No, it was doomed from the start. There was no plausible victory against China, and starting another enormous resource sink against giants far larger and richer than Japan doomed them. What they failed to grasp was that victory, by their terms, required than the Western navies (mostly the USN) fight on Japan's terms, which was impossible if they had a modicum of competence. Also, they failed to grasp that the USA wouldn't treat it as a colonial war with low casualty acceptance, instead it was a total war with almost unlimited resources being allocated.
It's a bit abstract.
There's just little US could do in Pacific, had they lost Midway or Solomons. And there's certain lack of appreciation that mood in US about Japan in spring 1942 was in fact turning gloomy.
Japan didn't fail due to American resources superiority - that was programmed failure which it didn't intend to even touch. Japan failed, fair and square, against pre-war US navy, in a decisive battle (Midway) and protracted campaign on Guadalcanal (decisively - in November night battles at sea and on land).
Midway is straightforward (name says all why it's important). Guadalcanal was built as a massive bomber airfield, to deny highly vulnerable (thousands of miles) long leg between it and entire south Pacific.
Either loss would've prevented US ability to support campaign in the Pacific, and momentarily deprived it of naval strength to even do the reverse option (northern option).
What that would meant is US having started from scratch, from the east, under UK leadership. Which is a total failure, and quite likely wouldn't have worked out politically.
This is important to understand in context of modern US/China situation. Resources in naval war by themselves mean less, and Japan won twice in situations of absolute resource inferiority before.
Naval war is tied to limited technical resources, and naval war in Pacific is dominated by (one can guess) Pacific.
Basic conclusion is that complacency and suffering key defeats in campaign with maxed goals is unacceptable; nation should understand consequences of defeats, and understand them as such, rather than just counting score points(approach which also lost naval WW2 to Italy, btw).
More important one is that US position in Eastpac is in fact rather shaky, especially in non-colonial world. Number of key positions, which can effectively deny US access to the theater, is small, and didn't change too much from 1940s (difference is in fact Japan, which is accessed from the sea and can be subjected to a decisive interdiction campaign).
Several key amphibious assaults even now effectively cut America away from Westpac, because Pacific is still that big, that empty, and Alaska/north are still that underdeveloped. And it isn't all that hard to call the names. It's Ryukyus(Okinawa itself preferably), Taiwan, Philippines, Wake, Midway and...Solomons/Fiji/Samoa.
From the west, it's straits, where there are now neutral nations with one particular exception (Singapore).
All memorable names, as you may notice.