J31 program is military version of Huawei, most griping in US minds.

Brumby said:

You are right. The J-31 is basically a demonstrator and its fate is far from certain. To even consider it as an economic or geopolitical threat is simply premature at best and a fantasy at worst.

In some threads you have to suspend a degree of reasoning and this is one of them. There are no substantive discussions consistent with the thread description but is just an excuse to by pass the threads that were locked out by the moderators. You are seeing the same development here. It is just a matter of time before this thread gets locked out at the rate it is going.

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tidalwave said:

why don't you ask those US articles why they put J31 there?
I only point it out.

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Brumby said:

First up you need to provide the links to those multiple articles that you were referring to. Others can then digest them and comment accordingly whether they agree or not with their contents.

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tidalwave said:

You know how to Google?
I will help if you can't find any.

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FriedRiceNSpice said:

Would it make sense for Shenyang (and the government, which would be needed to provide funding) to develop two platforms from the FC-31? One variant that is simply a mass producable refinement of the 2nd prototype for export market, and another enlarged and redesigned version for use on future carriers and possibly PLAAF? This would probably mean two engine variants as well.

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Brumby said:

Please help me with the specific links. I am not going to waste my time determining what may or may not be what you were referring to in the Google universe..

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tidalwave said:

why you waste time to make comment on this thread when you not even bother read the articles?

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As The Diplomat has extensively covered recently, the U.S. decision to implement CAATSA sanctions against China and Russia has the potential for huge fallout. On the one hand, the use

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sanctions represents a remarkably innovative use of financial and legal muscle, one that may portend a much more active effort to disrupt how the Chinese and Russian defense industrial bases (DIBs) do their work. On the other, it represents a major threat to core tenets of sovereignty that major powers have traditionally held dear: the ability to manage their own defense acquisitions and procurement without major foreign interference. Either way, the United States has decided to escalate its competition with Russia and China in a challenging new way.

To recap, the United States is flexing its financial muscles in order to limit the ability of the DIBs of competitor countries to do business. Moreover, it is doing so in an openly arbitrary fashion;

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that India, Indonesia, and Vietnam not suffer sanctions preventing the acquisition of U.S. equipment. Bonnie Girard

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that the United States can inflict; it can threaten the overseas property holdings of Chinese leadership; it can limit the travel and visa options of the same group; and it can reduce the ability of Chinese firms to execute deals using the U.S. financial system, which is to say U.S. currency.

The action also shows how the United States could mobilize economic and financial resources to inflict pain on China in the future. It is an article of faith (one supported by considerable evidence) in the U.S. defense community that China has widely appropriated U.S. military technology. The U.S. ability to contain the damage from that appropriation is in many ways limited; U.S. defense firms cannot plausibly expect to have their claims seriously entertained by Chinese courts when the PLA’s military capabilities are at stake. However, as the CAATSA sanctions show, the U.S. government has multiple tools to disrupt the operation of China’s military export regime if it so chooses.

It is not difficult to imagine, for example, a U.S. court determining that the J-31 stealth fighter infringes upon certain intellectual property rights of Lockheed Martin and other private firms and government organizations within the United States. The extensive intellectual property protection mechanisms that the United States has negotiated with countries around the world (including the ill-fated Trans-Pacific Partnership, but also bilateral trade deals) provide the means for U.S. firms to protect their IP in those partner countries. That the United States might mobilize these means to disrupt Chinese efforts to export infringing goods (again, the J-31 in this example), is not at all out of the question. Indeed, the effort to export to a third country could make the property of Chinese leaders and firms even more vulnerable to U.S. sanctions.

One thing is clear;

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this use of sanctions, and has made it clear that it believes the United States has crossed a line. Beijing appears to understand the implications of the U.S. decision, and is becoming cognizant of this particular vulnerability in a global system dominated by U.S. legal and financial tools. The United States can limit China’s options for

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, it can limit China’s ability to break into the global arms export market, and it can disrupt China’s efforts to acquire modern military technology. Whether “now” is the time to flex these muscles is a different question entirely; China may decide that it’s past time to challenge U.S. financial and legal hegemony.

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Let's pose a simple question: In the coming decade will China's military operate on US software, and will the US's military operate on 'made in China' hardware? If the answer is no, then you can quickly understand why the Huawei issue is the leading edge of a much-bigger issue of technology disentanglement and disengagement of supply chains that goes well beyond traditional views on issues of fair trade.

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