kwaigonegin
Colonel
I said I 'didn't' .. as in past tense... as in before all these rhetorics came out obviously.
PLA Navy news, pics and videos
- Thread starter Jeff Head
- Start date
I said I 'didn't' .. as in past tense... as in before all these rhetorics came out obviously.
Jura The idiot
General
Technically more related in the coast guard thread.
And it's not exactly new for those who are unfamiliar, I think CCG has done sailbys quite consistently over the last few years.
Not sure which thread is the most appropriate one, but don't want to start a new thread for this.... The article is too long, only the key finding part are posted.
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February 8, 2017
...
Key Findings
Both in the volume and the conference on which it is based, contributors reached general consensus concerning the following: China has achieved the most rapid aggregate SBI growth in modern history, with monumental but uneven results. Through a process of “imitative innovation,” the country has leapfrogged key development steps, saving time and resources. By 2020, the PLAN will be unambiguously the world’s second-largest blue-water navy. Moreover, if current trends continue, by 2030 China may assemble a combat fleet that in overall order of battle (hardware only) is quantitatively, and perhaps even qualitatively, in the same league as the USN. In my personal opinion, even the perception that China was on track to achieve such parity would have grave consequences for America’s standing and influence across the Asia-Pacific and around the world.
To be sure, China faces substantial difficulties in fielding the largest, most sophisticated surface combatants and submarines. They all involve complex systems-of-systems, such as propulsion and aspects of aviation, in which China’s preferred second-mover piecemeal integration of foreign and domestic technologies cannot offer a “good enough” result. Such ongoing limitations, as well as a lack of overseas bases, mean that far from its shores China will continue to extend radiating layers of but not—anytime soon—control. Even by 2030, the PLAN will remain in the early stages of increasing operational proficiency and ability to engage in high-intensity opposed operations in distant waters. Moreover, in coming years, China also faces mounting costs of maintaining its burgeoning fleet. China also confronts macro uncertainties, most importantly in the form of downside risks to its future economic growth. Meanwhile, it seems destined to confront a in the form of under .
But regardless of these challenges, in coordination with China’s other sea forces (including the coast guard and maritime militia) and services, the PLAN is increasingly capable of contesting sea control within widening-range rings surrounding the near seas and their immediate approaches. China’s SBI has already produced a fleet of several hundred (currently in the low 300s; ) increasingly advanced warships capable of “flooding the zone” along the contested East Asian littoral. When several hundred ships each from China’s coast guard and its most advanced maritime militia units are factored in, Beijing’s numerical preponderance for the “home game” scenarios it cares about most becomes formidable indeed. And that does not even include the land-based “” that backstops them. In this regard, while China continues a major ship buildout with tremendous implications, it is already able to pose a formidable military-maritime challenge to the regional interests and security of the United States and its East Asian allies and partners. Despite its ongoing limitations further afield, China has already proven itself capable of precisely the sort of maritime development that rightly concerns them most.
Central to this Chinese is the PLAN’s overmatching of the USN in key aspects of missile loadouts. Left unaddressed, this disparity is likely to worsen as China deploys greater quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those systems potentially employed by the USN against them. By 2020, China is expected to have:
• quantitative parity or better in surface-to-air missiles and antiship (ASCMs)
• parity in missile launch cells
• and quantitative inferiority only in multi-mission land-attack cruise missiles, which are less essential to prevailing worst-case or “war at sea” scenarios.
As with the platforms on which they are based, these Chinese weapons are concentrated in the near seas, while their American counterparts are dispersed globally. To make matters worse, the next-generation long-range ASCMs on which U.S. naval superiority hinges are still “paper missiles” not yet fielded on USN surface combatants. Moreover, these new ASCMs—the Long-Range Antiship Missile and vertical launch system–compatible Naval Strike Missile variant—may not be effectively targetable under contested .
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
February 8, 2017
...
Key Findings
Both in the volume and the conference on which it is based, contributors reached general consensus concerning the following: China has achieved the most rapid aggregate SBI growth in modern history, with monumental but uneven results. Through a process of “imitative innovation,” the country has leapfrogged key development steps, saving time and resources. By 2020, the PLAN will be unambiguously the world’s second-largest blue-water navy. Moreover, if current trends continue, by 2030 China may assemble a combat fleet that in overall order of battle (hardware only) is quantitatively, and perhaps even qualitatively, in the same league as the USN. In my personal opinion, even the perception that China was on track to achieve such parity would have grave consequences for America’s standing and influence across the Asia-Pacific and around the world.
To be sure, China faces substantial difficulties in fielding the largest, most sophisticated surface combatants and submarines. They all involve complex systems-of-systems, such as propulsion and aspects of aviation, in which China’s preferred second-mover piecemeal integration of foreign and domestic technologies cannot offer a “good enough” result. Such ongoing limitations, as well as a lack of overseas bases, mean that far from its shores China will continue to extend radiating layers of but not—anytime soon—control. Even by 2030, the PLAN will remain in the early stages of increasing operational proficiency and ability to engage in high-intensity opposed operations in distant waters. Moreover, in coming years, China also faces mounting costs of maintaining its burgeoning fleet. China also confronts macro uncertainties, most importantly in the form of downside risks to its future economic growth. Meanwhile, it seems destined to confront a in the form of under .
But regardless of these challenges, in coordination with China’s other sea forces (including the coast guard and maritime militia) and services, the PLAN is increasingly capable of contesting sea control within widening-range rings surrounding the near seas and their immediate approaches. China’s SBI has already produced a fleet of several hundred (currently in the low 300s; ) increasingly advanced warships capable of “flooding the zone” along the contested East Asian littoral. When several hundred ships each from China’s coast guard and its most advanced maritime militia units are factored in, Beijing’s numerical preponderance for the “home game” scenarios it cares about most becomes formidable indeed. And that does not even include the land-based “” that backstops them. In this regard, while China continues a major ship buildout with tremendous implications, it is already able to pose a formidable military-maritime challenge to the regional interests and security of the United States and its East Asian allies and partners. Despite its ongoing limitations further afield, China has already proven itself capable of precisely the sort of maritime development that rightly concerns them most.
Central to this Chinese is the PLAN’s overmatching of the USN in key aspects of missile loadouts. Left unaddressed, this disparity is likely to worsen as China deploys greater quantities of missiles with greater ranges than those systems potentially employed by the USN against them. By 2020, China is expected to have:
• quantitative parity or better in surface-to-air missiles and antiship (ASCMs)
• parity in missile launch cells
• and quantitative inferiority only in multi-mission land-attack cruise missiles, which are less essential to prevailing worst-case or “war at sea” scenarios.
As with the platforms on which they are based, these Chinese weapons are concentrated in the near seas, while their American counterparts are dispersed globally. To make matters worse, the next-generation long-range ASCMs on which U.S. naval superiority hinges are still “paper missiles” not yet fielded on USN surface combatants. Moreover, these new ASCMs—the Long-Range Antiship Missile and vertical launch system–compatible Naval Strike Missile variant—may not be effectively targetable under contested .
Jura The idiot
General
I noticed in Russian Internet (), located the source (says
PUBLISHED : Monday, 13 February, 2017, 7:02am
UPDATED : Monday, 13 February, 2017, 9:58am):
No advanced jet launch system for China’s third aircraft carrier, experts say
CV-17/001A Shandong carrier development and news Thread
(I don't subscribe to this thread, had I visited it before, I wouldn't have posted the above article, sorry)
PUBLISHED : Monday, 13 February, 2017, 7:02am
UPDATED : Monday, 13 February, 2017, 9:58am):
No advanced jet launch system for China’s third aircraft carrier, experts say
LOL now noticed it was probably debunked in
CV-17/001A Shandong carrier development and news Thread
(I don't subscribe to this thread, had I visited it before, I wouldn't have posted the above article, sorry)
Hendrik_2000
Lieutenant General
It is UNCLOS convention Part II article 20. the convention is clear but some country use sleight of hand by using socalled civilian crewed vessel doing exactly what is not considered as innocent passage. That way circumspect the convention
This article will examine the challenges related to evaluating whether embarking privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) aboard a merchant ship is contrary to the regime of innocent passage and whether vessels with embarked security teams are required to give prior notice of passage to coastal states.
Article20
Submarines and other underwater vehicles
In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.
Article25
Rights of protection of the coastal State
1. The coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent.
2. In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside internal waters, the coastal State also has the right to take the necessary steps to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal waters or such a call is subject.
3. The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.
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I don't know what those 'Chinese waters' are but surely it isn't half of East or South Chinese Sea. If they mean it they're... lunatics. That's all.