Mountain Cat light amphibious ATV

tankphobia said:

It's still the fact that those mountain cats likely can't even stand up to small arms fire, to land a decent sized force would make a ton of noise via helicopters, you're better off just using conventional APC/IFVs in that scenario. Although the ability for such a compact vehicle to participate in sophisticated network centric operations is nothing to scruff at either.

I'd see this as more of a technology demonstration rather than actual tactics in that case.

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tankphobia said:

It's still the fact that those mountain cats likely can't even stand up to small arms fire, to land a decent sized force would make a ton of noise via helicopters, you're better off just using conventional APC/IFVs in that scenario. Although the ability for such a compact vehicle to participate in sophisticated network centric operations is nothing to scruff at either.

I'd see this as more of a technology demonstration rather than actual tactics in that case.

Click to expand...

tphuang said:

At this point, this is a concept they are selling. However, you are wrong about the first part. The latest helicopters have extremely quiet engines and won't be heard unless they are right over top of you. They can certainly land troops and ShanMao at night time somewhere in Taiwan and not be detected (assuming they've already bombed it for a couple of weeks). They cannot use APC/IFVs because only ShanMao is designed to fit in the bellies of Z-8L and Mi-17s. With UCAV help other the top, I think they and UCAVs can help clear out the guarding force next to port or beach front ahead of an actual landing operation.

You have to imagine that by this point, defenders would be out of fuel and electricity, so it wouldn't be facing an armored vehicles.

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Heliox said:

Then we're talking of Cdo raids rather than conventional air assaults.

If we're relying on stealth to move from LZ to beach-head or port-head then you're going off-roads. Couple of things;
i) Taiwan terrain, off roads, is not very wheeled friendly. You might be better sticking to roads but using local vehicles (if you can drop a Shanmao, you can BYO fuel)
ii) Taiwan is quite populated all throughout and it'd be very difficult to move into the coastal zone without being detected** unless you're a small unit w/o vehicles or moving in plain sight using local wheels.
(** you're at the mercy of the civilian populations willingness to report or not report you to the local garrison)

If you're intending to fight your way to the beach/port then no point talking about going in quiet.

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tphuang said:

Lol, there will be no electricity, no gas and all dark at night time. Command centers will be all knocked out. There won't be working phones. Who is going to report them and who to?

And shanmao is great in off road terrains. That's why they are shan mao, not just regular mao.

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tphuang said:

Lol, there will be no electricity, no gas and all dark at night time. Command centers will be all knocked out. There won't be working phones. Who is going to report them and who to?

Click to expand...

And shanmao is great in off road terrains. That's why they are shan mao, not just regular mao.

Click to expand...

tankphobia said:

It's still the fact that those mountain cats likely can't even stand up to small arms fire, to land a decent sized force would make a ton of noise via helicopters, you're better off just using conventional APC/IFVs in that scenario. Although the ability for such a compact vehicle to participate in sophisticated network centric operations is nothing to scruff at either.

I'd see this as more of a technology demonstration rather than actual tactics in that case.

Click to expand...

Heliox said:

Let me start off by stating that this is what I trained for and have ground experience in.

I spent 15 years (2.5 active and the rest reserves) in a formation that specialises in amphib and heliborne ops. I was mainly doing Terminal Guidance (not quite TAG but similar) so I spent a lot of time doing small unit ops linking the bigger formations, often in the "opfor" rear area.

The above doesn't mean I'm right and you're not ... though I do struggle to wrap my head around your, to me, rather cavalier take on the above. I suppose there is always more than one way to skin a cat so I welcome your explanation of your POV.

Meantime, here's mine ...



I come from Singapore. It is no secret that our planning and training is an unstated focus on a conflict with Malaysia (even if just simply by virtue of it being the only "land" border we have).

Malaysia has a Volunteer Corp or Home Guard of almost 3 million members (less than 1% armed). Whatever their peacetime and other duties are, the one duty of theirs that is pertinent to this discussion and that my unit specifically takes into account is their role in wartime - which is to act as eyes and ears for the military in their rear area.

(remember the Taiwanese rich guy who wanted to privately fund training of 3million volunteers? people poo-poohed on that cos they approach it from the POV of trained and armed resistance but ... as a civilian ISR network?)

I can assure you that even if there is no electricity and fuel, ground level ISR provided by these volunteers is a factor you need to take into account. Do not for a moment think that their SOP does not take into account loss of modern comms. In this case, their intel may not be instant but it will still remain a present threat and you should never, never discount the ability of a patriot on a bicycle and his ability to bring grief, in the form of a military response onto you. (or a goatherd calling the local garrison onto a scud hunting patrol, but I digress)

I am also not debating the PLA's ability to achieve total, as in literally 100%, destruction of electricity, fuel and C3 except to state that one never gameplans success to be contingent on the above. You plan on the enemy having all of the above and then attempt to degrade them to increase chance of mission success. A plan reliant on total loss of fuel and C3 will be so totally screwed by even a single digit percentile retention of the above. The actual effect on the ground may be the same at the end but the direction of approach and mindset is vastly different.



It's also an open secret that the Singapore Armed Forces actually conducts training exercises in Taiwan. I have 3x2weeks of experience extensively walking the hinterlands of Southern Taiwan on military opex, the exact kind of areas you have any chance of an unobserved, helo insertion into.

And once on the ground in the hinterland, this is the kind of terrain your mini-ATV has to account for ...
View attachment 101411

Yes, we don't go through the forest 24/7 but even if take backroads/firetrails, we have to be ready to melt 15m+ into the treeline with any hint of oncoming. I don't quite see any ATV getting deep enough (or quietly enough) into that to be unnoticed.
View attachment 101412

and sometimes, like sometimes-too-often, you have to crossgrain the elevation #justbecause (eg, we have to bypass the village on that spur but still continue on the metal road) and it can get like this. Don't quite see any vehicles getting up/down the last slope. ...
View attachment 101413

Again, this is from the perspective of a small unit, behind lines, striving to remain unobserved which like I said, I spent quite a bit of time doing, even in Taiwan. The above pics are all internet sourced pics of Taiwan. I can't exactly use my own pics taken during OPEX but #trustmebro, it's similar. My observation is that outside of the heavily settled coastal region, the interior of Taiwan gets very hilly, very undergrown, very fast. Shanmao may be a mountain cat but it'll definitely struggle a fair bit to go where the legs are going.

Time and place for everything mate, time and place.

Click to expand...

Heliox said:

Let me start off by stating that this is what I trained for and have ground experience in.

I spent 15 years (2.5 active and the rest reserves) in a formation that specialises in amphib and heliborne ops. I was mainly doing Terminal Guidance (not quite TAG but similar) so I spent a lot of time doing small unit ops linking the bigger formations, often in the "opfor" rear area.

The above doesn't mean I'm right and you're not ... though I do struggle to wrap my head around your, to me, rather cavalier take on the above. I suppose there is always more than one way to skin a cat so I welcome your explanation of your POV.

Meantime, here's mine ...



I come from Singapore. It is no secret that our planning and training is an unstated focus on a conflict with Malaysia (even if just simply by virtue of it being the only "land" border we have).

Malaysia has a Volunteer Corp or Home Guard of almost 3 million members (less than 1% armed). Whatever their peacetime and other duties are, the one duty of theirs that is pertinent to this discussion and that my unit specifically takes into account is their role in wartime - which is to act as eyes and ears for the military in their rear area.

(remember the Taiwanese rich guy who wanted to privately fund training of 3million volunteers? people poo-poohed on that cos they approach it from the POV of trained and armed resistance but ... as a civilian ISR network?)

I can assure you that even if there is no electricity and fuel, ground level ISR provided by these volunteers is a factor you need to take into account. Do not for a moment think that their SOP does not take into account loss of modern comms. In this case, their intel may not be instant but it will still remain a present threat and you should never, never discount the ability of a patriot on a bicycle and his ability to bring grief, in the form of a military response onto you. (or a goatherd calling the local garrison onto a scud hunting patrol, but I digress)

I am also not debating the PLA's ability to achieve total, as in literally 100%, destruction of electricity, fuel and C3 except to state that one never gameplans success to be contingent on the above. You plan on the enemy having all of the above and then attempt to degrade them to increase chance of mission success. A plan reliant on total loss of fuel and C3 will be so totally screwed by even a single digit percentile retention of the above. The actual effect on the ground may be the same at the end but the direction of approach and mindset is vastly different.



It's also an open secret that the Singapore Armed Forces actually conducts training exercises in Taiwan. I have 3x2weeks of experience extensively walking the hinterlands of Southern Taiwan on military opex, the exact kind of areas you have any chance of an unobserved, helo insertion into.

And once on the ground in the hinterland, this is the kind of terrain your mini-ATV has to account for ...
View attachment 101411

Yes, we don't go through the forest 24/7 but even if take backroads/firetrails, we have to be ready to melt 15m+ into the treeline with any hint of oncoming. I don't quite see any ATV getting deep enough (or quietly enough) into that to be unnoticed.
View attachment 101412

and sometimes, like sometimes-too-often, you have to crossgrain the elevation #justbecause (eg, we have to bypass the village on that spur but still continue on the metal road) and it can get like this. Don't quite see any vehicles getting up/down the last slope. ...
View attachment 101413

Again, this is from the perspective of a small unit, behind lines, striving to remain unobserved which like I said, I spent quite a bit of time doing, even in Taiwan. The above pics are all internet sourced pics of Taiwan. I can't exactly use my own pics taken during OPEX but #trustmebro, it's similar. My observation is that outside of the heavily settled coastal region, the interior of Taiwan gets very hilly, very undergrown, very fast. Shanmao may be a mountain cat but it'll definitely struggle a fair bit to go where the legs are going.

Time and place for everything mate, time and place.

Click to expand...