PLA Strategy in a Taiwan Contingency

ZeEa5KPul said:

Knowing about it doesn't mean they can do anything about it. The PLA's firepower is too overwhelming. I could take measures to mitigate the impact of being punched by Mike Tyson, but it's not going to do me much good.

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For one thing they can reinforce the second island chain, which they are already doing.

tphuang said:

You might want to think about what these other countries can offer in a Westpac fight before writing these things.

There is no benefit for America to intentionally encourage china to attack first.

Countries don't follow some kind of moral code when deciding which sides they help out. They follow national interests. Normally, national interests is following the winning side.

So, the goal is to maximize your chances of winning rather than be the good guy.

If there is any lesson to learn from the Ukraine conflict, it's that trying to be the good guy once you already started the conflict is a worthless endeavor. China would be stupid to hold back once it makes the decision to attack. Go all out, give yourself the best chance to win is the logical solution. If you are not ready to do that and be the bad guy, don't attack.

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Sorry but neither your assertion that a first strike will win the war nor your assertion that countries will automatically fall in line with the victor are supported by history.

Furthermore, you are confounding different issues. Once again, let me summarize my position for you:

1. China will not launch AR before they are ready.
2. China will not attack US and its vassals unless attacked first.
3. China will not hold back against ROC forces if AR is initiated.
4. China will not hold back against US forces if attacked.

Furthermore, specifically on point 2, I do not believe China would or should preemptively attack the US and its vassals:
1. History has shown that most of those who believe a first overwhelming attack will win them the war has been proven wrong.

2. The Chinese people are not interested in war unless absolutely necessary. The CPC is not interested in initiating a war unless absolutely necessary.

3. China does not need to fight a war to win back TW. By current trends, it is inevitable that China will grow too powerful for the US to challenge militarily. Such an outcome would be infinitely better than launching a war even if China emerges the victor.

4. The US knows the above, therefore they are trying to provoke China into starting a war before they lose their military advantage.

5. If a preemptive attack was truly as effective as you believe, the US would have attacked China already. The fact that they have not proves that even the US believes an unprovoked attack is not worth the fallout. Therefore, I do not see why you would think China would believe otherwise.

Let me just add that any AR operation would certainly be accompanied, if not preceded by, a total Naval blockade of the island.

At that point, the US will try to evade the blockade in order to supply ROC forces. The logical thing for China would be to neutralize those supply units whenever they are found.

At this point, the US could either continue to supply TW while sustaining heavy losses on their supply units, or attempt to escort those units with their own naval forces. In the latter case we will see fighting between USN and PLAN units. Depending on how that plays out, we may then see direct PLARF strikes on where those US units are based.

Even at this point, I believe both sides will try to contain the conflict. I don't believe the US will directly attack Chinese forces, nor will China directly attack other US bases. However, in the event that the US does launch a direct attack on Chinese forces (as opposed to defending themselves from PLAN interdiction), China will then, and only then, retaliate with overwhelming forces against all US assets in the region.

solarz said:

For one thing they can reinforce the second island chain, which they are already doing.

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Do want to clarify however that the Japanese tried the same before and during the war, but having the proper strategic overmatch is the more important aspect in dealing with such conditions.

solarz said:

Let me just add that any AR operation would certainly be accompanied, if not preceded by, a total Naval blockade of the island.

At that point, the US will try to evade the blockade in order to supply ROC forces. The logical thing for China would be to neutralize those supply units whenever they are found.

At this point, the US could either continue to supply TW while sustaining heavy losses on their supply units, or attempt to escort those units with their own naval forces. In the latter case we will see fighting between USN and PLAN units. Depending on how that plays out, we may then see direct PLARF strikes on where those US units are based.

Even at this point, I believe both sides will try to contain the conflict. I don't believe the US will directly attack Chinese forces, nor will China directly attack other US bases. However, in the event that the US does launch a direct attack on Chinese forces (as opposed to defending themselves from PLAN interdiction), China will then, and only then, retaliate with overwhelming forces against all US assets in the region.

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The key question that the last few pages are asking, is "in an AR operation, on what basis would the PLA target US military forces"?

I agree with you in principle that China would ideally prefer to contain such a conflict between only itself and Taiwan, and to minimally involve the US.
However, the problem is that at the outset of conflict China cannot guarantee the US will not get involved later in the conflict, and US military infrastructure in the western pacific, if left unmolested, has the ability to be significantly fortified and enjoy significant augmentation of forces from CONTUS and other regions.

This leaves China in a bit of a dilemma:

A) if China does not strike at and neutralize US forces and bases in westpac at the outset or early stages of conflict, then it means the US may have the freedom to significantly augment and fortify those forces and bases over time and enter/intervene in a later stage of said conflict with a significantly more concentrated and resilient force from much more fortified bases/power projection centers, making the PLA's task of combating them much more difficult, and potentially making it very difficult if not impossible to achieve its military goals on the field.

On the other hand...

B) if China does strike at and neutralize US forces and bases in westpac at the outset or early stages of conflict, then it may be able to militarily cripple US ability to project power and operate in the westpac, but means it also guarantees US involvement in the conflict and is likely to cause the US government and public to feel obliged to commit themselves to the conflict in a manner where they feel aggrieved as an "innocent party being attacked for no reason," which leaves much more limited room for de-escalation and an offramp after conflict is settled, and even if a peace can be negotiated it is likely to make US-China relations grievous and irreparable for many many decades if not centuries.


Now, there are going to be other factors relevant to consider if we want to look at the above question, for example we should specifically consider whether AR is being done out of China's own volition (i.e.: "initiating a conflict" out of nowhere), or whether it is doing so in response to Taiwan and/or the US carrying out political maneuvers that crosses China's red lines (such as moving too far towards de jure independence).
Needless to say, the time period in which this is occurring is important too, as that would determine the balance of regional power and the options each side has to play.


However the fundamental benefits and risks of "not striking at US forces" versus "immediately striking at US forces" in a Taiwan contingency, will exist in the general same manner regardless of the permutations.


There are only a few ways I can foresee China as being willing to hold back from striking at US forces at the outset of a conflict:
- one is if the PLA can become so overwhelmingly capable in the westpac, that they are still able to robustly defeat a concentrated, fortified and augmented US force in westpac that has had the time to conduct global strategic redeployments to the region. But such a balance of forces is not going to occur in the near future.
- the other (which can exist alongside the above) is if there can be some kind of public political commitment from the US that they would not conduct material redeployments or augmentations to the westpac theater or conduct military operations against China or in support of Taiwan, and that if such events did occur then the PLA would consider that an act of aggression and use military force. But this is rather unlikely and the political environment in the US would be loathe to even entertain such an idea, certainly not to the degree that China would want.

james smith esq said:

To the west, the boundary could be, either the land boundaries of the SCS basin, or some line midway in the Indian Ocean. Actually, I’d prefer it if China could become the predominant naval power in the Indian Ocean, as a whole. This would limit the USN to being an Atlantic-Mediterranean/east+south-Pacific power, and provide China with significant control over its sea lines of trade/communication. It‘s all about the BRI, baby!

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Not ideal.

Having the western frontier, i.e. 4IC located laterally across the middle of the Indian Ocean (from Sri Lanka, cutting across Maldives and Diego Garcia before ending at the Antarctic coast) risks getting sandwiched by the Indian Navy from both the east and west, plus hammered by the Indian Air Force from the north-northeast - While also being supported by the Australian and European NATO navies from both sides of the 4IC.

In the meantime, China has no realistic ways to relieve and support troops stationed on the 4IC in time, thanks to the tyranny of distance (having to sail through the entire length of South China Sea, enter the Malacca Strait and Andaman Sea, and having to fight through Indian forces based at Andaman and Nicobar before entering the Indian Ocean) and potential enemy blockades along the way.

On the flipside, instead of using the 4IC as China's western maritime frontier, I believe that setting up a PLAN naval base on the coastal region of Myanmar facing the Andaman Sea would be a more feasible option. But in order for this to work, China needs a politically-stable and economically-vibrant Myanmar.

Blitzo said:

There are only a few ways I can foresee China as being willing to hold back from striking at US forces at the outset of a conflict:
- one is if the PLA can become so overwhelmingly capable in the westpac, that they are still able to robustly defeat a concentrated, fortified and augmented US force in westpac that has had the time to conduct global strategic redeployments to the region. But such a balance of forces is not going to occur in the near future.
- the other (which can exist alongside the above) is if there can be some kind of public political commitment from the US that they would not conduct material redeployments or augmentations to the westpac theater or conduct military operations against China or in support of Taiwan, and that if such events did occur then the PLA would consider that an act of aggression and use military force. But this is rather unlikely and the political environment in the US would be loathe to even entertain such an idea, certainly not to the degree that China would want.

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Or you know another possible option is China would tell US privately in no uncertain terms that AR is coming and any interference would mean total war. Biden would discuss with national security council, and the NSC advisor would privately call China back and discuss political off ramps. E.g., Aircraft carrier stationed in west pacific suddenly gets "broken" and have to stay in Japan for long term repairs or return back to US mainland.

The US would plant some rumors with dirt on the ruling Taiwan regime and start to question Taiwan's loyalty. Chinese president calls US president then reassures the public AR is not going to happen. Then Bam, AR happens, US got "blindsighted" and does nothing, "Mea Culpa". For a more detailed explanation, please refer to Sir Humphrey's four stages strategy from yes minister.

Bernard Woolley: What if the Prime Minister insists we help them?
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Then we follow the four-stage strategy.
Bernard Woolley: What's that?
Sir Richard Wharton: Standard Foreign Office response in a time of crisis.
Sir Richard Wharton: In stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
Sir Richard Wharton: In stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we *can* do.
Sir Humphrey Appleby: Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

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This four point strategy is the tried and trued strategy for recent US humiliations, think Afghanistan.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

Not ideal.

Having the western frontier, i.e. 4IC located laterally across the middle of the Indian Ocean (from Sri Lanka, cutting across Maldives and Diego Garcia before ending at the Antarctic coast) risks getting sandwiched by the Indian Navy from both the east and west, plus hammered by the Indian Air Force from the north-northeast - While also being supported by the Australian and European NATO navies from both sides of the 4IC.

In the meantime, China has no realistic ways to relieve and support troops stationed on the 4IC in time, thanks to the tyranny of distance (having to sail through the entire length of South China Sea, enter the Malacca Strait and Andaman Sea, and having to fight through Indian forces based at Andaman and Nicobar before entering the Indian Ocean) and potential enemy blockades along the way.

On the flipside, instead of using the 4IC as China's western maritime frontier, I believe that setting up a PLAN naval base on the coastal region of Myanmar facing the Andaman Sea would be a more feasible option. But in order for this to work, China needs a politically-stable and economically-vibrant Myanmar.

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A Myanmar air/naval base at the Bay of Bengal/Andaman Sea point would provide excellent support for greater Indian Ocean ambitions!
At some point, China will develop air transport capabilities to augment naval re-supply for such far-flung deployments as Djibouti.
Additionally, why not try to accomplish similar i accomodations on the Malay Peninsula?

Blitzo said:

This leaves China in a bit of a dilemma:

A) if China does not strike at and neutralize US forces and bases in westpac at the outset or early stages of conflict, then it means the US may have the freedom to significantly augment and fortify those forces and bases over time and enter/intervene in a later stage of said conflict with a significantly more concentrated and resilient force from much more fortified bases/power projection centers, making the PLA's task of combating them much more difficult, and potentially making it very difficult if not impossible to achieve its military goals on the field.

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I believe this is a false dilemma. The US is already in the process of reinforcing its assets, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, as I have mentioned before, China is perfectly willing to wait for PR, and it is the US trying to provoke China into AR, therefore if China launches AR in response to US provocations, then we can safely assume that the US has already made all of its preparations should it plan to enter into direct conflict with China.

Conversely, if they do not make the necessary preparations, then it means they do not wish to enter into such a conflict, and it would be thus foolish to launch a preemptive attack.

Blitzo said:

There are only a few ways I can foresee China as being willing to hold back from striking at US forces at the outset of a conflict:
- one is if the PLA can become so overwhelmingly capable in the westpac, that they are still able to robustly defeat a concentrated, fortified and augmented US force in westpac that has had the time to conduct global strategic redeployments to the region. But such a balance of forces is not going to occur in the near future.

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Where only that was true, we would not be seeing this kind of geopolitical tension in the region.

On the contrary, I think such a balance will happen within the next 20 years, not only because of China's growth, but also because of the US' decline.

ACuriousPLAFan said:

Not ideal.

Having the western frontier, i.e. 4IC located laterally across the middle of the Indian Ocean (from Sri Lanka, cutting across Maldives and Diego Garcia before ending at the Antarctic coast) risks getting sandwiched by the Indian Navy from both the east and west, plus hammered by the Indian Air Force from the north-northeast - While also being supported by the Australian and European NATO navies from both sides of the 4IC.

In the meantime, China has no realistic ways to relieve and support troops stationed on the 4IC in time, thanks to the tyranny of distance (having to sail through the entire length of South China Sea, enter the Malacca Strait and Andaman Sea, and having to fight through Indian forces based at Andaman and Nicobar before entering the Indian Ocean) and potential enemy blockades along the way.

On the flipside, instead of using the 4IC as China's western maritime frontier, I believe that setting up a PLAN naval base on the coastal region of Myanmar facing the Andaman Sea would be a more feasible option. But in order for this to work, China needs a politically-stable and economically-vibrant Myanmar.

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Myanmar is one of the few Sino-Tibetan states that have not peacefully joined China, thanks to UK and India. Long term, it is questionable as to the viability of an independent yet poor Sino-Tibetan state in South Asia bordering the very aggressive Indian regime. It may be in Myanmar's best interests to negotiate some sort of political agreement with China.

coolgod said:

Or you know another possible option is China would tell US privately in no uncertain terms that AR is coming and any interference would mean total war. Biden would discuss with national security council, and the NSC advisor would privately call China back and discuss political off ramps. E.g., Aircraft carrier stationed in west pacific suddenly gets "broken" and have to stay in Japan for long term repairs or return back to US mainland.

The US would plant some rumors with dirt on the ruling Taiwan regime and start to question Taiwan's loyalty. Chinese president calls US president then reassures the public AR is not going to happen. Then Bam, AR happens, US got "blindsighted" and does nothing, "Mea Culpa". For a more detailed explanation, please refer to Sir Humphrey's four stages strategy from yes minister.

This four point strategy is the tried and trued strategy for recent US humiliations, think Afghanistan.

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Private reassurances and commitments can be attempted as well, however I consider that to be even less viable than public commitments (which is why I didn't mention a private option) simply because of the ability of governments to deny any private commitments occurred while still building up forces.

For example, if the US agrees privately to stand down forces, but publicly rushes to reinforce their positions in the western pacific and denying there were any private agreements in the first place, then all you have left is essentially Option A by giving the US warning that China is intending to carry AR, which leaves China holding the decision to whether to strike at the US as part of AR operations.

solarz said:

I believe this is a false dilemma. The US is already in the process of reinforcing its assets, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, as I have mentioned before, China is perfectly willing to wait for PR, and it is the US trying to provoke China into AR, therefore if China launches AR in response to US provocations, then we can safely assume that the US has already made all of its preparations should it plan to enter into direct conflict with China.

Conversely, if they do not make the necessary preparations, then it means they do not wish to enter into such a conflict, and it would be thus foolish to launch a preemptive attack.

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It is important for us to recognize there is a difference between "preparedness" and "intent". I wrote about this a week or so ago with regards to China's capabilities vis a vis Taiwan, and it is also the case vis a vis the US to China.

Currently the US is indeed significantly fortifying its positions in the western pacific, however it is doing so to try and give itself as many capabilities and bases as it can, so that if conflict occurred, it has the best fighting chance and to allow itself to more rapidly redeploy and surge its global forces and CONTUS forces to the western pacific. It is engaging in preparedness.
However that doesn't mean the US right now has made a decision to explicitly provoke China into war at a given point in time.

If the US were intending to initiate a conflict with China, such as through provocations like conspiring with Taiwan to cross some of China's red lines, then I would be expecting the US to have made multiple months if not years of preparations before hand in the form of preparing its global and CONTUS based mobile units and redeploying them to the western pacific in rapid succession to give China minimal time to respond.


So no, it isn't a false dilemma, because the US has not chosen to prepare and massively surge the vast majority of its globally available air and naval forces to the western pacific yet.

If the US seriously wanted to prepare and commit to a western pacific war as part of a multi year plan, then we would be seeing stand down and work up periods of as many of its CSGs and air wings as possible, to allow them to recuperate, to enable as many of them to surge into the western pacific theater in as short of a period as possible.
Instead, what they're doing is fortifying alliances, expanding bases, and trying to acquire new bases, but the actual quantity and readiness of US globally available forces to rapidly redeploy to the western pacific is not significantly above recent norms, and their global deployment patterns are about normal as well.


Putting it another way -- what the US is currently doing at present is peacetime fortification. But if the US made an actual decision was made to carry out wartime fortification, redeployment and surge, then that would result in a far larger, more resilient, formidable and lethal force in the western pacific. It is the latter (wartime fortification, redeployment and surge) which the PLA would be most concerned about and ideally be wanting to prevent.

Which takes us back to the question of when/if they strike at US bases and forces in the region at the outset of conflict to prevent the US from reinforcing their westpac positions.

Edit:
One major "limitation" to US wartime reinforcing/surge capabilities to its westpac positions, is that it is not something which is permanent. It is not something the US can do indefinitely, and forces will eventually have to return to CONTUS for maintenance, stand down, and so on.
The problem becomes one of whether the PLA and US military in westpac actually wage war against each other when the US is reinforcing its westpac positions and the geopolitical decisions relevant to Taiwan. Namely, does the PLA conduct AR operations against Taiwan while the US has reinforced its westpac positions, or is there some ability for China to wait until the US has to drawdown its surge capabilities to strike once the US westpac presence is reduced?
Is it politically tenable for China to wait, if during that period for example Taiwan declares independence and the US and multiple other nations recognize its independence and open embassies and open up military bases on Taiwan, and China has to wait until the larger US westpac surge presence withdraws first, before carrying out AR operations?

That's the kind of unknowns we open ourselves up to, outside of Options A and B directly.

solarz said:

Where only that was true, we would not be seeing this kind of geopolitical tension in the region.


On the contrary, I think such a balance will happen within the next 20 years, not only because of China's growth, but also because of the US' decline.

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In terms of near future, I am talking about within the next 5-10 years. Beyond that, who knows.