I think we've reached the crux of our disagreement. Let me try explaining this with a tableLaunching tactical nukes at intercontinental ranges is fine, but you will not be about to launch more tactical nukes to the enemy's homeland than the enemy can launch to your homeland by virtue of the forces that they will have in your periphery at the onset of a conflict due to greater availability and variety of launch platforms (ships, submarines, bombers, and carriers) and much cheaper and varying warhead delivery vehicles (cruise missiles, regional range IRBMs/HGVs, or freefall guided nuclear weapons, dependent on launch platform of course).
When all you have are ICBMs (which are also a valuable delivery vehicle for your strategic nuclear warheads that you have to preserve a large force of ICBMs for!), against the opfor's variety of tactical nuclear weapon types that the PLA faces, it is not in the PLA's interest to seek to be the first to use tactical nuclear weapons.
Acceptable damage | Unacceptable damage | |
Success | China doesn't use nukes | Possible Chinese first use of tactical nukes |
Failure | N/A (transition to right) | Certain Chinese first use of strategic nukes |
The lower left just transitions into the lower right, because if the PLA can't defend China then acceptable damage will soon become unacceptable damage (that or China surrenders unconditionally). The lower right is what we all agree on. That leaves the upper right, which is the crux of our disagreement.
I hold that in the way you conceive of it, it's an impossible scenario. It's impossible for the US to have its forward postured tactical nuclear weapons (and not just a few remnant submarines) at a sufficient level to still hold an asymmetric advantage over China and have the PLA still be considered "successful". So either the US's advantages at the tactical nuclear level have been wiped out or we transition into the lower right (i.e., the PLA has failed).
I don't believe a conflict can be won if this vulnerability isn't addressed to a very high level. If China loses its industrial might then it's setting itself up for catastrophe down the road no matter how well the first Pacific war goes for it.But it does mean that operating under the assumption that somehow targets on Chinese soil are able to be invulnerable or deterred from being struck, is not a realistic luxury that is worthwhile being afforded, and should instead be viewed as a necessary conflict condition to be integrated into conflict projections.
Well here's the other thing, the US has a price to pay and risks to run if it wants to keep the entire Pacific lol. Sure, everybody wants an empire when they can get it for free, it's when they start having to pay for it that things get more complicated. I'm sure I don't need to tell you given your job and the circles you frequent how much more complicated things are getting.Well that's the thing, the US doesn't want "just its half" lol.
This isn't about what the US wants, it's about what the US is going to get.
An an overwhelming majority (if not the totality) of Americans with them. Make sure that factors into your calculations and remains at the forefront of your public's consciousness.or sentencing an overwhelming majority of the Chinese population to death and radiation sickness, I cannot see how one would prefer the latter.
Then we're in the upper left cell of the table I drew above and everything's just fine, no use of nuclear weapons by anybody and China gets what it wants.The US will lose if the PRC chooses to conduct an operation to de-throne the US in the Pacific. While the US would most certainly do its best to inflict a heavy toll on the PLA in the process, and upon the PRC as a whole - it would not randomly kill itself by launching a first-use nuclear strike on the PRC and guaranteeing retaliation.
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