mods should create a debatebro thread so you guys can enlighten each other and leave rule-abiding lurkers in peace.
PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency
- Thread starter pugachev_diver
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The mods should make a dedicated debate thread, otherwise the churn here is going to be stupendous. ~20 pages of mostly garbage in just the last 4-5 days alone. Mostly incited by just a single poster who won't just let it go. No one's mind is going to be changed by accusations of lying. People need to make more liberal use of the ignore function and just stop feeding the troll.
It's not $35 million per unit. The $449 million in the 2025 budget is for the acquisition of X number of undisclosed units. They're hiding a lot of the budget.
I do love your analogy about cats(being a cat lover myself) and LMAO when you alluded to having a house cat equates to manhandling a tiger-an exercise in stupidy and arrogance that was demonstrated in indo-Pak war May 7 where hubris got 5-7 IAF jets/UAV knocked out of the sky.My cat is now looking at me typing and blinking/thinking,'if I were only 100 times bigger"
Question, where do you keep getting "120 bases" from? This kind of sounds like the whole "US has 700-800 bases" around the world thing, when they actually don't, and that number is really from counting every single little thing as a "base". From literally dog memorials, to depots, to radar installations. We are talking specifically about "airbases". In regard to airbases, US has only six total in Japan: Kadena (Okinawa), Futenma, Iwakuni, Atsugi, Yokota, and Misawa.
The ones that are USAF bases are Kadena, Yokota, and Misawa. There's a few "auxiliary airfields", but those are not airbases, but for cargo or stationed helicopters (Kisarazu) and are smaller with smaller runways so cannot support much. So all in all, only seven total airbases the US has to use. Even if we add in Japanese air bases: Chitose Air Base (very far), Kasuminome Air Field (tiny and seems only for helicopters), Hyakuri Air Base, Komatsu Air Base, Gifu Air Base, Miho Air Base, Nyutabaru Air Base, and Omura Air Base. So in total, the US only has only 12-15 total air bases that they could use from Japan with only 3-4 being major air bases.
Some of these air bases are far, small with small runways, and clearly don't have the ability to support a large amount of infrastructure or aircraft. In contrast like I stated, there's over 170+ dedicated PLAAF/PLANAF airbases scattered across China plus dual-use bases/airports, not to mention the vast difference in hardening of these bases compared to the ones that exist for the US in region. Just from that comparison and the vast difference, US has no realistic ability to amass and match the airpower and distribution China has in their region in the 1IC, even if you added in all 11 carriers as well which is fundamentally impossible.
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Have you ever heard of the , or a by the name of from the late 1970s?
TBH, I would very much prefer for you to be categorically correct in this instance.
However, my personal assessment is that the regime in Taipei may be able to successfully manufacture, assemble or otherwise acquire at least a handful of deliverable nuclear weapons without Beijing finding out "fast enough."
That wouldn't be a credible deterrent in the sense of MAD, but it'll be very problematic.
This will require a certain degree of enablement from the US government, or at least certain elements therein, to help conceal the program from "everyone," including their own governments until it bears fruit.
Key here will be finding the right foreign partner, just as apartheid South Africa did in Israel. This foreign partner doesn't necessarily even need to be a full-blown sovereign nation state, but the devices will absolutely have to be assembled or otherwise manufactured outside of the island of Taiwan to ensure secrecy.
It won't be easy. There will be no guarantee of success. However, it's plausible, at least it could be worth trying — especially as the DPP leadership grows more desperate — with covert American enablement, the right foreign partner(s), and boatloads of money.
That would force the US to take drastic measures to meaningfully rebuild domestic supply chains, in ways that may legitimately reinvigorate American industry, albeit at the expense of both the quality of life of the American hoi polloi and the portfolios of their betters.
Such a scenario or a hot war are the only paths — there might be a few others, but nothing fun or easy — that'll justify the imposition of brutal, and otherwise politically unpalatable, yet necessary measures essential to the re-industrialization of America.
I get where you're coming from, but doubt that the Chinese government is looking to nudge the Trump administration in the "right direction."
You're practically threatening American political elites with a good time!
You might not know this, but that's not necessarily a scenario American policymakers will mind in private: a lot of them deeply dislike, if not despise Israel for obvious reasons, while the majority will happily leverage such Chinese measures as pretext to drastically increase aid to Israel.
Moreover, the logistics don't exist for Palestinian terrorists or freedom fighters (don't personally care for them either way however they're framed) to receive and operate Chinese arms, beyond systems that are insufficient for meaningfully challenging the IDF.
You're making this way more complicated than it really is.
Like Germany, there are tens of thousands of American troops stationed in South Korea and Japan. There are a lot fewer American troops in the Philippines, but they are even more dependent on American security guarantees.
TBF, Japan and South Korea don't want to get involved in a conflict against China over the island of Taiwan, but they might be forced to impose sanctions or create other inconveniences, or they might get dragged into a conflict if the US pursues direct military intervention.
Though a rapid and decisive Chinese military victory could potentially disincentivize such moves. No one wants to piss off a giant that they believe will crush them like an ant.
Regarding the earlier member that everyone (including myself was dunking on), I think there's an argument made that after playing an overture, one shouldn't then move on immediately to a full concerto when your audience is a metaphorical cow.
I do have a question for the Taiwan nuke in question. Why doesn't China simply tell the U.S. publicly, that if Taiwan find itself in possession of a nuclear device, China will automatically assume that it is from the U.S. or with U.S. involvement? And that if Taiwan were to fire a nuclear device against China, that China will treat it as if it were getting nuked by the United States and respond appropriately?
I do have a question for the Taiwan nuke in question. Why doesn't China simply tell the U.S. publicly, that if Taiwan find itself in possession of a nuclear device, China will automatically assume that it is from the U.S. or with U.S. involvement? And that if Taiwan were to fire a nuclear device against China, that China will treat it as if it were getting nuked by the United States and respond appropriately?
For Japan, you could summarise the situation as 4 groups of airbases as follows:
2+1 airbases in Okinawa
2 airbases in Southern Japan
2+4? airbases in Central Japan
1?+2 airbases in Northern Japan
And each of these groups is separated by ~800km, so they are not mutually supporting.
Therefore sufficient force can be concentrated on each group in turn, and they can be defeated in detail.
It's just a question of having enough aircraft, missiles and glide bombs to do this.
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As we've seen in Ukraine, Shaheed-type cruise missiles ($30K cost?) have become the primary means of offensive missiles. Production is at 2500+ per month, with plans to double this to 5000 per month.
And these are now accompanied by even larger numbers of Gerbera decoys which cost about $10K, which can be fitted with a small 2.5kg warhead.
If China were to scale to a proportionately similar level, we would be looking at numbers 10x larger.
My assessment is that the Taiwanese government and military is thoroughly penetrated, and no such programme could be kept secret. And which plausible foreign partner is going to produce the nuclear weapons for Taiwan?
But let's say your scenario somehow happens and Taiwan ends up with a small number of nukes AND also delivery vehicles.
These would likely still be tactical-level bombs with small warheads in the beginning. In such a scenario, I still think that this wouldn't deter the Chinese military. Look at how South Korea's doctrine, which is a lightning, pre-emptive conventional strike against North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles.
As I said, the scenario of China imposing a trade embargo on the USA, is if China thinks a war is inevitable and also imminent.
1. If the war happens, then China made the right move
2. If there is no war, because China successfully deterred the USA, then again, China made the right choice, because a war has been avoided
You're practically threatening American political elites with a good time!
You might not know this, but that's not necessarily a scenario American policymakers will mind in private: a lot of them deeply dislike, if not despise Israel for obvious reasons, while the majority will happily leverage such Chinese measures as pretext to drastically increase aid to Israel.
You have to distinguish between policymakers and politicans in the American elites.
The politicians in the USA are either:
1. thoroughly compromised by the Israel lobby
2. religious nutjobs that believe Israel must exist for their biblical prophecies to come true
Also remember that in the attacker versus defender cost equation, defending Israel is far more costly.
This will divert the US military towards the Middle East and away from the Western Pacific.
I don't see how rational American policymakers will be "happy" at this scenario.
Moreover, the logistics don't exist for Palestinian terrorists or freedom fighters (don't personally care for them either way however they're framed) to receive and operate Chinese arms, beyond systems that are insufficient for meaningfully challenging the IDF.
First off, Iran would welcome an inflow of Chinese weapons. After all, they've just been humiliated and are looking for vengeance. Note Israel is 1000km from Iran, with is comparable to the distances from China to Japan. And if Iran were to effectively become a Chinese proxy, I reckon the supply routes from Iran-Iraq-Syria-Lebanon would be reopened.
But again, I don't expect this scenario to happen, unless China sees a war with the USA as inevitable.
Here's the crux of the issue.
What happens if the American security guarantee simply isn't credible?
Remember that China can already project far more military power onto the Korean peninsula than can the USA.
That extends to the Western Pacific in general.
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My guess is that if required, China can successfully impose an indefinite air-sea blockade on Korea, Japan and the Philippines. And that the US military will be unable to break this blockade.
And in a long war, Chinese industry would be able to build a bigger Navy than the US, despite US attempts to attack Chinese industry.
Then the US Navy would be defeated in a blue-water naval battle in the Pacific.
So the US would lose control of global sea lanes and the US would then be subject to a Chinese naval blockade.