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ACuriousPLAFan

Brigadier
Registered Member
The JLSF has always been its own thing since the early 10s reforms, no?
Yes, the JLSF has been a thing since 2016 when the five theatre commands were established.
It's more that the PLASSF now has been split into three arms: Information Support Force, Aerospace Force, and Cyberspace Force.
And each of those three arms are now alongside and equal to the existing Joint Logistic Support Force (which is unchanged).

The PLA JLSF was never under the Strategic Support Force.

Yes, that's true. My initial lack of understanding on the matter is deeply regrettable.

I remember back when I was just lurking, @taxiya would often highlight that the PLASSF's name indicated it wasn't a “军”/branch and that this was a meaningful difference in PLA considerations (and the PLASSF already reported directly to the CMC before this split).

Indeed. Though, the use of the term "force" for the English name of the PLASSF (because there seems to be a lack of direct translation differentiation between "军" and "部队"), which is the same as the English naming for the 4 major services in the PLA (PLAGF, PLAN, PLAAF, PLARF) can be quite confusing for those who don't understand the PLA organizational structure quite well.

Maybe these reforms are mostly just a recognition that the space, cyber and information domains lack enough synergies to be led by the same staff?

Or that I'd like to view it as each of those 3 new arms that were originally part of the PLASSF have become increasingly important in terms of their roles and significance in how the PLA will conduct their warfare operations going forward, such that each of them becoming bigger, more mature and more complex than before means that retaining them underneath the singular command of the PLASSF has become unfeasible.

In other words (and IMHO, now that I've understood it), the PLASSF can be seen as a key stepping stone (even if temporary in nature) for the PLA to further bring the crucial elements of next-generation warfare into greater focus, streamlining and integration with how the PLA will be fighting its wars into the future with the 3 new arms that were originally parts of the PLASSF, alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force.
 
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NA1vE

Just Hatched
Registered Member
China has formally established the Information Support Force, to be directly commanded by the Central Military Commission.

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It seems like this unit is demoted to the Vice-Theater level, led by two Lt. Generals.
 

Bellum_Romanum

Brigadier
Registered Member
To everyone here: I just finished reading the early assessment(s) American MIC people regarding the most recent and unexpected announcement with respect to the newly created PLA Information Support Force disbanding the PLASSF which was itself just formed back in 2015.

Henry Wang of RANCORP argues that there's a seeming contradiction with what the CPC/PLA theoretical intentions vs the actual practice on the ground. The implications given by the analyst is that CMC Chairman's penchant for integrated information goes against the very nature and demand for the need to centralize information to a single entity (Xi). The author asserted that PLA rank and file recognize the challenges on what it takes to be a joint commander and push back against the highly centralized vision: "WE CANNOT ASSUME FOR JOINT COMMANDERS TO BE OMNIPOTENT."

I would like for everyone on this forum to debate/discuss the merit of what this analyst said and why his assessment(s) maybe incorrect or the interpretation of this move by the PLA to be even misguided. My own rudimentary understanding or lack thereof regarding this recent development is clouded by the idea and persuasion I read and gleaned from Gen.Charles Krulak (USMC) 3 block war concepts of what he coined as "STRATEGIC CORPORAL/SOLDIER." As I understood it's proposed scope was to allow command flexibility and response time to the soldier that's in the thick of the battlefield to make quick decisions/authority without having the constant need of approval process to the upper chain of command/echelon thereby cutting down the delay in response time that can be the difference maker in tactical tempo/operations and victory and defeat.

 

Aniah

Senior Member
Registered Member
To everyone here: I just finished reading the early assessment(s) American MIC people regarding the most recent and unexpected announcement with respect to the newly created PLA Information Support Force disbanding the PLASSF which was itself just formed back in 2015.

Henry Wang of RANCORP argues that there's a seeming contradiction with what the CPC/PLA theoretical intentions vs the actual practice on the ground. The implications given by the analyst is that CMC Chairman's penchant for integrated information goes against the very nature and demand for the need to centralize information to a single entity (Xi). The author asserted that PLA rank and file recognize the challenges on what it takes to be a joint commander and push back against the highly centralized vision: "WE CANNOT ASSUME FOR JOINT COMMANDERS TO BE OMNIPOTENT."

I would like for everyone on this forum to debate/discuss the merit of what this analyst said and why his assessment(s) maybe incorrect or the interpretation of this move by the PLA to be even misguided. My own rudimentary understanding or lack thereof regarding this recent development is clouded by the idea and persuasion I read and gleaned from Gen.Charles Krulak (USMC) 3 block war concepts of what he coined as "STRATEGIC CORPORAL/SOLDIER." As I understood it's proposed scope was to allow command flexibility and response time to the soldier that's in the thick of the battlefield to make quick decisions/authority without having the constant need of approval process to the upper chain of command/echelon thereby cutting down the delay in response time that can be the difference maker in tactical tempo/operations and victory and defeat.

Feels like the PVA all over again. I think it's a good thing, allows people to respond to events faster.
 

99PLAAFBalloons

New Member
Registered Member
Or that I'd like to view it as each of those 3 new arms that were originally part of the PLASSF have become increasingly important in terms of their roles and significance in how the PLA will conduct their warfare operations going forward, such that each of them becoming bigger, more mature and more complex than before means that retaining them underneath the singular command of the PLASSF has become unfeasible.

In other words (and IMHO, now that I've understood it), the PLASSF can be seen as a key stepping stone (even if temporary in nature) for the PLA to further bring the crucial elements of next-generation warfare into greater focus, streamlining and integration with how the PLA will be fighting its wars into the future with the 3 new arms that were originally parts of the PLASSF, alongside the Joint Logistics Support Force.
Certainly plausible :)

All three domains have long been seen as significant - each of them has their own dedicated section in Chapter 9 of the 2020 战略学 (when are we getting a new one?). I've mostly presumed that they were under the PLASSF umbrella for tighter co-ordination as back in 2016 the PLA didn't lack the resources to staff the more specialised organisations that this reform now brings, but the stepping stone hypothesis makes sense too
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
To everyone here: I just finished reading the early assessment(s) American MIC people regarding the most recent and unexpected announcement with respect to the newly created PLA Information Support Force disbanding the PLASSF which was itself just formed back in 2015.

Henry Wang of RANCORP argues that there's a seeming contradiction with what the CPC/PLA theoretical intentions vs the actual practice on the ground. The implications given by the analyst is that CMC Chairman's penchant for integrated information goes against the very nature and demand for the need to centralize information to a single entity (Xi). The author asserted that PLA rank and file recognize the challenges on what it takes to be a joint commander and push back against the highly centralized vision: "WE CANNOT ASSUME FOR JOINT COMMANDERS TO BE OMNIPOTENT."

I would like for everyone on this forum to debate/discuss the merit of what this analyst said and why his assessment(s) maybe incorrect or the interpretation of this move by the PLA to be even misguided. My own rudimentary understanding or lack thereof regarding this recent development is clouded by the idea and persuasion I read and gleaned from Gen.Charles Krulak (USMC) 3 block war concepts of what he coined as "STRATEGIC CORPORAL/SOLDIER." As I understood it's proposed scope was to allow command flexibility and response time to the soldier that's in the thick of the battlefield to make quick decisions/authority without having the constant need of approval process to the upper chain of command/echelon thereby cutting down the delay in response time that can be the difference maker in tactical tempo/operations and victory and defeat.


I think they're reading too much into it.

For most of these analysts or commentators, unless they have actual raw intelligence from within the PLA and CMC as to the decision making process, the early stage of these kind of reforms or changes being announced is just an exercise for them to impose their own views and stereotypes of what they think the PLA "is".


I also think that particular thread focuses too much on the "Information Support Force" replacing the SSF (which is frankly incorrect) and the focus around the SSF's changes should be instead looking at how they've separated its constituents into the Information Support Force, Cyberspace Force, and Space/Aerospace Force.
 

Wrought

Junior Member
Registered Member
I think they're reading too much into it.

For most of these analysts or commentators, unless they have actual raw intelligence from within the PLA and CMC as to the decision making process, the early stage of these kind of reforms or changes being announced is just an exercise for them to impose their own views and stereotypes of what they think the PLA "is".


I also think that particular thread focuses too much on the "Information Support Force" replacing the SSF (which is frankly incorrect) and the focus around the SSF's changes should be instead looking at how they've separated its constituents into the Information Support Force, Cyberspace Force, and Space/Aerospace Force.

Probably because the English-language articles all seem to have headlines like this:

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!

Please, Log in or Register to view URLs content!
 

OppositeDay

Senior Member
Registered Member
Only the Information Support Force is new (hence why ceremony was held only for them). Aerospace Force and Cyberspace Force came from preexisting divisions of the old Strategic Support Force.

I've read on Chinese internet that the new Information Support Force got all of China's ground based early warning systems.
 

plawolf

Lieutenant General
To everyone here: I just finished reading the early assessment(s) American MIC people regarding the most recent and unexpected announcement with respect to the newly created PLA Information Support Force disbanding the PLASSF which was itself just formed back in 2015.

Henry Wang of RANCORP argues that there's a seeming contradiction with what the CPC/PLA theoretical intentions vs the actual practice on the ground. The implications given by the analyst is that CMC Chairman's penchant for integrated information goes against the very nature and demand for the need to centralize information to a single entity (Xi). The author asserted that PLA rank and file recognize the challenges on what it takes to be a joint commander and push back against the highly centralized vision: "WE CANNOT ASSUME FOR JOINT COMMANDERS TO BE OMNIPOTENT."

I would like for everyone on this forum to debate/discuss the merit of what this analyst said and why his assessment(s) maybe incorrect or the interpretation of this move by the PLA to be even misguided. My own rudimentary understanding or lack thereof regarding this recent development is clouded by the idea and persuasion I read and gleaned from Gen.Charles Krulak (USMC) 3 block war concepts of what he coined as "STRATEGIC CORPORAL/SOLDIER." As I understood it's proposed scope was to allow command flexibility and response time to the soldier that's in the thick of the battlefield to make quick decisions/authority without having the constant need of approval process to the upper chain of command/echelon thereby cutting down the delay in response time that can be the difference maker in tactical tempo/operations and victory and defeat.


You can have a centralised integrated single entitle information directorate while still maintaining grassroots integration and support with combat forces. The two are not mutually exclusive and it’s incredibly common to have such structures within companies. The most common and widespread application are your Finance and HR business partners who are all members of centralised departments, but who work closely with frontline departments to help them manage their resources and meet their daily operational needs. It’s less common, but the same principle could also be applied to IT business partners.

By consolidating all of the grassroots information forces into one single directorate, you can achieve massive savings and improvements as you will find many teams across the board all working in parallel on similar or the same problems, so you have a large number of different solutions being developed across the board. This is incredibly wasteful, inefficient and can cause problems with co-operation and integration. But having all of the IT support in one function, the PLA can streamline processes across the board, collect detailed user requirements across the PLA and make big decisions based on that data and commission bespoke software development that individual IT departments could not dream to have the budget for etc.
 
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