PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
LRASMs are easy to intercept, but destroyers have limited VLS tubes. Hence why a quad packable AD missile of moderate performance would be perfect counter. The LRASMs do not have to actually sink the destroyers. Just force them back to replenish in order to prevent those destroyers from being able to partake in offensive operations or other naval missions.

Threre are only 500 LRASMs currently in total inventory. Plus my guess is that the maximum salvo size would be 200 missiles. So even a small Chinese SAG with 4 ships is theoretically capable of handling this.

I agree that a quad-packed SAM would be a useful option. But I don't think the number of planned LRASMs is sufficient to justify this

Also remember that operations would typically be nearby within the Second Island Chain. So call it a 3 day turnaround to leave, reload at a Chinese port, and return on station.
 
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votran

Junior Member
Registered Member
LRASMs are easy to intercept, but destroyers have limited VLS tubes. Hence why a quad packable AD missile of moderate performance would be perfect counter. The LRASMs do not have to actually sink the destroyers. Just force them back to replenish in order to prevent those destroyers from being able to partake in offensive operations or other naval missions.
not really easy , the advantage of modern carrier escort destroyers is able to data link with AWAC and launch intercept missile to destroy non-stealth sea hugging ASM right at midcourse where most ASM need to flight at sub-sonic speed to save fuel even YJ-18

stealth LRAM allow them slip thought carrier AWAC radar safety midcourse travel then only get detect when they already in terminal phase very close to target carrier group .

at this phase there are no place for intercept mistake , or miss intercept because every single one is fatal , much harder than intercept ASM right at midcourse where they still far away from you carrier group > much more comfort allow more room for mistake or miss

also the stealth coating on missile highly like can also mess up intercept missile sensor , on-board radar or even 30mm CIWS build-in sensor and radar way better than non-stealth add alot more burden for carrier escort task force
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
not really easy , the advantage of modern carrier escort destroyers is able to data link with AWAC and launch intercept missile to destroy non-stealth sea hugging ASM right at midcourse where most ASM need to flight at sub-sonic speed to save fuel even YJ-18

stealth LRAM allow them slip thought carrier AWAC radar safety midcourse travel then only get detect when they already in terminal phase very close to target carrier group .

at this phase there are no place for intercept mistake , or miss intercept because every single one is fatal , much harder than intercept ASM right at midcourse where they still far away from you carrier group > much more comfort allow more room for mistake or miss

also the stealth coating on missile highly like can also mess up intercept missile sensor , on-board radar or even 30mm CIWS build-in sensor and radar way better than non-stealth add alot more burden for carrier escort task force

My guess is that LRASMs are still easily detectable with UHF/VHF band AESA radars, particularly if these are airborne.

That is because LRASM surfaces are still quite small and produce a "resonance" effect at these frequencies.

So LRASMs can still be detected at a much longer range.

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As for the effectiveness of sea-skimming, I think it is over-rated given the effectiveness of modern radars and electronics.

As long as a radar can measure the doppler-shift, they can discriminate against radar reflections which are stationary like ocean waves versus a cruise missile travelling at 1000km/h
 
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CMP

Senior Member
Registered Member
stealth LRAM allow them slip thought carrier AWAC radar safety midcourse travel then only get detect when they already in terminal phase very close to target carrier group .

also the stealth coating on missile highly like can also mess up intercept missile sensor , on-board radar or even 30mm CIWS build-in sensor and radar way better than non-stealth add alot more burden for carrier escort task force
These two paragraphs in particular cannot be assumed to be true against Chinese radar. It would need to be proven against Chinese radar given China's world leading capabilities in detection and targeting of stealthy targets.
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
Don't most Chinese Frigates and Destroyers have a VHF volume search radar, which should be able to detect an incoming LRASM as soon as it crosses the radar horizon some 30km away?

That gives the defender 2 minutes of engagement time, which should be enough for at least 4 full-length SAM engagements and almost guarantee the LRASMs are shot down. The US Navy notes that medium-range SAM systems are very capable against incoming subsonic cruise missiles.

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And if we have drones/aircraft with UHF/VHF radars, they should have a much longer detection range.
Presumably this would allow for:

1. CEC with long-range HHQ-9 SAMs launched from Destroyers.
2. Fighter jets launching AAMs to intercept incoming LRASMs (with the option of CEC as well)

---

Lastly, if LRASMs are so effective, then why has the Chinese Navy skipped the development of an LRASM equivalent?

They are perfectly capable of doing this, considering how many other stealth aircraft they have.
And they have developed many other types of anti-ship missiles, including non-stealthy subsonic anti-ship missiles.

Instead, the Chinese Navy has focused on hypersonic missiles, which are far more difficult to develop than an LRASM.
And we see the US Navy desperately trying to catch up in this area.
The LRASM possesses characteristics that give it a strong chance of penetrating the most advanced and dense defensive systems, such as full stealth (radar, thermal, and signal emission), immunity to GPS denial, a seeker immune to jamming, the ability to implement a sea-skimming terminal trajectory, high terminal maneuverability, and the ability to operate cooperatively with other missiles, in addition to the ability to implement active ECM.

The technological concept chosen by the West, notably the US, to penetrate advanced defensive systems is "stealth," based on the maxim that "if something can be detected, it can be destroyed." Therefore, stealth technology occupies a prominent place in the West's offensive capabilities.

To be able to neutralize "time-critical targets" from very long ranges, the Americans will have to forgo stealth in favor of speed, making it impossible to combine the two concepts.

But this missile's greatest advantage over current missiles isn't stealth, but rather its ability to find targets on its own without requiring prior designation. A SHORAD solution that uses electro-optical sensors (CIWS with IR/IIR guidance – electro-optical) for target detection is the "most effective" means of countering a threat like the LRASM. The problem is the sheer number of missiles that must be countered.

Supersonic (or hypersonic) missiles require more advanced designation because they don't have time to search for targets or make major course corrections. They only activate their radars when they're about 20 km from their targets. Even though these large, long-range supersonic missiles have large and powerful radars (compared to smaller missiles), and even though the targets are gigantic reflectors (with RCS over 1,000 m²), they avoid activating their radars too far away to avoid alerting ship defenses.

At 20 km from the target ship, a Mach 2.5 missile has only 25 seconds to find and lock on. If the missile isn't placed "face-to-face" and the target is too far off its axis of travel, it may not be able to steer in the correct direction in time.

To provide this level of precision, aircraft must be in close proximity to the target ships (about 200 km at most), which becomes difficult when attacking a task force centered around an aircraft carrier and protected by AEW aircraft and fighters.

The Americans propose solving this "problem" by using a small, subsonic, long-range, highly maneuverable stealth missile with loitering and re-attack capabilities, equipped with active and passive multispectral sensors, operating within the NWC concept (including satellite-based), with onboard ECM capability and AI self-leveling, which, in theory, enables it to find its own targets in a congested environment without needing to be placed in front of the target.

Furthermore, the fact that the LRASM is a stealth missile has sea-skimming capabilities further complicates detection, as X- and K-band radars (and at most C-band) are ideal for scanning the horizon at low altitudes. These are the bands in which stealth technology is particularly effective. Long-range S- and L-band surveillance radars are ineffective for contact very close to the sea surface and are the bands in which stealth begins to degrade. This way, the LRASM retains the ability to fly close to sea level in the final phase, delaying the warning of ships using long-range radars.

If they were detected earlier by these long-range radars, there would be enough time to turn the EO fire directors against the threats, and this is what the low altitude of the missiles in the final phase tries to prevent.

The fact that the missile has a low radar signature and is close to the radar emitters allows compact, low-power jammers to have the potential to degrade the performance of the fire direction radars.

As I said, the USN and the PLAN have different views. A subsonic missile, if detected and tracked, can become easy prey for CIWS, but supersonic missiles are easy prey for everything the ship has. Even with a reduced radar signature, they are not stealth (VLO) and have a very high thermal signature. In other words, they are potential prey for radar-guided missiles (active and semi-active), EO directors equipped with thermal cameras, cannons with radar-guided radar, cannons with EO-guided radar, IR seeker-guided missiles, etc. They are also detected by radar aircraft (AWACS, AEW, etc.) and fighter radars and can be engaged at a distance due to conventional RCS (generally above 0.1 m²).

Long-range supersonic (and hypersonic) missiles generally have to fly high to reach maximum range, making them detectable by surveillance radars. This makes these maximum ranges only theoretical. Flying low reduces the range significantly, and the thermal signature explodes. The low range for a subsonic missile can be as low as 2 or 3 meters, while for a Moskit or a Brahmos it's at least 10 times that.

In other words, we once again see two schools of thought on ASuW, just as with the Western and Russian views of air combat.
 

ShariQ Ansari

New Member
Registered Member
Also think to note is China's mainstay destroyer type 052d generally carries less missile against their American counterparts and it's allies 64 vs 96 for for Alreigh Burke class destroyer.
Therefore it's necessary for them to quad pack those missile.
 

FairAndUnbiased

Brigadier
Registered Member
The LRASM possesses characteristics that give it a strong chance of penetrating the most advanced and dense defensive systems, such as full stealth (radar, thermal, and signal emission), immunity to GPS denial, a seeker immune to jamming, the ability to implement a sea-skimming terminal trajectory, high terminal maneuverability, and the ability to operate cooperatively with other missiles, in addition to the ability to implement active ECM.

The technological concept chosen by the West, notably the US, to penetrate advanced defensive systems is "stealth," based on the maxim that "if something can be detected, it can be destroyed." Therefore, stealth technology occupies a prominent place in the West's offensive capabilities.

To be able to neutralize "time-critical targets" from very long ranges, the Americans will have to forgo stealth in favor of speed, making it impossible to combine the two concepts.

But this missile's greatest advantage over current missiles isn't stealth, but rather its ability to find targets on its own without requiring prior designation. A SHORAD solution that uses electro-optical sensors (CIWS with IR/IIR guidance – electro-optical) for target detection is the "most effective" means of countering a threat like the LRASM. The problem is the sheer number of missiles that must be countered.

Supersonic (or hypersonic) missiles require more advanced designation because they don't have time to search for targets or make major course corrections. They only activate their radars when they're about 20 km from their targets. Even though these large, long-range supersonic missiles have large and powerful radars (compared to smaller missiles), and even though the targets are gigantic reflectors (with RCS over 1,000 m²), they avoid activating their radars too far away to avoid alerting ship defenses.

At 20 km from the target ship, a Mach 2.5 missile has only 25 seconds to find and lock on. If the missile isn't placed "face-to-face" and the target is too far off its axis of travel, it may not be able to steer in the correct direction in time.

To provide this level of precision, aircraft must be in close proximity to the target ships (about 200 km at most), which becomes difficult when attacking a task force centered around an aircraft carrier and protected by AEW aircraft and fighters.

The Americans propose solving this "problem" by using a small, subsonic, long-range, highly maneuverable stealth missile with loitering and re-attack capabilities, equipped with active and passive multispectral sensors, operating within the NWC concept (including satellite-based), with onboard ECM capability and AI self-leveling, which, in theory, enables it to find its own targets in a congested environment without needing to be placed in front of the target.

Furthermore, the fact that the LRASM is a stealth missile has sea-skimming capabilities further complicates detection, as X- and K-band radars (and at most C-band) are ideal for scanning the horizon at low altitudes. These are the bands in which stealth technology is particularly effective. Long-range S- and L-band surveillance radars are ineffective for contact very close to the sea surface and are the bands in which stealth begins to degrade. This way, the LRASM retains the ability to fly close to sea level in the final phase, delaying the warning of ships using long-range radars.

If they were detected earlier by these long-range radars, there would be enough time to turn the EO fire directors against the threats, and this is what the low altitude of the missiles in the final phase tries to prevent.

The fact that the missile has a low radar signature and is close to the radar emitters allows compact, low-power jammers to have the potential to degrade the performance of the fire direction radars.

As I said, the USN and the PLAN have different views. A subsonic missile, if detected and tracked, can become easy prey for CIWS, but supersonic missiles are easy prey for everything the ship has. Even with a reduced radar signature, they are not stealth (VLO) and have a very high thermal signature. In other words, they are potential prey for radar-guided missiles (active and semi-active), EO directors equipped with thermal cameras, cannons with radar-guided radar, cannons with EO-guided radar, IR seeker-guided missiles, etc. They are also detected by radar aircraft (AWACS, AEW, etc.) and fighter radars and can be engaged at a distance due to conventional RCS (generally above 0.1 m²).

Long-range supersonic (and hypersonic) missiles generally have to fly high to reach maximum range, making them detectable by surveillance radars. This makes these maximum ranges only theoretical. Flying low reduces the range significantly, and the thermal signature explodes. The low range for a subsonic missile can be as low as 2 or 3 meters, while for a Moskit or a Brahmos it's at least 10 times that.

In other words, we once again see two schools of thought on ASuW, just as with the Western and Russian views of air combat.
How does the missile find targets on its own when it is limited by its own small radar horizon when sea skimming?
 

Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
How does the missile find targets on its own when it is limited by its own small radar horizon when sea skimming?
The LRASM scans (circles a certain area searching for targets) a pre-designated area before launch or after launch until it finds its targets. The LRASM is designed to navigate autonomously around enemy radar and defenses, with sufficient onboard artificial intelligence to change course without human supervision or satellite guidance.

In the case of the LRASM, which theoretically has a range of about 700 km, it should be able to reduce its speed when it reaches a target search zone to remain there longer. I estimate it should drop to half of a maximum of 900 km/h.

Basically, an anti-ship missile like the Harpoon allows the search zone to be an area represented by a circle with a radius of 10 km. A supersonic missile would require a search zone of about 3 to 4 km. A hypersonic missile would require a search zone of 1 to 2 km.

In the case of a "smart" subsonic missile like the LRASM, this search zone should be around 50 to 100 km in radius. The missile is launched and heads toward an area where it is certain to have valid targets (enemy ships). Once there, it enters "loitering" mode, scanning the environment with its sensors, selecting a target, and then homing in on it.

In the case of the LRASM, only on its final approach does it deploy a very low-altitude flight, maneuver, and begin jamming point defense system radars using active ECM. Its sensor suite likely consists of a high-definition imaging camera, an IR imaging camera, and a passive radio frequency system that "listens" to the ships' radars. Essentially, the passive RF system is the primary sensor, detecting a potential target based on the characteristics of its RF emissions and triangulating with other missiles in the LRASM "pack." Long-range detection is achieved via radar, and target type confirmation is achieved via visual/IR imaging.

However, its ability to interfere with radars in point defense systems using active ECM is unlikely to be very powerful, as there are no sensors small enough to fit inside the seeker head and simultaneously emit a strong signal. However, the LRASM has capable sensors, as it can detect electromagnetic emissions.
 

bebops

Junior Member
Registered Member
The LRASM scans (circles a certain area searching for targets) a pre-designated area before launch or after launch until it finds its targets. The LRASM is designed to navigate autonomously around enemy radar and defenses, with sufficient onboard artificial intelligence to change course without human supervision or satellite guidance.

In the case of the LRASM, which theoretically has a range of about 700 km, it should be able to reduce its speed when it reaches a target search zone to remain there longer. I estimate it should drop to half of a maximum of 900 km/h.

Basically, an anti-ship missile like the Harpoon allows the search zone to be an area represented by a circle with a radius of 10 km. A supersonic missile would require a search zone of about 3 to 4 km. A hypersonic missile would require a search zone of 1 to 2 km.

In the case of a "smart" subsonic missile like the LRASM, this search zone should be around 50 to 100 km in radius. The missile is launched and heads toward an area where it is certain to have valid targets (enemy ships). Once there, it enters "loitering" mode, scanning the environment with its sensors, selecting a target, and then homing in on it.

In the case of the LRASM, only on its final approach does it deploy a very low-altitude flight, maneuver, and begin jamming point defense system radars using active ECM. Its sensor suite likely consists of a high-definition imaging camera, an IR imaging camera, and a passive radio frequency system that "listens" to the ships' radars. Essentially, the passive RF system is the primary sensor, detecting a potential target based on the characteristics of its RF emissions and triangulating with other missiles in the LRASM "pack." Long-range detection is achieved via radar, and target type confirmation is achieved via visual/IR imaging.

However, its ability to interfere with radars in point defense systems using active ECM is unlikely to be very powerful, as there are no sensors small enough to fit inside the seeker head and simultaneously emit a strong signal. However, the LRASM has capable sensors, as it can detect electromagnetic emissions.

LRASM is very similiar to those Storm Shadow missiles that UK sent to Ukraine. It has some success against Russia and I also heard reports that several of them had been shot down.

I guess if you launch a swarm of missiles, anything can penetrate the defense.

At least China is beefing up their 5th gen production. It is provides good protection for navy ships or enemy forces coming too close to you. I have been saying that planes are good area denial platforms.

First line of offense is drone or UAV. Followed second by planes. Third is navy ships. Lastly ground launch missiles deployed behind all three of them which will provide protection to all three of them.
 
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Sinnavuuty

Captain
Registered Member
not really easy , the advantage of modern carrier escort destroyers is able to data link with AWAC and launch intercept missile to destroy non-stealth sea hugging ASM right at midcourse where most ASM need to flight at sub-sonic speed to save fuel even YJ-18

stealth LRAM allow them slip thought carrier AWAC radar safety midcourse travel then only get detect when they already in terminal phase very close to target carrier group .

at this phase there are no place for intercept mistake , or miss intercept because every single one is fatal , much harder than intercept ASM right at midcourse where they still far away from you carrier group > much more comfort allow more room for mistake or miss

also the stealth coating on missile highly like can also mess up intercept missile sensor , on-board radar or even 30mm CIWS build-in sensor and radar way better than non-stealth add alot more burden for carrier escort task force
It's worth noting that a missile like the LRASM can create one or more fake missiles to evade defensive radar systems, using its ECM capabilities, for example. But will this work against Chinese radar? I don't think so. But it does make life difficult for the defender.
 
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