Ladakh Flash Point

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Brumby

Major
also, @Brumby ; the local forum-goers are confident that the PLAGF / PLAAF knows what they're doing. Once we go onto actual capabilities, you have massive ambiguity; the Indian military is known to be corrupt, but the Chinese military is known to be corrupt and out of practice. We know that the InAF trains assiduously, crashing many planes, but we don't know whether they train in the best manner. We know that the PLAAF has recently upgraded their training significantly, a far cry from the EP-3 incident in 2000 / 2001 where a lack of pilot training caused a pilot to veer into the American spy plane, but we don't know whether it's affirmatively good enough.

Hard capabilities, though, more Indian aircraft, better Chinese planes and missiles.

As I mentioned in an earlier post any outcome is likely be shaped by the appropriate employment of tactics that are internalized through an extensive realistic training regime. It will be wise to leverage your strength, exploit your opponents weakness and adapt to the environment of operation. In Sun Tzu's terminology "If you know your enemy and know yourself, you will succeed in a hundred battles".

The Ladakh region is unique in that it is at high elevation with mountainous terrain. As an example, the J-20 no doubt will have first look because of its RCS advantage. In order to close the distance for engagement, avoiding detection by adopting relative altitudes in flight profile might be beneficial. This may mean using terrain following features. The J-20 is primarily an air to air platform as there are no known evidence that it is currently air to ground capable. That means its radar is configured and optimized for air to air detection. Look down mode against a mountainous terrain will present it with detection issues due to land clutter. Additionally, the J-20 by design to my knowledge does not come with IR suppression features and in particular its engines. The Rafale operating at a lower altitude in a look up mode through its IRST will be in a better vintage point to locate and track the J-20 against a cooler background sky at higher altitude. The MICA IR carried by the Rafale and Mirage 2000 with its dual band IR seeker would be ideal for such an engagement as it is jam resistant. Whether using such tactics will be sufficient is obviously an unknown.

Another tactic to mitigate the J-20 first look and consequently first shot advantage is to try to draw it down to a lower altitude because among all the conditions affecting AAM range, air density is the most significant. The difference between high and low altitude air density is as much as 7 times resulting in missile range degradation by as much as 65 %. In other words, a PL-15 with a range of 200 kms at high attitude might only have an effective range of 70 kms at sea level.

Another important consideration that will impact tactics on both sides are pop up threats from MANPADS. In view of the high elevation, air crafts operating up to 20,000 feet might be at risk from such threats.

Airforces can spend years developing and refining tactics based on experiences especially those gained from interacting with other countries. In this respect, the IAF has an advantage having gone up against F-15, F-16, F-18, Euro Typhoons and Rafales plus the different tactics that are employed. China being more isolated has fewer of such interactions.
 

Waqar Khan

Junior Member
Registered Member
Current update on Ladakh situation

'Chinese Are on Indian Territory in Depsang and Pangong; LAC Has Shifted Westward'

I am baffled and surprised why no proper official briefings are happening,' former Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda tells Karan Thapar.

2 hours ago |
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In perhaps the most outspoken and comprehensive interview given by one of the Indian army’s most senior retired Army Commanders, Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda has readily accepted there’s contradiction and confusion in press reports of disengagement at Gogra and has called for an official statement by either the army or the government to clarify the matter.

Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda, who was the Northern Army Commander during the 2016 surgical strikes, said there is no reason why there should not be an official statement clarifying the disengagement at Gogra as well as other points in Ladakh. When asked if this failure to clearly communicate and clarify was a lapse, Gen. Hooda said: “You could call it a lapse”.

Although every other newspaper and television channel has reported disengagement between the Indian and Chinese armies at Gogra, the Business Standard on July 10, said that talks had broken down and there was no disengagement.

The author of that article, Col. Ajai Shukla, the paper’s Strategic Affairs Editor, reiterated the same point but in even greater detail i
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. Although later that day in his private blog he said a 1 kilometre disengagement had taken place, that piece has not appeared in the Business Standard.

On July 15, The Economic Times said both sides have retained 50 soldiers each at Gogra whilst today, July 16, the Hindustan Times reports that there are 30 Chinese soldiers in forward locations at Gogra. The Hindustan Times adds there are hopes “for a total withdrawal by this weekend”. It’s this contradiction and confusion that Gen. Hooda has said must be clarified. As he put it: “The need to be factual is a priority”.

In a 40-minute interview to Karan Thapar for The Wire, Gen. Hooda clearly and unequivocally accepted that at Depsang and Pangong Lake the Chinese are on Indian territory. He said: “Certainly in Depsang and Pangong the Chinese are sitting on our territory and the LAC has shifted westwards. There can be no two ways about that.”

Gen. Hooda said that Depsang is ”tactically and strategically more important to us” than Pangong Lake. It is critical for India’s access to the Daulat Beg Oldi airstrip as well as the Karakoram region. However, he added, “it’s going to be difficult” to get the Chinese to withdraw from Indian territory at Depsang and Pangong. “Here you are looking at very hard and tough negotiations … it’s going to take time … it will be difficult to secure Chinese withdrawal.”

Speaking specifically about Pangong Lake and the proposal that’s appeared in the media that disengagement can be secured by the Chinese pulling back to Finger 6 whilst the Indians pull back to Finger 2, Gen. Hooda said, “The Galwan principle cannot apply at Pangong or even Depsang”. If it does, he added, China will be “left holding our territory”. He said the only solution to the Depsang and Pangong Lake situation is for the full restoration of status quo ante as existed before May 5.

Gen. Hooda also spoke about reports in newspapers (The Hindu and Business Standard) that, because India has accepted the Y-Nallah as the marker for the LAC at Galwan instead of PP-14, the LAC has moved 1 km to the west into Indian territory. He said whilst “every metre is critical”, he believes this is “not a permanent arrangement but just temporary”. He pointed out that in 2015 the Chinese built a watch tower just a few metres inside Indian territory in Depsang which the Indian army destroyed. Later China accepted it was on Indian territory.


Questioned about reports that buffer zones at Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra were largely or perhaps entirely on Indian territory, Gen. Hooda first said that it was hard sitting in Delhi to be certain of this because we aren’t exactly sure where the LAC lies on the ground so we don’t know if it’s on Indian territory or not. However, he also pointed out that something similar happened in 2014 when the Chumar incident occurred. Buffer zones, he added, keep peace when soldiers would otherwise be face to face if not eyeball to eyeball. However, he added, we must make sure these buffer zones do not become permanent thus restricting India’s right to patrol up to its full perception of the LAC.

Asked if the Indian army has the military capacity to push the Chinese back, Gen. Hooda said: “The military can do it. Certainly. But it will be war.” When questioned further, Gen. Hooda accepted that in terms of resources and numbers there is a big difference between the Indian and Chinese armies but, he added, the application of large force in Ladakh’s high altitude area is not easy. He said “we have war-gamed it enough”. He added that the Indian air force has an advantage over the Chinese. He said “We can hold our own”.

Speaking to The Wire about the will shown by India’s political leadership and whether it needs to be more clearly and forcefully expressed, he said: “In my view more forcefully is the answer”. Gen. Hooda added that China “is attempting to coerce us militarily”. He said “our firmness must be clearly communicated”.

Gen. Hooda said that in the early weeks of the present crisis the government had underplayed it and that was a disadvantage. He said the Prime Minister’s visit to Ladakh had altered that but he added “it should have been done earlier”.

In this context Gen. Hooda twice said that India “should not rule out the military option” even whilst, in the first instance, relying on negotiations and political talks between the two countries.

Questioned about reports that there was intelligence in April which the army either did not properly assess or wrongly dismissed as normal spring time activity by the Chinese, Gen. Hooda, a former Northern Army Commander, said not just the army but the intelligence system as a whole failed to correctly assess Chinese intentions. He said we need to look into this after the crisis is over.

However, Gen. Hooda unequivocally and at least on two occasions said: “The fact is we got surprised. There is no doubt about that”. He added: “No one expected the Chinese could carry out such a blatant move.”

Whilst accepting that COVID-19 related problems had delayed the Indian army’s exercises as a result of which a brigade that should have been in Ladakh wasn’t there, Gen. Hooda added that it would have been better had the brigade been in Ladakh but it wouldn’t have made a difference.

Finally, Gen. Hooda was closely questioned about one of the Army Chief’s comments to the Economic Times in an interview on May 14, 10 days after 70 Indian soldiers got injured in a skirmish on Pangong Lake on May 5 and 6. In the interview the Army Chief referred to clashes between Indian and Chinese troops as “a routine happening … we should not read too much into it.”

Gen. Hooda said injuring 70 Indian soldiers is not routine. It hasn’t happened in the past. However, he believes that Gen. Naravane was “trying to play it down”. He added that underplaying the situation was the approach of the entire government.

When further questioned by The Wire on whether in playing down what had happened the Army Chief seemed guilty of misleading the Indian people, Gen. Hooda, who called the Chief “a professionally competent man” and “an honourable man”, admitted that Gen. Naravane’s “choice of words could have been different”.

Gen. Hooda was more openly critical of the way in which both the army and the government have been communicating through unnamed sources. He said: “I’m baffled and surprised why no proper official briefings has happened.” He pointed out that such briefings happened during the Kargil war of 1999. He said whilst every day briefing was not necessary it was wrong not to brief regularly. He repeated he simply couldn’t explain why this was not happening.

Finally, when asked if, after a distinguished four decade career in the army, he was saddened that today questions are being asked about the army’s handling of intelligence, its preparedness in Ladakh and, most importantly, comments made by the Army Chief, Gen. Hooda said: “It pains me”. He explained that the situation “requires introspection” both by the army and government. He said a detailed study like the Kargil Review Committee is needed once the crisis is over.

The above is a paraphrased precis of Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda’s interview. Please
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for details.
I think the answer is simple,Indian Intelligence failed,Indian military failed,Indian political leadership remained confused and India has no story to tell the world and Indian public. its a total deflection campaign and flag showing.I am surprised that BJP has so much time for toppling Congress governments in states like Rajasthan and doing twisting stories on Ladakh
 

Biscuits

Major
Registered Member
That retired Indian general seems to be contradicting his leader who clearly said there were no Chinese troops in India. Who should we believe?
 

Inst

Captain
As I mentioned in an earlier post any outcome is likely be shaped by the appropriate employment of tactics that are internalized through an extensive realistic training regime. It will be wise to leverage your strength, exploit your opponents weakness and adapt to the environment of operation. In Sun Tzu's terminology "If you know your enemy and know yourself, you will succeed in a hundred battles".

The Ladakh region is unique in that it is at high elevation with mountainous terrain. As an example, the J-20 no doubt will have first look because of its RCS advantage. In order to close the distance for engagement, avoiding detection by adopting relative altitudes in flight profile might be beneficial. This may mean using terrain following features. The J-20 is primarily an air to air platform as there are no known evidence that it is currently air to ground capable. That means its radar is configured and optimized for air to air detection. Look down mode against a mountainous terrain will present it with detection issues due to land clutter. Additionally, the J-20 by design to my knowledge does not come with IR suppression features and in particular its engines. The Rafale operating at a lower altitude in a look up mode through its IRST will be in a better vintage point to locate and track the J-20 against a cooler background sky at higher altitude. The MICA IR carried by the Rafale and Mirage 2000 with its dual band IR seeker would be ideal for such an engagement as it is jam resistant. Whether using such tactics will be sufficient is obviously an unknown.

Another tactic to mitigate the J-20 first look and consequently first shot advantage is to try to draw it down to a lower altitude because among all the conditions affecting AAM range, air density is the most significant. The difference between high and low altitude air density is as much as 7 times resulting in missile range degradation by as much as 65 %. In other words, a PL-15 with a range of 200 kms at high attitude might only have an effective range of 70 kms at sea level.

Another important consideration that will impact tactics on both sides are pop up threats from MANPADS. In view of the high elevation, air crafts operating up to 20,000 feet might be at risk from such threats.

Airforces can spend years developing and refining tactics based on experiences especially those gained from interacting with other countries. In this respect, the IAF has an advantage having gone up against F-15, F-16, F-18, Euro Typhoons and Rafales plus the different tactics that are employed. China being more isolated has fewer of such interactions.

Some corrections:

1. We've seen Chinese stealth strike missiles along the style of F-35 strike missiles, so the J-20 is intended to get an air-to-surface / sea role at some point.

2. The J-20's IR reduction seems to come primarily from its tailfin set-up; the engines are nestled behind pylons that block exhaust view from the side, and ventral fins below seem to be used to lower IR detection from below and at certain aspect angles. It's not a given that it has no IR reduction tools.

===

The other problem, IMO, isn't the first-look advantage of the J-20; the J-20 can definitely see the Rafale at very long distances, especially if it's supported by AEW&C that can cue its EODAS / IRST.

The J-20's problem is more that while its missiles likely have a range advantage over the Rafale (PL-15), the question is more about what its missile effective range would be vs a Rafale. The Rafale is known to be an 11G fighter, meaning you'd need 55G to knock it out from Mach 5 when it's running at Mach 1. That means J-20 missiles would need to retain enough energy that they could conduct 55G or so maneuverability vs the Rafale from long-range; in an ideal circumstance, the J-20 would function undetected until it can put the Rafale into its effective range, then ripple fire PL-15s. That might put it into the IRST range of the Rafale.

Another factor that should be considered is that the PLA's J-20 training emphasizes its use in concert with 4th generation fighters. One way the J-20 could handle things would be to use J-16s and J-10s as bait, then swoop in for the kill once the J-16s and J-10s end up being attacked by Rafale or Su-30MKIs.
 

Inst

Captain
@Biscuits

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Check out the section on the number of PLA officers that have been investigated and disciplined.

As far as I'm concerned, relative levels of corruption between the PLA and InA is unknown; it's an ambiguous factor. But I'm sort of tired of arguing with nationalists on the Chinese side who want to present everything as hunky-dory.

The main issue with the PLA right now is that its force posture is designed as a deterrence army; the Chinese are neither the Imperial Japanese nor Indians who derive wealth and/or power from war. The Chinese are economically oriented and prefer development to fighting. But at the same time, if the assumption becomes that no one is actually going to use the warfighting kit, then there's a lot of space to cut corners without anything bad ever happening as no one's ever going to use the equipment in a real battle.

===

One example could be the deployment of DF-21s and DF-26s vs the USN's CBGs in the Western Pacific. These DF-21s and DF-26s are dependent on satellite guidance to make sure they know where they are and to enable them to hit the target.

Unfortunately, the US has a lot of anti-satellite technology and in a hot war they're liable to shoot down the Chinese satellites. But the DF-21 / DF-26 combo, on the other hand, provides a deterrence factor; shooting down satellites is a major escalation and the DF-21s and DF-26s deter American intervention because they don't want to set off the Kessler effect with sat shoot down trades and deny everyone access to spaceflight.
 

visitor123

New Member
Registered Member
@Inst
very nice analysis. Remind me of 1962.

don't even put the PLA and the Indian whatever defense army or what not in the same sentence.
They started buying planes after their soldiers were killed and their land taken away. That's the height of incompetence and is frankly hilarious :D:D

If the Indians know their place, they will be much better off.
 

Inst

Captain
@Inst
very nice analysis. Remind me of 1962.

don't even put the PLA and the Indian whatever defense army or what not in the same sentence.
They started buying planes after their soldiers were killed and their land taken away. That's the height of incompetence and is frankly hilarious :D:D

If the Indians know their place, they will be much better off.

India spends roughly 2.4% of its GDP on defense spending, while China has traditionally spent around 2% of its GDP on defense spending. That's a difference in priority.

But I need to highlight that simply because a military is inferior, it doesn't mean that they can't hurt you. The Vietnamese, for instance, bled the Americans out in the 60s and early 70s. The Japanese military and industrial base was vastly superior to China's during the Second Sino-Vietnamese War, but the Chinese were successful because the US intervened and the Chinese locked down IJA troops.

A grueling blood vs blood fight vs the Indians would not be in China's strategic favor, even if it won. The best strategic scenario for China would be for India to drop its antagonism toward China, hopefully joining BRI, and not waste time on the Sino-Indian frontier.
 

badoc

Junior Member
Registered Member
India spends roughly 2.4% of its GDP on defense spending, while China has traditionally spent around 2% of its GDP on defense spending. That's a difference in priority.

But I need to highlight that simply because a military is inferior, it doesn't mean that they can't hurt you. The Vietnamese, for instance, bled the Americans out in the 60s and early 70s. The Japanese military and industrial base was vastly superior to China's during the Second Sino-Vietnamese War, but the Chinese were successful because the US intervened and the Chinese locked down IJA troops.

A grueling blood vs blood fight vs the Indians would not be in China's strategic favor, even if it won. The best strategic scenario for China would be for India to drop its antagonism toward China, hopefully joining BRI, and not waste time on the Sino-Indian frontier.
But India is a nation that was conquered by a GRAND TOTAL of 3000 soldiers from the East India Company.
Apparently East Asians have more fight in them.
.
 

Figaro

Senior Member
Registered Member
@Biscuits

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Check out the section on the number of PLA officers that have been investigated and disciplined.

As far as I'm concerned, relative levels of corruption between the PLA and InA is unknown; it's an ambiguous factor. But I'm sort of tired of arguing with nationalists on the Chinese side who want to present everything as hunky-dory.

The main issue with the PLA right now is that its force posture is designed as a deterrence army; the Chinese are neither the Imperial Japanese nor Indians who derive wealth and/or power from war. The Chinese are economically oriented and prefer development to fighting. But at the same time, if the assumption becomes that no one is actually going to use the warfighting kit, then there's a lot of space to cut corners without anything bad ever happening as no one's ever going to use the equipment in a real battle.

===

One example could be the deployment of DF-21s and DF-26s vs the USN's CBGs in the Western Pacific. These DF-21s and DF-26s are dependent on satellite guidance to make sure they know where they are and to enable them to hit the target.

Unfortunately, the US has a lot of anti-satellite technology and in a hot war they're liable to shoot down the Chinese satellites. But the DF-21 / DF-26 combo, on the other hand, provides a deterrence factor; shooting down satellites is a major escalation and the DF-21s and DF-26s deter American intervention because they don't want to set off the Kessler effect with sat shoot down trades and deny everyone access to spaceflight.
I think corruption within the PLA has been mitigated by a significant extent, ever since the expulsion of Gu Junshan. You have to remember, endemic corruption was the problem standing in the way of the PLA 2016 reforms and the transitioning the PLA from a primarily ground force to one with much more naval and air power. Ever since the PLA anti-corruption drive started, things have moved along much much quicker, especially in terms of operations. The ability of the PLA to undergo the 2016 reforms (including the painful 300k troop cuts) and shifting of much assets towards the air force and navy shows you the corruption has drastically subsided. As for the Indian military, I'm not sure what levels of corruption they are suffering.
 
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