Persian Gulf & Middle East Military News, Reports, Data, etc.

i.e.

Senior Member
And after acting like that for a dozen years the US were surprised not to be hailed as liberators when they started their invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Wide Range Economic Sanctions are much like the mass aerial bombardment of cities, developed shortly before and extensive exercised in ww2, the theory goes that if you deprave the population too much, you can 1) destroy the state's capacity for industrialized warfare, 2) make the working population life so miserable by either deprive them of life, or starve them into submission via sanctions, that they turn against their regime.

I will let one decide the moral equavlency of those two approaches, but the fundamental aim is same.

btw,
in 99' Kosovo war NATO end up bombing alot of water treatment, TV statesion, powergrid and powerplants and bridges on Danbue in Belgrade... urban infrastructures if you will, after they couldn't hit any Serbian Army targets worth any value. First time an european city is bombed like this post ww2. I watched it with incredulous... I thought I will never see this post 91' Gulfwar.. but it happened again. with all the talk of precision bombing and "humanitarian intervention", this is return to the most ugly of the ugly human behavior. wether you kill a population with carpet bombing city blocks or kill them with lack of food, clean water and heat, it is killing a population non-the-less. The world is turning more and more towards "The Strong Do What it Will and the Weak Suffers what it Must".

btw look up that quote, and understand the background. it is incredible the repeat of History of Pelopennesian war is unfolding right infront of the eyes of modern world and seems not many people is drawing the lessons.
 

delft

Brigadier
Re The bridges in Novi Sad: They closed for years the river transport between Southern Germany and the Black Sea, to the detriment of all riparian countries.
 

Kurt

Junior Member
its reported in this months AFM (just a small article) that Venezuela in 2006 transfered one of its F16s in knock down condition to Iran to quote "help calibrate Irans airdefences"

the F16 was in 2 x C130 Cargos and stoped over in over 6 countrys with the last one stop in Algeria, it took a very complicated route

dont know if its true though

It is about the US stopping arms sales to Venezuela because they have troubles with Hugo Chavez. The F-16 is half of Venezuela's fighter force, the others are Su-30 (altogether less than 50 fighters). That's a logical step if the US threatens to ground the fighters of another country - sell all information and spares to an enemy of the US in retaliation. True or not, any information flow to Iran will be hard to control. Be carefull what weapons and know-how you export and keep upgraded.

@ i.e.
As to destruction of civilian infrastructure by military means, it's a kind of chevauche to force the enemy to fight under suitable conditions to the attacker and not hide away. It's very hard to destroy a tank parked in a garage in the woods if you have no idea where it is. If the enemy's armed forces don't react with predictable measures of violence to these chevauches, they do take a heavy toll on the civilians and they do demonstrate power. The effect of such a power demonstration is a profound fear in the enemy that he tries to overplay by empasis of hate, especially during the conflict. Humans depend on good nourishment and hygiene in order to develop full mental and physical potential. Denying that results in less average capability and a much higher lifelong susceptibility to diseases (perhaps even passed on to some degree by specific responsive DNA methylations).
The problem with warfare is that in order to not have these destructions, there must be mutual agreements to establish some conditions to slug it out. In ancient Greece, they met on few select plains and had their hoplite match. By contrast, in the Hundred Years War, the French were chasing the evasive English and when they finally cornered them with their mounted troops, tried to overrun them - creating the legend of the English longbow.
War is first of all about making someone else's life miserable and second it is about catching these guys. In between are short lapses where humans recognize that it is OK to settle things more on a playing field with less collateral damage - but the current US armament makes them an overwhelming champion in that area and we are in a so-called post-heroic age where you consider it insane to fight like that (comment by the Persians on the Greek warfare before they had more first hand experience). A
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would be Europe or Japan versus the USA, the current wars are more like the Athenian expeditions to the Hellespont and Thrace in order to secure interests and have not reached the punitive expeditions of the Delian League/First Athenian Empire.
 
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Kurt

Junior Member
It was mentioned on this forum how fortunate South Korea is by being able to buy Iranian oil despite the US embargo goal. That might be a misunderstanding about how you engineer sanctions.
You can try to create a complete embargo. This will reduce the amount of produce available - make prices rise and enforcing it will become very expensive, the more so if a lot of capabilities to smuggle exist. Iraq is pretty easy to block, Iran has too many connections, especially the Caspian Sea is unblockable and separating Iranian from Azerbaijani or Turkmeni oil would be a funny task.
If you give Iran a controlled outlet for their oil, the official embargo helps in limiting Iranian barter ability due to lack of business partners and thus keep down their oil price as well as the global oil price which is related to the available amount and price of this material. The important part is the controlled outlet and who would be better suited than a money-hungry "illoyal" US-ally? This idea has the most benefits for a longterm economic wealth sapping plan, while a complete embargo would backfire after shortterm investments in oil flow redirection and selling in a high-price illegally fueled market.
 

i.e.

Senior Member
Re The bridges in Novi Sad: They closed for years the river transport between Southern Germany and the Black Sea, to the detriment of all riparian countries.

...which has very little or no immediate military value because it is the main Danbue crossing in northern serbia.

Unless Serbia was amassing armour to invade hungary croatia or romania in northern serbia, I don't see the reason how it is going to aid kosovo war on the coalition which is mainly fought in southern Serbia and kosovo!

pure economic punishment.
 

delft

Brigadier
Things are really moving in the Middle East. Here is an article by ambassador Bhadrakumar about the implications of the political developments in Egypt:
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Egypt thumbs the nose at US
By M K Bhadrakumar

The gloom in Washington must be deepening. Egypt is careering away from the alliance with the United States - and the bitter truth cannot be hidden or obfuscated anymore.

This is not how Washington expected the "right side of history" to play out. The Arab Spring has borne a strange fruit in Egypt - a pure breed, unlike the hybrids in Tunisia, Libya or Yemen.

Consider the following. President Barack Obama was one of the first statesmen to greet Mohammed Morsi on his election victory in May. Obama broke protocol and phoned to congratulate him, signifying the anxiety in Washington to have a splendid chemistry with him.

Then, Obama wrote a letter to Morsi and he deputed Deputy Secretary of State William Burns to fly to Cairo and deliver it in person. Burns was followed to Cairo by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, again for an audience with Morsi. That, in turn, was followed by the visit to Cairo by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. All this, within the first month of Morsi's presidency.

Panetta came back to Washington greatly pleased that the Egyptian military leadership, which has been the anchor sheet of the US regional strategy and the custodian of the US' interests in Egypt, and Morsi were not only getting alone fine but they even had a common agenda.

The rest is history. Within days or weeks of Panetta's optimism, Morsi unceremoniously sent the military back to the barracks from the corridors of political power. Washington had no choice but to put a brave face on it, almost spreading a canard that Morsi consulted the Obama administration before cracking down on the Egyptian military.

However, in the weekend, the truth is out. The US may be facing across a huge setback to its robust efforts to influence Morsi's presidency. The letter that Burns carried a month ago apparently contained an invitation from Obama to Morsi to visit Washington.

And Morsi is instead travelling to China and Iran.

This was announced on the Egyptian president's official website on Sunday. Morsi is apparently combining the visits to China and Iran. It seems he will pay a three-day visit to China next Monday at the invitation of President Hu Jintao and from Beijing he proposes to travel to Tehran on Thursday to attend the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Beijing is yet to announce a visit by Morsi. The government-owned China Daily, in fact, featured a commentary on Monday exclusively titled "Morsi's visit to Iran could reshape political landscape", which pointedly sidestepped any suggestion that the Egyptian president's itinerary would include Beijing as well.

However, Egypt's flagship newspaper Al-Ahram has reported that Morsi and Hu "plan to discuss crucial issues facing the Arab world, such as the Syrian situation and the Palestinian question. The two presidents will also discuss ways of enhancing commercial exchange between their respective countries, in addition to increasing Chinese investment in Egypt."

Al-Ahram summed up: "The two visits may mark changes in Egypt's foreign policy, given that both countries [China and Iran] have tense relations with the United States, to whom Egypt has been a loyal ally, especially under the rule of ousted president Hosni Mubarak."

Nobody's poodle
Indeed, the Middle East is waking up to the fact that the Americans are in the dog house in Cairo. Without doubt, this decision bears the stamp of the Muslim Brotherhood. What are the calculations?

First, Brothers know that this will go down extremely well with the public mood in Egypt, which is vehemently demanding a new foreign policy orientation that jettisons the Mubarak-era partnership with the US and Israel and a return to the country's independent foreign policy.

Second, Morsi does not want to depend too heavily on the dole-outs by the International Monetary Fund and/or the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which he is hard-pressed to accept while knowing that they come with political strings attached.

The International Monetary Fund is dictating tough terms for a US$3.2 billion loan for Egypt. The Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank agreed to give Egypt $2.5 billion in financing. Qatar is depositing $2 billion in the Central Bank of Egypt aimed at alleviating Egypt's foreign exchange shortage. Last year in May, Saudi Arabia announced aid to Egypt totaling $4 billion in "soft loans, deposits and grants". A US-led struggle was keenly underway to buy off Egypt's soul.

Conceivably, Morsi eyes China as a potential investor in the Egyptian economy because Beijing attaches no strings to economic cooperation and plays generally by the market rules, attuned to the neo-liberal policies that Morsi would be largely pursuing. The point is, Brothers know pretty well that the GCC countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia - but especially Saudi Arabia, view them intrinsically with distaste and disquiet as posing an existential danger to their authoritarian regimes. Saudi Arabia, in particular, has had a troubled relationship with the Brotherhood.

The late Crown Prince Nayef used brutal methods to suppress the activities of the Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi establishment daily Asharq Al-Awasat displayed its antipathy toward Morsi as recently as Saturday, when in a signed article the daily's senior editor Osman Mirghani wrote,
The blow that Mursi struck [at the military], allowing him to seize power, was completely unforeseen, not just on the part of the SCAF leadership, but for the Egyptian people as a whole ... These decisions were akin to a coup d'etat ... Brotherhood has attempted to dominate the political arena since they hijacked the revolution and rode the revolutionary wave into government, despite the fact that they joined this revolution quite late ... Brotherhood has sought to undermine all other parties and therefore purposely refused to cooperate or coordinate with them during the transitional period prior to the elections.

'Egypt is now being governed by declarations and "constitutional" decisions that are issued by a president who has far more powers than Mubarak ever did ... If some people are saying that Mursi ... has liberated himself and the presidency from the army's custody and intervention, then the question that must be asked here is: will this be followed by Mursi liberating himself from the Brotherhood, which seems to be present in all his decisions and measures?"
It is useful to bear in mind that this sharp criticism appeared within a month of Morsi's visit to Riyadh at the invitation of King Abdullah and within two days of the extraordinary summit of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Jeddah, which Morsi attended.

The narrative has been that Morsi while addressing the OIC summit called for "regime change" in Syria - implying that Egypt is a dutiful camp follower of the line set by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. But in actuality, Morsi snubbed the troika by proposing a solution to the Syrian crisis by forming a Contact Group comprising Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Egypt, which could mediate a Syrian dialogue and reconciliation leading to peaceful political transition in an atmosphere free of violence.

Handshake across Arabia
Of course, Morsi's inclusion of Iran in the proposed Contact Group amounted to a snub to Saudi Arabia, which hosted the OIC summit. Then, there was the body language, which counts heavily in intra-Arab parleys. On the sidelines of the OIC summit, Morsi exchanged handshakes and kisses with Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and spoke with him amidst much manifest warmth.

Tehran promptly welcomed Morsi's proposal, which in turn prompted an appreciation by the Brotherhood in Cairo that saw in Tehran's warm reaction an unmistakable confirmation that Egypt is beginning to regain some of the diplomatic and strategic clout it once held in the region. A sort of mutual admiration society formed between Cairo and Tehran across the arid deserts of the Arabian Peninsula.

Three things emerged from Morsi's performance at the OIC summit. First, Morsi signaled that Egypt intended to pursue a foreign policy that would be independent of Western or oil Gulf countries' agendas. That is to say, Egypt will not meekly follow their footsteps any more or accept an inferior position.

Second, Egypt does not see Turkey as a role model, notwithstanding the high-decibel Western propaganda ever since the Arab Spring appeared that the Islamism of the kind that the present government led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan espouses is what the doctor would also prescribe for the ailing Middle East. Erdogan came back from a visit to Cairo last year imagining he was a a rock star for Egyptians, but Morsi apparently doesn't think so.

Third, Morsi's decision to include Iran as a partner in the search for peace in Syria meant a rejection of the Western and Saudi-Turkish approach. On the sidelines of the OIC summit, Egyptian foreign minister Mohammed Amr also met his Iranian counterpart Al Akbar Salehi to urge that Tehran should assist in solving the Syrian crisis.

Indeed, these are early days but Morsi's decision to visit Iran (with which Egypt doesn't have diplomatic relations) can only be seen as a strategic move with profound implications for regional security and global politics. It needs some explanation.

For one thing, Iran is the first Muslim country after Saudi Arabia that Morsi will be visiting in the Middle East. The Arab Street will take note that Egypt's Brothers reject the notion (propagated by Saudi Arabia and the West) of an Iran-led "Shi'ite crescent" posing a threat to the Sunni communities of the Muslim Middle East.

Clearly, Egypt intends to normalize its relations with Iran, whereas Mubarak's Egypt was awash with Manichean fears of Iranian plots to destabilize it. Things have changed. The deputy leader of the Brotherhood, Mahmoud Ezzat, recently told Associated Press, "The old regime used to turn any of his [Mubarak's] rivals to a ghost. We [Brotherhood] don't want to do like Mubarak and exaggerate the fear of Iran."

From Tehran's viewpoint, this comes as a diplomatic and geopolitical breakthrough at a difficult time when the P5+1-Iran talks are in an impasse. Simply put, the Middle Eastern equations have been suddenly thrown into a state of flux. It was all meant to be a neat little logarithm of "Tehran's camp" (Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas) versus the "American camp" (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Qatar). But Morsi is nonchalantly crisscrossing that geopolitical barrier.

Could a big shake-up of regional politics be under way? At a minimum, the kaleidoscope is shifting and all of a sudden it seems that the situations in Syria, Lebanon or Gaza might be fraught with new possibilities. (By the way, Morsi made it clear at the OIC summit that any focus on the Syrian crisis should not detract attention from the Palestinian problem, which is the core issue for the Muslim world.)

The big question is what is prompting Egypt's Brotherhood? The conventional wisdom is that the Brothers are a cautious lot and will take their own sweet time to reset the power calculus in Cairo, leave alone tamper with the compass of Egypt's foreign policy. But through the past eight-day period, a different picture of the Brothers has begun emerging. What explains it?

No return to Mubarak era
In retrospect, Morsi's crackdown on the military a week ago was a pre-emptive coup. The Brothers estimated that their best bet would be to ride the wave of high expectations in the public opinion favoring fundamental changes in national policies and that any delay and procrastination in doing so would result in the military gaining the upper hand and turning the tables politically on Morsi's leadership.

Equally, the Brothers harbor distrust of the US' role and its real intentions toward Morsi's leadership. It is useful to remember that the Brotherhood (and Hamas) pointedly accused Israel's Mossad of being responsible for the terrorist strike in Sinai on August 5.

What made the Brothers come to this conclusion is unclear, but Sinai has been a lawless land for decades and it is inconceivable that Israeli intelligence paid no attention to the Islamist militant groups present there. In fact, what really happened on August 5 remains anybody's guess and it needs a willing suspension of disbelief to accept that the Bedouins could mount such a highly professional operation.

Besides, something else was jarring. The terrorist strike in Sinai followed Morsi's meetings with the Hamas leadership in Cairo and his decision to partially ease the restrictions at the Rafah crossing (which of course made a mockery of Israel's "blockade" of Gaza.

Be that as it may, the attack in Sinai came even as the US was piling pressure on Morsi to optimally resuscitate the Mubarak-era security and military tie-ups between Cairo, Washington and Tel Aviv. Both Clinton and Panetta tried hard to persuade Morsi to recapture the spirit of the tripartite US-Egypt-Israel security cooperation over Sinai.

But the Brothers would see that any such reversion to Mubarak-era policies towards Israel would be deeply resented by the Egyptian public - Islamists and "secularists alike - and in turn discredit the Brotherhood and erode the credibility of Morsi's presidency - in sum, it will be suicidal politically. The Brothers would also know that any configuration of Egypt's regional strategies with the locus resting on terrorism would preclude all possibilities of any creative policy rethink on Gaza.

In sum, Morsi's decision to open a line to Beijing and Tehran needs to be weighed against a big backdrop. The Brothers apprehend a US-Israeli plan to destabilize Morsi's government if it doesn't fall in line with Washington's diktat. Therefore, they are looking for ways and means to whittle down the current level of Egypt's over-dependence on the US and its Persian-Gulf allies by diversifying the country's external relationships and adding countervailing partnerships that would help enhance the country's strategic autonomy.

Next week promises to be a defining moment in Middle Eastern politics and inter-Arab alignments when Morsi travels to Beijing and Tehran. With Egypt drifting away, the US' regional strategies are in great disarray. The immediate question will be what is gained, after all, by conquering Damascus with such mindless brutal violence and bestiality if Cairo and Baghdad have already been lost.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Developments in Syria have been too slow for the US for a long time already and the Egyptian developments accentuate this, and I suppose President Obama's talk about US intervention if something happens with respect to Syrian chemical weapons is mend to push things along but it reminded me of GWB's talk about Iraqi WMD's.
 

delft

Brigadier
An interview by an Italian journalist with a professor at the University of Ankara about political developments in the Middle East with a view back to the 1920's and '30's in Asia Times on line:
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INTERVIEW
The remapping of the Middle East
By Claudio Gallo

Jeremy Salt is a professor of History and Politics of the Middle East at Bilkent University, Ankara. His book The Unmaking of the Middle East is a brilliant history of the last hundred years in the region, not affected by "orientalist" cliches. We asked Professor Salt to explain the present transformation of the Middle East, including the Kurdish knot. The Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey now can't stop talking about the emergence of a Great Kurdistan.

Claudio Gallo: Syria's President Bashar al-Assad gave a free hand to northern Syria Kurds. May this become a real casus belli with Turkey?

Jeremy Salt: It may be going too far - to conclude that Assad gave a free hand to the Kurds in Syria. It is more likely that in the
complete turmoil spreading across the country, he could not stop them from taking control of Kurdish areas close to the Turkish border. He certainly would not want to open up a front against the Kurds while trying to suppress the armed groups.

Whether this becomes a casus belli depends on how the Turkish government chooses to read the situation. But it is alarmed at the possibility of a Kurdish enclave being established in Northern Syria, strengthening the prospect of a "Greater Kurdistan" being created in the future. These complications should have been foreseen but apparently were not when Turkey decided to confront the Syrian government more than a year ago.

CG: Ankara is keeping a direct connection with the Iraqi Kurd administration, bypassing Baghdad. What in your opinion is the goal of Turkish diplomacy?

JS: It is very difficult to read Turkish diplomacy at the moment or to understand what the present regional policy is intended to achieve. If we look at Turkish policy until the beginning of 2012, we can see that "soft power" and "zero problems" [as pushed for by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu] had worked. Turkey had a strong working relationship with all of its eastern neighbors. As a result of the decision to work for "regime change" in Syria all this has been turned upside down.

The US and the Gulf states may be grateful for the central role Turkey is playing in the campaign to dislodge the Syrian government but the costs for Turkey have been great. Apart from the complete rupture with Damascus, the relationship with Iran and Iraq has been undermined. Turkey has also put itself at odds with Russia.

Again, all of this should have been foreseen a year ago as the inevitable outcome of confronting the government in Damascus, which has a strong strategic relationship with Iran and which gives port facilities to the Russian fleet and has had a strong relationship with Russia/the USSR for the past half century.

Iraq has been opposed to Turkish policy in Syria from the beginning. This is partly because Iraq is still suffering the consequences of armed Western intervention in 2003 and partly because of the way Turkey has developed its relationship with the Kurdish governorate in the north at the expense of its relationship with the Iraqi capital.

Turkey has a strong trading relationship with the Iraqi north and one has to assume that its position is dictated by trade, oil and the strategic importance of the Kurdish north to the Western-Gulf state alliance confronting Syria and Iran.

It must be remembered that more than 60% of Iraqis are Shi'ite. The sectarian element in Iraqi politics has been brought to the surface by virtually daily attacks on the Shi'ite and by the charges laid against the Sunni Muslim vice president, Tareq al-Hashimi, of organizing an anti-Shi'ite "death squad". Hashimi is now out of the country, with the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, among those who have risen to his defense.

CG: Is independence in the agenda of the president of the Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani?

JS: The Kurdish governorate of Iraq is already independent in all but name. It maintains a strong army - officially described as security forces - and increasingly goes its own way whatever the government in Baghdad thinks or wants. So a declaration of independence is probably only a matter of timing once it is judged that the circumstances are right.

Barzani has never made any secret of his view that a large slab of eastern Anatolia is "Western Kurdistan". The incorporation of all this territory in a Kurdish state would be his ultimate objective. This makes Turkey's dealings with the Kurdish north at the expense of its relationship with the central government of Iraq even harder to understand.

Ultimately the Kurds will put their own interests first, a point that was underlined when Barzani recently brokered a meeting of Syrian Kurds and pushed them into reconciliation. As the Syrian Kurds include a faction close to the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] the Turkish prime minister was infuriated. Turkey is now very alarmed by the awakening of the Syrian Kurds.

CG: May the possible fall of Assad's Syria be the starting point for the creation of a Kurdish state?

JS: The repercussions of the collapse of the Syrian state would be so severe that no one could now predict what might come out of the ruins. Such a collapse is not on the agenda for the moment, and it is probable that even the enemies of the Syrian government don't want it because of the uncontrollable spillover effect.

They might want a compliant government in place but they do not want chaos that will threaten their own interests across the region. A Kurdish state-in-being was able to arise in Iraq because of the invasion and occupation of 2003. This is not likely to be repeated in Syria.

CG: Is Iran playing the Kurdish card against Turkey?

JS
: These states are always playing one card or another against each other. This is what is called diplomacy. Both Iran and Turkey have a Kurdish problem that governments inside and outside the region can exploit, as they have exploited it in the past. For both these countries, exploiting the Kurdish issue always carries the risk of blowback.

I see no evidence that Iran is at present using the Kurdish card against Turkey, unless there is something I have missed. The greater danger arises from northern Iraq, where both the PKK and its Iranian Kurdish counterpart maintain bases of operations. It is from Iraq and not Iran that Kurdish militants - terrorists according to the Turkish government - have traditionally operated against Turkey.

CG: It seems that we are back to the "unmaking" of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century. Do you think that the parallel is correct?

JS
: What we are witnessing behind the immediate scenes of horror in Syria is the most comprehensive attempt to reshape the Middle East since World War I. The Sykes-Picot treaty of 1916 set out the geostrategic parameters of the modern Middle East but the model no longer works for the imperial/post-imperial powers and their regional allies.

We have been through several phases but until now the nation-state has withstood the stress to which it has been subjected. These include the Suez War of 1956, the Western-backed Israeli attack on Egypt and Syria in 1967 and Israel's attempt to set up a puppet government in Lebanon. The center of attention is what used to be called the "fertile crescent", what is now Iraq and what is now Syria, Lebanon and Israel/Palestine.

This entire region lends itself to ethno-religious breakdown if the "West" can get its foot through the door.

The invasion of Iraq was followed by the destruction of Iraq as a unitary state. The constitution written in Washington - much as the constitutions of Iraq and Egypt in the 1920s and 1930s were written in London - turned a secular state into a state with a sectarian religious basis. It created a weak central government and fostered the growth of an increasingly powerful Kurdish governorate in the north. By submitting the future of Kirkuk to a referendum (yet to be held) it encouraged the demographic war that has been taking place as the Kurds seek to build up their numbers in and around this city.

Syria lends itself to the same process of ethno-religious separation if the country can be collapsed and there is opposition to a Western-installed government. In 1918, the imperial powers divided the Middle East in a certain way that suited their interests at the time. They are now remapping it again - and again to suit their interests. It is not coincidental that this program dovetails with Israel's own long-term strategic planning.

Russia and China are fully aware of what is going on, which is why the present situation can be seen as a 21st century extension of the "Eastern question" or of the "Great Game" between Russia and Britain. Certainly the outcome of the struggle for Syria will shape the future of the Middle East for a long time to come. However they see themselves, the local actors are pawns in this game.

Claudio Gallo is world news editor of Italian daily La Stampa.

(Copyright 2012 Claudio Gallo.)
How was Turkey brought to cooperate in this dangerous game?
 

delft

Brigadier
It seems to me that Israeli aircraft will want to land in Afghanistan after attacking Iran. They don't carry enough fuel to return to Israel without this. But that would make the US position in the country immediately untenable. So if this were to happen the US must have concluded that the end is already very near.
Here is an article by Tom Engelhardt from Asia Times on line:
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How quickly will the US leave Afghanistan?
By Tom Engelhardt

In the wake of several deaths among its contingent of troops in a previously peaceful province in Afghanistan, New Zealand (like France and South Korea) is now expediting the departure of its 140 soldiers.

That's not exactly headline-making news here in the US. If you're an American, you probably didn't even know that New Zealand was playing a small part in our Afghan War. In fact, you may hardly have known about the part Americans are playing in a conflict that, over the last decade-plus, has repeatedly been labeled "the forgotten war."

Still, maybe it's time to take notice. Maybe the flight of those Kiwis should be thought of as a small omen, even if they are departing as decorously, quietly, and flightlessly as possible. Because here's the thing: once the November election is over, "expedited departure" could well become an American term and the US, as it slips ignominiously out of Afghanistan, could turn out to be the New Zealand of superpowers.

You undoubtedly know the phrase: the best laid plans of mice and men. It couldn't be more apt when it comes to the American project in Afghanistan. Washington's plans have indeed been carefully drawn up. By the end of 2014, US "combat troops" are to be withdrawn, but left behind on the giant bases the Pentagon has built will be thousands of US trainers and advisers, as well as special operations forces to go after al-Qaeda remnants (and other "militants"), and undoubtedly the air power to back them all up.

Their job will officially be to continue to "stand up" the humongous security force that no Afghan government in that thoroughly impoverished country will ever be able to pay for. Thanks to a 10-year Strategic Partnership Agreement that President Barack Obama flew to Kabul to seal with Afghan President Hamid Karzai as May began, there they are to remain until 2020 or beyond.

In other words, it being Afghanistan, we need a translator. The American "withdrawal" regularly mentioned in the media doesn't really mean "withdrawal". On paper at least, for years to come the US will partially occupy a country that has a history of loathing foreigners who won't leave (and making them pay for it).

Tea boys and old men
Plans are one thing, reality another. After all, when invading US troops triumphantly arrived in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, in April 2003, the White House and the Pentagon were already planning to stay forever and a day - and they instantly began building permanent bases (though they preferred to speak of "permanent access" via "enduring camps") as a token of their intent.

Only a couple of years later, in a gesture that couldn't have been more emphatic in planning terms, they constructed the largest (and possibly most expensive) embassy on the planet as a regional command center in Baghdad. Yet somehow those perfectly laid plans went desperately awry and only a few years later, with American leaders still looking for ways to garrison the country into the distant future, Washington found itself out on its ear. But that's reality for you, isn't it?

Right now, evidence on the ground - in the form of dead American bodies piling up - indicates that even the Afghans closest to us don't exactly second the Obama administration's plans for a 20-year occupation. In fact, news from the deep-sixed war in that forgotten land, often considered the longest conflict in American history, has suddenly burst onto the front pages of our newspapers and to the top of the TV news.

And there's just one reason for that: despite the copious plans of the planet's last superpower, the poor, backward, illiterate, hapless, corrupt Afghans - whose security forces, despite unending American financial support and mentoring, have never effectively "stood up" - made it happen. They have been sending a stark message, written in blood, to Washington's planners.

A 15-year-old "tea boy" at a US base opened fire on Marine special forces trainers exercising at a gym, killing three of them and seriously wounding another; a 60- or 70-year-old farmer, who volunteered to become a member of a village security force, turned the first gun his American special forces trainers gave him at an "inauguration ceremony" back on them, killing two; a police officer who, his father claims, joined the force four years earlier, invited Marine Special Operations advisers to a meal and gunned down three of them, wounding a fourth, before fleeing, perhaps to the Taliban.

About other "allies" involved in similar incidents - recently, there were at least nine "green-on-blue" attacks in an 11-day span in which 10 Americans died - we know almost nothing, except that they were Afghan policemen or soldiers their American trainers and mentors were trying to "stand up" to fight the Taliban. Some were promptly shot to death. At least one may have escaped.

These green-on-blue incidents, which the Pentagon recently relabeled "insider attacks", have been escalating for months. Now, they seem to have reached a critical mass and so are finally causing a public stir in official circles in Washington. A "deeply concerned" President Obama commented to reporters on the phenomenon ("We've got to make sure that we're on top of this ...") and said he was planning to "reach out" to Afghan President Karzai on the matter. In the meantime, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta did so, pressing Karzai to take tougher steps in the vetting of recruits for the Afghan security forces. (Karzai and his aides promptly blamed the attacks on the Iranian and Pakistani intelligence agencies.)

General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, flew to Afghanistan to consult with his counterparts on what to make of these incidents (and had his plane shelled on a runway at Bagram Air Field - "a lucky shot", claimed a spokesman for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - for his effort). US Afghan war commander General John Allen convened a meeting of more than 40 generals to discuss how to stop the attacks, even as he insisted "the campaign remains on track". There are now rumblings in congress about hearings on the subject.

Struggling with the message
Worry about such devastating attacks and their implications for the American mission, slow to rise, is now widespread. But much of this is reported in our media as if in a kind of code. Take for example the way Laura King put the threat in a front-page Los Angeles Times piece (and she was hardly alone). Reflecting Washington's wisdom on the subject, she wrote that the attacks "could threaten a linchpin of the Western exit strategy: training Afghan security forces in preparation for handing over most fighting duties to them by 2014." It almost sounds as if, thanks to these incidents, our combat troops might not be able to make it out of there on schedule.

No less striking is the reported general puzzlement over what lies behind these Afghan actions. In most cases, the motivation for them, writes King, "remains opaque". There are, it seems, many theories within the US military about why Afghans are turning their guns on Americans, including personal pique, individual grudges, cultural touchiness, "heat-of-the moment disputes in a society where arguments are often settled with a Kalashnikov", and in a minority of cases - about a 10th of them, according to a recent military study, though one top commander suggested the number could range up to a quarter - actual infiltration or "coercion" by the Taliban.

General Allen even suggested recently that some insider attacks might be traced to religious fasting for the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, combined with unseasonable summer heat, leaving Afghans hungry, tetchy, and prone to impulsive acts, guns in hand. According to the Washington Post, however, "Allen acknowledged that US and Afghan officials have struggled to determine what's behind the rise in attacks."

"American officials are still struggling", wrote the New York Times in an editorial on the subject, "to understand the forces at work." And in that the editorial writers like the general reflected the basic way these acts are registering here - as a remarkable Afghan mystery. In other words, in Washington's version of the blame game, the quirky, unpredictable Afghans from Hamid Karzai on down are in the crosshairs. What is the matter with them?

In the midst of all this, few say the obvious. Undoubtedly, a chasm of potential misunderstanding lies between Afghan trainees and their American trainers; Afghans may indeed feel insulted by any number of culturally inapt, inept, or hostile acts by their mentors. They may have been on edge from fasting for Ramadan. They may be holding grudges. None of the various explanations being offered, that is, may in themselves be wrong.

The problem is that none of them allow an observer to grasp what's actually going on. On that, there really should be few "misunderstandings" and, though you won't hear it in Washington, right now Americans are actually the ones in the crosshairs, and not just in the literal sense either.

While the motives of any individual Afghan turning his gun on an American may be beyond our knowing - just what made him plan it, just what made him snap - history should tell us something about the more general motives of Afghans (and perhaps the rest of us as well). After all, the United States was founded after colonial settlers grew tired of an occupying army and power in their midst.

Whatever the individual insults Afghans feel, the deeper insult almost 11 years after the US military, crony corporations, hire-a-gun outfits, contractors, advisers, and aid types arrived on the scene en masse with all their money, equipment, and promises is that things are going truly badly; that the Westerners are still around; that the Americans are still trying to stand up those Afghan forces (when the Taliban has no problem standing its forces up and fighting effectively without foreign trainers); that the defeated Taliban, one of the less popular movements of modern history, is again on the rise; that the country is a sea of corruption; that more than 30 years after the first Afghan War against the Soviets began, the country is still a morass of violence, suffering, and death.

Plumb the mystery all you want, our Afghan allies couldn't be clearer as a collective group. They are sick of foreign occupying armies, even when, in some cases, they may have no sympathy for the Taliban. This should be a situation in which no translators are needed. The "insult" to Afghan ways is, after all, large indeed and should be easy enough for Americans to grasp.

Just try to reverse the situation with Chinese, Russian, or Iranian armies heavily garrisoning the US, supporting political candidates, and trying to stand us up for more than a decade and it may be easier to understand. Americans, after all, blow people away regularly over far less than that.

And keep in mind as well what history does tell us: that the Afghans have quite a record of getting disgusted with occupying armies and blowing them away. After all, they managed to eject the militaries of two of the most powerful empires of their moments, the British in the 1840s and the Russians in the 1980s. Why not a third great empire as well?

A contagion of killing
The message is certainly clear enough, however unprepared those in Washington and in the field are to hear it: forget our enemies; a rising number of those Afghans closest to us want us out in the worst way possible and their message on the subject has been horrifically blunt. As NBC correspondent Jim Miklaszewski put it recently, among Americans in Afghanistan there is now "a growing fear the armed Afghan soldier standing next to them may really be the enemy".

It's a situation that isn't likely to be rectified by quick fixes, including the eerily named Guardian Angel program (which leaves an armed American with the sole job of watching out for trigger-happy Afghans in exchanges with his compatriots), or better "vetting" of Afghan recruits, or putting Afghan counterintelligence officers in ever more units to watch over their own troops.

The question is: why can't our leaders in Washington and in the US military stop "struggling" and see this for what it obviously is? Why can't anyone in the mainstream media write about it as it obviously is? After all, when almost 11 years after your arrival to "liberate" a country, orders are issued for every American soldier to carry a loaded weapon everywhere at all times, even on American bases, lest your allies blow you away, you should know that you've failed.

When you can't train your allies to defend their own country without an armed guardian angel watching at all times, you should know that it's long past time to leave a distant country of no strategic value to the United States.

As is now regularly noted, the incidents of green-on-blue violence are rising rapidly. There have been 32 of them reported so far this year, with 40 American or coalition members killed, compared to 21 reported in all of 2011, killing 35. The numbers have a chilling quality, a sense of contagion, to them. They suggest that this may be an unraveling moment, and don't think - though no one mentions this - that it couldn't get far worse.

To date, such incidents are essentially the work of lone-wolf attackers, in a few cases of two Afghans, and in a single case of three Afghans plotting together. But no matter how many counterintelligence agents are slipped into the ranks or guardian angels appointed, don't think there's something magical about the numbers one, two, and three.

While there's no way to foresee the future, there's no reason not to believe that what one or two Afghans are already doing couldn't in the end be done by four or five, by parts of squads, by small units. With a spirit of contagion, of copycat killings with a message, loose in the land, this could get far worse.

One thing seems ever more likely. If your plan is to stay and train a security force growing numbers of whom are focused on killing you, then you are, by definition, in an impossible situation and you should know that your days are numbered, that it's not likely you'll be there in 2020 or even maybe 2015. When training your allies to stand up means training them to do you in, it's long past time to go, whatever your plans may have been. After all, the British had "plans" for Afghanistan, as did the Russians. Little good it did them.

Imagine for a moment that you were in Kabul or Washington at the end of December 2001, after the Taliban had been crushed, after Osama bin Laden fled to Pakistan, and as the US was moving into "liberated" Afghanistan for the long haul. Imagine as well that someone claiming to be a seer made this prediction: almost 11 years from then, despite endless tens of billions of dollars spent on Afghan "reconstruction," despite nearly US$50 billion spent on "standing up" an Afghan security force that could defend the country, and with more than 700 bases built for US troops and Afghan allies, local soldiers and police would be deserting in droves, the Taliban would be back in force, those being trained would be blowing their trainers away in record numbers, and by order of the Pentagon, an American soldier could not go to the bathroom unarmed on an American base for fear of being shot down by an Afghan "friend".

You would, of course, have been considered a first-class idiot, if not a madman, and yet this is exactly the US "hearts and minds" record in Afghanistan to date. Welcomed in 2001, we are being shown the door in the worst possible way in 2012. Washington is losing it. It's too late to exit gracefully, but exit in time we must.

Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project and author of The United States of Fear as well as The End of Victory Culture, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. His latest book, co-authored with Nick Turse, is Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050.
 

delft

Brigadier
The Washington Post Ombudsman about Israeli nuclear weapons and the lack of mention of them in US media:
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What about Israel’s nuclear weapons?
By Patrick B. Pexton, Saturday, September 1, 2:38 AM

Readers periodically ask me some variation on this question: “Why does the press follow every jot and tittle of Iran’s nuclear program, but we never see any stories about Israel’s nuclear weapons capability?”

It’s a fair question. Going back 10 years into Post archives, I could not find any in-depth reporting on Israeli nuclear capabilities, although national security writer Walter Pincus has touched on it many times in his articles and columns.


I spoke with several experts in the nuclear and nonproliferation fields , and they say that the lack of reporting on Israel’s nuclear weapons is real — and frustrating. There are some obvious reasons for this, and others that are not so obvious.

First, Israel refuses to acknowledge publicly that it has nuclear weapons. The U.S. government also officially does not acknowledge the existence of such a program. Israel’s official position, as reiterated by Aaron Sagui, spokesman for the Israeli Embassy here, is that “Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Israel supports a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction following the attainment of peace.” The “introduce” language is purposefully vague, but experts say it means that Israel will not openly test a weapon or declare publicly that it has one.

According to Avner Cohen, a professor at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California who has written two books about this subject, this formulation was born in the mid-1960s in Israel and was the foundation of a still-secret 1969 agreement between Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and President Richard Nixon, reached when the United States became sure that Israel possessed nuclear bombs.

President John Kennedy vigorously tried to prevent Israel from obtaining the bomb; President Lyndon Johnson did so to a much lesser extent. But once it was a done deal, Nixon and every president since has not pressed Israel to officially disclose its capabilities or to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In return, Israel agrees to keep its nuclear weapons unacknowledged and low-profile.

Because Israel has not signed the treaty, it is under no legal obligation to submit its major nuclear facility at Dimona to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. Iran, in contrast, did sign the treaty and thus agrees to periodic inspections. IAEA inspectors are regularly in Iran, but the core of the current dispute is that Tehran is not letting them have unfettered access to all of the country’s nuclear installations.

Furthermore, although Israel has an aggressive media, it still has military censors that can and do prevent publication of material on Israel’s nuclear forces. Censorship applies to foreign correspondents working there, too.

Another problem, Cohen said, is that relatively few people have overall knowledge of the Israeli program and no one leaks. Those in the program certainly do not leak; it is a crime to do so. The last time an Israeli insider leaked, in 1986, nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu was kidnapped by Israeli agents in Italy, taken home to trial, convicted and served 18 years in jail, much of it in solitary confinement.

And perhaps most important, Americans don’t leak about the Israeli nuclear program either. Cohen said information about Israeli nuclear capabilities is some of the most compartmentalized and secret information the U.S. government holds, far more secret than information about Iran, for example. U.S. nuclear researchers, Cohen said, have been reprimanded by their agencies for talking about it openly.

George Perkovich, director of the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said there are benign and not-so-benign reasons that U.S. officials are so tight-lipped. The United States and Israel are allies and friends. “Do you ‘out’ your friends?” he asked.

And not being open about Israel’s nuclear weapons serves both U.S. and Israeli interests, Perkovich noted. If Israel were public about its nukes, or brandished its program recklessly — as North Korea does every time it wants something — it would put more pressure on Arab states to obtain their own bomb.

Among the less benign reasons U.S. sources don’t leak is that it can hurt your career. Said Perkovich: “It’s like all things having to do with Israel and the United States. If you want to get ahead, you don’t talk about it; you don’t criticize Israel, you protect Israel. You don’t talk about illegal settlements on the West Bank even though everyone knows they are there.”

I don’t think many people fault Israel for having nuclear weapons. If I were a child of the Holocaust, I, too, would want such a deterrent to annihilation. But that doesn’t mean the media shouldn’t write about how Israel’s doomsday weapons affect the Middle East equation. Just because a story is hard to do doesn’t mean The Post, and the U.S. press more generally, shouldn’t do it.
Why do they expect us not to see hypocrisy?
 

Kurt

Junior Member
An interview by an Italian journalist with a professor at the University of Ankara about political developments in the Middle East with a view back to the 1920's and '30's in Asia Times on line:
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How was Turkey brought to cooperate in this dangerous game?

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has good footnotes and links for further reading on Turkish WWI covert operations.
Turkey just continues the game of becoming a great power again since the Crimean War in 1853, including WWI, and now they have the economic strength to back their planned ascendancy.
 
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