not excessively, it makes sense to built the next one too at DL. JN would be building LHD's of about the size of CdG.
The talk is also that building an aircraft carrier at DL costs six years. That is three years for building the hull and three years afloat fitting out. After the fitting out they will want to dock her again for painting the underwater part of the ship. That will then be possible in the building dock because the next hull has then be floated out and the one after that not yet been started.
BTW when was that dock last used before the hull now building was started? That will give the time after which the keel for this hull was laid ( if you can call it that - it should be: after the first module of this hull was lowered into the dock :) ).
Also: would those six years include the time modules were being fabricated before the first one was lowered into the dock?
 

kwaigonegin

Colonel
Anybody here in Shanghai or Dalian? If there are massive hirings for dock workers, welders, marine engineers etc in the proceeding next few years we know! LOL
 

Brumby

Major
?
CV-17 is meant to be 001A, aka based on the liaoning design and configuration
CV-18 would refer to 002, a new CATOBAR design

I think a lot of the variables comes down to whether one accepts the consensus that the first indigenous carrier/001A is going to be built by DL and whether the second indigenous carrier/002 is going to be built by JN.

JN is almost definitely the superior of the two and I think is widely considered by most PLA watchers to be superior as well, and may explain why the more ambitious and more original carrier is going to be built by JN rather than DL.

If 001A does turn out to have issues (remembering that it's based of 001 AKA CV16 Liaoning), one has to consider whether it is because of...
  1. 001A's design (A: too similar to Liaoning, or B: too different?) or...
  2. Is it because of DL being less competent (in other words, if 001A was built by JN would the result have been better?) or...
  3. Is it because of a more systemic problem in the actual shipbuilding industry as a whole and/or a systemic issue with subcontractors?
If 001A did turn out to have an unacceptable number of issues, that would spell likely problems for 002 if the cause were 1B or 3.
For 1B: if there are too many modifications on 001A from 001 which turned out to be poorly designed, then that could possibly mean Chinese carrier design philosophy and competency needs work and could implicate 002 as well as it would be a more original design.
For 3: if the chinese shipbuilding industry were systemically unprepared for carrier construction which resulted in problems with 001A then that could mean 002 could also be similarly implicated, depending on whether the overall industry is able to quickly learn from DL's 001A experience and apply the lessons to JN's 002.

But OTOH, if 1A and 2 were reasons for 001A's issues, then 002 may not necessarily be affected.
1A would naturally suggest that the issues with 001A is because the original Kuznetsov design was poor in the first place and would require a more radical departure from it.
2 would naturally implicate DL incompetency and leaves open the wide possibility that JN may perform better with 002.

Failure or likely difficulties encountered during the build process is not necessarily incompetence but rather it is a complex undertaking without the benefit of an experienced industrial base commensurate with the effort. I have no idea how complex and difficult it is to build a carrier but all indications are it is probably right up there in terms of scale. As such, I expect that the first indigenous build will stay close to the Liaoning design to mitigate issues and the decision on the second one will likely be put on hold until some assessment can be made from the first build. Concurrent development is highly risky and is not reflective of the approach by the PLAN to-date unless there is extenuating reason to take that path.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
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Failure or likely difficulties encountered during the build process is not necessarily incompetence but rather it is a complex undertaking without the benefit of an experienced industrial base commensurate with the effort. I have no idea how complex and difficult it is to build a carrier but all indications are it is probably right up there in terms of scale. As such, I expect that the first indigenous build will stay close to the Liaoning design to mitigate issues and the decision on the second one will likely be put on hold until some assessment can be made from the first build. Concurrent development is highly risky and is not reflective of the approach by the PLAN to-date unless there is extenuating reason to take that path.

Well, by incompetence in this case I do mean being incompetent in building a carrier effectively or to a sensible sufficient standard, in line with PLAN requirements

Concurrent development for the PLA was actually very much a hallmark of previous projects, where more indigenous developments like 052C, J-10, HQ-9 were developed while also procuring and/or developing more foreign designs or subsystems as the "backup" and less ambitious route, like 051C, J-11, S-300. I wouldn't be surprised if the carrier programme yielded a similar approach for the first few indigenous carriers.

From what you're saying it seems like the big factor in your opinion is down to how good Chinese shipbuilders are?

Regarding the "stop and assess" idea, I think there is a spectrum of rate of development which could have been applied to the carrier programme. For instance, PLAN could have been even more cautious than they are now and waited for Liaoning to be fully operational and for the experienced crew to give more reliable feedback, before applying lessons to design and build 001A. On the other side of the spectrum, PLAN might have considered a small 30,000 ton carrier designed only to fly with navalized Q-5s two decades ago (not saying that they did consider this, it's just for the purposes of illustrating the spectrum of decisions at their disposal) if they felt there was a strong need for it, even if the result of such a project would have been poor and incapable.

In other words, one really does have to consider if the PLAN's potential requirements of carriers in the next decade and two decades is enough to drive a more vigorous carrier development schedule where they may have more capabilities in a shorter time but with greater risk, a more passive one where they will achieve capabilities at a later date but can mitigate risk, or somewhere in between.

Personally I believe the circumstances of national security and projected need over the next decade and a half do necessitate an approach somewhere in the middle but erring slightly on the side of greater capability in a slightly shorter time span while accepting a degree of higher risk.
 

Equation

Lieutenant General
Anybody here in Shanghai or Dalian? If there are massive hirings for dock workers, welders, marine engineers etc in the proceeding next few years we know! LOL
Actually these workers would be hired in secrecy and security clearances especially when it involves building an aircraft carrier. Best way to look for signs of increasing activities are the numbers of recently apartment rentals near the dry dock areas for the temporary workers would be my guess.
 

Brumby

Major
Concurrent development for the PLA was actually very much a hallmark of previous projects, where more indigenous developments like 052C, J-10, HQ-9 were developed while also procuring and/or developing more foreign designs or subsystems as the "backup" and less ambitious route, like 051C, J-11, S-300. I wouldn't be surprised if the carrier programme yielded a similar approach for the first few indigenous carriers.

I disagree on two counts. Firstly, carrier development and build is effectively a class of its own. I am not sure to what extend the portability and scalability is comparable to say building a destroyer or an aircraft. Secondly, the 052C development is in my view a sum of the building block process that originated with the Type 52 (1991-93) to 51B (1997) to 52B (2002) to 51C (2004) and eventually to 52C (2003, 2010-2012). Type 052C is a sum from the experience of a number of prior builds. Any concurrent development with the indigenous carrier lacks the foundation of prior builds unlike 052C which you have quoted as an example.
 

Blitzo

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I disagree on two counts. Firstly, carrier development and build is effectively a class of its own. I am not sure to what extend the portability and scalability is comparable to say building a destroyer or an aircraft. Secondly, the 052C development is in my view a sum of the building block process that originated with the Type 52 (1991-93) to 51B (1997) to 52B (2002) to 51C (2004) and eventually to 52C (2003, 2010-2012). Type 052C is a sum from the experience of a number of prior builds. Any concurrent development with the indigenous carrier lacks the foundation of prior builds unlike 052C which you have quoted as an example.

Regarding 052C versus 051C, it is the intended capability and role which made them "concurrent". Any prior experience and capabilities doesn't change the fact that the initial two 052Cs and the first two 051Cs were built at almost the same time with differing associated risks for the same role. Obviously 052C turned out to be a much more successful design (as intended) compared to 051C, which was still very much a lower risk "back up" in case 052C experienced issues or delays. Now that the first two 052Cs were successful and were expanded into a class of six warships, 051C is very much relegated to a less primary role in air defence.
Similarly, I personally speculate that two 002 type carriers will be built, before any nuclear carriers are attempted, and the two 002s will very much supersede 001 and 001A as the navy's primary carriers once they enter service by virtue of their configuration and likely increase in displacement and newer propulsion.

Of course you're not incorrect correct in saying that aircraft carriers are very much in a class of their own, but I'd argue that current civil and military shipbuilding experience and overall industry capability is as much applicable in this case as the prior civil and military shipbuilding experience and industry capability of the early 2000s were for 051C and 052C's construction.

The point I was illustrating with the examples, is that it isn't new for the PLA to pursue near simultaneous, dual track high risk and low risk development projects with similar roles.
Whether one believes PLA will pursue the same approach for carriers, comes back down to whether one believes the Chinese shipbuilding industry is at a level of capability when it can design and near simultaneously construct two aircraft carriers likely of differing levels of ambition, with an acceptable level of risk.


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On the matter of shipbuilding industry capability, I think it's worth keeping in mind that DL refurbished and outfitted the decayed Varyag hull into Liaoning... with virtually all the subsystems being sourced indigenously and all the work (to my knowledge) performed by DL and/or other domestic groups.
Fitting out something as complicated as an aircraft carrier is arguably as difficult if not more difficult than building the empty hull and flight deck itself, and I think DL have shown they at least are competent in planning and carrying out the fitting out process -- any experience and lessons would likely have translated to JN by now (who of course have also fitted out the PLAN's primary aegis type destroyers of recent years en masse so they don't exactly lack experience and might even be more effective than DL).

So a question which might be more accurate, is whether JN and DL and the rest of the chinese shipbuilding industry are able to design, plan and construct competent aircraft hulls, flight decks, and internal structures... to be fitted out (which is something which I think we can judge as not something either DL or JN "need to prove").
 
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Brumby

Major
Regarding 052C versus 051C, it is the intended capability and role which made them "concurrent". Any prior experience and capabilities doesn't change the fact that the initial two 052Cs and the first two 051Cs were built at almost the same time with differing associated risks

It seems to me that you are conveniently ignoring that Type 52 (1991-93) to 51B (1997) to 52B (2002) served as the foundation for the initial 052C and 051C. In the indigenous carrier situation where is the initial foundation of prior builds dawn from to attempt concurrency?
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
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It seems to me that you are conveniently ignoring that Type 52 (1991-93) to 51B (1997) to 52B (2002) served as the foundation for the initial 052C and 051C. In the indigenous carrier situation where is the initial foundation of prior builds dawn from to attempt concurrency?

Actually I've acknowledged that entire relevant industries (both shipbuilding and other) prior to 052C and 051C served as their foundation... No doubt their development were made easier on the basis that they were using hull designs based off existing hulls, and with a similar case regarding powerplants, but their air defence systems did not have that benefit.
So where should one draw the line to determine whether concurrent development is feasible and how should it scale to carrier production?

Are similar hulls and powerplants the prerequisite for allowing concurrent development? Or maybe similar essential subsystems and their arrangement within a ship?
I'd argue it is neither of those specific examples but more dependent on the industry's relevant capability drawn from previous relevant experience, like how previous attempts of aircraft design and construction were important to the PRC's relevant aeronautical industries in allowing for the development of J-10 and J-11, or as previous attempts of radar and SAM design were important for the relevant industries in the development of HQ-9...

So to answer your question, in my view, "foundations" do not have to be drawn from having attempted a specific design of the exact same close type (whether it is building an empty carrier's hull or fitting out an empty carrier's hull) but more dependent on the relevant industry's overall capability that can be demonstrated in other projects demanding similar skills.
To illustrate my point, I consider current advanced shipbuilding industries like that of South Korea or Japan to also be capable of designing and constructing and fitting out carriers if they were called upon to, on the basis of their vast experience and capability in advanced civil and military construction.
Of course there are limits -- access to certain vital subsystems like nuclear propulsion or catapult technology may hinder such construction, but that has less to do with the shipbuilding industry itself (i.e.: the ability to design and produce the hulls and internal structures, and to fit them out with the relevant subsystems) than more exact subsystem industries.

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Also, at this point I think it is worth going back to my previous point about designing and fabricating a hull and internal structures, versus the fitting out and integration of subsystems for a carrier.
It's easy to say "building a carrier is in a class of its own" but in regards to the present Chinese shipbuilding industry and the experience they have, considering those two major points, it is arguably only the ability to design and fabricating a carrier sized hull with its internals which has yet to be demonstrated...
However the design and production of large sized warships (such as 071 LPD), and any advanced and complex civilian ships of large size can shed light on the possible level of competency of the industry in regards to the matter of hull/internal structure design+fabrication, and from there we can consider if the capability of the industry may be at a point where the PLAN is willing to consider a concurrent or near concurrent carrier production programme...
 
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