This is magical thinking. If you don’t prioritize your capital efficiency you can’t execute effectively enough to compete. You can’t “dominate” a market that already has powerful incumbents if your business is less efficient and built on unreliable suppliers. Being immune to sanctions is not the same thing as dominating a market. There’s no point hardening yourself against sanctions if you can’t even get marketshare without sanctions. Worrying about sanction proofing first is putting the cart before the horse.
New entrants always need to worry about short term profit first, because they literally start out in a position where even if they have a good product they’re in danger of being completely outspent. Only once they’ve secured their position and built up their asset capacity can they start prioritizing long term.
But by then it is too late like what they are in now. Not necessarily true what is lacking is vision being rational is not always the virtue that you try portrait. Samsung founder go against the protestation of his own Samsung board Sometime you have to go against the stream. He funded the then fledging start up to become what is now Samsung semiconductor.
Look where is Samsung now and where is Huawei now! Can you explain that to me?
There were only so many places to go for major technology financing in Korea. The economic climate was worsening, with oil prices continuing to skyrocket and the Japanese pulling back. Samsung had money. Lee Byung-Chull and his son, Lee Kun-Hee, were convinced they had to enter the semiconductor business, not just buy chips. They tried persuading their management teams that advanced chips such as Hankook was building would be the future. Management balked.
Against such sage advice, on December 6, 1974, the Lees funded a stake in Hankook Semiconductor – using money from their own pockets. By the end of 1977, the operation was fully merged, becoming Samsung Semiconductor.
Kang Ki-Dong acquired a Ph.D. at The Ohio State University in 1962, and went to work at Motorola in Phoenix, Arizona in one of the largest discrete transistor plants in the world. As a Korean engineer who also spoke Japanese, he gave many plant tours to visiting engineers, building a network. When the time came to open a Motorola facility in Korea, Kang was sent ahead to perform an initial assessment for land and contacts, including interviewing prospective engineering staff.
After returning to the US and working for another firm, Kang encountered two old friends. The first was Kim Chu-Han, a prominent radio network operator Kang had introduced to ham radio years earlier. The second was a classmate, Harry Cho, an operations manager in semiconductors. Kim had access to financing, Cho could sell, and Kang knew fab technology. Together, the three formulated an idea for a new company: Integrated Circuit International, Incorporated, or ICII.
ICII designed a digital watch chip, and made its first 5 micron CMOS large-scale integration (LSI) parts on a small 3” line in Sunnyvale, California during 1973. Demand was substantial, many times bigger than what ICII could produce, and customers held back volume production orders. Kim’s firm was willing to finance expansion, but would only do so if the capital expenditure remained inside Korea.
Kang decided to pivot. He would continue ICII chip design operations in the US, but send the ICII fabrication line to Puchon and expand it there. The new joint venture was Hankook Semiconductor. However, the global oil crisis in 1974 and a litany of import red tape made the relocation much more expensive than planned. The fab finally came up and produced chips, but operating funds dwindled dangerously low within a few months.
There were only so many places to go for major technology financing in Korea. The economic climate was worsening, with oil prices continuing to skyrocket and the Japanese pulling back. Samsung had money. Lee Byung-Chull and his son, Lee Kun-Hee, were convinced they had to enter the semiconductor business, not just buy chips. They tried persuading their management teams that advanced chips such as Hankook was building would be the future. Management balked.
Against such sage advice, on December 6, 1974, the Lees funded a stake in Hankook Semiconductor – using money from their own pockets. By the end of 1977, the operation was fully merged, becoming Samsung Semiconductor.