PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

PRC Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency - 14th FYP vs 15th FYP



Promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the reunification of the motherland. Uphold the one-China principle and the “1992 Consensus,” take the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait as the guiding purpose, and promote the peaceful and integrated development of cross-Strait relations. Strengthen industrial cooperation across the Strait, build a common cross-Strait market, and expand the Chinese nation’s economy while jointly promoting Chinese culture. Improve systems and policies that safeguard the welfare of Taiwan compatriots and ensure they enjoy equal treatment on the mainland. Support Taiwan businesses and enterprises in participating in the Belt and Road Initiative and in national regional-coordination development strategies. Support eligible Taiwan-funded enterprises in being listed on the mainland’s stock markets, and support Fujian in exploring new paths for cross-Strait integrated development. Strengthen grassroots and youth exchanges across the Strait. Remain highly vigilant against and firmly curb “Taiwan independence” separatist activities. (14th FYP)



Promote the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and advance the great cause of national reunification. Fully implement the Party’s overall strategy for resolving the Taiwan question in the new era, resolutely combat “Taiwan independence” separatist forces, oppose interference by external forces, safeguard peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and firmly maintain the initiative and leadership in cross-Strait relations. Deepen cross-Strait exchanges and cooperation, and jointly inherit and promote Chinese culture. Promote with high quality the construction of demonstration zones for cross-Strait integrated development, strengthen industrial cooperation, and advance cross-Strait economic cooperation. Implement policies that ensure Taiwan compatriots enjoy equal treatment, create better conditions for them to study, work, and live on the mainland, and enhance the well-being of compatriots on both sides of the Strait. (15th FYP)

Compared to the same poll in 2023:

willing to pay any price (including death) to defend Taiwan

52.2% unwilling, up 8.4%
40.8% willing, down 3.8%

best approach to ensure Taiwan's safety and prevent war

58.3% favoured resuming government-to-government talks with Beijing and easing people-to-people exchanges
28.2% favoured increasing defends spending
3% favoured comply fully with requests from Trump

Temstar said:

willing to pay any price (including death) to defend Taiwan
View attachment 163546
52.2% unwilling, up 8.4%
40.8% willing, down 3.8%

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I mean yes but, y-axis though

I made a rough Google Earth project by setting the camera bearing to about 330° and adding some extended island chain guide lines to offer a different perspective on the Western Pacific conflict compared to a flat map.


From this angle, it seems easier to see the layers of U.S. containment and its Indo-Pacific strategy toward China.
Just like the A2/AD system forms land-based “bubbles” that grow stronger closer to the coast, countries can also be seen as having their own influence bubbles.

Right now, most of China’s power projection still depends on land and nearby islands.
Because China’s blue-water navy is still young, its ability to project power drops sharply the farther it moves from the mainland.
At the same time, other countries (Japan, Indonesia, Australia, India, etc.) and U.S. bases located in or near them also create their own influence bubbles.
When China approaches these areas, its influence weakens as well.

1. Purple Line – The First Island Chain (~1,000 km)
   Within this zone, China can establish order mainly through land-based airpower and missile support, plus limited naval and air forces.
2. Green Line – The Second Island Chain (~2,000 km from Japan to ~3,000 km near Guam)
   Within this zone, China can establish order with land-based air and missile support, and a naval and air force slightly weaker than that of the U.S.
3. Yellow Line – The 2.5 Island Chain (Japanese version, WWII maximum control line, ~3,000–5,000 km)
   Within this zone, China would face a situation similar to Japan’s in the past—needing anti-access and area-denial measures to deal with encirclement.
   In a sense, Japan and China share similar strategic dilemmas: both have faced blockades and the need to build A2/AD-type defense zones.
4. Orange Line – The 2.5 Island Chain (Chinese version, ~3,000–5,000 km)
   Within this zone, China could establish order only by moving land-based airpower to more distant islands, supported by limited missile forces and a navy equal to the U.S., while penetrating other countries’ A2/AD systems.
   The U.S. and its allies already have the ability to build their own A2/AD systems here.

This idea was first proposed by another forum user; I made a few adjustments.
My reasoning is that China is located farther southwest than Japan.
So, while keeping the overall size and range of the 2.5 Island Chain unchanged, I shifted it as a whole toward the southwest to better fit China’s geographic position.

1. White Line – The Third Island Chain (~5,000–8,000 km)
   Within this zone, China could establish order only with large-scale forward deployment of land-based airpower, a navy stronger than the U.S., and the ability to break through multiple foreign A2/AD layers.
   In the distant future, many countries in this area will likely have enough time and space to build their own A2/AD systems.

This map is not accurate at all — it’s just a rough illustration.
I deliberately made the orange and white lines overlap in northwestern Australia to make it clear how blurry these boundaries really are.

Trump said that the long-contentious issue of Taiwan did not come up in his talks with Xi on Thursday in South Korea that largely focused on U.S.-China trade tensions. But the U.S. leader expressed certainty that China would not take action on Taiwan, while he’s in office.

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“He has openly said, and his people have openly said at meetings, ‘We would never do anything while President Trump is president,’ because they know the consequences,” Trump said in an excerpt of an interview with the CBS’ program “60 Minutes” that aired Sunday.

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According to data from the Legislative Yuan's Budget Office in Taiwan, between 2021 and 2024, 12,884 contract soldiers left the military before completing the minimum required years of active duty, even they have to pay compensation. This represents nearly a quarter (24.47%) of the total number of voluntary enlistees during the same period (52,674).

In 2021, only 521 military cadets graduated and became officers before completing the minimum required years of active duty as stipulated in the recruitment guidelines. However, in 2023 and 2024, the number of early discharges was 1,104 and 1,072 respectively, with compensation amounts reaching NT$244,723,000 and NT$259,279,000 respectively. As of the end of June this year, 430 soldiers have been discharged early, exceeding 80% of the number in 2021.

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Despite the DPP's relentless manipulation of definitions and figures to create the illusion that the voluntary enlistment rate has exceeded expectations, ROCA soldiers are voting with their feet.

bsdnf said:

Despite the DPP's relentless manipulation of definitions and figures to create the illusion that the voluntary enlistment rate has exceeded expectations, ROCA soldiers are voting with their feet.

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The DPP purposely lowers their expectations to make it seem higher they also don’t talk about that more people often leave then come in so it’s a net negative not a net positive.