Generally, there would be some assumptions about the deployment of various F-35's on the first island chain and naval carriers (carriers, LHDs). Of course, one can debate how viable or how close to the Chinese mainland they're, but that would be another discussion.
J-35 carrier fighter (PLAN) thread
- Thread starter Deino
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Generally, there would be some assumptions about the deployment of various F-35's on the first island chain and naval carriers (carriers, LHDs). Of course, one can debate how viable or how close to the Chinese mainland they're, but that would be another discussion.
Sure, and as I wrote in my post that you replied to here, I agree that blindly overemphasizing sortie rate at the expense of range/payload/sensors would be a poor choice.
However, in context to the original remark that asif was making, I also think it goes without saying that the sortie rate that is currently achievable by the CV-16/17 and J-15 combination is frankly well below what would be desirable, and I don't think asif was suggesting that greater sortie rates should be achieved at blind expense to range/payload/sensors.
As I wrote previously -- holding all else equal (i.e.: the inherent capability of the individual aircraft, like sensors, weapons, range, stealth, networking etc, and friendly force multipliers), that for an aircraft carrier (or indeed any sort of military aviation enabling asset, even ones like an air base).... sortie rate is the foundational key desirable trait for increasing your capability to better prosecute the missions of sea control and airspace control.
I believe that is what asif's post in reply #785 was alluding to.
And I think that your calling sortie rate "a bunch of wank" was far too gratuitous and blunt a manner to describe what your actual argument was as described in your post here, which is more reasonable and nuanced.
Sleek deadly bird, unlike J15, with no pitot tube.
RE: count of carriers for China....
US emphasis on expeditionary assets like carriers because US is on outskirt fringe of the world island.
China is located on the world island, with 70% of the world's population within 1,000 mile radius of it's border with the most neighbors on earth and longest total land border in the world. China really only needs the Western Pacific and Indian oceans to access it's entire BRI, whereas US needs basic access Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian just to have a seat on the high table. That's why Soviet Union only needed one (max two) carriers, it has direct access to world island already.
China should invest in assymetric tech like hypersonic manuverable skimming anti-ship missiles with quantum-data links. To get into an aircraft carrier race is really wasteful unless you forsee a large-scale conflict, at which point you might as well just launch tactical nukes as an equalizer.
US emphasis on expeditionary assets like carriers because US is on outskirt fringe of the world island.
China is located on the world island, with 70% of the world's population within 1,000 mile radius of it's border with the most neighbors on earth and longest total land border in the world. China really only needs the Western Pacific and Indian oceans to access it's entire BRI, whereas US needs basic access Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian just to have a seat on the high table. That's why Soviet Union only needed one (max two) carriers, it has direct access to world island already.
China should invest in assymetric tech like hypersonic manuverable skimming anti-ship missiles with quantum-data links. To get into an aircraft carrier race is really wasteful unless you forsee a large-scale conflict, at which point you might as well just launch tactical nukes as an equalizer.
...and at the time of its dissolution had 5, and intended to proceed to have at least 10.
Lethe
Captain
Replying to this again from a different but ironically more immediately relevant angle. This is an example of a common form of argument which essentially runs as follows: the US military is today the world's most formidable military force, with high levels of funding, an advanced technology base, mature institutions and a wealth of combat experience. Therefore, whatever the US military is doing is correct, and alternatives that the US has not pursued are wrong.
Stated clearly and baldly in this manner, the argument is obviously silly, but it is nonetheless advanced more subtly in many different forms and in many different contexts, as in the quoted portion above. The mistake in this reasoning is in failing to appreciate the strategic, political, institutional, budgetary, and other factors that have shaped the acquisition and development paths of the US military. The obvious corollary to this is that as those contextual factors change, the "correct" solution changes as well. In particular, folks often fail to appreciate and acknowledge the contextual factors that have shaped the development of the US military in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf War period. On the one hand you have a major reorientation in the kinds of threats and tasks that are envisioned, coupled with a significant reduction in the anticipated resources available to meet those tasks. But equally as significant was the "revolution in military affairs" occasioned by the Gulf War experience, in which the application of superior technology (exemplified most clearly by the F-117A Nighthawk) led to an astonishingly bloodless and comprehensive victory. The bloodless aspect was important because it translated to little domestic opposition (remember, the reference point before this was the Vietnam War and all the domestic unrest that came with it) and opened the prospect, for those in the American foreign policy community who dreamed of it, of the routine exercise of American power around the world unfettered by domestic political considerations. The heady experience of the Gulf War drove a whole generation of "technology first" programs such as Zumwalt, LCS, F-35 and Ford, many of which later foundered on the rocks of their own hubris. In the case of Ford, you have USN literally inventing a requirement to maximise sortie rate generation beyond anything that has ever previously been required or even envisioned in order to protect the supercarrier from the criticisms levelled both by USAF and from the budget hawks that were circling. With Ford, USN promised both a BETTER "mobile airfield for the sustained bombardment of third-world nations" AND a cheaper one courtesy of the application of revolutionary technologies that would reduce life cycle costs primarily by reducing manning requirements.
So now we get to the immediately relevant example of folks neglecting relevant contextual factors. A considerable volume of discourse has taken the emergence of Super Hornet and F-35 as the primary constituents of the contemporary and near-future USN carrier air wing, as primary evidence for the assertion that medium-sized carrier-based aircraft are preferable to larger ones. This assertion is then used to argue the case for J-35 as THE future carrier-based aircraft for PLAN. This is a fundamental misreading of the evolution of USN's carrier air wing and the context in which that evolution occurred.
At one level, it is simply incorrect to claim that USN has moved to lighter aircraft. The predecessor to the 14-15 ton F-35B and F-35C is the 10-ton F/A-18 Hornet and its predecessor is the 8.5-ton A-7 Corsair II. At each stage the "light" aircraft in the inventory has become larger and heavier.
With respect to Super Hornet replacing the F-14 Tomcat and A-6 Intruder, folks need to look at the intended successsors to those aircraft. NATF and the A-12 Avenger were both large, heavy aircraft that were conceived in the Cold War environment of high-end threats. Northrop Grumman's NATF proposal had an empty weight of 16.5 tons (Lockheed Martin's proposal, being based on the F-22, would almost certainly have been heavier) while the A-12 Avenger had a target empty weight of 17.5 tons. These were the aircraft conceived after "generations of experience" and with a high-end threat in mind. When these programs foundered, Super Hornet was their cheap and cheerful replacement. It was an affordable and flexible option conceived in an era where those were the major qualities required and relevance to a high-end threat was not.
As we speak USN is again working on a fighter/interceptor aircraft designed to address a high-end threat. I will be astonished if that aircraft is not significantly larger than Super Hornet or F-35. And it will comprehensively outclass J-35 for the same reason that F-22, J-20 and Su-57 outclass the F-35, i.e. superior range, payload, sensors, speed, altitude and acceleration. It is for that reason that I do not believe J-35 is suitable as the sole combat aircraft in China's carrier groups going forward. J-35 is fine to serve as a complement to J-15 and play a role more or less equivalent to F-35C in USN's carrier air wings, but PLAN will still need an NGAD equivalent to follow on from that and replace J-15.
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It appears to me sortie rate measures a combination of different turn around times. Not all of these are irrelevant to a sea control mission. For example, the ability of an carrier to rapidly, but safely, rearm and refuel a large flight, or the ability to launch or recover one package while arming and fueling another, How fast aircraft can be struck below to clear the deck, or how fast they can be brought on deck, certainly seem relevant to how fast a carrier strike group to react to changing circumstances and battlefield intelligence in a sea control mission against a rival naval force.
Further more, if a central mission of the Chinese navy for planning purposes remains that of facilitating the armed reclaiming of Taiwan should prevention of declaration of de Jure separation fail, then the ability to generate more forward air support sortie against targets on land from the eastern side of the island would seem relevant to how useful these carriers potentially are to one of the navy’s central missions.
Further more, if a central mission of the Chinese navy for planning purposes remains that of facilitating the armed reclaiming of Taiwan should prevention of declaration of de Jure separation fail, then the ability to generate more forward air support sortie against targets on land from the eastern side of the island would seem relevant to how useful these carriers potentially are to one of the navy’s central missions.
As for the 'J35', at least it has 2 engines. Not sure USN has any great love for F35C given the numbers being procured and the amount being spent on SuperHornet Block III.
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Ok, if a kind reminder does not work, then take it as a warning! US CBG's at San Diego, NATF and ATA replacing A-6 and F-14 are irrelevant!