Even IF the US - in 2030 - can penetrate the Chinese A2/AD complex of hundreds of destroyers and frigates with thousands of VLS cells and land based missiles, EW, sensors etc and can get to Taiwan how do they plan to save it?
As far as I can see there is only 2 options for them : interdict Chinese shipping and perform sorties on Chinese targets that are on Formosa however as I demonstrate below this is unrealistic.
Interdicting Chinese ships - They are going to be facing thousands of civilian cargo vessels and their anti ship munitions would have been exhausted from getting through the Chinese bubble of ships and J-20s. Not to mention that since the strait is only like 100 miles China will be able to shoot down a lot of those anti ship munitions with SAMs from the mainland. Since there are thousands of cheap replaceable civilian cargo vessels the US won't possess the magazine depth to destroy them meaning even if (there are strong doubts the US can do this in the first place) China's A2/AD complex is broken they won't be able to stop the flow of Chinese troops. US submarines would be useless in this scenario due to the lack of depth in the Taiwan strait.
Perform sorties on Chinese land targets on Formosa - The longest range US air to ground CAS munitions are all under 100km. This means that if the US wants to perform sorties on Formosa, F-35s/B21s will have to get *extremely* close to the PLA ground forces. A range where ground based SAMs on the mainland guided by AWACS networking can take them out. Not to mention that its likely that China should be able to have a higher precision fire prosecution rate due to having MLRS suicide piston drones and other pgms. This means that even if the F-35s aren't sent to their creator they won't be able to stop China's takeover Taiwan as China will be able to create more effects on Taiwan than the US can.
Does anyone have any idea of how else the US can stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan even if they can breakthrough the PLAN & PLAAF?
Lol they "save" it the same way Russians are "saving" Kiev and Odessa. Why use language that defends the aggressor?
Anyways, it's not enough for US to be able to bomb China's periphery, they also need to be able to sustain a credible logistics line for the invasion force. That's much much more difficult.
China will work by destroying US & US aligned infrastructure and depots. And why then not start with the closest US positions from the KMT in Taiwan? So no, they do not need to destroy rest of USN first before destroying US' incursion into China. In fact, the priority would be to ensure a succesful counteroffensive as early as possible, as it will greatly hurt US morale/momentum while allowing China to push up weapons closer to Japan.
In the starting weeks, China would focus on keeping US incursion units out of Taiwan, while bombing the rebels with 100 000s of fires per day, only hitting more faraway US bases (which are much more expensive to strike) on a more sporadic basis, unless large columns of US forces fuck up and get within missile spam range.
Once the immediate threat inside China is taken out, which ensures the relative safety of the for China by far most vulnerable group of civilians in the conflict (those living in Taiwan), they can move on towards destroying Japanese infrastructure in earnest and eventually counterinvade wherever US is using as staging ground.
At that point, China would also have entered higher mobilization. Earlier in the war, it's harder for China to sustain huge amount of fires at further away targets.