PLA next/6th generation fighter thread

[AndrewS]

Well the "fulls scale" tech demonstrator for the US NGAD is also very much unclear what its characteristics and maturity are, so I would treat that with some caution especially in keeping with recent USAF statements about re-evaluating what they actually want with the NGAD platform.

Previous public comments from the DOD indicated a range of 1500-1800 nautical miles (3000km) for the USAF manned NGAD
That was acknowledgment that US airbases closer to China (on the 1IC) are simply too vulnerable.

So that meant Guam and possibly the Southern Philippines as operating locations, but there are only a handful of possible bases there.

But the Southern Philippines (at 2000km from the Chinese mainland and 1000km from the trio of China SCS island bases) is arguably too vulnerable to attack and blockade. For example, we now see low-cost Sunflower 200 (Shaheed-class) cruise missiles being marketed with a 2000km range.

For Guam we can see 100? DF-26 missiles per year for example.

And what happens when China fields its own NGAD with a 3000km range? There are now 50 Chinese airbases arrayed against the handful of bases in Guam and the Southern Philippines. So we're looking at Chinese air superiority over Guam, no matter how many manned NGADs the USAF buys.

You could even argue that today's J-20 fleet (when equipped with drop tanks) could operate against Guam.

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So I see the delay to NGAD as the USAF belatedly acknowledging that even Guam is no longer a feasible operating location.

But the next available bases are a handful in Australia (4200km) and Wake (4600km). For aircraft to operate at these sorts of distances, it starts looking like a B-21 bomber? with tanker support. And those tankers will also be very vulnerable at their bases.

Arguably a USAF manned NGAD simply doesn't work, given the geography of the Western Pacific and South East Asia.
So might the USAF just go with a heavily modified variant of the existing B-21, focusing on air superiority?

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From the Chinese perspective, a 3000km range NGAD still makes sense to develop and build.
1. It denies the US usage of Guam and the Philippines
2. Extends China's defensive perimeter deep into the Pacific and also to the Malacca Straits

And with airborne refueling, we could even see Chinese NGADs reach Australia and Wake.

 

[Blitzo]

Previous public comments from the DOD indicated a range of 1500-1800 nautical miles (3000km) for the USAF manned NGAD
That was acknowledgment that US airbases closer to China (on the 1IC) are simply too vulnerable.

So that meant Guam and possibly the Southern Philippines as operating locations, but there are only a handful of possible bases there.

But the Southern Philippines (at 2000km from the Chinese mainland and 1000km from the trio of China SCS island bases) is arguably too vulnerable to attack and blockade. For example, we now see low-cost Sunflower 200 (Shaheed-class) cruise missiles being marketed with a 2000km range.

For Guam we can see 100? DF-26 missiles per year for example.

And what happens when China fields its own NGAD with a 3000km range? There are now 50 Chinese airbases arrayed against the handful of bases in Guam and the Southern Philippines. So we're looking at Chinese air superiority over Guam, no matter how many manned NGADs the USAF buys.

You could even argue that today's J-20 fleet (when equipped with drop tanks) could operate against Guam.

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So I see the delay to NGAD as the USAF belatedly acknowledging that even Guam is no longer a feasible operating location.

But the next available bases are a handful in Australia (4200km) and Wake (4600km). For aircraft to operate at these sorts of distances, it starts looking like a B-21 bomber? with tanker support. And those tankers will also be very vulnerable at their bases.

Arguably a USAF manned NGAD simply doesn't work, given the geography of the Western Pacific and South East Asia.
So might the USAF just go with a heavily modified variant of the existing B-21, focusing on air superiority?

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From the Chinese perspective, a 3000km range NGAD still makes sense to develop and build.
1. It denies the US usage of Guam and the Philippines
2. Extends China's defensive perimeter deep into the Pacific and also to the Malacca Straits

And with airborne refueling, we could even see Chinese NGADs reach Australia and Wake.

I think you're thinking about this in too much depth at this time, and extrapolating a bit too much detail wrt US NGAD plans and issues and bringing in too many disparate other platforms.

It's safer and most correct to say that we can't exclude cost or capability or technology as reasons for the US desire to review and revise NGAD, but also that we can't pin it on a single factor.


IMO often "I don't know, and there's no reason to speculate further" is the best answer.

 

[Michaelsinodef]

I think you're thinking about this in too much depth at this time, and extrapolating a bit too much detail wrt US NGAD plans and issues and bringing in too many disparate other platforms.

It's safer and most correct to say that we can't exclude cost or capability or technology as reasons for the US desire to review and revise NGAD, but also that we can't pin it on a single factor.


IMO often "I don't know, and there's no reason to speculate further" is the best answer.

Probably more correct to say a combination of all those 3 factors (and probably some more).

Although we can't make any judgement how much each factor weighted when it came to US desire to review and revise NGAD.

 

[AndrewS]

Probably more correct to say a combination of all those 3 factors (and probably some more).

Although we can't make any judgement how much each factor weighted when it came to US desire to review and revise NGAD.

I think there is enough data available.

For any given range, we can expect the Chinese Air Force to develop their own NGAD, which would be better in terms of equivalent cost, range and capability. As per the USAF briefing on Chinese weapons development being 4x faster and having significant cost advantages.

If you use equivalence in the Chinese and USAF NGAD as the base assumption (which is being generous to the USAF), then it does come down to geography and numbers (which itself is related to cost and geography)

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And if you think about it, why was the USAF NGAD being designed with a 3000km range in the first place, instead of a shorter ranged version operating from the 1IC?

That was largely because of the recognition that China has the capacity to hit the airbases in the 1IC and do this indefinitely. So even if the USAF could come up with a relatively cheap NGAD, it wouldn't make any difference.

Hence the USAF NGAD specification was to operate from the 2IC. But now, they can see the 2IC airbases facing the same issue.

 

[Blitzo]

Probably more correct to say a combination of all those 3 factors (and probably some more).

Although we can't make any judgement how much each factor weighted when it came to US desire to review and revise NGAD.

As I said, I'm not excluding any of those three factors, and I'm not saying there aren't any other factors which are relevant either.

My point is that the original post suggesting it was just due to cost or even primarily due to cost, is a poor argument.

It's better to say we don't know.

I think there is enough data available.

For any given range, we can expect the Chinese Air Force to develop their own NGAD, which would be better in terms of equivalent cost, range and capability. As per the USAF briefing on Chinese weapons development being 4x faster and having significant cost advantages.

If you use equivalence in the Chinese and USAF NGAD as the base assumption (which is being generous to the USAF), then it does come down to geography and numbers (which itself is related to cost and geography)

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And if you think about it, why was the USAF NGAD being designed with a 3000km range in the first place, instead of a shorter ranged version operating from the 1IC?

That was largely because of the recognition that China has the capacity to hit the airbases in the 1IC and do this indefinitely. So even if the USAF could come up with a relatively cheap NGAD, it wouldn't make any difference.

Hence the USAF NGAD specification was to operate from the 2IC. But now, they can see the 2IC airbases facing the same issue.

You're being too confident, not to mention assuming equivalence where there isn't necessarily equivalence, and using scaling too linearly.

I'm not saying your line of thinking cannot be possible, nor am I saying that thinking in terms of basing is a bad idea (in fact, I think it's a very important aspect), but some concepts are better left not defined too well because otherwise you'll be left trying to defend them without a viable foundation to base your arguments off of.


I don't see what's wrong with just saying "the US NGAD review/revision is due to a number of factors, including cost which has been stated, and likely other factors including but not limited to capability, technology, etc, all of which are interrelated with each other".
It's a defensible statement without being too specific and without getting lost in the details about geography or relative cost assumptions which may or may not even be true.

There's no need to be more specific than one needs to if there is a lack of clear evidence for it.

 

[gelgoog]

I think the main issue for the US is that by switching the SRBMs and IRBMs to glide versions China is extending the range of what is the bulk of their ballistic rocket forces. By switching the DF-16 to the DF-17 for example they doubled the range of that missile and made it much harder to intercept. This probably reduced the warhead mass, but that is kind of irrelevant if you put a tactical nuke in it.
With that kind of range they can use their existing large amount of such launchers to strike targets which would require larger missiles before. And those large missiles can now be used to strike targets further away.
Oh and the larger missiles are also getting glide versions and high mobility launcher vehicles. Which means the replacement for the DF-26, the DF-27, won't just be able to strike Guam but all the way to Hawaii while penetrating the US Aegis BMD more easily.

This makes the usage case for NGAD that much harder. It will require specialized airbases and long airstrips which can be attacked by China with its Rocket Force. So now the US wants smaller platforms to be stationed in their many military bases close to China. And they want to increase the amount of such bases to make it harder for China to destroy all of them.

I still think the US whole game plan for 6th gen is kind of misguided though. The smaller fighters should instead be drones and it is a horrible idea to use a small fighter as a drone controller. You will need a two seater aircraft minimum I think. The best option is probably two 6th generation aircraft. A light optionally manned fighter, and a heavy drone control/fighter bomber aircraft.

I think China will aim to do both those aircraft designs. The only question is which will we see first.

 

[AndrewS]

I think the main issue for the US is that by switching the SRBMs and IRBMs to glide versions China is extending the range of what is the bulk of their ballistic rocket forces. By switching the DF-16 to the DF-17 for example they doubled the range of that missile and made it much harder to intercept. This probably reduced the warhead mass, but that is kind of irrelevant if you put a tactical nuke in it.
With that kind of range they can use their existing large amount of such launchers to strike targets which would require larger missiles before. And those large missiles can now be used to strike targets further away.
Oh and the larger missiles are also getting glide versions and high mobility launcher vehicles. Which means the replacement for the DF-26, the DF-27, won't just be able to strike Guam but all the way to Hawaii while penetrating the US Aegis BMD more easily.

If we take the DF-17, the indications are that it only costs $2 Million, which wouldn't be that much more than a DF-16.
So we could expect the same cost difference to apply to the DF-26 and DF-27 missiles.

There's no need for nuke warheads. They can use cluster warheads to cover soft area targets, and there will be a lot of kinetic energy for a penetrator at higher speeds.

This makes the usage case for NGAD that much harder. It will require specialized airbases and long airstrips which can be attacked by China with its Rocket Force. So now the US wants smaller platforms to be stationed in their many military bases close to China. And they want to increase the amount of such bases to make it harder for China to destroy all of them.

The US was trying to get away from stationing anything on the 1IC, because these locations are just too close to China. For example:

1. A CJ-10 (Tomahawk) class cruise missile should have a range of 1500km+. And we have the CCTV newsreel on Chinese factorie(s) ramping up to 1000 per day if required
2. A sunflower (Shaheed-class) piston-engine cruise missile is listed with a range of 2000km. These missiles are dirt-cheap and should be even easier to scale up production.
3. Heavyweight fighters should be able to conduct strike missions to 1500km with air escorts.

Once China ramps up munitions production, I don't see any scenario where the US can station enough forces on the 1IC for them to be survivable, nor can these forces be resupplied from runways or ports which are under constant attack.

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Simply put, I don't see any way that the US can prevent absolute military superiority by the Chinese military over the 1IC.
We see senior US government officials occasionally making the same comment in interviews as well.

 

[Blitzo]

If we take the DF-17, the indications are that it only costs $2 Million, which wouldn't be that much more than a DF-16.
So we could expect the same cost difference to apply to the DF-26 and DF-27 missiles.

There's no need for nuke warheads. They can use cluster warheads to cover soft area targets, and there will be a lot of kinetic energy for a penetrator at higher speeds.



The US was trying to get away from stationing anything on the 1IC, because these locations are just too close to China. For example:

1. A CJ-10 (Tomahawk) class cruise missile should have a range of 1500km+. And we have the CCTV newsreel on Chinese factorie(s) ramping up to 1000 per day if required
2. A sunflower (Shaheed-class) piston-engine cruise missile is listed with a range of 2000km. These missiles are dirt-cheap and should be even easier to scale up production.
3. Heavyweight fighters should be able to conduct strike missions to 1500km with air escorts.

Once China ramps up munitions production, I don't see any scenario where the US can station enough forces on the 1IC for them to be survivable, nor can these forces be resupplied from runways or ports which are under constant attack.

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Simply put, I don't see any way that the US can prevent absolute military superiority by the Chinese military over the 1IC.
We see senior US government officials occasionally making the same comment in interviews as well.

Please stop assuming cost differences as a given.

This is worse than your extrapolations of future Chinese GDP and military size based on direct comparisons with the US equivalents.


Some arguments are really better left unsaid

 

[leibowitz]

One thing we should all be mindful of here is that a test demonstrator flight and a public test flight are not the same thing. This means that we should not get overly excited if we see a J-XD demonstration flight ahead of the US NGAD (as the US has likely flown an NGAD as early as 2022).

 

[Blitzo]

One thing we should all be mindful of here is that a test demonstrator flight and a public test flight are not the same thing. This means that we should not get overly excited if we see a J-XD demonstration flight ahead of the US NGAD (as the US has likely flown an NGAD as early as 2022).

The nuances of that question was discussed a page or two back.

We know that the US has flown some sort of "full scale tech demonstrator" for NGAD a few years ago, but the nature of that demonstrator is unknown (a new airframe, or demonstrating 6th gen relevant technologies, etc), yet we do know that despite whatever NGAD relevant tech or systems were flown with that demonstrator the USAF is undergoing a major review and revision of their NGAD effort and it's unclear if the NGAD demonstrator will be a "YF-22" equivalent tech demonstrator for the eventual final NGAD product.

The same question also applies for J-XD -- if a tech demo/prototype does emerge in the near future, in theory we don't know if it will be a "YF-22/J-20 an 2001" equivalent tech demonstrator either, but the noise being made strongly implies an expectation that its more than just a basic tech demonstrator but rather relevant for a final product. (Not to mention we have had high suspicions for a while now that J-XD relevant tech demos have also flown in the past)


Putting it another way -- not all "tech demonstrators" are equal.
It remains to be seen how relevant the US NGAD tech demo flown a few years back in secret is to the final US NGAD product, and if a J-XD tech demo does fly in the near future we don't know if how relevant it will be for its final product either (though the noise and time schedule seems slightly weighted in the more definitive spectrum)