Xi Yazhou analyzing DF-26s vs Guam and America's strategy of reviving old WWII era airports. Now, some of them are quite small, not really suitable for what seems to be more than short 24 hour usage.
It does seem to me that H-6K and cruise missile threats here often get ignored for some reason, when they are definitely going to be part of the equation to give defense more missiles and different threats to deal with.
A carrier based cruise missile strike with only 24 J-15 would only mean 48 missiles and the aircraft would have to get too close to Guam.
In comparison, I could see the PLAAF devoting 100 H-6 sorties per day for Guam. So that would be 400+ cruise missiles.
It would make more sense for the J-15s to provide fighter cover for these H-6 launching at 1500km (the midpoint between China and Guam)
H-6s will play a major part in launching strike missions to destroy and/or deal damages against military facilities at Guam.
However, suppression and/or clean-up missions following the initial strike missions to prevent effective repair and replacement of damaged facilities and equipment will have to conducted over significant periods of time, such that the enemy forces will be rendered incapable of mounting meaningful offensive and defensive threats against the PLA's operational and strategic interests from those locations.
In this regard, the H-6s cannot do that constantly for extended periods of time. Doing so in the long run means that they (both the airframe and crew) are going to break down sooner rather than later.
Such missions will be better suited for unmanned units, e.g. GJ-11 and CH-7 (plus hopefully GJ-XX powered by two non-AB WS-21/19/10C engines in the future).
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