Operational use of LR-AAMs in aerial combat - Interceptor role

Equation

Lieutenant General
Vaporware?

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SACM is real. You're upset about it because I'm telling you, the moment it comes online and is widely implemented, the J-20 loses its interception role and has to go to conventional air superiority.

Regarding RAM, the J-20 has two tail strakes, tailfins, and a set of canards. It's limited by resonance effect vs low-frequency radar. Likewise, if you go off the Kopp RCS, the RAM was already simulated.

Regarding EODAS, so what if it's short-ranged? You use a two-element detection scheme; EODAS in front, AEW&C in back, AEW&C detects, EODAS tracks and kills the opponent. Since EODAS is passive, the EODAS-sensor isn't spotted by the attacking aircraft, and it can't use its own EODAS to track the opponent without assistance from its own AEW&C. In the interceptor role, the J-20 is moving too quickly to be escorted by AEW&C.

Just curious wouldn't these SACM would add weight and limited internal weapons bay space for offensive missiles for the F-22 and F-35? Especially when both of the fighters have to do evasive maneuvers (burning fuel) and than fire the SACM system (several of them) just to hit a single BVR missile.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
IIRC, we have pictures of CUDA models floating around. It is definitely not vaporware, and it's coming. I'm not saying it's a present US capability, but once it comes online the J-20 and PAK-FA can no longer fulfill their interception roles.
When is "once"? How long is this missile going to take to develop? How effective will it be? Is this project even going to mature to term? You're assuming this project is foregone when it's only at a very preliminary stage of development.

Regarding Deino and Chinese missiles, the PL-ASR (to avoid confusing with the older PL-10) has a range of about 22 km, and it lacks LOAL capability. Other WVR missiles have hit 40 km, and IIRC US WVRs are being upgraded to around 50 km range, important since stealth vs stealth is going to be all about extended range knifefights, swordfights if you'd will.
If I recall, the PL-10 has LOAL...so why wouldn't future Chinese SRAAMs? I wouldn't make too big a deal out of stated range. Each country has different parameters by which they report max range. What actually matters is information that is unknown to us, which is pK at each range.

The PL-15, likewise, is a muddle. Are we talking the PL-21 interceptor missile, or the PL-12 modified to fit in the J-20's internal bays, or the PL-12D with a ramjet and extended range? The first two we've seen, and the last we've not, and more importantly, if it exists, it has to be able to fit into the J-20's weapons bay. True, compared to modern R-77s and AMRAAMs, the PL-12 is not that far behind, but when you consider that Meteor is about to hit operational status the PL-12 is antiquated.

I find it slightly ironic that you would push a strong argument talking up the capabilities of one military based on a missile that hasn't even been prototyped yet in one paragraph and then talk down the capabilities of another military based on their current missile technology in the same post.
 
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latenlazy

Brigadier
Latenlazy, I don't think you understand my point about EODAS + AEW&C combos. It's late, so it's probably my fault.

Look, the deal is, you have an AEW&C in the back, providing detection of stealth aircraft at roughly 300-400km. In the front, about 200 km off from the AEW&C, you have stealthy fighters with EODAS. Now, when the opponent attempts an interception mission, the moment they get detected by AEW&C, the AEW&C passes them off to the stealth EODAS fighters, which then track, and open fire.

Now, in this circumstance, the attacking aircraft have two choices. Either they can abort the interception mission, or they can attempt to launch. In the former case, it's neutralization of the interception, since the mission is aborted. In the latter case, if you don't have sufficient missile range, it doesn't matter whether or not you want to fire, you can't. So it's necessary for interception missiles to have long-range, and by extension, significant volume and weight.
In your proposed scenario, in order for your stealth fighters to be within range to detect the incoming bogey with your EODAS, your fighters are similarly susceptible to the incoming bogey's EODAS. Furthermore, you are assuming the incoming bogey wouldn't be anticipating the escorts, when in any realistic scenario they would have game planned for that as well. This is why I questioned the sensibility of a scenario where a J-20 is operating solo against an entire group.
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
In your proposed scenario, in order for your stealth fighters to be within range to detect the incoming bogey with your EODAS, your fighters are similarly susceptible to the incoming bogey's EODAS. Furthermore, you are assuming the incoming bogey wouldn't be anticipating the escorts, when in any realistic scenario they would have game planned for that as well. This is why I questioned the sensibility of a scenario where a J-20 is operating solo against an entire group.

Not to mention the J-20 side would have their own AEW&C as well.

The problem with trying to envision hypothetical tactical scenarios is that it very quickly can cascade into a discussion about operational level movements of larger units. This makes sense of course, because modern wars between near peer adversaries are fought very much in a system of systems vs system of systems way. That's why these kind of discussions become very hard to sustain very quickly once you pick at some of the operational level details.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
Not to mention the J-20 side would have their own AEW&C as well.

The problem with trying to envision hypothetical tactical scenarios is that it very quickly can cascade into a discussion about operational level movements of larger units. This makes sense of course, because modern wars between near peer adversaries are fought very much in a system of systems vs system of systems way. That's why these kind of discussions become very hard to sustain very quickly once you pick at some of the operational level details.
Yep! Hence the question of whether the scenario we're talking about even makes sense.
 

Inst

Captain
It's late, I'm heading to bed. About counter-counter measures, I recall Pierrotlefou talking about why anti-missiles weren't considered in the first place; the proposition is what happens when you have anti-anti-missiles? For counter-counter measures, you'd also have counter-counter-counter measures, and US R&D capability is not to be underestimated.

Moreover, the big problem with CCMs is that anti-missiles don't need a high PK against heavy interception missiles, not when one F-15 brings you at least 16 anti-missiles. How many missiles do you expect an J-20 flight to launch against a single AEW&C? The point of the J-20 doing interception missions is that interception missions are relatively easy and present low-risk high-reward missions against enemy high-value targets. When the enemy high-value targets are defended out the wazoo, the calculus changes and going after AEW&C becomes as costly as going after enemy fighters directly.

I also think you're underestimating the maturity of modern anti-missile technology. Remember, back in the 90s and noughts, we used to see ABMs as fundamentally unreliable. Recent SM launches, on the other hand, have shown relatively high reliability at intercepting missiles. While CCMs may reduce the PK, they won't reduce the PK to zero, and overwhelming AAM shells can make it prohibitively expensive to shoot down an AEW&C.
 

Inst

Captain
@Equation: SACM as an offensive combat weapon, say, 50 km IR WVR missiles, does not detract from the combat capability of F-22s and F-35s; in fact, they would enhance it by allowing the F-22s and F-35s to pack more firepower against stealth aircraft. SACM as a defensive combat weapon, on the other hand, are better suited for cheap F-15s escorting AEW&C. It's relatively low-cost, high efficacy.

@Blitzo & Latenlazy about AEW&C:

An interception mission assumes you're talking about wings of J-20 unsupported. Interception, in the J-20's context, is not unlike submarine warfare, the goal is to hit the target, then get out before their escorts can respond. If you bring along an AEW&C, you can't get out, because the AEW&C is subsonic and will get destroyed by enemy aircraft in reprisal.

If you bring in an AEW&C, then it automatically becomes an air superiority battle, because in order to defend your AEW&C, you need to wipe out the enemy fighters.
 

latenlazy

Brigadier
It's late, I'm heading to bed. About counter-counter measures, I recall Pierrotlefou talking about why anti-missiles weren't considered in the first place; the proposition is what happens when you have anti-anti-missiles? For counter-counter measures, you'd also have counter-counter-counter measures, and US R&D capability is not to be underestimated.

Moreover, the big problem with CCMs is that anti-missiles don't need a high PK against heavy interception missiles, not when one F-15 brings you at least 16 anti-missiles. How many missiles do you expect an J-20 flight to launch against a single AEW&C? The point of the J-20 doing interception missions is that interception missions are relatively easy and present low-risk high-reward missions against enemy high-value targets. When the enemy high-value targets are defended out the wazoo, the calculus changes and going after AEW&C becomes as costly as going after enemy fighters directly.

I also think you're underestimating the maturity of modern anti-missile technology. Remember, back in the 90s and noughts, we used to see ABMs as fundamentally unreliable. Recent SM launches, on the other hand, have shown relatively high reliability at intercepting missiles. While CCMs may reduce the PK, they won't reduce the PK to zero, and overwhelming AAM shells can make it prohibitively expensive to shoot down an AEW&C.
Of course US R&D isn't to be underestimated, but that doesn't mean all ideas are viable. It won't be the first time a weapon idea was proposed, studied, entered development, and found to be wanting. Maybe you don't need a high pK with a higher load out, but getting a lock and hitting a hypersonic target with little lead time in the air is *incredibly* difficult thing to do, and even a high load out isn't going to matter if the pK is low enough. Frankly speaking I think you would have gotten further talking about DEWs than an anti-missile missile.

I am not underestimating anything. A mach 4 missile takes about 2 and a half minutes to travel 120 miles. That's far less lead time than what antiballistic missiles get.

All that aside, the point is there's no reason we should be assuming these missiles are sure things in a future conflict scenario if there isn't even a prototype.
 

Inst

Captain
@ Iron Man: We were following the Lockheed CUDA project, which is well documented. Strangely enough, the US government decided to pick Raytheon's SACM instead.

Anyways, a picture of CUDA:

lockheed_martin_bastelt_revolutionaerer_lockheedscuda-aam_0120121220182134.jpg
 

Blitzo

Lieutenant General
Staff member
Super Moderator
Registered Member
@Blitzo & Latenlazy about AEW&C:

An interception mission assumes you're talking about wings of J-20 unsupported. Interception, in the J-20's context, is not unlike submarine warfare, the goal is to hit the target, then get out before their escorts can respond. If you bring along an AEW&C, you can't get out, because the AEW&C is subsonic and will get destroyed by enemy aircraft in reprisal.

If you bring in an AEW&C, then it automatically becomes an air superiority battle, because in order to defend your AEW&C, you need to wipe out the enemy fighters.

Yes.

And that is why I think it is foolish to describe J-20's anti force multiplier role with the assumption that it would be operating as a traditional interceptor only, when in reality the actual state of the air war will involve the units all operating together on both sides and seizing opportunities as they present themselves.
 
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