PLA Strike Strategies in Westpac HIC

Gloire_bb said:

You need to take firing position from a vector conductive to successful engagement, against slow target flying very low, often hiding in local terrain, trees, buildings and so on.
One may say, that Ukrainians and Americans aren't using best sensors and seekers possible. Counterargument is that shahed isn't even close to the level of mass produced stealth drone modern dark factory can manage.
Imagine hunting waves of cooled electric jet flying wings with return of around -70dB.
Offbore targeting in this situation will mostly kill local infrastructure rather than targets. Which, by the way, already happened with Dutch F-35 against a foam drone over Poland.

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I appreciate that Blitzo has said most of what needs to be said as a counterpoint to what you raised. Not going to confuse the argument by wading in.

We may be in a Vietnam situation here, where theory crafting (again) is that engagements, despite the proliferation of VLO platforms both manned and unmanned, will be successfully concluded at BVR ranges until it isn't and then the mad scramble for WVR weapons and skills ensues. We haven't really seen anything in recent years that will suggest one or the other is more likely.

One other thing, what is this F-35 taking out infrastructure you speak of? I'm only aware of an AMRAAM crashing into a farmhouse in Poland (launched by an F-16) that in no way demonstrates a HOB targeting failure.

Gloire_bb said:

It was indecisive as heck.
One side tried to be tactical and decisive, flew flying colours into WEZ. Got bloodied, and went into safe mode for the rest of the conflict, throwing absolutely safe weapons from deep interior. First day, as much a spectacle it was, accounted for ~1% of Indian air TAF even per most optimistic claims.

After that engagenemt, no one was shot down for the rest of the war...

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That's why I said the first night was decisive, but it was only indecisive because neither side had the resolve or fleet size to commit their aircraft.
Putting it another way, the fact that neither side went to continue their sorties is an example of how lethal and decisive a modern BVR air war can be.

Gloire_bb said:

I may be relying too much on WW2 maritime history as example, but rule of thumb is that for all the decisive preparations, rarely sides truly risked attritable assets (and when they did, more often than not it didn't really end well).
Occasional blood noses for expensive units, and most of war fighting done by attritable/disposable assets.

Because, even for 2 largest modern forces, which both stand at sub 2000 fleet(and production at below 200 mark, i.e. 2 aircraft per 3 days; lower rate for fighter pilots), throwing aircraftat a peer enemy isn't exactly acceptable.
To compare, for WW2, loss rates of couple of thousand aircraft per month and comparable number of crews was like...norm (and even that broke down Luftwaffe and japanese services).
Russia lost several dozen aircraft during spring 22(iirc something around 1 aircraft/day, which is a highly optimistic assumption v US/China), i.e. 1 year of its a/c production in theory(~60 for modern Russia). In practice, much more, because losses weren't spread evenly, and even after campaign switched into indecisive archery phase, additional losses continued.

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What you are describing is all writing in support of the lethality and decisiveness of a modern air war, not detracting from it.

The reason why nations might be more reluctant to participate in a large scale modern BVR air war isn't because that style of war itself is indecisive, but rather it is because it is too decisive, therefore nations and air forces prefer to conserve as much of their forces as practically possible and lose them gradually with more conservative ROEs than to use them in a large scale standing match.


The problem for a high end BVR air war for us -- which, let's be honest is just the PLA and US in a westpac conflict -- is that there are many viable circumstances where multiple hundreds of sorties can be fielded by one or both sides in pursuit of geopolitical objectives.

Gloire_bb said:

I am merely describing majority of actual engagements of last ~2 years. Which are emerging more and more urgent, as these "cruise missiles" collect spectral intel, engage targets of opportunity through AI, mesh/satellite datalinks, drop drones and supplies for sabotage teams...
It's super dangerous to split "lowly" and "knightly" air defense, because at current point "low altitude air economy" simply creates another layer of air superiority, detached from the upper one. Which really questions value of singular focus on upper layer of air dominance - what good is it on its own?

Assuming both sides use effective means of forming airspace picture and weapons - that's exactly where indecisiveness comes from. Especially since defender, usually, has basic WEZ advantage.
Decisive action can come either when (1)side are determined that intensive, risky campaign will be more beneficial to them than to the enemy, and(1.1) it actually turns out this way, and (1.2)enemy can't disengage(which land air force in a big war almost always can). Or (2)when weapons used by one of sides are actually ineffective.
Basic assumption for peer conflict is that they're effective, or effective enough.

I.e.,

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The Russian and Ukrainian conflict is a very good example of how neither side has the ability to fight a true proper modern air war commensurate with the quality of sensors, weapons and geography that exists.
So, the engagements you are describing are not relevant to a high end BVR air war between peers.

If anything it is better to start with a clean slate rather than have the sample be polluted by irrelevant data points.


As for "decisiveness" -- you are talking about the human/command decision to commit to an engagement or to preserve their forces, in leading to "indecisiveness".
I am saying that once committed, a modern BVR peer air war itself is likely to be very very decisive.

That is why the India Pakistan conflict is arguably the best example of how a modern BVR peer air war would look like -- brutal, short, and devastating. If each side had continued throwing up sorties at the other, it would not have taken long (a few days?) for one side to prevail over the other through sheer loss of airframes.

Gloire_bb said:

I think when both sides keep to this level, it leads to a stalemate, not the other way around.
The way to achieve initiative is when there's a viable path to make opponent blind, or his weapons - ineffective. If sides are peers...risktaker just loses.

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When both sides commit to what I described, it leads to one side rapidly losing their forces (because one side will inevitably have the totality in advantage of sensors, networking, weapons, fleet size) and non-graceful degradation of their sortie generating capabilities while the other side's sortie generating capability (i.e.: air frame losses) are kept at a minimum.

Blitzo said:

That's why I said the first night was decisive, but it was only indecisive because neither side had the resolve or fleet size to commit their aircraft.
Putting it another way, the fact that neither side went to continue their sorties is an example of how lethal and decisive a modern BVR air war can be.

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"Can".
1930s were full of decisive maneuvers by great navies (famously, RN in mediterranean, some of more crazy fleet problems in US; japanese preparations). Everything was to be solved in a great decisive battle; cruisers "torpedoed" whole battle divisions, destroyers performed daring charges, everyone was having fun for public money. Until it wasn't.

Very early in mediterranean war, Pakistani J-10CWarspite gets effective gunnery in july 1940 on Cesare off Calabria, showing that long range gunfire is potentially effective. Italians get bloodied, lose couple dozen men, disengage.
There's effectively no further battleship gunnery duels on theater till the very end of the war. Italians carefully chose their engagements, don't let their heavy units to stray out at night (especially after losing whole heavy cruiser division to it), and throw submarines and planes at problems. It isn't like sides are absolutely protective of their heavy units: they still seek out each other. Just carefully and with 90 considerations. Until conditions for Great Decisive Engagement are met, however, sides throw planes and stuff at each other.
And as we know, whole war gets decided by attritable planes, submarines and light forces. Mathematically, and many years later.

After few encounters here and there(germans play really boldly despite Spee, and for a while get away with it), in 1941 Bismarck destroys Hood in few minutes of gunfire. Couple days later, gets lost itself, completely irreplaceable. Then naval war will continue for 4 more years, as neither brits really want to end up on the receiving end, nor germans want to lose their units decisively. They eventually will get Sharnhortst to re-learn the lesson, but it'll take years of careful in-and-out under attritable bombers, submarines and special forces.

Pacific war is even more striking, but such a short summary for it is just impossible. I think you know how it went on without me anyway.

Blitzo said:

What you are describing is all writing in support of the lethality and decisiveness of a modern air war, not detracting from it.

The reason why nations might be more reluctant to participate in a large scale modern BVR air war isn't because that style of war itself is indecisive, but rather it is because it is too decisive, therefore nations and air forces prefer to conserve as much of their forces as practically possible and lose them gradually with more conservative ROEs than to use them in a large scale standing match.

Click to expand...

If something is so dangerous as to result in doubts and qualm, it is the very definition of indecisiveness.
Machine gun is one hell of effective and decisive weapon, killing rows of attacking infantry with just a couple of men. But it results in a stalemate - even with absolutely replaceable ww1 men.
Even at Chinese peacetime speed - you can't sustain decisive campaign, losing a dozen planes per day, for long. You can do it for one campaign, sure - but so can your opponent, and what comes next? Even more, what to do when, say, american aircraft production is mostly out of interference reach, but Shenyang, Xi'an and Chengdu are disruptable. What to do when force regeneration may not in fact reach desired speeds?

Next comes throwing things that can be produced, thrown out at will, and production of which can not be disrupted. Planes use comes down to a replenishable tempo. This doesn't mean they can't be used - it's just that modern aircraft production tempo is more like ww2 light surface vessel production (corvettes, frigates/DEs, submarines, destroyers at most). You can risk them, but you try not to lose more than you get. Gambling is done by reckless nations, who are certain that they don't have production capacity to play longer and safer. Sometimes with great success - but overall, all decisive gamblers historically failed.

Blitzo said:

I am saying that once committed, a modern BVR peer air war itself is likely to be very very decisive.

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But experience, again, says otherwise. Sides just don't get into ranges where they can't survive.
And again - Indopakistani brawl was anything but decisive. Exactly because only one side even tried to commit, failed, and then both went to throw things at each other. It didn't lose nowhere near enough airframes to have operational impact - it isn't WW2 carrier battle where sides don't retreat, attack regardless of circumstances, and pilots are taught to treat themselves as disposables.
Because it doesn't really matter whether they live or not, what matters is whether carrier does. If it will - someone maybe will pick you up. If it won't - even if you bail into sea, sharks will still get their meal.
But this is a rare historical exception.

Blitzo said:

When both sides commit to what I described, it leads to one side rapidly losing their forces (because one side will inevitably have the totality in advantage of sensors, networking, weapons, fleet size) and non-graceful degradation of their sortie generating capabilities while the other side's sortie generating capability (i.e.: air frame losses) are kept at a minimum.

Click to expand...

This isn't numbers game. There is saturation point, when sensory/killchain network is dense enough to force enough costs on risk takers. After that saturation point, everything else turns into force deployment game - move them closer/further to reach desired loss rate.

Attempts to pursue advantage in this case all turn into gambles - i.e. attacker first commits to taking heavy losses, which maybe will bring heavier rewards.
And every bad attempt gets immediate political/internal pushback.

If there is any hope for decisiveness - it's really that new generation of planes will break information environment, making it inefficient enough to decisively collapse it without taking unacceptable risks. Which is in essense commiting to USAF(aka strongest air force in the world), together with parasitic partner air forces(all from rich and technologically developed nations, with clue on what's going on) being absolutely paralized for years to come. This is just unlikely.
What's more likely, however, is when great sides miss shift, like it happened in 1940 in Ardennes - because learning from Spain and Khalkin Gol was beyond true powers and best armed forces. After that, irony wasn't even in what happened in France. Irony was that it happened again, a whole year later, in exact same disastrous manner, against weak Japan(Khalkin Gol again), in Malaya. Because someone was too white to learn.

TLDR: i don't think ubiqutous information space is anything good for decisiveness, unless there is a reliable way to collapse it down, or there's a way to make long range weapons ineffective.
Long range engagement in transparent battlefield are an epytome of indecisiveness. Not because they're ineffective - but because when they are, sides move out even further, and dug in.
The way to break stalemate is already emerging - and it's emerging "underneath" advanced fighters, mostly because the task isn't seen as knightly enough. But it doesn't matter fi it's knightly or not - as both high and low air can bring effects of air superiority. At best. they cancel out each other. In most cases, low air appears to be the priority one, because for all its weakness(coming from relative novelty), it brings effects cheaper.

Gloire_bb said:

"Can".
1930s were full of decisive maneuvers by great navies (famously, RN in mediterranean, some of more crazy fleet problems in US; japanese preparations). Everything was to be solved in a great decisive battle; cruisers "torpedoed" whole battle divisions, destroyers performed daring charges, everyone was having fun for public money. Until it wasn't.

Very early in mediterranean war, Pakistani J-10CWarspite gets effective gunnery in july 1940 on Cesare off Calabria, showing that long range gunfire is potentially effective. Italians get bloodied, lose couple dozen men, disengage.
There's effectively no further battleship gunnery duels on theater till the very end of the war. Italians carefully chose their engagements, don't let their heavy units to stray out at night (especially after losing whole heavy cruiser division to it), and throw submarines and planes at problems. It isn't like sides are absolutely protective of their heavy units: they still seek out each other. Just carefully and with 90 considerations. Until conditions for Great Decisive Engagement are met, however, sides throw planes and stuff at each other.
And as we know, whole war gets decided by attritable planes, submarines and light forces. Mathematically, and many years later.

After few encounters here and there(germans play really boldly despite Spee, and for a while get away with it), in 1941 Bismarck destroys Hood in few minutes of gunfire. Couple days later, gets lost itself, completely irreplaceable. Then naval war will continue for 4 more years, as neither brits really want to end up on the receiving end, nor germans want to lose their units decisively. They eventually will get Sharnhortst to re-learn the lesson, but it'll take years of careful in-and-out under attritable bombers, submarines and special forces.

Pacific war is even more striking, but such a short summary for it is just impossible. I think you know how it went on without me anyway.


If something is so dangerous as to result in doubts and qualm, it is the very definition of indecisiveness.
Machine gun is one hell of effective and decisive weapon, killing rows of attacking infantry with just a couple of men. But it results in a stalemate - even with absolutely replaceable ww1 men.
Even at Chinese peacetime speed - you can't sustain decisive campaign, losing a dozen planes per day, for long. You can do it for one campaign, sure - but so can your opponent, and what comes next? Even more, what to do when, say, american aircraft production is mostly out of interference reach, but Shenyang, Xi'an and Chengdu are disruptable. What to do when force regeneration may not in fact reach desired speeds?

Next comes throwing things that can be produced, thrown out at will, and production of which can not be disrupted. Planes use comes down to a replenishable tempo. This doesn't mean they can't be used - it's just that modern aircraft production tempo is more like ww2 light surface vessel production (corvettes, frigates/DEs, submarines, destroyers at most). You can risk them, but you try not to lose more than you get. Gambling is done by reckless nations, who are certain that they don't have production capacity to play longer and safer. Sometimes with great success - but overall, all decisive gamblers historically failed.


But experience, again, says otherwise. Sides just don't get into ranges where they can't survive.
And again - Indopakistani brawl was anything but decisive. Exactly because only one side even tried to commit, failed, and then both went to throw things at each other. It didn't lose nowhere near enough airframes to have operational impact - it isn't WW2 carrier battle where sides don't retreat, attack regardless of circumstances, and pilots are taught to treat themselves as disposables.
Because it doesn't really matter whether they live or not, what matters is whether carrier does. If it will - someone maybe will pick you up. If it won't - even if you bail into sea, sharks will still get their meal.
But this is a rare historical exception.

This isn't numbers game. There is saturation point, when sensory/killchain network is dense enough to force enough costs on risk takers. After that saturation point, everything else turns into force deployment game - move them closer/further to reach desired loss rate.

Attempts to pursue advantage in this case all turn into gambles - i.e. attacker first commits to taking heavy losses, which maybe will bring heavier rewards.
And every bad attempt gets immediate political/internal pushback.

If there is any hope for decisiveness - it's really that new generation of planes will break information environment, making it inefficient enough to decisively collapse it without taking unacceptable risks. Which is in essense commiting to USAF(aka strongest air force in the world), together with parasitic partner air forces(all from rich and technologically developed nations, with clue on what's going on) being absolutely paralized for years to come. This is just unlikely.
What's more likely, however, is when great sides miss shift, like it happened in 1940 in Ardennes - because learning from Spain and Khalkin Gol was beyond true powers and best armed forces. After that, irony wasn't even in what happened in France. Irony was that it happened again, a whole year later, in exact same disastrous manner, against weak Japan(Khalkin Gol again), in Malaya. Because someone was too white to learn.

TLDR: i don't think ubiqutous information space is anything good for decisiveness, unless there is a reliable way to collapse it down, or there's a way to make long range weapons ineffective.
Long range engagement in transparent battlefield are an epytome of indecisiveness. Not because they're ineffective - but because when they are, sides move out even further, and dug in.
The way to break stalemate is already emerging - and it's emerging "underneath" advanced fighters, mostly because the task isn't seen as knightly enough. But it doesn't matter fi it's knightly or not - as both high and low air can bring effects of air superiority. At best. they cancel out each other. In most cases, low air appears to be the priority one, because for all its weakness(coming from relative novelty), it brings effects cheaper.

Click to expand...

Everything you've written here is simply describing strategic and political level decisions for why battle was not chosen or avoided using other means rather than to risk assets in potentially force-destroying battles if a battle did not go in their favour.

You wrote in #1540 "Here is wast majority of modern air to air combat. Pay attention to vector, range and altitude" as if it was an example of a peer level modern BVR air war (which it was not), and in #1542 followed it up by saying the more outrageous statement "One of basic traits of peer long range combat appears that it's indecisive, and decisive action role increasingly gets transferred to those who can."


This is fundamentally incorrect. Modern BVR combat (as well as various examples of past forms of battle which you listed) is very devastatingly decisive -- the problem is not in the form of combat itself, but rather the strategic and political level willingness of air forces to fight in such a battle which is so decisive in nature where they may risk losing large parts of their force.



The indecisiveness you are talking about is at the strategic and political levels of decision making where nations will seek to achieve their goals by other, less risky means to preserve as much of their (air) force as possible.
The fact they seek to preserve their air force in that way is by very nature supportive of the devastating and decisive nature of modern BVR air war, because all it takes is a few days of persistent air war where one side has a worse exchange ratio, and then the losing side will essentially fully cede the ability to contest the air due to loss of airframes.

In context of the conflict scenarios we are interested in (high end westpac conflict which is basically the only scenario where a high end peer BVR air war could properly occur at scale), the question shouldn't be "is modern BVR air war decisive" -- because the answer is yes.
Rather the question should be "is there a permutation/scenario of a high end westpac conflict where modern BVR air war can be avoided by the participants in context of the likely strategic and political objectives".

Or to sum up -- if a high end BVR peer air war constitutes an "unacceptable risk" then that by definition means that a high end BVR peer air wars are decisive.


Edit: finally, this discussion about BVR combat emerged out of the original topic about the role of WVR BFM in modern contests for air superiority, where others rightfully made the argument that WVR BFM in peacetime is not reflective of how a modern peer air war would occur as such a contest would be done in BVR.

To be honest your posts in this thread criticising the decisiveness of modern BVR doesn't even seem to be in relation to WVR or even about peer air forces, instead you are coming in with some strange argument that almost seems to be suggesting that contests for air superiority between tactical fighter aircraft is not a reflection of how modern air combat will be, but instead are reflected in interception missions against cruise missiles and low end suicide drones???

I am truly confused as to how your topic is relevant at all to what was discussed prior.


This will be my last post on the topic.
I'll give you the last word, and then I'll consider the discussion finished.

Blitzo said:

You wrote in #1540 "Here is wast majority of modern air to air combat. Pay attention to vector, range and altitude" as if it was an example of a peer level modern BVR air war (which it was not), and in #1542 followed it up by saying the more outrageous statement "One of basic traits of peer long range combat appears that it's indecisive, and decisive action role increasingly gets transferred to those who can."

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It is same by proxy - in Ukraine, Ukrainian F-16 MLU firing AIM-120C-8 (which is a reasonable proxy for ~30-40% of China's fighter fleet), supported by concentrated Ukrainian(often west provided) and NATO aerial assets, engages a typical modern one way drone. In Iranian conflict, US conflicts engaged absolutely same drones, in absolutely similar manner, though in a much more favorable geographical setup.
Or, recently, in Poland, when NATO forces (with 3rd grade fighters like F-35As firing AIM-120D-3 and Sidewinder X) engaged similar drones directly - with well known success(hopeless fraction of daily ukrainian/russian one despite engaging only fraction of daily normal, that is). Turned out, throwing killchain abbreviations at styrfoam planes isn't as effective as it sounds. And yes, dudes with ww1 maxim guns and handheld lights appear to be better than F-35. Here goes the sarcasm.

BVR engagements also happen quite often during last few years - be it two conflicts between India and Pakistan, or endless BVR over LOC in Ukraine, resulting in a handful of planes shot down per season. Are Su-35s, Su-57s hopelessly outdated, or are PAC-3s and NASAMS missiles aren't modern enough? Like, PLAAF isn't exactly known for A-A APKWS either yet, and its weapons are of 2010s era; all the same noise gates probably apply, as that was just too early for what emerged later. Continuous lack of enthusiasm for WVR missiles also doesn't inspire optimism.

Like, Chinese history is quite full of denial of barbaric developments in warfighting (with consistently superb consequences), and I really hope, given what we saw on sept. 3 (whole system of everything and more against drones), that this is just forum opinion.
Aka, i am very much looking forward to chinese fighters and helicopters firing chinese rocket guidance kits at target drones.
Long lists of abbreviations leading to pK of 4/24 (recent Poland, rate of success sufficient for even that small attack to balckout entire eastern europe, by the way) are less relevant.

Blitzo said:

The indecisiveness you are talking about is at the strategic and political levels of decision making where nations will seek to achieve their goals by other, less risky means to preserve as much of their (air) force as possible.
The fact they seek to preserve their air force in that way is by very nature supportive of the devastating and decisive nature of modern BVR air war, because all it takes is a few days of persistent air war where one side has a worse exchange ratio, and then the losing side will essentially fully cede the ability to contest the air due to loss of airframes.

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The answer is exactly no! You're looking at how weapons perform, but what we should look at is how people react to it! Weapons count as decisive not when they kill well, but when people can't run away from them. Otherwise, it's archery competition.

Sides consistently don't commit to decisive combat, and instead prefer it being indecisive, but sustainable.
Many tried over and over to go decisive, and form a very simple logical split:
a, weapons are effective - casualties sustained, unsustainable operations cease.
b, weapons are ineffective - go on, bomb Tehran.

I.e. decisive form is when long range weapons are ineffective. Indesisive - when the opposite is the case. With development going towards, who could've thought, making long range weapons ineffective again(aka stand off and massed drones).

I understand that you are cautious about scale and degree, assuming that it may not apply to highly concentrated operations (Taiwan). It's reasonable. But this is a special subset and almost unique situation even for US-China peer conflict (well, unless we wargame South Korea for some reason). Everything else is again un-concentrated, stretched and attrited over distance and time. And - different.
Yes, PLAAF is like ~x2 effective tactical strength of VKS or CENTCOM+friends, with x3...5 information support assets over them. It's enemies are more potent, though, it's going to be spread over, and fight will be over a very inconvenient terrain.

Gloire_bb said:

It is same by proxy - in Ukraine, Ukrainian F-16 MLU firing AIM-120C-8 (which is a reasonable proxy for ~30-40% of China's fighter fleet), supported by concentrated Ukrainian(often west provided) and NATO aerial assets, engages a typical modern one way drone. In Iranian conflict, US conflicts engaged absolutely same drones, in absolutely similar manner, though in a much more favorable geographical setup.
Or, recently, in Poland, when NATO forces (with 3rd grade fighters like F-35As firing AIM-120D-3 and Sidewinder X) engaged similar drones directly - with well known success(hopeless fraction of daily ukrainian/russian one despite engaging only fraction of daily normal, that is). Turned out, throwing killchain abbreviations at styrfoam planes isn't as effective as it sounds. And yes, dudes with ww1 maxim guns and handheld lights appear to be better than F-35. Here goes the sarcasm.

BVR engagements also happen quite often during last few years - be it two conflicts between India and Pakistan, or endless BVR over LOC in Ukraine, resulting in a handful of planes shot down per season. Are Su-35s, Su-57s hopelessly outdated, or are PAC-3s and NASAMS missiles aren't modern enough? Like, PLAAF isn't exactly known for A-A APKWS either yet, and its weapons are of 2010s era; all the same noise gates probably apply, as that was just too early for what emerged later. Continuous lack of enthusiasm for WVR missiles also doesn't inspire optimism.

Like, Chinese history is quite full of denial of barbaric developments in warfighting (with consistently superb consequences), and I really hope, given what we saw on sept. 3 (whole system of everything and more against drones), that this is just forum opinion.
Aka, i am very much looking forward to chinese fighters and helicopters firing chinese rocket guidance kits at target drones.
Long lists of abbreviations leading to pK of 4/24 (recent Poland, rate of success sufficient for even that small attack to balckout entire eastern europe, by the way) are less relevant.

The answer is exactly no! You're looking at how weapons perform, but what we should look at is how people react to it! Weapons count as decisive not when they kill well, but when people can't run away from them. Otherwise, it's archery competition.

Sides consistently don't commit to decisive combat, and instead prefer it being indecisive, but sustainable.
Many tried over and over to go decisive, and form a very simple logical split:
a, weapons are effective - casualties sustained, unsustainable operations cease.
b, weapons are ineffective - go on, bomb Tehran.

I.e. decisive form is when long range weapons are ineffective. Indesisive - when the opposite is the case. With development going towards, who could've thought, making long range weapons ineffective again(aka stand off and massed drones).

I understand that you are cautious about scale and degree, assuming that it may not apply to highly concentrated operations (Taiwan). It's reasonable. But this is a special subset and almost unique situation even for US-China peer conflict (well, unless we wargame South Korea for some reason). Everything else is again un-concentrated, stretched and attrited over distance and time. And - different.
Yes, PLAAF is like ~x2 effective tactical strength of VKS or CENTCOM+friends, with x3...5 information support assets over them. It's enemies are more potent, though, it's going to be spread over, and fight will be over a very inconvenient terrain.

Click to expand...

I've moved the prior posts to the PLA westpac HIC thread, where the discussion can be continued in some form without detracting from the Flanker thread.

I will focus on this part:

Sides consistently don't commit to decisive combat, and instead prefer it being indecisive, but sustainable.
Many tried over and over to go decisive, and form a very simple logical split:
a, weapons are effective - casualties sustained, unsustainable operations cease.
b, weapons are ineffective - go on, bomb Tehran.

Click to expand...

By definition, what you are saying is that modern BVR combat is decisive, because if the weapons are effective, then one side will have to cease their unsustainable operations by virtue of losing their ability to effectively fight/conduct operations/put up sorties.
The side which is able to sustain their operations is the victor.

The fact that nations are capable of avoiding decisive combat (such as high end BVR air war) is a reflection of national political and strategic decision making, and associated appetite for risk.

No one denies that nations will seek to use less costly and less risky means of attaining objectives if such options are available. History has proven that. You don't need to give examples of that to convince me, I am well aware of it.

We are all speaking of high end modern BVR in context of accepting that such a mode of conflict is unable to be avoided in pursuant of political or strategic objectives.

One might argue "Oh well maybe the PLA and/or US will use other ways to try and achieve their goals" -- yeah great, but what if they can't?
What if the permutations of all the other multi-domain factors and fires and defenses still requires a high end contest for air superiority to occur?
That is the unspoken assumption of all of these discussions, ranging from usual talks about current fighter developments, to future 6th gen platforms, to new CCAs and UADFs and AEW&C and EW etc. Because without that assumption, then all discussion will basically just boil down to "why bother with trying to symmetrically contest air superiority to begin with?"



As for the role of suicide drones -- I have nothing particularly against their role in modern warfare overall.
I think they can be an affordable means of providing long range fires which are essentially poverty cruise missiles, which against an unprepared opponent can cause them to use cost-inefficient ways of defending against them.

However I find it very objectionable that you view the role of suicide drones (and the defense against them) as if they are even in the same breath as talking about peer contests for air superiority between tactical fighter aircraft which was the topic of discussion in the Flanker thread.

Gloire_bb said:

I understand that you are cautious about scale and degree, assuming that it may not apply to highly concentrated operations (Taiwan). It's reasonable. But this is a special subset and almost unique situation even for US-China peer conflict (well, unless we wargame South Korea for some reason). Everything else is again un-concentrated, stretched and attrited over distance and time. And - different.
Yes, PLAAF is like ~x2 effective tactical strength of VKS or CENTCOM+friends, with x3...5 information support assets over them. It's enemies are more potent, though, it's going to be spread over, and fight will be over a very inconvenient terrain.

Click to expand...

With Ukraine-Russia and India, they have the strategic depth to relocate aircraft to distant rear area airbases, and rely on GBAD to deny opposing aircraft from overflying their respective territory

But this doesn't apply to the geography of the Western Pacific, as there is no/little strategic depth.
So the defending air force in the 1IC has to stand and fight, because there is nowhere to retreat to.

(Plus I see Japan as a larger version of Taiwan)

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So in the 1IC, the vast majority of targets are:

1. within the 2000-2500km range of low-cost Shaheed-type munitions, and we see up to 800 launched in a salvo in Ukraine.
2. within 100km of the coastline. So aircraft can remain safely offshore and still launch a) low-cost glide bombs and b) ARMs targeting air defences.

If the Chinese Air Force can achieve local air superiority (over water offshore), that means all the airbases and seaports in the 1IC can be made non-operational, and the aircraft destroyed on the ground.

That is a decisive advantage, as the opposing Air Force is decimated (like what we've seen with the Ukrainian Air Force). There is also no way to resupply/regenerate because those islands in the 1IC are now under effective blockade.

So it makes sense for the Chinese Air Force to push for local air superiority over the 1IC, even if it results in losses.

In comparison, mainland China has too many aircraft, air defences and also airbases available in depth. So the Chinese military can a) resupply and regenerate frontline airbases after an attack and b) still provide air cover from airbases located a little bit further to the rear. So there is no way for the US to realistically conduct decisive aerial combat operations.

AndrewS said:

With Ukraine-Russia and India, they have the strategic depth to relocate aircraft to distant rear area airbases, and rely on GBAD to deny opposing aircraft from overflying their respective territory

But this doesn't apply to the geography of the Western Pacific, as there is no/little strategic depth.
So the defending air force in the 1IC has to stand and fight, because there is nowhere to retreat to.

(Plus I see Japan as a larger version of Taiwan)

---

So in the 1IC, the vast majority of targets are:

1. within the 2000-2500km range of low-cost Shaheed-type munitions, and we see up to 800 launched in a salvo in Ukraine.
2. within 100km of the coastline. So aircraft can remain safely offshore and still launch a) low-cost glide bombs and b) ARMs targeting air defences.

If the Chinese Air Force can achieve local air superiority (over water offshore), that means all the airbases and seaports in the 1IC can be made non-operational, and the aircraft destroyed on the ground.

That is a decisive advantage, as the opposing Air Force is decimated (like what we've seen with the Ukrainian Air Force). There is also no way to resupply/regenerate because those islands in the 1IC are now under effective blockade.

So it makes sense for the Chinese Air Force to push for local air superiority over the 1IC, even if it results in losses.

In comparison, mainland China has too many aircraft, air defences and also airbases available in depth. So the Chinese military can a) resupply and regenerate frontline airbases after an attack and b) still provide air cover from airbases located a little bit further to the rear. So there is no way for the US to realistically conduct decisive aerial combat operations.

Click to expand...

To add to this point, even in 1988 the USAF would have been hard pressed to strike at all critical targets in China while possessing superiority in technology, in a modern environment where China has numerical superiority and technical parity/superiority of its own the US would be more like the Germans in Operation Bagration or the Japanese in the Marianas. This will be even clearer when the Type 095 subs reach mass production because by then the PLA would have shored up the remainder of any lingering technical limitations for a total war scenario.

Blitzo said:

As for the role of suicide drones -- I have nothing particularly against their role in modern warfare overall.
I think they can be an affordable means of providing long range fires which are essentially poverty cruise missiles, which against an unprepared opponent can cause them to use cost-inefficient ways of defending against them.

However I find it very objectionable that you view the role of suicide drones (and the defense against them) as if they are even in the same breath as talking about peer contests for air superiority between tactical fighter aircraft which was the topic of discussion in the Flanker thread.

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I wouldn't describe them as "poverty" cruise missiles.

There are serious production bottlenecks for high-end cruise missiles, but it's far easier to ramp up production of Shaheed-types, which are also far cheaper and comparable in cost to a glide bomb.

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In Ukraine, we now see salvoes of up to 800 Shaheed-types, which are now the primary long-range strike missiles.

And I recall a study that even without any local air support and SEAD/DEAD, 1 in 6 are getting through.

And that in terms of [cost per target hit], the Shaheeds are comparable to high-end missiles. Albeit the Shaheeds have a much smaller warhead.

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Even if the defenders are prepared for the Shaheeds, if they also face aircraft hunting those air defences, I don't see the air defence surviving after they reveal themselves.

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Plus there are so many potential targets which won't have any nearby air defences.

I've read some excellent posts by the experts on this forum and jotted down some of my own thoughts. I hope to receive some constructive criticism.

1. The Root Cause of Sino-American Conflict

There is a narrative known as the Thucydides Trap, used to spread rumors that China seeks to disrupt peace in the Asia-Pacific region and invade Taiwan. Specifically, it suggests that when a challenger rises to threaten the status of an incumbent power, the two nations become more likely to engage in direct military conflict. However, in reality, the United States is the current challenger to the international order, while China is the incumbent power.

The peaceful, free-trade, globalized world order that existed from the end of the Cold War until the mid-2010s. China has no reason to actively undermine its own interests by destroying an international order from which it has gained the most benefits. China will prevail over the United States within this very order that America itself established. Therefore, the rational grand strategy for the United States is to alter the previous world order of peace, free trade, and globalization, using military means to counterbalance China's development. China, with no other choice, must also employ military means to defend peace and an international order favorable to itself.

2. Paths to Victory for China and the United States

I contend that China's path to victory (merely one possibility, not a guarantee of capability) lies in preventing the United States and its allies from penetrating the Second Island Chain, the South China Sea, and Central Asia. China can leverage its surplus industrial capacity to deplete allies' military assets—which are difficult to replenish—through protracted warfare, while expanding its area of denial through ground occupation. This strategy aims to compensate for tactical disadvantages with strategic superiority.

America's path to victory (similarly) involves penetrating these regions as deeply as possible. By disrupting raw material supply chains and conducting strategic bombing campaigns, the United States aims to reduce China's production capacity below its own level. This strategy seeks to reverse strategic disadvantages through a series of tactical victories.

The core debate centers on the contest between China's denial capabilities and allied invasion capabilities.

I broadly agree, but wish to add the following points:

a. U.S. production capacity is underestimated. If the U.S. were to forcibly requisition EU production capacity and manpower, these entities lack both the political will and defensive capabilities to resist. As long as vassal states lack the capacity to confront their overlords, disrupting ties with them incurs no net loss. A rational U.S. has every reason to pursue this approach—and indeed has already begun doing so. Under such circumstances, production capacity between the two sides may converge toward greater parity.

b. Tactical victories can compensate for strategic disadvantages. Early in WWII, Allied production capacity and troop strength vastly exceeded Germany's, yet Germany ultimately conquered Europe, significantly offsetting its resource and manpower shortfalls. If the U.S. launches a decisive surprise attack against China's land, sea, space, financial systems, and networks, it could severely weaken China's anti-access capabilities and military assets. This would facilitate U.S. blockade and strategic bombing campaigns against China, thereby undermining America's own production capacity advantage. A decisive surprise attack at war's outset would be catastrophic for China.

3. Timelines and Preparations Based on Paths to Victory

Militarily, Taiwan is not the root cause of conflict in the Western Pacific—merely the trigger. The fundamental cause lies in differing world order perceptions: America's political goal is maintaining unipolar hegemony, while China's is development.

Consider a model where East Asia's relative military strength against the U.S. grows over time. Define:

D = Time of conflict onset

Phase 1 = China lacks first island chain denial capability against the U.S. (Before mid-2010s)

Phase 2 = China achieves reliable first island chain denial but lacks second island chain capability.

Phase 3 = China achieves reliable second island chain denial but lacks 2.5 island chain capability.

Phase 4 = China reliably denies the U.S. within the 2.5th island chain but still lacks the capability to deny the U.S. in the 3rd island chain.

Phase 5 = China's naval power surpasses the U.S. on the high seas.

My personal assessment is that China is in the late Phase 2 or early Phase 3. Given that Dongda's relative military strength against the U.S. increases over time, the rational approach is to indefinitely delay war until the latest possible phase—until its military strength reaches its peak or achieves Phase 5.

America's “rational” approach is to provoke conflict with China as early as possible. However, the U.S. is not yet prepared for war and does not wish to engage directly. Before it is ready, America needs to weaken China through two means—or prepare for conflict:

Weaken China through hard power: Suppose China's military strength grows at a rate v0 relative to the United States. A rational strategy would be to employ non-war military actions, organize allies, and deteriorate China's military environment—offset China's military progress at a rate v1 greater than v0.

Weaken China through soft power (order): Shape an unstable Asia-Pacific order.

The U.S. can act on hard power to worsen China's military environment. Since China's military strength is insufficient to deter the U.S., China must intervene directly, using force to defend peace. The U.S. can then accuse China of undermining Asia-Pacific peace, amplify regional instability narratives, and weaken China through soft power. This cycle repeats.

For example, the Philippines, at U.S. urging, violates China's sovereignty. China finds itself unable to persuade them to cease such actions and must resort to non-war military means to uphold its rights (hard power). The U.S. and Philippines then hype tensions in the South China Sea, undermining the existing order of peace and development (order). Some Southeast Asian nations might then be swayed by this narrative, permitting the U.S. to establish more military bases and provoking increased maritime law enforcement clashes with China (hard power). Consequently, Southeast Asia's stability would further deteriorate (order).

The sovereignty, law enforcement, and diplomatic battles surrounding Taiwan follow a similar pattern.

China must enhance its capacity to counter U.S. non-war military operations. Once China achieves this, and the U.S. realizes that non-war military means cannot contain China—that China's military strength will irreversibly rise relative to its own—the U.S. may become less resistant to war. If they don't, that's even better, as it means China can delay further and accumulate strength.

4. The Logic of the Trigger
Personally, I believe it may resemble World War I. Facing a rising Russia, Germany perceived time as working against them. They judged that launching war now still offered a chance of victory, while further delay would inevitably disadvantage them. They did not desire war, but they desired peace even less. Though they did not actively provoke the conflict, they did not resist it either. In the crisis, they chose a hardline response, even knowing it essentially meant war.

In a specific crisis—such as a maritime law enforcement clash or the downing of a government official's aircraft—the United States could very well adopt a similar stance. There would undoubtedly be a period of diplomatic maneuvering, but both sides would simultaneously engage in mobilization and preparations for war. When hostilities commence, each side would launch surprise attacks while also being prepared to defend against the other's surprise assault.