While acknowledging China's growing strength, the inevitability of that strength provoking hedging responses by other nations, and the ability of other nations to take actions that force China's hand, I am not confident that China has pursued an ideal path to date in terms of calibrating its strength to its actions and managing the perceptions and responses from other nations. That is not to say that I think China has done poorly in these respects, only that pathways leading to better outcomes -- specifically lower levels of strategic hedging by other nations -- may have been available. Specifically, I question the value of China "flexing its muscles" while it remains clearly inferior to the United States across the various dimensions of national power. Such behaviour seems calculated to provoke hedging responses from smaller powers in the form of increased military spending and the formation and reinforcement of strategic relationships that threaten Chinese interests (e.g. the USA-Japan-India-Australia 'Quad' or the US-Vietnam rapprochement).
We can debate whether China miscalculated on its timing (though probably best not done in extenddd fashion in this thread, so this will be my only response on this matter), but the point is a flex was coming at some point, and we all should have expected it.
I would contend that China was going to sart getting hedge responses from its neighbors regardless of whether it chose to flex as soon as it became evident what kind of military capabilities they were reaching for. One could also argue that if China hadn’t flexed neighbors it has disputes with would have been motivated to try to bake in their claims earlier and more aggressively as it became clearer China’s was well on the road to attaining miliary supremacy over them, to increase the cost of uprooting their positions, and that’s was another consideration it had to balance in its security calculus. Indeed, rightly or wrongly, they saw the activities of some ASEAN countries as examples of the latter, and Obama’s announcement of a pivot as an example of the former. Some of the potential risks we could cite in China’s security environment are flex neutral, and some are actually risks that come from *not* flexing. China being less assertive doesn’t necessarily equate to its neighbors being more complacent, or being more trustful, or putting off hedging positions.
I don’t think efforts such as Quad or US rapproachment with Vietnam will prove to be effective answers. In addition to the lead time challenges of reactive coordination, even as the more proactive countries in the region have become visibly antsy about Chinese power they still also have to balance an economic relationship which is still largely positive. Part of effective strategy is execution speed and comprehensiveness, and China has acquired quite bit of asymmetric advantage on that front compared to the answers its strategic competitors can mount in the short term, which is why despite the ire Beijing seems to be illicting from its neighbors they have largely been successful at hardening and reinforcing their strategic positions. We will see how the rest plays out, but sometimes waiting for a “perfect” time in the short term is imperfect strategy, and over the long term the fundamentals tend to speak for themselves.