In his most revealing remarks on the subject to date, the German chancellor said he would ultimately like to restore the patchwork of security arrangements stitched together during and after the Cold War, so long as Moscow was ready to honour them.
Up to now Nato leaders have tended to discuss future relations with Russia in highly vague terms, beyond insisting that only Ukraine can determine the terms on which it is prepared to end the war.
However, during a panel discussion at the Berlin Security Conference Scholz said there was a “willingness” to engage with the Kremlin on questions such as arms control and missile deployment on the condition that Putin stopped trying to expand Russia’s territory through invasions.
Asked how Germany would act towards Russia once the war was over, given the “strong partnership” that had previously existed between the two countries, the chancellor replied: “At this stage I would say it’s not about partnership, to be very honest. Russia spoilt the peace order we worked on for so many decades and we agreed there should never again be the attempt to change borders by force.
“And what Russia is doing today is going back to the imperialistic approach of the 19th, 18th, 17th century where just a stronger country thinks it could just take the territory of the neighbour, understanding neighbours as just hinterland, and some place they can give rules to be followed. And this can never be accepted.”
However, he continued: “We have to go back to the agreements which we had in the last decades and which were the basis for peace and security order in Europe.
“And for Russia this also means that it accepts that there are open-minded societies, open societies, democracies, that follow completely a different way of how they are governed and how they attract people . . . In the end there is no aggression coming from the member states of the European Union, there is no aggression coming from Nato, and all questions of common security could be solved and discussed. There is a willingness to do so.”
Scholz concluded, to a round of applause from the audience: “We can come back to a peace order that worked and make it safe again if there is a willingness in Russia to go back to this peace order.”
His comments appear to put him at odds with some of his more stridently Putin-sceptic Nato allies such as Poland and the Baltic states, which are intensely reluctant to make concessions to the Kremlin and mistrustful of its readiness to uphold any postwar peace agreement.
Yet they also indicate that some leaders in the alliance are beginning to define more specific aims for a lasting accommodation with Russia once the war in Ukraine comes to an end.
In the days before the Russian invasion in February, Scholz visited Putin in Moscow for a last-ditch attempt to avert war through negotiations on a collective European security architecture. Like President Macron, he has since maintained periodic telephone contact with the Russian president and the German diplomatic service is understood to have kept a number of back channels open to the Kremlin.
The German economy is forecast to slide into recession next year, with the worst performance of any G20 state apart from Britain and Russia. Its troubles stem in large part from high energy prices driven by the curtailment of the Russian gas supplies on which much of its industry depends.
Its armed forces are also struggling with a shortage of materiel after pledging at least €1.2 billion worth of military support to Ukraine, including 22 million rounds of firearms ammunition, 100,000 hand grenades and hundreds of thousands of higher-calibre rounds and missiles for artillery, air defence systems and rocket launchers.
Germany needs to procure another €20 billion to €30 billion of ammunition simply to meet its minimum requirements as a Nato member, which oblige it to hold sufficient stocks to sustain high-intensity land warfare for at least 30 days. Some analysts estimate that in such a scenario the German armed forces would run out of munitions in as little as two days.
Last night Der Spiegel reported that Christine Lambrecht, the defence minister, had urgently requested extra funds for “significant quantities of urgently needed ammunition”.
Are Russian guarantees worth the paper they are written on?
For years the mission statement of Scholz’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) has maintained that there cannot be lasting peace in Europe “against Russia” — only with Russia.
It was so strong an article of faith that Scholz repeated those very words on the eve of his meeting with President Putin in the Kremlin days before the Russian attack on Ukraine on February 24.
Like many of the other guiding tenets of Germany’s foreign policy, this axiom has gone up in flames since the invasion and the SPD has pledged to erase it from its core manifesto.
Yet the problem it was meant to address clearly lingers on and will only come into sharper focus whenever the war in Ukraine ultimately draws to an end.
It is all very well to treat Russia as a pariah state. In practice, however, it cannot simply be shunned and locked away in a kind of geopolitical quarantine for ever: despite the sanctions regime its economy remains entangled with Europe’s and it retains enough influence on the global stage that it will have to be dealt with one way or another.
On several occasions over the past few months Scholz has likened the current situation to the years preceding the First World War. He evidently worries that the world may be stumbling into a cycle of escalating conflict that could last for decades, and wants to try and stabilise matters before it is too late to prevent a much wider catastrophe beyond Ukraine’s borders.
Whether this can be achieved through anything like a return to the status quo ante bellum, however, is open to question.
Having shattered so many of its international commitments and carried out war crimes on an industrial scale, it is not clear that Russia can provide any guarantees worth the paper they are written on.