Don't most Chinese Frigates and Destroyers have a VHF volume search radar, which should be able to detect an incoming LRASM as soon as it crosses the radar horizon some 30km away?
That gives the defender 2 minutes of engagement time, which should be enough for at least 4 full-length SAM engagements and almost guarantee the LRASMs are shot down. The US Navy notes that medium-range SAM systems are very capable against incoming subsonic cruise missiles.
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And if we have drones/aircraft with UHF/VHF radars, they should have a much longer detection range.
Presumably this would allow for:
1. CEC with long-range HHQ-9 SAMs launched from Destroyers.
2. Fighter jets launching AAMs to intercept incoming LRASMs (with the option of CEC as well)
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Lastly, if LRASMs are so effective, then why has the Chinese Navy skipped the development of an LRASM equivalent?
They are perfectly capable of doing this, considering how many other stealth aircraft they have.
And they have developed many other types of anti-ship missiles, including non-stealthy subsonic anti-ship missiles.
Instead, the Chinese Navy has focused on hypersonic missiles, which are far more difficult to develop than an LRASM.
And we see the US Navy desperately trying to catch up in this area.
The LRASM possesses characteristics that give it a strong chance of penetrating the most advanced and dense defensive systems, such as full stealth (radar, thermal, and signal emission), immunity to GPS denial, a seeker immune to jamming, the ability to implement a sea-skimming terminal trajectory, high terminal maneuverability, and the ability to operate cooperatively with other missiles, in addition to the ability to implement active ECM.
The technological concept chosen by the West, notably the US, to penetrate advanced defensive systems is "stealth," based on the maxim that "if something can be detected, it can be destroyed." Therefore, stealth technology occupies a prominent place in the West's offensive capabilities.
To be able to neutralize "time-critical targets" from very long ranges, the Americans will have to forgo stealth in favor of speed, making it impossible to combine the two concepts.
But this missile's greatest advantage over current missiles isn't stealth, but rather its ability to find targets on its own without requiring prior designation. A SHORAD solution that uses electro-optical sensors (CIWS with IR/IIR guidance – electro-optical) for target detection is the "most effective" means of countering a threat like the LRASM. The problem is the sheer number of missiles that must be countered.
Supersonic (or hypersonic) missiles require more advanced designation because they don't have time to search for targets or make major course corrections. They only activate their radars when they're about 20 km from their targets. Even though these large, long-range supersonic missiles have large and powerful radars (compared to smaller missiles), and even though the targets are gigantic reflectors (with RCS over 1,000 m²), they avoid activating their radars too far away to avoid alerting ship defenses.
At 20 km from the target ship, a Mach 2.5 missile has only 25 seconds to find and lock on. If the missile isn't placed "face-to-face" and the target is too far off its axis of travel, it may not be able to steer in the correct direction in time.
To provide this level of precision, aircraft must be in close proximity to the target ships (about 200 km at most), which becomes difficult when attacking a task force centered around an aircraft carrier and protected by AEW aircraft and fighters.
The Americans propose solving this "problem" by using a small, subsonic, long-range, highly maneuverable stealth missile with loitering and re-attack capabilities, equipped with active and passive multispectral sensors, operating within the NWC concept (including satellite-based), with onboard ECM capability and AI self-leveling, which, in theory, enables it to find its own targets in a congested environment without needing to be placed in front of the target.
Furthermore, the fact that the LRASM is a stealth missile has sea-skimming capabilities further complicates detection, as X- and K-band radars (and at most C-band) are ideal for scanning the horizon at low altitudes. These are the bands in which stealth technology is particularly effective. Long-range S- and L-band surveillance radars are ineffective for contact very close to the sea surface and are the bands in which stealth begins to degrade. This way, the LRASM retains the ability to fly close to sea level in the final phase, delaying the warning of ships using long-range radars.
If they were detected earlier by these long-range radars, there would be enough time to turn the EO fire directors against the threats, and this is what the low altitude of the missiles in the final phase tries to prevent.
The fact that the missile has a low radar signature and is close to the radar emitters allows compact, low-power jammers to have the potential to degrade the performance of the fire direction radars.
As I said, the USN and the PLAN have different views. A subsonic missile, if detected and tracked, can become easy prey for CIWS, but supersonic missiles are easy prey for everything the ship has. Even with a reduced radar signature, they are not stealth (VLO) and have a very high thermal signature. In other words, they are potential prey for radar-guided missiles (active and semi-active), EO directors equipped with thermal cameras, cannons with radar-guided radar, cannons with EO-guided radar, IR seeker-guided missiles, etc. They are also detected by radar aircraft (AWACS, AEW, etc.) and fighter radars and can be engaged at a distance due to conventional RCS (generally above 0.1 m²).
Long-range supersonic (and hypersonic) missiles generally have to fly high to reach maximum range, making them detectable by surveillance radars. This makes these maximum ranges only theoretical. Flying low reduces the range significantly, and the thermal signature explodes. The low range for a subsonic missile can be as low as 2 or 3 meters, while for a Moskit or a Brahmos it's at least 10 times that.
In other words, we once again see two schools of thought on ASuW, just as with the Western and Russian views of air combat.
