US Blocks Engine Exports for Turkey’s KAAN Fighter Jet: NATO Rift Deepens
US Congress blocks the export of F110 engines for Turkey’s KAAN stealth fighter jet, triggering delays, straining NATO ties, and opening the door for Russia and China to exploit Ankara’s strategic vulnerability.
In a dramatic escalation of defence-industrial tensions between Washington and Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has confirmed that the United States Congress has blocked the export of crucial engines intended for Turkey’s indigenous KAAN fifth-generation fighter jet program.
This unprecedented move underscores the deep fractures within NATO and highlights the growing mistrust that continues to plague US-Turkey defence relations in the aftermath of Ankara’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 air defence system.
The decision threatens to delay the KAAN program at a critical stage, undermining Turkey’s ambition to become one of the few nations capable of producing a stealth fighter jet and complicating its aspirations for both domestic deployment and international export success.
Beyond the technical disruption, the blockage carries profound implications for regional power balances in the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East, and South Asia, where Ankara has sought to project influence through defence exports and indigenous military technology.
Turkey now faces an acute dilemma—either accelerate the development of its domestic engine technology, seek alternative suppliers from Russia or China, or risk strategic vulnerability by extending reliance on its ageing fleet of F-16s.
The KAAN program, long heralded as the jewel of Turkey’s indigenous defence sector, suddenly finds itself entangled in the geopolitics of sanctions, alliance politics, and competing great power strategies.
Meanwhile, Turkish defence industry insiders reveal that TRMotor’s indigenous engine program has been accelerated with emergency funding injections, though most analysts agree it remains at least seven years away from maturity.
At the same time, Chinese defence commentators have speculated that Beijing may view Turkey’s predicament as a golden opportunity to market its WS-15 engine or propose joint development, a move that would further strain Ankara’s already fragile relationship with the United States.
The aircraft’s early prototypes rely on US-manufactured General Electric F110-GE-129 turbofan engines, the same engines powering upgraded F-16s, with Turkey planning to build 20 KAANs using this configuration before switching to an indigenous powerplant.
This transition hinges on TRMotor, a joint venture involving Turkish engine manufacturers such as Kale Group, tasked with developing a domestic turbofan capable of matching fifth-generation requirements by 2032.
The KAAN also integrates Turkish-made AESA radar, mission software, and electronic warfare suites, distinguishing it from South Korea’s KF-21, which still relies heavily on US subsystems.
Turkey envisions the KAAN as both a strategic deterrent and a lucrative export vehicle, potentially reshaping its defence export profile in parallel with UAV successes such as the Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı.
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed in his address that Washington had blocked the export licenses for GE’s F110 engines, calling the move “a deliberate obstruction against Turkey’s rightful ambition to secure its national defence independence.”
He linked the congressional decision directly to wider disputes within the alliance, accusing the US of leveraging military technology as a political weapon against Ankara’s strategic autonomy.
The blocked engines are vital for Turkey’s planned Block 0 and Block 1 production runs of the KAAN, expected to provide the Turkish Air Force with initial operational capability before the integration of a domestic engine.
Turkey had requested permission not only to import the F110 engines but also to assemble both F110 and F404 engines locally to reduce dependency, create industrial spillover, and accelerate its indigenous propulsion ambitions.
US lawmakers, however, have resisted these requests, citing national security concerns, intellectual property sensitivities, and mistrust over Ankara’s willingness to align with NATO policies.
US officials argue that the S-400, when deployed in close proximity to NATO aircraft, risks exposing sensitive radar signatures and potentially compromising the stealth profile of advanced Western jets.
Congressional hawks have pushed to extend restrictions beyond the F-35 to include all high-end aerospace technology, Thus, the engine blockage reflects not just a technical dispute but a political stand—punishing Ankara for policies deemed incompatible with Western strategic unity.
The immediate impact of the blockage is a potential delay to the KAAN’s production schedule, with serial deliveries originally targeted for 2028 now at risk of slipping well into the 2030s.
Without US-supplied F110 engines, Turkey may struggle to field even its limited batch of Block 0 and Block 1 fighters, creating an operational gap that forces continued reliance on its ageing F-16s.
Turkey may be compelled to seek interim solutions, such as additional F-16 upgrades, or even pivot toward Russian or Chinese engine suppliers to keep the KAAN project alive.
For prospective customers like Pakistan, which viewed KAAN as a counterbalance to India’s Rafale and potential Su-57 acquisitions, delays could derail procurement timelines and complicate strategic planning.
Economically, the setback undermines Ankara’s ambition to turn the KAAN into a multi-billion-dollar export programme capable of rivaling the success of Turkish UAVs in markets from Azerbaijan to Africa.
Yet the crisis may also serve as a catalyst for Turkey’s defence industry to double down on domestic propulsion research, accelerating TRMotor’s development despite the formidable technical challenges of producing a fifth-generation-class engine.
To sustain momentum, Turkey may need to expand its defence budget well beyond the current $45–47 billion range, prioritising aerospace independence at the expense of other procurement projects.
Reactions within Turkey have been defiant, with officials stressing that the KAAN is already 80 percent indigenous and will not be derailed by congressional obstruction.
Defence analysts on Turkish media platforms and social networks have urged Ankara to explore engine options from Russia’s Saturn AL-41 or China’s WS-15 programs, though such moves would carry enormous political consequences.
The US Congress’s decision to block the export of F110 engines for the KAAN program represents a watershed moment in the trajectory of Turkey’s defence-industrial ambitions.
It exposes the vulnerabilities of Ankara’s reliance on foreign suppliers for critical technologies while simultaneously reinforcing its determination to pursue technological sovereignty at all costs.
In the short term, the decision delays Turkey’s entry into the fifth-generation fighter club and complicates its regional airpower calculus, particularly against rivals armed with F-35s.
In the longer term, it may accelerate Ankara’s pivot toward non-Western suppliers or galvanise its domestic engine development efforts, reshaping Turkey’s defence trajectory for decades to come.
At stake is more than just an aircraft—it is the future of Turkey’s role in NATO, the resilience of the transatlantic alliance, and the evolving balance of power across one of the world’s most volatile geostrategic regions.
The KAAN’s fate will thus serve as both a barometer and a battleground for the intersection of technology, geopolitics, and national ambition in the 21st century.
Already, reports from Ankara suggest that Turkish defence planners are intensifying dialogue with Pakistan and Azerbaijan to establish a broader KAAN consortium that could share the costs and risks of engine development.
At the same time, Turkish officials have quietly expanded exploratory contacts with Ukraine’s Motor Sich and even South Korea’s Hanwha Aerospace, seeking potential interim solutions until the TRMotor engine is ready.
Analysts caution that any reliance on Russian or Chinese engines would not only invite further US sanctions but also compromise Turkey’s leverage within NATO, deepening suspicions about Ankara’s long-term strategic alignment.
Ultimately, the coming years will determine whether Turkey transforms this crisis into a springboard for genuine aerospace independence or whether the KAAN project becomes another victim of the great-power rivalries that increasingly define the Indo-Pacific and European security landscapes.
