Can i please ask you to quote statements you're replying to, especially considering it's an old thread? I had to go back and reread all i've written in this thread. Anyway...
cabbageman said:
Totoro:
USAF isn’t going to takeover China, it doesn’t need to plan like Operation Iraqi Freedom. 3000 cruise missiles and refueled stealth bombers are more than enough for US Effects-Based Operation. At the very least, short range aircraft like J-7 will not be able to operate effectively after major forward airbases near China coast have been paralyzed. New aircrafts such as Su-27 won’t have the same problem, but PLAAF’s overall quantitative advantage will decrease for sure.
US wouldn't have for its mission to invade china, that is true. But i am arguing that the cruise missiles used in operation iraqi freedom were used to attack the same kind of targets that would have to be attacked in a huge air campaign that we were discussing here. Once All the C&C nodes, sam defenses, airbases were destroyed there was no need for cruise missiles in iraq. They were used mostly in the opening days of the war. Same principle applies to china air campaign. Only difference is that such targets in china number in thousands, not hundreds like in iraq.
Just when we're talking about major military airbases, iraq had 24 operational ones in first gulf war, less than that number in 2003, according to globalsecurity.org. Of course i'm not saying all of them were attacked with cruise missiles but it's a fair illustration of the difference in scale. in 1999 Yugoslavia had five major airbases. China on the other hand operates 110.
Over 330 cruise missiles were launched in first gulf war. That figure is not even relevant anymore as back then it was an unproven weapon and later caimpaigns showed that US would rely on cruise missiles much more.
Over 400 were launched in 1998 during operation desert fox in iraq, then again over 230 in 1999 during air strikes on yugoslavia. Finally, at least 750 were launched in 2003 during invasion of iraq. Even if we assume that as many as 20 airbases were operational in 2003 in iraq that would give a ratio of over 40 launched cruise missiles for one airbase. That pretty much means 4500 cruise missiles for china. That does no take into account the fact that china has far bigger military industry targets, more decentralized c&c network and more potent radar and interception network than either iraq or serbia had.
I still stand to my assesment that IF america would want to achieve the same effect that it had in serbia and iraq, over all of china's targets, not even 5000 cruise missiles would be enough. And whole discussion is moot really since current US inventory is under 3000 thousand.
I apologize for this slight off topic rant bout numbers of cruise missiles fired, but at least now we have them all listed in one place, if anyone wants to read.
Anyhow, deep inland of china could not be reached by tomahawks anyway, which pretty much leavs only B2s as the weeapon of choice, as no fighter or EW plane could have the range to assist it. Unless US achieves such air superiority that it starts refuelling its planes over china itself. Of course, that does leave more tomahawks for targets closer to the shore, for bigger saturation.
Just what do you mean when you say effects based operation? This whole discussion so far has been under the assumption US goal would be to obliterate china's air and naval force and infrastructure, as well as destroy military equipment factories and research centers with c&c networks and sam sites being necessary prerequisite targets to pull all that off. If by effects based operation you mean a smaller scale air campaign than this - well, then we're both barking up the wrong tree.
Another thing to note. It is not that easy to paralyze an airbase. With all the overwhelming qualitative and quantitative advantage US had, iraq still managed to sustain it sortie rates for several days. It has been shown that an airbase whose infrastructure has been attacked can be put back into operation in very little time. damaged airstrips were repaired in a matter of several hours. So US would need to maintain its attacks over several days on chinese airbases in order to truly paralyze them.
cabbageman said:
Sea Dog’s 1:6 / 1:8 ratio doesn’t mean anything, he pulled it out of a hat. RAND estimates a 1:3 to 1:6 ratio of F-15C and Su-27. F-22A with its stealth features and datalink technology is far better than that. According to RAND, F-22 could achieve 1:20 ratio against Flankers.
If you consider Electronic Warfare superiority, pilot trainings, and AWACS advantage, there isn’t any need to even consider J-7 and J-8. Only J-10 and Flankers stand a chance against Super Hornet, JSF, and F-22. The gap of fighter technology is only one element of the war, the overall operational planning and tactics of USAF are much better than some people assumed.
I know Sea Dog's ratio is something he pulled out of a hat. I asked him to do that. 1:8 ratio is pure guesswork, just like RAND ratio figure is. There is no real way to come up with realistic ratio based on computer simulations based on assumed tech data based on guesswork tactical and strategical situation. But lets assume RAND data is true, since it is very convenient to have some palpable figures, otherwise the whole discussion is meaningless.
US would lose its 36 (guesswork figure of combat ready raptors) in exchange for some 720 flankers. Of course china doesnt have that many. If no raptors are lost in strike missions US wins. Chinese 350 flankers and j10s would then down some 78 f15Cs. Not bad for US. And so on. It really is the main question here, just how effective is PLAAF and just how effective is USAF and USN. Simulations are nice but they're next to useless. We can know the real efficiency only from real combat.
JSF isnt available yet though, and old f18s still comprise two thirds of an carrier air wing. I wonder what RAND said about the ratio there, flanker against old f18 and against super hornet? Can you please provide the RAND study link, i'm really curious.
US training advantage is already assumed. Tactics and force multipliers are assumed. China had plenty of opportunities to study both. Plus i would not assume j7 and j8 planes are useless, even j6s. At close range and/or in large numbers they can still be either deadly for US or a factor that will force the US attack to be turned away if the risk is deemed too high. More missiles fired at j7s means less missiles fired at flankers. However small or big difference that may make, it still does make a difference.
cabbageman said:
When you talked about target rich environment in China, don’t forget that the strategic depth also means there are more area to defend. It’s true that attackers need more resources and higher strength to penetrate, but defense has the dilemma of not knowing where the attacker will concentrate and therefore defense must cover all. An alternative to the “cover all” defense strategy is to have high mobility and logistics, but PLAAF does not have enough modern fighters and infrastructure to do that yet. Short range aircrafts like J-7 don’t have the capability and the flexibility for that kind of strategy.
Absolutely. China will have to choose what to defend. I am sure it will knowingly sacrifice certain areas so it arranges a more efficient defense in other areas. This again raises the question of just what do you think is the goal of this hypothetical US led air caimpagn?
Thing is, i believe logistics issues are on china's side, by a huge margin. While US would probably enjoy greater efficiency attacking china's coastline (especially opposing japan) and striking just few hundrd kms inland, the deeper it'd go its efficiency would start dropping sharply. Two things are imporant here. Max number of planes available for a mission at one time and sustained sortie rates.
US would more or less have to rely on its own airbases in the area. There are not very many of those. One can forget about using nearby countries to base planes or even fly over their territory. Pretty much only country safe from china and at the same time willing to help US would be Japan. Taiwan too could help this whole thread assumed US would attack because taiwan was being attacked/invaded.
Some 400 carrier borne planes would be available, plus up to 200 USAF planes. Unless japanese airbases get used by USAF too. That is some 800 sustained sorties available, providing all the carrier groups are near japan and all the attacks get concentratd around that general area. Attacks on south china would see perhaps a third less sorties. Even the puny j7 has a combat range of some 550 km. If attacked at the area opposing taiwan chinese could generate over 2000 sorties, pretty much assuring there'd always be enough planes in the air to intercept any US attack in the opening days of the war. Of course, if the ratio will be something like 10 flankers for a super hornet - that won't help chinese that much.
cabbageman said:
Edit:
Made mistake on the OEF sortie rate. Carrier operation had long hours, not high sortie rate per day.
I don't understand, are you saying you made a mistake or i did? And if so, what is the mistake refering to? You havent mentioned carriers yourself.... so the figure of USN sortie rates in OEF i gave is wrong? Or what?