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The United States State Department has released a series of satellite images it says show the kinds of weaponry Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime is using against his own people and the Free Syrian army fighters.

The United States State Department says satellite imagery of Syria shows escalating violence between government and rebel forces as the regime deploys armored divisions and artillery against major cities.

These satellite images show artillery positions of the Syrian army around several cities in the country, mainly in the north-east of Damascus and around the city of Homs.
[...]
The satellite images show also mobile rocket launchers BM-21 and artillery vehicle 2S1, 2S3 and towed howitzer M-46 and D30 on the outskirts of Homs and Az Zabadani, Halbun and Rankus, cities near the Syrian capital of Damascus.

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But here are a couple of the released images:





There are BM-21 too

A look in depth at the situation in the Middle East by Alastair Crooke, a former adviser to the former EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana, from 1997-2003:

Putting match to tinder
By Alastair Crooke

A former head of Mossad, the Israeli secret service, Efraim Halevy, neatly encapsulated [1] one primary aim of a war that has already been ignited in the Middle East: "The current standoff in Syria presents a rare chance to rid the world of the Iranian menace ... And ending Iran's presence in [in Syria] poses less of a risk to international commerce and security than harsher sanctions, or war [on Iran would pose]".

And it is real, hot war now: both in the microcosm of Syria and on the geostrategic plane. In the wake of its failure to bulldoze the United Nations Security Council into demanding President Bashar al-Assad's head, Saudi Arabia and Qatar vowed to intensify the bloody insurgency in Syria in order to bring down a fellow Arab head of state through violent insurrection.

If Syria were not currently such a hated object for the West and Israel, such actions would, in any other circumstances, be labeled terrorism. It would be obtuse to imagine either Saudi Arabia or Qatar were so outraged at the Security Council veto for reason of their deep commitment to popular democracy.

What is roiling the politics of the region, and fanning this hot proxy war into wider sectarian distrust and fear among religious minorities, is the sense that at play are several quite distinct "war projects". The bursting into flame of these multiple agendas touches on the most sensitive, the most elemental aspects of the sectarian divide in Islam.

The feeling is one of approaching an abyss, particularly as it is not clear what the true objectives to some of these wars are. That is to say, we all hear their ostensible aims of humanitarian concern, but for most these ring laughably false. Some projects may march in step, some may overlap to some extent but run counter in part, and some may simply have completely opposing ends to what is proclaimed.

We have the ubiquitous American "project", the Israeli "project" from which it in some respects differs, and which also contains the potential to run counter to the American project. We have too the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood "project" in the region to actualize political power, the Saudi-Salafist "project" to shore up conservative monarchical legitimacy, the Turkish aspirations to lead the Sunni community, the Qatari ambition to be America's regional "fixer", and the not insignificant jihadi-Salafist "project" to deconstruct "authority", to name but a few that have suddenly flared up; and of course there is the long established Iranian "resistance" project.

Additionally, there are the strategically important "projects" to seize influence over the region's energy supplies - in order to influence which of the competing gas pipeline projects will serve Europe's needs: either tilting European dependency towards, on the one hand, Russia and Iran; or alternatively, tying her to US proxies such as Qatar and Turkey. On such calculations will hinge too whether China's future energy needs will, or will not be, vulnerable to subsequent American squeeze as part of its containment of China policies.

And as no one really is sure what is the true extent of the designs behind these multiple projects, except that - since all have a claim to power and hegemony - suspicion and mistrust inevitably are mushrooming to the point at which tensions can easily spill over, at any point, into localized sectarian violence and then jump the firewall into the geostrategic conflict. This is what is meant by the "abyss".

Lost in all this is the "Awakening's" origins as a popular stirring: it has metamorphosed for now into a profound geostrategic and sectarian struggle over the future of the region. And though the popular impulse has been for the moment harnessed into other agendas, it nonetheless may yet surge again. The potential for this certainly is there: even to turn the political complexion of the region inside out.

Now, it is the West and Gulf states' "war" against Iran and Syria that predominates. But what exactly are the final aims of this war? It may seem obvious, but in fact on this very point, both America and Israel are internally conflicted. And of the US Arab allies in this project, Saudi Arabia's and Qatar's intentions clearly extend well beyond the mere destruction of Iranian political power to a much wider ambition not only to subvert real reform in the region, but to restore a Sunni conservative primacy throughout much of the Arab world as a bulwark against Iran and reformist Islamism.

This current ultimately is one of political autocracy, and of imposed civil and Islamic discipline. It is about a hugely wealthy elite staying on top.

United States Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, in recent comments, has made clear that a direct military attack on Iran does not suit US interests, (or rather does not suit President Barack Obama's current electoral interests) - at least for now. Any attack at this early stage in the electoral process, simply would be too risky - it would allow too much time - after the television "spectacle" of the first "hit" gives Obama's ratings a lift - for some horrible, possibly traumatic consequences of military action to play out, not least economically - and much to the president's electoral disadvantage.

The US presidential race is about the economy, "stupid", quite evidently, but already Iran has been identified as the potential "wild card" that might upset such electoral calculations. And, although Obama uses tough language to inoculate himself from Republican accusations of being "too weak" on Iran, he knows that the person best placed to play that "wild card" and possibly endanger his presidential bid is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, rather than the Republican candidates per se.

Netanyahu makes no secret of his strong Republican sympathies, or his hope that Obama will not be the next president. And it is in this latter context that Netanyahu's calculations on how to weaken Iran are likely to include a large element of US domestic electoral calculation, as much as any simple military cost/benefit analysis.

It is against this background that "regime change" in Syria becomes so important. Both in Israel and America, there are serious constituencies which argue that a direct military strike on Iran would provoke a terrible disaster. To answer this, the combination of financial siege on the Iranian people, in combination with the overthrow of Assad - in favor of an anti-Iranian, Sunni successor - is crafted precisely to assuage those hawks demanding military action.

It holds out the prospect to them, as Halevy notes, of an alternative: "of the Iranian people once again rising up against the regime which has brought them so much suffering" - of soft regime change, in place of the unpredictability and riskiness of war.

The question is: would such a plan see Obama safely pass through the re-election process, and thus sink Netanyahu and Likud hopes for a Republican win in 2012? That is the key issue on which the White House and Panetta must maneuver. Independent Israeli action could upset this calculus.

But collective "suffering" did not cause the people of Gaza to turn against Hamas, and there is no reason to think it more likely to work in Iran. Iranians do not react well to pressure; and if the US and its allies fail to depose Syria's leadership, as seems likely, for an anti-Iranian one, then the very "logic" of the Obama position, on its own terms, will ratchet his policy in the direction of the "final option" - with vociferous Iran hawks levering the war option along the ratchet.

Some in Washington, unable to see how power is shifting in the world today, firmly believe that Iran's destruction would put Israel and the US back at the top in the Middle East.

No wonder there was such affronted outrage from the administration when China and Russia vetoed the Syria "regime change" resolution at the Security Council: It killed the best option for assuaging Iran hawks, and risks Obama being painted into an unpredictable Gulf war.

That Obama has painted himself into such a corner is the direct result of his endorsement of Dennis Ross' "engagement with pressure" policy on Iran, which apart from raising the question of whether there ever was any meaningful engagement intended, cannot now possibly provide any negotiated solution - other than Iranian surrender - that would be not be spared a brutal savaging by the Republicans as Democrat "appeasement" and "weakness", in a campaign year.

But in pursuing this project of seeking to mollify Iran hawks through a hot, increasingly sectarian "war" in Syria, and by letting the Gulf monarchies fire up reactionary Salafist movements across the region - supposedly again to "contain" Shi'ite influence and further weaken Iran - the US and Europe are becoming increasingly witting, or unwitting partisans, in a Sunni sectarian "project" for the restoration of Sunni primacy which is piggy-backing on the US and European obsessive animosity towards Iran. This risks another type of war, just as dangerous - but to which Western powers seem oblivious.

One element of this Sunni project is seen in the electoral resurgence of the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood. But another Sunni primacy "project" actually pits itself against the Muslim Brotherhood initiative: The Saudi-Salafist "project" is intended to "contain" the Brotherhood's bid for power, and to seek for itself the hold over regional changes. This is being done in the interest of preserving pliant, conservative Islam, and Saudi absolutism.

And finally we have the quite separate jihadi-Salafist project to exploit regional tensions to deconstruct "authority" to establish regional footholds as sites for jihad - and the emergence of a very different type of authority. These projects, set afoot under cover of the US containment of Iran, are setting sect against sect, one generation against another and one class in society against another, and in pitting them one against another, may set the region on fire.

They are all pitted against the "resistance" project of Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. And some in Tel Aviv, Washington and Paris will think this must be a good thing; but this limited perspective rather overlooks the fact that some of these movements being fired up - whilst they do indeed hate the Shi'ites - also hate moderate Sunnis, all heterodoxy, Israel and Western values too.

Not surprisingly, Russia and China see the disaster looming: They see the US-Gulf Cooperation Council project as threatening fitna (civil and religious strife), and risking sectarian war. It directly threatens their own security: Russia is not at risk in the Caucuses from Shi'ite Islam; but from fired-up Salafism: Iran in fact is all that stands geographically between the now quiescent Salafism in the Central Asian republics and the stoking of it happening in the Middle East.

It is not hard to imagine that Russians see that this current of Islam that historically has been the most violent could, in due course, be redirected by the US towards their Asian allies - just as it has been pointed towards Syria. Equally, China is just as sensitive about its own Muslim community. It can see too that the Western "project", were it to succeed, potentially would give the US huge leverage over China's growing energy requirements - and hence its economy.

What is extraordinary is that European states have not woken up to the fact that it is they who have most to lose in this "great game". They too have an alienated, disenchanted Muslim population, and are far from self-sufficient in energy - unlike the US. Their placing of the Israeli interest, refracted at them from the prism of essentially domestic American political needs, blindly followed, seems to repeat the history of the 2003 Gulf war: Another war "project" that fissured Europe, closed off policy options, and brought terrorism to European streets.

Note
1. See Iran's Achilles' Heel The New York Times, February 7.

Alastair Crooke is founder and director of Conflicts Forum and is a former adviser to the former EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana, from 1997-2003.

(Copyright 2012 Alastair Crooke.)

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For anyone, who wants to understand the Middle East region, needs to focus solely on Israel and its agenda.

To understand Israel, one needs to understand it's inception and every that has happen since.

Israel is the only country, which was created on the claims of biblical inheritence. No other country, could ever make a claim that they lived in a certain land area, 2000 years ago and now are migrating back to their original place residence.

For this reason alone, one can understand why the Arab people, not leaderships, are so anti-Israel.

Today, Israel's military capability, has no equal in the Middle East. So for those who argue, that countries like Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, are equals in military terms, to Israel, are incorrect.

First of all, the leaderships in these countries, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait ...... are pro-west and hence, have no inclination to challenge Israel, militarily. Also, one should take note, that in the event of a conflict with Israel, these Middle Eastern countries would be handicapped, simply because 90% of their military hardware is American. Hence, it is a no-brainer, that America will impose military sanctions on these countries, in the event they try to challenge Israel.

Secondly, the current, so-called Arab Springs, are essentially contrived. But the term, 'contrived' should be interpreted as, where the Western Powers are allowing it to happen on purpose. A term, which Dr. Webster G. Tarpley has used quite often, is LIHOP. Which basically refers to the influence of the U.S government and where it's posture is decribed as Let It Happen On Purpose.

To understand why the Arab Springs are LIHOPs, one should understand the direct effect of these springs, on Israel. Where stability is essentially eroded. Case in point, Egypt, Libya and Syria. Where all of these countries are currently unstable and without a Central Power Base and/or where there is a power struggle. As such, a country which is unstable and has no central power to run it, does pose littlle or no threat to Israel.

But one has to ask, why and what would be so threatening to Israel? Since we already know that major Muslim countries have already accepted and recognize Israel as a soverign state. Then what is that would be so threatening to Israel, when Saudis don't have a problem with them, nor do the Jordanians or Egypt. All of whom share an immediate border with Israel.

The answer is simple, for those countries which are already handicapped by America military hardware and their leaderships are bought up by the Zionist-West. They aren't going to pose a threat to Israel, when it attempts to demolish the Islamic Holy Site of Al-Aqsa & the Dome of Rock. And Israel has to demolish these Islamic Sites, in order to build it's biblically claimed, Temple of Solomon. As to why Israel would go ahead and do such a thing, well it's simple ....... Israel lays claim that their Prophet Solomon, built their temple, over 3000 years ago.

Israel's very existence is based on that it's capital be Jerusalem, not Tel Aviv. Also, that the center piece in it's historical capital (Jerusalem), be the Temple of Solomon, i.e the Temple Mount.

Now, if Israel attempts to demolish Masjid Al-Aqsa and the Dome of Rock. There is every guarantee and every certainty, that the 1.4 billion Muslims around the world, would errupt in rage and will engage Israel in war. And to anyone who doesn't understand why the Muslims would behave in such a fashion? The answer is simple, before Makkah (Mecca), all Muslims use to pray in the direction of Jerusalem. And Masjid Al-Aqsa/Dome of Rock is the third most Holy Site in Islam, after the Kaa'bah (Makkah) and Masjid-u-Nabawee (Madinah).

Hence, this is where Israel truly faces a real and dangerous threat. As a backlash from a united Muslim world would most certainly cause a lot chaos in Israel and could essentially threaten it's very existence.

But while we try to understand all this and digest these facts and figures. There is also another very important angle to take a close look at. And that is, the Iranian Mullah Regime, isn't necessarily an actual threat to Israel. One cannot really ignore the fact, how beneficial Iran has been to the United States, as because of Iranian Mullah Regime's aggressive stance, Saudi Arabia is compelled to sign a $60 billion military deal. So has the United Arab Emirates, who has bought upto $20 billion in military deals with America.

So, to wrap it up, none of these countries, which include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Emirates, Qatar, Egypt, Turkey, Syria or Iraq, have the loyal to Islam - Political Leadership, nor the Military Capability to challenge Israel, when it destroys Masjid Al-Aqsa/Dome of Rock to build the Temple Mount (Temple of Solomon).

In a twist of fate, ironically, the one country that does have the military capability and a hybrid power center, is Pakistan. The first and only (to date), Islamic Nuclear Power in the World. What's worst, Pakistan doesn't even have a common border or is even in the same region as Israel. But, if Israel does destroy Masjid Al-Aqsa/Dome of Rock, then the 180 million Pakistanis would force its Military/Government to take action against Israel.

Infact, not only would the Pakistanis be up in arms, but the entire Muslim world would be calling for Pakistan Military to take action against Israel. Why? Because it is only Pakistan, in the Islamic World, that has not only the Nuclear Weapons, but a very accurate and deadly delivery system to attack Israel.

Pakistan's political landscape is as perplexing, as it is unstable. Where there has been not a single democratically elected government, which can claim to be corruption free and/or have total power in Pakistan. In reality, Pakistan Military is the most powerful organization in the country. To date, every attempt by the West, to control Pakistan's leadership, has been in vain. Since none of the political parties, have been able to wrest their grip for longer the 5 years.

Be it Musharraf's 7 years in power, Bhutto's two terms in office or Nawaz Shareef's two terms in office. All have been deposed and the people of Pakistan don't trust them. Worst, the current utterly corrupt government of Zardari, is the most hated and admonished in the history of Pakistan. Which is why I use the term 'Hybrid Power Center', because no one is truly in absolute power and control in this very irratic and unpredictable country.

So, to sum it all up, yet again ...... Israel's and the West's real threat is Pakistan. Which is one of the major reasons why American military has been in Afghanistan for over a decade. It is also the reason why we are witnessing such instability, where foreign terrorists are infiltrating into Pakistani territory and carrying out horrific and brutal terrorist attacks, bombing and so on. Which is why, for all intents and purposes, Iran isn't the real threat to Israel, as it has no military capability or resolve to do so. Iran's Mullah Regime's primary objective is to establish and expand the Persian influence in the Middle East. Nothing more.

Hence, the political landscape of the Middle East, is solely dependant on Israel's behavior and it's intentions. For if today, Israel genuinely withdraws all it's settlements from the West Bank and Jerusalem. And gives full authority and sovereignty to the people of Palestine. Then we could effectively say that the Middle East would not have any conflicts, ever. Sadly, that is not the case and Israel has no intentions of withdrawing from the West Bank settlements, rather, it's increasing the number of Settlement Projects, by demolishing and annexing more and more of the Palestinian lands, every day.

Will India be forced to pay for Iranian oil in RMB? And note how improbable it is that Iran had anything to do with the terrorist explosion in the car of the wife of the Israeli defense attache in New Delhi. Also listen to the BBC ( I do myself ) but don't trust it.

India's dilemma: How to pay for Iranian oil
By Vijay Prashad

An explosion on Aurangzeb Road in New Delhi damaged an Israeli embassy car, and injured its occupants.Tal Yehoshua Koren, the wife of the defense attache at the Israeli embassy was seriously wounded. She is in critical care. She was on her way to pick up her children from their school. It is unusual for a diplomatic vehicle to be attacked on the streets of New Delhi. The Delhi police went into action. The international media wanted to know who had done the attack minutes after it was reported.

The police was wary. Let us conduct our investigation, they said. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu went before his parliament and accused Iran of a terrorist act. "The elements behind these attacks were Iran and its protege, Hezbollah." Iran, he said, is "the largest terror exporter in the world" and Israel "would act with a strong hand." This was all the confirmation that BBC needed. It began to report the attack as an Iranian act against an Israeli diplomat on Indian soil.

Why would Iran conduct an attack on an Israeli diplomat in India, particularly as India is in the midst of trying to negotiate a delicate arrangement with Tehran to pay for Iranian oil? The question mystifies.

Iran is responsible for 12% of India's imported oil (see my India pivots, and pivots again, Asia Times, February 9, 2012). Over the past two years India has struggled to find a mechanism to pay Iran for this oil. Sanctions by the United States and the European Union as well as by the United Nations Security Council against Iran have complicated the market for Iranian oil. Until 2010, India used the facilities offered by the Asian Clearing Union (ACU), founded in 1974 as an outgrowth of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific.

To help countries economize on their foreign exchange reserves, the ACU allowed them to conduct bilateral barter and make payments using the Asian Monetary Units (currency units indexed to the US dollar and the euro that allowed countries to hold surpluses and deficits outside their formal foreign exchange reserves). In December 2010, under pressure from the US Treasury, the Indian government withdrew from the ACU facility (a Reserve Bank of India circular from December 27 noted that "all eligible current account transactions including trade transactions with Iran should be settled in any permitted currency outside the ACU mechanism").

The Indian government then turned between February to April 2011 to a complex mechanism using the Hamburg-based Europaisch-Iranische Handels Bank (EIH) via the German Central Bank and the State Bank of India. The procedure did not violate UN security council or European Union sanctions. With the end use for payments certificate provided by the State Bank of India, the US Treasury should have ben satisfied - the money was going toward payments for crude and not to facilitate Iran's nuclear program.

Nonetheless, pressure on German Chancellor Angela Merkel from the US mounted. "Treasury is concerned about recent reports that the German government authorized the use of EIH as a conduit for India's oil payments to Iran," the US government noted. "Treasury will continue to engage with both German and Indian authorities about this situation and will continue to work with all the allies to isolate EIH." On April 4, 2011, the US Treasury got its way. Germany broke the India-Iran link.

India then conjured up an arrangement with Turkey's Halkbank. Turkey, with deep economic ties with Iran, has abided by the 2010 security council restrictions but has refused the deeper US and European Union sanctions regime. The Turkish government owns a 75% stake in Halkbank, and has allowed it to be the conduit for countries like India to pay for Iranian oil. Mehmet Ozkan, who teaches international relations at the International University of Sarajevo, told me that Turkey is trying to develop an "independent line," following the UN sanctions but keeping itself apart from the harsher US and European Union sanctions.

Over the past year, US Treasury officials have visited Turkey to try and cut Turkey's links to Iran. Obama's December 31 tighter sanctions made it illegal for American firms to do business with those firms that dealt with Iran's Central Bank. Halkbank is relatively immune from the US financial system, and it is the main financial intermediary for the Turkish refiner Tupras. Nonetheless, as E Ahmet Tonak who teaches political economy at Istanbul Bilgi University told me, Halkbank had to accede to the strong US pressure, particularly after a US Treasury team visited Turkey in the past few weeks.

Indian and Iranian officials have been in dialogue over the past two weeks to circumvent the embargo of Iran's financial system. India does not have the flexibility of China, whose economic power gives it genuine independence. China pays for Iranian oil with the yuan, which it is trying to put forward as an international trading currency. India does not have that freedom.

In early February, the Indians and Iranians created a payments mechanism: India would pay 45% of its oil bill with rupees which would be held in the Kolkata-based UCO bank and paid out to two Iranian private banks, Bank Parsian and Karafarin Bank. The rest of the oil bill will be sorted out in time.

India hopes to use these rupees to boost exports from India to Iran. Currently trade between India and Iran is uneven, with only US$ 2.74 billion as Indian exports in a total trade bill of $13.6 billion. To boost the Indian exports, the government plans to send a delegation to Iran in the next few months. "A huge delegation will be going," said Commerce Secretary Rahul Khullar. Anup Pujari, Director-General Foreign Trade (DGFT), Union Ministry of Commerce, pledged to a gathering in Mangalore that this delegation was going to strike a deal.

The exporters should continue booking business with their Iranian counterparts. India wishes to export wheat and rice, tea, pharmaceuticals, iron and steel. The US has said that it would not sanction "food, medicine, medical devices. So from our perspective," US State Department spokesperson Victoria Nuland said, "this kind of trade would not be sanctioned." Or at least one should say, it will not be sanctioned for now. There was also talk that India could barter wheat for oil, but the country's Food Minister K V Thomas has not yet seen a formal proposal.

The stumbling block this week was over the payment mechanism. By Indian law, if Iran receives payment in rupees inside India it will have to pay a 40% withholding tax. The Indian government is under pressure from the refiners in India to forgive this tax. "Most likely the National Iranian Oil Company would not want to pay this high tax," said B Mukherjee, a director of the Hindustan Petroleum Corporation. "We clearly do not want to pay the tax as it will make our imports costlier. I might as well buy oil from somewhere else if this 40% stake is saddled on me."

In a major speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on February 6,India's Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai noted, "Iran is our near neighbor, our only surface access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and constitutes a declining but still a significant share of our oil imports. For us, there are also broader and long-term geostrategic concerns that are no different from what we face elsewhere in the Asia-Pacific region. Our relationship with Iran is neither inconsistent with our non-proliferation objectives, nor is it in contradiction with the relationships that we have with our friends in West Asia or with the United States and Europe."

The US sees these trade relations as deeply troubling. The US is eager to make the Iranian sanctions a test of friendship with its allies. US State Department spokesperson Nuland said last week, "We are working with countries around the world, including India, that maintain strong oil relationships with Iran, encouraging all of them to reduce their dependence on Iranian crude."

The India-Iran deal is near completion. How the attack on the Israeli embassy car in New Delhi will impact on this is anyone's guess. Parochial political agendas once more threaten to interrupt a very important quest, which is to create trust and interdependence across the Asian continent and defuse any tensions that might lead to war. The sanctions regime is a fool's paradise, undermining the fuel paradise that Iran and India have sought to construct.

Vijay Prashad is Professor and Director of International Studies at Trinity College, Hartford, United States. This spring he will publish two books: Arab Spring, Libyan Winter (AK Press) and Uncle Swami: South Asians in America Today (New Press). He is the author of Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World (New Press), which won the 2009 Muzaffar Ahmed Book Prize.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), the leading shipbuilder and naval support services provider in the Gulf region launched "Mezyad", the fourth vessel of the Baynunah Multi-Mission Corvette Class Program for the UAE Navy and the third vessel under the Baynunah fleet constructed by ADSB. The vessel was launched in the presence of senior officials from the UAE Navy and ADSB.

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An article in Asia Times on line by Ambassador Bhadrakumar that sounds quite optimistic about a solution to the stand off between the US and Iran:

US, Iran inching toward talks
By M K Bhadrakumar

The foreplay is nearing completion on the Iran situation. The surest sign is that there were no serious takers in Western capitals for the Israeli smear campaign this week that Tehran's agents had been going about placing bombs in New Delhi, Tbilisi and Bangkok. Simply put, there is growing impatience that it is way past the time for histrionics.

Several indicators are available that matters are moving towards a substantive plane. One cluster of events this week consists of the Iranian reply to the letter from the European Union foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, penned by Tehran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili. Simultaneously, Tehran announced it was developing a new generation of centrifuges and augmenting its number of centrifuges from 6,000 to 9,000 as well as loading a research reactor with Iran's first batch of domestically produced fuel.

While Tehran's announcement of new nuclear "achievements" might have appeared as a belligerent move - Washington derided it as "hype" meant for the domestic audience in Iran - the contents of Jalili's letter, and, more important, the initial responses of cautious optimism it generated within hours in Western capitals convey that there are positive stirrings in the air.
The reaction in Washington is particularly noteworthy. A White House official was quoted as saying, "It [Jalili's letter] could lead to further diplomacy, provided that they [Iranians] are serious about it. We have made clear that this has to be a dialogue about their nuclear program specifically."

Jalili's letter apparently said Tehran would have "new initiatives" and indicated Iran's openness to discussing the nuclear issue. It suggested that "[A] constructive and positive attitude toward the Islamic Republic of Iran's new initiatives in this round of talks could open a positive perspective for our negotiation".

Jalili concluded, "Therefore ... I propose to resume out talks in order to take fundamental steps for sustainable cooperation in the earliest possibility in a mutually agreed venue and time." Significantly, neither Ashton nor Jalili raised any pre-conditions for the talks. Quite obviously, Brussels has already begun consultations with Washington on setting the date and venue for the resumption of talks between the "Iran Six" and Iran after a gap of three years. The "Iran Six" - also known as the "P5+1", includes the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the US, France, China, Russia, Britain - plus Germany.

A second cluster of positive signs is the virtual toning down of rhetoric on both sides. The most significant contribution to an easing of tensions came from senior American intelligence officials in the course of a US Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Thursday - within a day of receiving Jalili's letter. It is interesting that the hearing itself came on the heels of a bipartisan draft resolution being mooted by 32 senators "ruling out a strategy of containment for a nuclear-armed Iran".

James Clapper, the US director of national intelligence, assessed that as of now, Tehran has not decided whether to build a nuclear weapon, although it has been acquiring some skills. He doubted whether Iran would really take the plunge, either:

We [US] believe that the decision would be made by the Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Ali Khamenei] himself and he would base that decision on a cost-benefit analysis. I don't think he'd want a nuclear weapon at any price, so that I think plays to the value of sanctions. They are keeping themselves in a position to make that decision, but there are certain things they have not yet done and have not done for some time.

Conceivably, Clapper was also acknowledging Washington's appreciation of the self-restraint Tehran has been showing in not optimally pursing its nuclear program. In parallel testimony, the director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, added that "Iran today has the technical, scientific and industrial capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons" and notwithstanding the international pressure through sanctions "we assess that Tehran is not close to agreeing to abandon its nuclear program".

Putting both testimonies together, the Barack Obama administration has unambiguously indicated that the time is most opportune to engage Tehran in talks. Both Clapper and Burgess downplayed the prospect of Iran posing security threats to the US or to the Strait of Hormuz.

A fascinating aspect of the testimony was that the US officials virtually admitted that Tehran was on the whole being reactive rather than being provocative or belligerent in ratcheting up tensions. Burgess went to the extent of saying Iran could be expected to respond if attacked, but that in the US estimation it was unlikely to start any military conflict on its own.

Clapper went a step further, directly linking any shifts in Tehran's peaceful nuclear program to an eventuality where "the [Iranian] regime feels threatened in terms of its stability and tenure". Clapper also agreed with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta that at any rate, producing a bomb "would probably take them [Iranians] about a year, and then possibly another one or two years in order to put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort".

Clapper added, "It's technically feasible [making a bomb] but practically not likely. There are all kinds of combinations and permutations that would affect how long it might take, should the Iranians make a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon." In sum, Clapper poured cold water on the Israeli scenario of "apocalypse now". (He also repeated that Israel was not planning to attack Iran.)


On the whole, these testimonies must be seen as a comprehensive assurance being held out to Tehran that there are, after all, enough folks in Washington who haven't lost their sanity through all these months of shadow-boxing and grandstanding in the US-Iran standoff.

Alongside, in a third cluster, Tehran, too, has resorted to a bit of public diplomacy to project its interest in constructively engaging the US. Prominent among these have been three articles penned by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who held a key position in Iran's nuclear negotiating team until six years ago (besides serving as Iran's ambassador to Germany for seven years.)

His opening article was featured in the influential US magazine Foreign Affairs. Mousavian looked back at the US-Iran standoff on the nuclear issue over the past eight years as a chronicle of wasted time, of missed opportunities and misunderstandings and mutual misconceptions feeding on each other with both sides resorting to miscalculations that ultimately didn't help matters, leave alone end the stalemate.

He placed the blame squarely on successive US administrations for not having cared to explore repeated Iranian overtures for a normalization of relations.

His refrain throughout has been that the nuclear issue should never have been regarded as a "stand-alone" question that could be dealt with separately from the larger issues of the confrontational relationship that the two countries have had since the 1979 Iranian revolution.

As he put it, "There won't be a solution to the nuclear dispute as long as officials in Tehran and Washington continue to base their relationship on escalating hostility, threats and mistrust, particularly if the ultimate US goal is regime change." (By an interesting coincidence, this was also the grain of what Panetta and Clapper said this week.)

In his latest and concluding third part, Mousavian suggested the "bottom lines" in the upcoming negotiations: "For Iran, this means the ability to produce reliable civilian energy, as it is entitled to do under [nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty. For the US and Europe, it means never having Iran develop nuclear weapons or a short-notice breakout capability."

How are the expectations of the two sides to be harmonized? Mousavian has the following to say:

Specifically, the West should recognize the legitimate right of Iran to produce nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment; remove sanctions; and normalize Iran's nuclear file at the UN Security Council and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. To meet the P5+1 conditions, Iran should accept the maximum level of transparency by implementing the IAEA's Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty's Additional Protocol, which broadly enable intrusive monitoring and inspections of nuclear facilities.

To eliminate Western concerns about a possible nuclear weapons breakout using low-enriched uranium, any deal should place a limit on Iran's enrichment activities to less than 5 percent ... A deal should also cap the amount of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride that Iran can stockpile; limit its enrichment sites during a period of confidence building; establish an international consortium on enrichment in Iran; and commit not to reprocess low-enriched uranium during the confidence-building period.

The "Mousavian suggestion" is somewhat modeled on Russia's "step-by-step" plan that also includes full supervision by the IAEA; implementation of the Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement between the IAEA and Iran; limiting enrichment sites to one; and temporary suspension of enrichment.

Moscow proposed that in return, Iran would expect the "Iran Six" to remove sanctions and normalize Iran's nuclear file in the IAEA and the United Nations Security Council.

To what extent Mousavian's opinions reflect the thinking within the Iranian regime is hard to tell and indeed he is conscious that the "domestic political climate in both countries" has come in the way of meaningful negotiations between Washington and Tehran in the past.

But what is striking is that the testimonies by Clapper and Burgess are in broad harmony with what Mousavian has suggested as the way forward.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)


As an illustration of his remarks about the attitude towards the recent bombings in Asia this heading in the Newsletter from The Washington Post: "Israel again tries to link bombs to Iran."

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Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar summarizes China's position to the Syrian crisis and the Middle East in general in his blog:

China on the geopolitics of Syria crisis
In the first Chinese commentary after the weekend visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Zhai Jun to Damascus as president Hu Jintao’s special envoy, Beijing has ‘hardened’ its stance on Syria. The commentary appeared in today’s China Daily. The salients are as follows:

1. China’s and Russia’s veto of the UN Security Council resolution and the rejection of the subsequent UN GA resolution factored in that they might pave the way for outside intervention in Syria. The veto doesn’t mean China is favoring the Syrian government or that it is indifferent to the violence. But the priority is to ensure Syria doesn’t “end up on the same disastrous road as Libya.”
2. National sovereignty is a core principle for China. And the human rights issue is used by the West as pretext to pursue global or regional strategic interests.
3. The West’s “furious response” to the Chinese and Russian veto exposes its intention to dominate the Middle East and “monopolise” the UN.
4. The “intense and sharp contradictions in the Arab world” are also to be traced to the West’s ‘divide-and-conquer’ approach to the Middle East region.
5.. The Syrian crisis is not an issue of human rights alone. “The West wants to topple the Syrian government and replace it with a pro-Western one. Syria is considered a problem in the West’s Middle East strategy because of its close relations with Iran and Lebanon, which are hostile to the United States.”
6. The Arab League is playing second fiddle to the West’s Middle East strategy. The West’s “next target, no doubt, will be Iran.”
7. The Cold-War paradigm of western powers aligning against the “non-western world” continues and the “balance of power” between the US and the “non-western world” needs a “counterweight”.
8. Washington’s “hysterical reaction” to China’s veto shows it has not “adapted to China’s change”. China’s development will continue and China will be assertive as one of the P-5.
Once again, China has bracketed its veto with Russia’s. The reference to the ‘counterweight’ echoes the Global Times commentary on January 20 regarding a China-Russia alliance. The China Daily commentary is here.
Posted in Politics.

Tagged with China and Arab Spring, China Russia, China US, China's stance on Syria, Iran.

By M K Bhadrakumar – February 20, 2012

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---------- Post added at 10:30 PM ---------- Previous post was at 09:52 PM ----------

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar on the relations between Iran and Syria, Egypt and Turkey &c. in Asia Times on line:

IRAN ON THE MOVE

Warships sail to Syria
By M K Bhadrakumar

A flotilla of Iranian warships crossed the Suez Canal and docked at the Syrian port of Tartus on Saturday. Iran's Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said the mission displays Iran's "might" despite 30 years of relentless sanctions.

The flotilla comprised the 18th Fleet of the Iranian navy. The warships would hold exercises and will "train Syrian naval forces under an agreement signed between Tehran and Damascus one year ago".

The influential cleric and deputy chairman of the Majlis' (parliament's" National Security and Foreign PolicyCommittee, Hossein Ebrahimi said:
"The presence of Iran and Russia's flotillas along the Syrian coasts has a clear message against the United States' possible adventurism. In case of any US strategic mistake in Syria, there is a possibility that Iran, Russia and a number of other countries will give a crushing response to the US."


The activities of the Iranian warships at Tartus (which is also used by the Russian navy) will be keenly watched by the regional countries - Turkey, Jordan, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in particular. Unconfirmed reports appeared recently that veterans of Iran's Qods Force (a special unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps) might be dispatched to Syria to assist the regime.

Simply put, Iran's message to Turkey and its Arab allies (which are arming and supporting the Syrian opposition) will be: "Brothers, if you keep doing this, so can we." There is much food for thought here for these countries - especially the oil monarchies - as they gather in Tunis this coming Sunday for the first meeting of the "Friends of Syria".

For Turkey, the Iranian warships have arrived in Syria at an awkward time. The Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reported that the Syrian army had captured 40 Turkish intelligence officers involved in subversive activities and over the past week Ankara has been "conducting intensive negotiations" with Damascus to secure their freedom. But the latter insists in return Turkey ending weapon transfers and infiltrations, and, furthermore, wants Iran to be the mediator. Ha'aretz noted:

Western officials fear that Iranian military presence along with Russian aid could turn Syria into a center of international friction much worse than the struggle inside Syria. They fear that the control over actions in Syria will be taken over by a Russian-Iranian "partnership" which would exclude the European Union and Turkey ...

Testing times
However, Tehran is also testing the waters. Under international law, Iran enjoys the right of passage for its warships to pass through Red Sea and the Suez Canal. But Egypt's equations with Iran remain ambivalent.

Egypt never allowed Iranian warships to cross the Suez until February last year following the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime when, undeterred by the diplomatic pressure from the US and threatening noises from Israel, Cairo allowed an Iranian destroyer to pass through. Israel called it a "provocation".

But since then, Egypt has been in turmoil and the initial enthusiasm for normalization of ties with Tehran has somewhat waned even as Egypt became dependent on financial help from Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf.

Thus, the permission given to an entire Iranian fleet to cross the Suez last weekend signifies not only Egypt's thinking toward Iran but also the growing complexities and unpredictability of its relations with the US.

The Egypt-US ties are passing through testing times. A potentially serious row has erupted with a crackdown on several dozen foreign non-governmental organization (NGO) workers by the Egyptian authorities, including 19 American nationals. An undisclosed number of US citizens have taken shelter in the US Embassy in Cairo.

Cairo announced on Saturday that 43 of these suspects who include foreigners (Americans, Serbs, Germans, Norwegians, Jordanians and Palestinians) and Egyptians will be put on trial coming Sunday charged with "establishing unlicensed chapters of international organizations and accepting foreign funding to finance these groups in a manner that breached the Egyptian state's sovereignty".

Washington has warned Cairo that the crackdown could harm bilateral ties and hinted that it might cut off military aid amounting to US$1.3 billion annually. Washington apprehends that a public trial could expose the scale of the US interference in Egypt's internal affairs. Ten prominent American civil-society organizations operating in Egypt have been raided, including the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute and Freedom House, which receive US government funding.

The ruling Supreme Council for the Armed Forces in Cairo blames "foreign hands" for the continued unrest in Egypt. The colorful Minister of International Cooperation Fayza Abul-Naga (who is one of the few officials from the Mubarak regime to retain her cabinet seat) is spearheading the campaign against the foreign funding for NGOs.The Muslim Brotherhood has threatened to review Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel if the US cuts off aid.

Strategic defiance
Suffice to say, Tehran chose the appropriate moment to fathom the Egyptian mind. Cairo's decision to allow the Iranian flotilla to cross the Suez underscores that it retains the strategic autonomy to reset relations with Iran. (Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has publicly expressed appreciation for Cairo's decision.) Which contains more than a hint to Washington.

Both Cairo and Tehran are underscoring that the Middle East has phenomenally changed and things can never be the same again. The stunning reality is that Egypt and Iran are not exactly seeing eye-to-eye on the Syrian crisis and yet Cairo waved the warships through as they headed for Tartus.

On its part, the most important message Iran could be giving is that neither the heightened standoff with the US nor the avalanche of Israeli threats has succeeded in brow-beating it or will detract from its will and capacity to help its Syrian ally.

However, the danger of an actual confrontation with the US over Syria is very, very unlikely and Tehran never quite estimated that the Barack Obama administration was being swept into a Libya-like intervention in Syria. Tehran, which is well clued in on the ground situation in Syria, remained confident that President Bashar al-Assad was not in any danger.

Yet, Iran's display of "might" in the eastern Mediterranean will cast its shadows on regional politics. Actually, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Amal Movement in a joint statement on Saturday reiterated their alliance with Iran. They said events in Syria were part of the "desperate efforts made by the enemies" to destabilize the country and destroy its national unity and undermine Syria's firm support for the Palestinian resistance.

(Hezbollah chief Seyed Hassan Nasrallah said this month that Iran rendered "moral, political and financial support in all its available forms since 1982" to the movement. He said Hezbollah scored the "most prominent Arab victory" over Israel, this victory couldn't have been achieved without Iranian support and "Syria had a big role in the victory".)

At any rate, the display of "might" in the Mediterranean, which is historically a "Western lake", is bound to carry resonance within Iran itself. Such displays appeal to the Iranian people's sense of national honor and in turn helps consolidate public opinion, which is particularly important for the regime as the country approaches a crucial parliamentary election in March in which the calculus of power is expected to decisively shift and the alchemy of the Majlis to transform radically.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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A broad survey of the current situation in the Middle East.

P.S.
A recent article in Christian Science Monitor pointed out that the US maintains government payed "NGOs" like the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute and Freedom House in about 150 countries while they wouldn't allow another country to maintain such organisations on their own soil to meddle in US internal politics.

The Syrian opposition is so divided that it can't have started its revolt without outside pushing. At this time it seems to have fewer supporters than the regime. However Hilary Clinton seems to have sufficient authority to declare

They will, from somewhere, somehow, find the means to defend themselves, as well as begin offensive measures.

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From .

A citation from the article:

One official, among several who spoke on the condition of anonymity about policies that are still under intense internal and international discussion, compared the situation to the one in revolutionary Libya and recalled that weapons supplies to opposition forces there began in a similar manner, followed by open shipments by some Arab countries. The U.S. government, he recalled, sent nonlethal military aid, including communications equipment, and supplied training for the rebel forces.

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We all know that Libya is now a failed state with all that that means for the people in that country and for the security in all the neighboring countries.

Images of the next AIP Dolphin class submarine have surfaced as the vessel was getting prepared for its launch in the water at the German shipbuilder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) shipyard in Kiel. This is the first of at least two (and up to three) new generation of Dolphin class submarine for the Israeli Navy.

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The diplomatic acrobatics and brinkmanship on display over Iran’s nuclear program are escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf to new heights, raising the stakes for all of the protagonists involved—including China. In this context, it is worth examining China’s position on the rapidly evolving events in the Persian Gulf. The marked expansion of Chinese diplomatic, energy and economic interests in the strategically important Persian Gulf represents one of the most important geopolitical trends of recent years. In accordance with its traditionally pragmatic, middle-of-the-road approach to international affairs, China has cultivated friendly relationships with the array of hostile rivals competing for influence and primacy in the region. As a result, China has been thrust into the mix of diplomacy and tensions surrounding the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. It should be no surprise, therefore, that China’s stance on Iran was a topic of great interest during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s recent six-day visit to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar from January 14-19, the first major foreign trip undertaken by Chinese leaders in 2012 (Xinhua, January 20).

Entering the Fray

Before delving further into the implications of Wen’s recent visit to the Persian Gulf, the atmospherics surrounding the tensions over Iran’s nuclear program are vital for context. The United States continues to ramp up pressure on Iran over the purported nature of its nuclear ambitions by imposing a new and particularly aggressive package of economic sanctions. The latest iteration of economic sanctions to hit Iran targets its energy sector and all monetary transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran (Al-Jazeera [Doha], February 6). Washington also has succeeded in enlisting the support of the European Union (EU) to further stifle the Iranian economy; the EU implemented its own ban on the import, purchase and delivery of Iranian oil beginning July 1 (Financial Times [London], January 23) [1]. EU sanctions will cause Iran to lose approximately 20 percent of its foreign oil sales (Economist [London], January 21). Iran’s regional rivals also are assisting in punishing the Islamic Republic. Israel, the region’s only nuclear-armed power, is threatening to bomb Iran. The Persian Gulf monarchies led by Saudi Arabia readily broadcast their concerns about the prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran and Tehran’s posture in the region. To ease fears in global energy markets about how the latest sanctions will impact oil prices and consumer countries heavily reliant on oil imports from Iran, Saudi Arabia—the world’s top oil exporter—along with its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners has committed to raising oil production to compensate for supply gaps stemming from the removal of Iranian oil from international markets (Al-Arabiya [Dubai], January 16).

Iran has remained defiant in the face of this relentless pressure by threatening to play its trump card: disrupting the Strait of Hormuz (National [Abu Dhabi], December 29, 2011). Over 35 percent of the world’s seaborne shipments of oil and around 20 percent of the world’s overall oil production pass through the strait every day. Tehran has threatened its neighbors against filling any supply gaps in the global oil supply after the latest round of sanctions go into effect or allowing for their respective territories to be used to launch attacks against Iran (Al-Arabiya, January 16; Fars News Agency [Tehran], February 5). To preempt the EU’s embargo against its oil beginning in July, Iran also has threatened to cut off oil exports immediately to certain EU member states (Press TV [Tehran], February 7).

On the surface, the underlying thrust behind Wen’s visit to three of the frontline Persian Gulf states ringing Iran was to discuss an array of political, energy, economic and cultural issues. Wen’s visit marked the first by a Chinese premier to Saudi Arabia in over two decades and the first visit ever by a Chinese premier to the UAE and Qatar. His itinerary included meetings with all three heads of state. Additionally, Wen met with the heads of the GCC and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Wen also was present at the World Future Energy Summit and the fourth annual China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. Indeed, Wen and his counterparts concluded numerous agreements governing a range of issues, further solidifying the already strong relationships nurtured between China and all three countries over the years (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 20; also see “Bloc Politics in the Persian Gulf: China’s Multilateral Engagement with the Gulf Cooperation Council,” China Brief, September 24, 2010). Yet it was the Iranian question that colored the priorities and outcomes of the meetings. China has a critical stake in Iran and counts the Islamic Republic as a strategic partner. Consequently, China remains one of Iran’s most important defenders on the international stage. At the same time, China has worked hard to elevate its ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar—three of Iran’s regional opponents—specifically in the energy sphere. These dynamics are forcing Beijing to navigate a fine line between the competing rivals to ensure that its interests are protected, whatever the outcome of the current tensions.

Defining the Sino-Iranian Strategic Partnership

China’s quest to satisfy its growing demand for energy has served as the initial impetus underlying the Sino-Iranian strategic partnership. China, the world’s second-largest oil consumer and third-largest importer of crude, depends heavily on Iranian oil imports. This is the case even as Beijing has reduced its imports of Iranian oil in recent months over a series of pricing disputes with Tehran (Wall Street Journal, February 8). Iran is China’s third-largest supplier of imported oil; Iranian oil accounts for approximately 10 percent of China’s imported crude (Reuters, February 6). China is also Iran’s top purchaser of crude and biggest trade partner (Al-Jazeera, February 1). China also has a growing interest in Iranian natural gas. While Western companies have abandoned the Iranian energy sector due to the imposition of harsh economic sanctions against Tehran over the years, Chinese state-owned companies have inked upstream and downstream energy agreements dealing with oil, natural gas, refining and petrochemicals valued at over $40 billion (Zawya [Dubai], February 7; Press TV, July 31, 2010).

At the same time, China’s interests in Iran transcend energy. In principle, China is strongly opposed to U.S. and international moves to sanction Iran, especially efforts that target Iran’s energy and banking sectors. In accordance with its philosophy of advocating for non-interference in other nations’ domestic affairs, China supports Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology and insists on resolving any disputes over it through negotiations. Yet China also is opposed to any possibility that Iran develops nuclear arms. During his recent visit to Doha, Wen declared “China adamantly opposes Iran developing and possessing nuclear weapons” (Al-Jazeera, February 1). China’s status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) affords it with significant leverage when it comes to fending off U.S.-led international efforts to isolate Iran. China’s principled stance in defense of Iran’s right to pursue its nuclear program in the face of a U.S.-directed campaign against it is also viewed in Beijing as a gauge of Chinese credibility. China is keen to show its allies and rivals alike that it is loyal and prepared to stand by its commitments, even in the face of U.S. pressure. The Sino-Iranian relationship also affords Beijing with important diplomatic leverage over Washington, the still preeminent diplomatic and military power in the Middle East. China’s support for Iran serves as a check against Washington in response to the U.S. military presence in East Asia and its constellation of allies and partners surrounding Chinese territory.

Expanding Horizons

China’s insatiable demand for energy in recent years has prompted Beijing to expand its network of energy suppliers in the Middle East and beyond. While Iran remains an important source of oil, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil producer, is currently China’s top source of imported oil. By the end of 2009, China overtook the United States as the top importer of Saudi oil (“Shifting Sands in the Gulf: The Iran Calculus in China-Saudi Arabia Relations,” China Brief, May 13, 2010). Saudi Arabia sold China 1.12 million barrels per day (bpd) in December 2011, the fourth highest amount on record and a figure that represents over 20 percent of China’s imported crude (Al-Jazeera, February 1; Reuters, January 21). Herein lies the significance of the timing of Wen’s visit to the Persian Gulf during this period. As China remains steadfast in its support for Iran, Beijing also is determined to ensure that its access to the region’s vital energy resources is secure in the event of a prolonged disruption of Iranian or other regional oil exports due to any crises that may arise.

The complexity of the current circumstances facing China presents Beijing with a difficult contradiction. On the one hand, China continues to benefit greatly from the multifaceted relationship with Iran. The current state of geopolitics suggests the enduring aspects of the Sino-Iranian partnership will remain an important pillar of Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East. On the other hand, the reality of China’s growing energy needs has alerted Beijing to the importance of securing stable alternative supplies of energy. China also may be concerned about the ramifications of the latest U.S. sanctions applied to Iran, prompting it to seek ways to further decrease its reliance on imports of Iranian oil to satisfy Washington. In a sign of things to come, the United States sanctioned China’s Zhuhai Zhenrong Company in January for doing business with the Iranian oil sector (Al-Jazeera, January 16). While China appears resolute on how it chooses to engage with Iran, Beijing also seems to be taking a pragmatic approach to account for future crises that may arise over its dealings with Iran.

China probably is hedging to mitigate any risk to potential losses it would incur in an extreme set of circumstances that would see it shift course on its overarching policy toward Iran. China’s unyielding position over its dispute with Iran over Tehran’s oil pricing policies may indicate a shift in Beijing’s position on Iran may not be out of the question down the line, although a break between China and Iran of such magnitude is highly unlikely. India, a rival of China and the second largest purchaser of Iranian oil, has exploited the current rift between Tehran and Beijing to increase substantially its imports of crude from Iran, effectively scooping up China’s share (Fars News Agency, February 9). To circumvent the restrictions hampering dealings with Iran’s central bank as a result of the U.S. sanctions, India and Iran have concluded an agreement that allows New Delhi to pay for 45 percent of its imports of Iranian oil in rupees. Both countries also have discussed other creative ways to ensure Iranian oil continues to flow to India, including a barter system whereby India trades critical commodities and products such as wheat or industrial goods in exchange for Iranian crude (Times of India [New Delhi], February 8). Japan and South Korea, the third and fourth largest purchasers of Iranian crude, have expressed deep reservations about the latest sanctions on Iran (Reuters, February 1). Considering Beijing’s mercantilist outlook, it is unlikely that China’s top leaders would stand by as regional rivals displace China’s favored position in Iran.

The timing of China’s outreach to Iran’s rivals in the Persian Gulf does not portend a dramatic shift in Beijing’s regional policy is in the offing. China is not about to abandon Iran. China, however, is acting to shore up its energy security in the event of a regional conflagration by diversifying its oil supply network. Consequently, China is becoming more entangled in the region’s rivalries. China claims to pursue a regional foreign policy that separates business and trade from politics. Yet the current stakes involved are such that China is being drawn into the larger regional competition pitting the Persian Gulf monarchies against Iran—a price Beijing appears willing to pay to secure its interests even at Iran’s expense. In addition to expressing China’s opposition to Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear arms, Wen conveyed Beijing’s objection to Tehran’s threat to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz (Al-Jazeera, February 1). Notwithstanding China’s military and defense relations with Iran, Beijing also has agreed to assist Saudi Arabia in developing its own nuclear program (Wall Street Journal, January 16). Such a gesture on the part of China almost certainly was designed to serve as an act of political theater to please the Saudi royal family and its GCC partners and to place further pressure on Tehran. For its part, Riyadh may very well be operating under the assumption that the United States already has decided to accept the reality of a nuclear Iran. Paradoxically, such a scenario may eventually usher in a genuine rapprochement between Washington and Tehran in the long run—however unlikely such a scenario may seem at the moment—diminishing the relative influence and significance of Saudi Arabia, Israel and other U.S. allies in Washington’s strategic concept of the Middle East. In this regard, Saudi Arabia and its regional partners are looking to China to help shape events surrounding the Iranian question in their favor. By eliciting an agreement from China to help initiate its own nuclear program, ostensibly as a counter to Iran’s nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia is showing Washington, as well as Tehran, that it too can explore a variety of options to secure its interests.

Conclusion

The ebb and flow of diplomacy and crisis involving the Iranian nuclear question will continue to impact the course of events in the Persian Gulf in the foreseeable future. As China’s interests in the Persian Gulf continue to broaden in such a climate, Beijing will find it increasingly difficult to maintain its delicate balancing act between the myriad competing interests at play. The challenges confronting Chinese diplomacy in the Persian Gulf make it harder for Beijing to sustain its traditional middle-of-the road approach to engaging the region. Given the extent of regional tensions, a solid tilt by China toward one of either Iran or the Persian Gulf monarchies will affect that strategic landscape of the region. After all, China’s continued support for Iran on the international stage ensures that Tehran escapes further isolation. Likewise, a hypothetical tilt by Beijing toward Iran’s rivals at this juncture would represent a major convergence between China and the United States. In spite of China’s genuine interest in fostering its ties with the Persian Gulf monarchies, Beijing is not prepared to sacrifice Tehran and lose the leverage its relationship with Iran affords it over the United States.