I don't think china's sam system network is as good as russia or us. Russia has like 1500 s-300/s-400. US has 1000+ patriots. Compared to that China only has 300 HQ-9 launchers overall and out of which only 100 HQ-9B. It only has 2-300 s-300 from older generation as well. It's simply inadequate to cover the entirety of China. There will be gaps and US could exploit them. China needs to really up its air defense missile production if they want to have a solid air defense shield.
I think I was quite clear when I said: China has one of the largest networks of air search radars and sensors...
Also, disregarding the air search radars and sensors part, let's analyze the Chinese GBAD component:
PLAGF: SAM 754+
Medium-range 250 HQ-16A/B (CH-SA-16)
Short-range 504: 24 9K331 Tor-M1 (RS-SA-15 Gauntlet); 30 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6); 200 HQ-7A/B (CH-SA-4); 200 HQ-17 (CH-SA-15); 50 HQ-17A (CH-SA-15)
Point-defence HN-5A/B (CH-SA-3); FN-6 (CH-SA-10); QW-1 (CH-SA-7); QW-2 (CH-SA-8) SPAAGM 25mm 270 PGZ-04A
GUNS 7,126+
SP 126: 30mm adds PGL-19; 35mm 120 PGZ-07; 37mm 6 PGZ-88
TOWED: 7,000+: 25mm PG-87; 35mm PG-99 (GDF-002); 37mm PG-55 (M-1939)/PG-65/PG-74; 57mm PG-59 (S-60); 100mm PG-59 (KS-19)
GBAD strength of PLAGF divided into:
17 AD div
8 AD bde
8 AD regt
PLAAF: SAM 894+
Long-range 670+: 196 HQ-9 (CH-SA-9); 96 HQ-9B (CH-SA-21); 130+ HQ-22; 32 S-300PMU (RS-SA-10 grumble); 64 S-300PMU1 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 120 S-300PMU2 (RS-SA-20 Gargoyle); 32 S-400 (RS-SA-21B Growler)
Medium-range 150 HQ-12 (CH-SA-12)
Short-range 74+: 50+ HQ-6A (CH-SA-6); 24 HQ-6D (CH-SA-6)
GUNS • TOWED • 57mm PG-59 (S-60)
PLAAF GBAD force divided into:
1 SAM div (3 SAM regt)
26 SAM bde
Still missing missiles:
HQ-11 - Point-defence
HQ-26 - Long Range ABM
HQ-19 - Long Range ABM
HQ-29 - SAM Long Range
Remembering that the source is the TMB 2024 which is completely out of date regarding the PLA.
Furthermore, the quantity manufactured for the US Army may have been 1,000 Patriots, but only 480 M902/M903 Patriot PAC-3/PAC-3
MSEs are in service, divided into eight brigades, three of them permanently based abroad.
For any country large enough like China and Russia, simply any number deployed may be insufficient to cover the entire country, even though this is not considered ideal, the air defense system, especially long range, becomes an important asset for front denial. Multilayered, long-range engagement capabilities are the basis for the consolidation of anti-access and air denial (A2/AD) bubbles along the border.
Assuming that China is in an inferior position in the war, Chinese anti-access and area denial capabilities are an asymmetric warfare strategy in which a militarily weaker state seeks to prevent or hinder an aggressor state from freely using certain areas, geographic regions or means (land, naval or air) to attack it. China, in response to the US ability to launch large-scale operations in its airspace, establishes large A2/AD exclusion zones or “bubbles” centered on long-range systems. These A2/AD bubbles allow Beijing to deny the use of airspace in these areas.