PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Sinnavuuty · Jul 13, 2025

bebops said:
LRASM is very similiar to those Storm Shadow missiles that UK sent to Ukraine. It has some success against Russia and I also heard reports that several of them had been shot down.

I guess if you launch a swarm of missiles, anything can penetrate the defense.

The physics of interception are already known, regardless of the missile we're talking about, be it LRASM or Storm Shadow.

There are fire directors equipped with EO (TV, IIR) systems for both cannons and point defense missiles, but the warning is still 99.99% carried out by surveillance radars, even in the case of the Phalanx, for example.

What if they achieved such a level of stealth that the missile is literally "invisible" to X- and K-band radars, which are generally the ones that warn of approaching sea-skimming threats?

There are already ships equipped with IRST-based surveillance systems, but they can be counted on the fingers of one hand. And yet, I have no doubt that this missile has a very reduced IR signature, making even this mode of observation difficult.

One question that arises is: why does a stealth missile have to be sea-skimming? Basically, what we see is that for scanning the horizon at low altitudes, X- and K-band radars (and at most C-band) are ideal. These are the bands in which stealth technology is particularly effective. Long-range surveillance radars in S- and L-bands are not effective for contact very close to the sea surface and are the bands in which stealth begins to degrade. Thus, the LRASM retains the ability to fly close to sea level in the final phase to delay the alert of ships using long-range radars.

If detected earlier by these long-range radars, there would be enough time to turn the EO fire directors against the threats, and this is what the low altitude of the missiles in the final phase aims to prevent.

It is worth noting that they must have some level of ECM. The fact that the missile has a low radar signature and is close to the radar emitters allows compact, low-power jammers to have the potential to degrade the performance of the fire direction radars. And of course, the old saturation attack tactic will certainly continue, given the point defense level of some ships.

This is the solution the Americans have developed, and it doesn't mean it's a miracle or that it will always work. However, it is an important advance that, combined with other advances, such as the use of the SM-6 anti-ship missile, will eliminate or at least significantly reduce the US's lag behind Russian and Chinese anti-ship missile technology.

votran · Jul 13, 2025

FairAndUnbiased said:
How does the missile find targets on its own when it is limited by its own small radar horizon when sea skimming?

data-link with AWAC guild the missile to general direction of target carrier group , when missile enter terminal phase (inside horizon range) it will active on-board radar and seeker to find target
modern missile also carry pre-load image data to find the correct target ship to strike avoid the issue all missile just target the closest and first ship they spot

votran · Jul 13, 2025

ShariQ Ansari said:
Also think to note is China's mainstay destroyer type 052d generally carries less missile against their American counterparts and it's allies 64 vs 96 for for Alreigh Burke class destroyer.
Therefore it's necessary for them to quad pack those missile.

not only PLAN super slow in adaption of quad-pack mid range SAM to counter stealth ASM spam tactic , they also slow in term of anti-drone 30mm airburst , good depression cannon turret on every warship bigger than corvette
as you see beside VLS sam , cwis , close-range missile rim-116
US destroyers and carrier also have one of this 30mm gun turret each side

it can be auto/manual control equip with good optic/thermal and specially good gun depression level to counter air/sea drone spawn tactic long before drone warfare even start to become reality .

without this shit if ship get ambush by naval drone spawn attack like russian navy . the only way to counter them is sailor with fucking small arms and machine gun just like russian did in the famous naval drone strike video (because ship main cannon and cwis do not have enough gun depression for naval drone shooting) and failed because human eye + fucking ship flash light just can't be good enough at night

FairAndUnbiased · Jul 13, 2025

votran said:
data-link with AWAC guild the missile to general direction of target carrier group , when missile enter terminal phase (inside horizon range) it will active on-board radar and seeker to find target
modern missile also carry pre-load image data to find the correct target ship to strike avoid the issue all missile just target the closest and first ship they spot

then it is not finding its own target. it needs to datalink to an AWAC. what's the difference between that and a kinematically superior missile that also datalinks to an AWAC other than being easier to shoot down?

vincent · Jul 13, 2025

votran said:
data-link with AWAC guild the missile to general direction of target carrier group , when missile enter terminal phase (inside horizon range) it will active on-board radar and seeker to find target
modern missile also carry pre-load image data to find the correct target ship to strike avoid the issue all missile just target the closest and first ship they spot

What makes you think E-2D's or E-3's are survivable if they have to be closed enough to paint the surface ships?

AndrewS · Jul 13, 2025

Sinnavuuty said:
The LRASM possesses characteristics that give it a strong chance of penetrating the most advanced and dense defensive systems, such as full stealth (radar, thermal, and signal emission)

I'll start here, because your assumption is that an LRASM has "full stealth", whereas I disagree.

It is impossible for LRASM to have full stealth because it is not shaped as a flying wing (ideally a hopeless diamond shape)

We have 5th gen fighters like the F-22, F-35 and J-20. And my understanding is that their stealth is optimised against X-Band radars. But the canards and tailfins are very susceptible to VHF or UHF radars did to a "resonance" effect. Thus, we have 6th generation aircraft (such as the J-36, J-50 and F-47) getting rid of any tailfins or canards. Why do this, unless features like tailfins or canards can be detected by radar?

I also recall the USAF reporting that the KJ-500 (with an L-Band radar) was capable of detecting opposing stealth fighters, and was vectoring Chinese fighters in parallel in response. That implies a significant detection range, based on the defending Chinese fighters keeping the US stealth fighters from beyond AMRAAM range.

And if we look at the JY-27V specifications, they claim a 250km+ range against the F-22 or F-35. But it fails to mention the B-2, which is a flying wing design.

So given the size of an LRASM and its physical design (where we can see tailfins and small wings), it should face the same radar detection issues as an F-22 or F-35.

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Now, in the absence of any authoritative statements, this is my best guess and the reasoning why.

Comments?

AndrewS · Jul 13, 2025

Sinnavuuty said:
Supersonic (or hypersonic) missiles require more advanced designation because they don't have time to search for targets or make major course corrections. They only activate their radars when they're about 20 km from their targets. Even though these large, long-range supersonic missiles have large and powerful radars (compared to smaller missiles), and even though the targets are gigantic reflectors (with RCS over 1,000 m²), they avoid activating their radars too far away to avoid alerting ship defenses.

At 20 km from the target ship, a Mach 2.5 missile has only 25 seconds to find and lock on. If the missile isn't placed "face-to-face" and the target is too far off its axis of travel, it may not be able to steer in the correct direction in time.

To provide this level of precision, aircraft must be in close proximity to the target ships (about 200 km at most), which becomes difficult when attacking a task force centered around an aircraft carrier and protected by AEW aircraft and fighters.

The Americans propose solving this "problem" by using a small, subsonic, long-range, highly maneuverable stealth missile with loitering and re-attack capabilities, equipped with active and passive multispectral sensors, operating within the NWC concept (including satellite-based), with onboard ECM capability and AI self-leveling, which, in theory, enables it to find its own targets in a congested environment without needing to be placed in front of the target.

Furthermore, the fact that the LRASM is a stealth missile has sea-skimming capabilities further complicates detection, as X- and K-band radars (and at most C-band) are ideal for scanning the horizon at low altitudes. These are the bands in which stealth technology is particularly effective. Long-range S- and L-band surveillance radars are ineffective for contact very close to the sea surface and are the bands in which stealth begins to degrade. This way, the LRASM retains the ability to fly close to sea level in the final phase, delaying the warning of ships using long-range radars.

If they were detected earlier by these long-range radars, there would be enough time to turn the EO fire directors against the threats, and this is what the low altitude of the missiles in the final phase tries to prevent.

The fact that the missile has a low radar signature and is close to the radar emitters allows compact, low-power jammers to have the potential to degrade the performance of the fire direction radars.

As I said, the USN and the PLAN have different views. A subsonic missile, if detected and tracked, can become easy prey for CIWS, but supersonic missiles are easy prey for everything the ship has. Even with a reduced radar signature, they are not stealth (VLO) and have a very high thermal signature. In other words, they are potential prey for radar-guided missiles (active and semi-active), EO directors equipped with thermal cameras, cannons with radar-guided radar, cannons with EO-guided radar, IR seeker-guided missiles, etc. They are also detected by radar aircraft (AWACS, AEW, etc.) and fighter radars and can be engaged at a distance due to conventional RCS (generally above 0.1 m²).

Long-range supersonic (and hypersonic) missiles generally have to fly high to reach maximum range, making them detectable by surveillance radars. This makes these maximum ranges only theoretical. Flying low reduces the range significantly, and the thermal signature explodes. The low range for a subsonic missile can be as low as 2 or 3 meters, while for a Moskit or a Brahmos it's at least 10 times that.

In other words, we once again see two schools of thought on ASuW, just as with the Western and Russian views of air combat.

Why are you talking about supersonic Mach 2.5 antiship missiles?
We can see that both the US and Chinese militaries don't see their (continued) development as useful.

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Again, I've highlighted that the Chinese military has decided that high-altitude, hypersonic (Mach 5+) antiship missiles are the way to go, because they are far more difficult to shoot down, plus it also ameliorates the issue of striking a distant ship target before it has travelled much distance.

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But let's say a LRASM is an undetectable antiship superweapon, as you say.
For the Chinese military, such a capability would be fantastic.
They wouldn't have to worry about building a long-range detection and tracking network.

They could develop an extended-range version, which could be launched by trucks based on mainland China.
Then, such a weapon would easily sink every ship trying to approach the First Island Chain (and probably within the Second Island Chain as well)

Yet the Chinese military are too stupid to realise how effective an LRASM is, and build their own version?

And we're talking about 3 different branches of the Chinese military all being that stupid.
Namely the Rocket Force, the Navy and the Air Force.

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We also see the US military publicly complaining about American hypersonic missiles being ridiculously expensive at $40+ Mn and $100+ Mn per missile. Yet they are still buying them.

We also see the US military complaining that American hypersonic missiles are 20x more expensive than equivalent Chinese hypersonic capability in the Western Pacific. The implication here is that if the US could get their costs down to Chinese levels, the Americans would completely ditch LRASM and go all in on hypersonics.

FriedRiceNSpice · Jul 13, 2025

Sinnavuuty said:
It's worth noting that a missile like the LRASM can create one or more fake missiles to evade defensive radar systems, using its ECM capabilities, for example. But will this work against Chinese radar? I don't think so. But it does make life difficult for the defender.

This is simply radar spoofing and nothing new. Rafale's SPECTRA also has this capability. And I think we all know how well it worked against Chinese radar.

CMP · Jul 13, 2025

I think all this nonsense just boils down to blind worship of White magic and the assumption that China hasn't mimicked (and then innovated into the lead) of a "superior" weapon type due to inability, stupidity, or poor judgement. What nonsense. If we trust that American hypersonic weapons will cost 40-100 million USD and are 20x more expensive than Chinese hypersonic weapons as stated by the US military, then that means Chinese hypersonic weapons are around the same cost as LRASM +/- a bit, in which case it's a nobrainer to go all in on hypersonic weapons instead of mucking about with subsonic ones.

CMP · Jul 13, 2025

votran said:
not only PLAN super slow in adaption of quad-pack mid range SAM to counter stealth ASM spam tactic , they also slow in term of anti-drone 30mm airburst , good depression cannon turret on every warship bigger than corvette
as you see beside VLS sam , cwis , close-range missile rim-116
US destroyers and carrier also have one of this 30mm gun turret each side
View attachment 156051
it can be auto/manual control equip with good optic/thermal and specially good gun depression level to counter air/sea drone spawn tactic long before drone warfare even start to become reality .

without this shit if ship get ambush by naval drone spawn attack like russian navy . the only way to counter them is sailor with fucking small arms and machine gun just like russian did in the famous naval drone strike video (because ship main cannon and cwis do not have enough gun depression for naval drone shooting) and failed because human eye + fucking ship flash light just can't be good enough at night

Alternatively, Chinese, being the masters of drone technology, have superior anti-drone weapons than old-school guns as well. These conversations are getting dumber and dumber. Looks like a fresh new crop for the ignore list.

PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

Sinnavuuty

Captain

votran

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votran

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FairAndUnbiased

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vincent

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AndrewS

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AndrewS

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FriedRiceNSpice

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CMP

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CMP

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