J-35 carrier fighter (PLAN) thread

[Lethe]

Heavy fighters suck for carriers for a multitude of reasons.

The day that we get notional specifications for USN's NGAD is the day that this entire line of argument will vanish from the internet. Overnight it will become the accepted wisdom that heavy carrier-based combat aircraft are clearly superior to lighter ones.

The argument to the contrary appears to derive mostly from some weird combination of post hoc justifications for the evolution of USN's carrier air wings in the post-Cold War period ("USN has moved to "medium" aircraft, USN is the best, therefore "medium" aircraft are the best", an analysis that is not only logically flawed, but one that ignores the historical context in which those decisions were made) coupled with predictable western anti-Flanker propaganda, aided by a few useful Russian idiots trying to pretend that the decision to develop MiG-29K rather than Su-33M was driven by something other than the need to throw RAC MiG an industrial lifeline.

To put it in concrete terms that can be judged in retrospect: I will be shocked if NGAD empty weight comes in at less than 17,000kg.

 

[Deino]

Allegedly two J-35 … however I don‘t know if it is a recent image and we know at leat a few images showing both FC-31 demonstrators.

 

[zyun8288]

Allegedly two J-35 … however I don‘t know if it is a recent image and we know at leat a few images showing both FC-31 demonstrators.

View attachment 121060

Look like F35 to me. The tree, the house, don’t look like China

 

[gongolongo]

The day that we get notional specifications for USN's NGAD is the day that this entire line of argument will vanish from the internet. Overnight it will become the accepted wisdom that heavy carrier-based combat aircraft are clearly superior to lighter ones.

The argument to the contrary appears to derive mostly from some weird combination of post hoc justifications for the evolution of USN's carrier air wings in the post-Cold War period ("USN has moved to "medium" aircraft, USN is the best, therefore "medium" aircraft are the best", an analysis that is not only logically flawed, but one that ignores the historical context in which those decisions were made) coupled with predictable western anti-Flanker propaganda, aided by a few useful Russian idiots trying to pretend that the decision to develop MiG-29K rather than Su-33M was driven by something other than the need to throw RAC MiG an industrial lifeline.

To put it in concrete terms that can be judged in retrospect: I will be shocked if NGAD empty weight comes in at less than 17,000kg.

Well you can think of it as this way. The NGAD potentially has so much going for it that the negative large factor is not a big deal.

I know the notion of larger aircraft on carriers having issues derived from the F-14. Because of its size it was hard to move around the ship and the weight caused extra wear on parts meaning more maintainence.

 

[Lethe]

Well you can think of it as this way. The NGAD potentially has so much going for it that the negative large factor is not a big deal.

I know the notion of larger aircraft on carriers having issues derived from the F-14. Because of its size it was hard to move around the ship and the weight caused extra wear on parts meaning more maintainence.

I think the F-14 more or less established the upper limit of what USN wanted to operate from its carrier decks in terms of both weight and dimensional footprint. "No larger than F-14" was one of the explicit requirements set for NATF. But not wanting to go larger than F-14 is not the same thing as wanting to go smaller. Looking beyond the various "Super Tomcat" proposals that were seriously considered at one point or another, the A-12 was going to be a big jet. NATF was going to be a big jet. A/F-X was going to be a big jet. None of these late-80s to late-90s programs were cancelled because USN figured out that more modest aircraft were preferable for deck handling reasons or whatever, rather they were cancelled mostly for budgetary reasons and in the absence of a credible threat justifying the resources necessary to bring them to fruition. We can add Boeing's 2008 NGAD proposal (notional empty weight: 18,000kg) to this list of large carrier-based combat aircraft proposals considered in the post-F-14 era.

 

[ACuriousPLAFan]

One of the main considerations is that with the developmental trend for future land-based fighters, which is to have much larger combat radius than previous-gen fighters, present-day carrier-based fighters are getting outclassed with their comparably smaller combat radius.

Even with the support of friendly refueling assets, in a prolonged high-intensity conflict, that shortcoming is still going to become more pronounced and handicapping combat capabilities of carrier-based fighters going forward.

Then, there are also the various requirements for more advanced avionics and computers, more powerful engines and generators, larger payload (weight and volume) and fuel capacities, greater networking capabilities, better survivability, etc etc - All of these will eventually compound to formulate demands which are going to become increasingly beyond what present-day 4th and 5th-gen carrier-based fighters could reasonably fulfill, even with major MLUs done upon them.

Therefore, in order for future carrier-based fighters to be able to stand shoulder-to-shoulder (figuratively) with their land-based counterparts, these fighters definitely are going to get larger and heavier. Sure, they can still follow the "no bigger than F-14" rule - But they definitely aren't going to stick around with dimensions and weights of the F-35 and J-35.

Last-but-not-least, those EMALS catapults on Ford (and supposedly Fujian too) are able to catapult aircrafts as heavy as 40+ tons. So there's that too.

 

[anzha]

I think the F-14 more or less established the upper limit of what USN wanted to operate from its carrier decks in terms of both weight and dimensional footprint. "No larger than F-14" was one of the explicit requirements set for NATF.

Not sure what this has to do with the J-35. This seems to be a discussion of the USN naval aircraft rather than the PLAN's. However, you are aware, I assume of the A-3 Skywarrior, right? It was larger & heavier than the F-14 with a longer range, but a moderately lower payload.

 

[Lethe]

One of the main considerations is that with the developmental trend for future land-based fighters, which is to have much larger combat radius than previous-gen fighters, present-day carrier-based fighters are getting outclassed with their comparably smaller combat radius.

Even with the support of friendly refueling assets, in a prolonged high-intensity conflict, that shortcoming is still going to become more pronounced and handicapping combat capabilities of carrier-based fighters going forward.

Then, there are also the various requirements for more advanced avionics and computers, more powerful engines and generators, larger payload (weight and volume) and fuel capacities, greater networking capabilities, better survivability, etc etc - All of these will eventually compound to formulate demands which are going to become increasingly beyond what present-day 4th and 5th-gen carrier-based fighters could reasonably fulfill, even with major MLUs done upon them.

Therefore, in order for future carrier-based fighters to be able to stand shoulder-to-shoulder (figuratively) with their land-based counterparts, these fighters definitely are going to get larger and heavier. Sure, they can still follow the "no bigger than F-14" rule - But they definitely aren't going to stick around with dimensions and weights of the F-35 and J-35.

Exactly. The reason I am confident that USN's NGAD/F/A-XX will be a large aircraft more akin to J-15 or F-14 rather than F/A-18E/F or J-35 is not simply by extrapolating from the various programs that USN has tried to get off the ground since the F-14, but because it follows from the characteristics that USN will be seeking for the aircraft. The #1 characteristic that they will seek to maximise is range, in order to increase both the offensive and defensive "bubble" of the aircraft carrier. This bubble shrunk in the post-Cold War era with the retirement of A-6 (not a particularly large aircraft, but an efficient one) and F-14 and the deficit has only been partially addressed by the induction of Super Hornet (+40% internal fuel relative to F/A-18C) and F-35C (+8% internal fuel relative to F-35A, in both cases you see the priorities at work).

This post-Cold War "shrinking of the bubble" was tolerable in an era of limited threats, but with USN now looking to confront advanced Chinese airpower (and missile threats against the carrier group) they will undoubtedly seek to push the bubble out as far as they can, while the existence of that threat will likely ensure that NGAD does not meet the same fate as the ATA/A-12, NATF, A-F/X projects of the past. Payload, sensors and signature management are likely to be the other major priority areas. The result is likely to be an aircraft that is notably larger than J-35 and, coupled with USA's more advanced engine technology, is likely to comprehensively overmatch that aircraft. Hence it is my contention that while J-35 is a sensible, risk-constrained project to get China into the carrier-based VLO game, that it alone will not suffice as a long-term solution, but will need to be augmented from late 2030s with a probably larger and perhaps more developmentally risky aircraft, one that would replace J-15 in the inventory.

Not sure what this has to do with the J-35. This seems to be a discussion of the USN naval aircraft rather than the PLAN's. However, you are aware, I assume of the A-3 Skywarrior, right? It was larger & heavier than the F-14 with a longer range, but a moderately lower payload.

It is certainly a useful observation that F-14 is not unique in the history of USN carrier operations. The context is the discussion about the ideal size for carrier-based combat aircraft. There is the suggestion that J-15 is too big and that the smaller size of J-35 is actually preferable because it allows for better deck handling and for a few more aircraft to be carried aboard leading to better sustained sortie generation. One of the observations underlying this argument is that USN has moved from the larger F-14 to smaller F/A-18E/F. In this context, examples of aircraft prior to the F-14 are not as useful in refuting the idea that USN has in recent decades discovered the 'Goldilocks' size for carrier-based combat aircraft. Hence my focus on the various post-F-14 projects that, had they been pursued to fruition, would also have resulted in aircraft notably larger than the F/A-18E/F and even F-35C that we see today.

 

[TK3600]

Exactly. The reason I am confident that USN's NGAD/F/A-XX will be a large aircraft more akin to J-15 or F-14 rather than F/A-18E/F or J-35 is not simply by extrapolating from the various programs that USN has tried to get off the ground since the F-14, but because it follows from the characteristics that USN will be seeking for the aircraft. The #1 characteristic that they will seek to maximise is range, in order to increase both the offensive and defensive "bubble" of the aircraft carrier. This bubble shrunk in the post-Cold War era with the retirement of A-6 (not a particularly large aircraft, but an efficient one) and F-14 and the deficit has only been partially addressed by the induction of Super Hornet (+40% internal fuel relative to F/A-18C) and F-35C (+8% internal fuel relative to F-35A, in both cases you see the priorities at work).

This post-Cold War "shrinking of the bubble" was tolerable in an era of limited threats, but with USN now looking to confront advanced Chinese airpower (and missile threats against the carrier group) they will undoubtedly seek to push the bubble out as far as they can, while the existence of that threat will likely ensure that NGAD does not meet the same fate as the ATA/A-12, NATF, A-F/X projects of the past. Payload, sensors and signature management are likely to be the other major priority areas. The result is likely to be an aircraft that is notably larger than J-35 and, coupled with USA's more advanced engine technology, is likely to comprehensively overmatch that aircraft. Hence it is my contention that while J-35 is a sensible, risk-constrained project to get China into the carrier-based VLO game, that it alone will not suffice as a long-term solution, but will need to be augmented from late 2030s with a probably larger and perhaps more developmentally risky aircraft, one that would replace J-15 in the inventory.



It is certainly a useful observation that F-14 is not unique in the history of USN carrier operations. The context is the discussion about the ideal size for carrier-based combat aircraft. There is the suggestion that J-15 is too big and that the smaller size of J-35 is actually preferable because it allows for better deck handling and for a few more aircraft to be carried aboard leading to better sustained sortie generation. One of the observations underlying this argument is that USN has moved from the larger F-14 to smaller F/A-18E/F. In this context, examples of aircraft prior to the F-14 are not as useful in refuting the idea that USN has in recent decades discovered the 'Goldilocks' size for carrier-based combat aircraft. Hence my focus on the various post-F-14 projects that, had they been pursued to fruition, would also have resulted in aircraft notably larger than the F/A-18E/F and even F-35C that we see today.

Why not both? J-15 is pretty huge, but it is mixed with J-35. Likewise US can also mix up their plane. NGAD can be be big long range aircraft while F-35 be the smaller one. The difference is J-15 is the primary strike platform, while I think NGAD will be primarily an air superiority platform.

 

[Wrought]

Exactly. The reason I am confident that USN's NGAD/F/A-XX will be a large aircraft more akin to J-15 or F-14 rather than F/A-18E/F or J-35 is not simply by extrapolating from the various programs that USN has tried to get off the ground since the F-14, but because it follows from the characteristics that USN will be seeking for the aircraft. The #1 characteristic that they will seek to maximise is range, in order to increase both the offensive and defensive "bubble" of the aircraft carrier. This bubble shrunk in the post-Cold War era with the retirement of A-6 (not a particularly large aircraft, but an efficient one) and F-14 and the deficit has only been partially addressed by the induction of Super Hornet (+40% internal fuel relative to F/A-18C) and F-35C (+8% internal fuel relative to F-35A, in both cases you see the priorities at work).

This post-Cold War "shrinking of the bubble" was tolerable in an era of limited threats, but with USN now looking to confront advanced Chinese airpower (and missile threats against the carrier group) they will undoubtedly seek to push the bubble out as far as they can, while the existence of that threat will likely ensure that NGAD does not meet the same fate as the ATA/A-12, NATF, A-F/X projects of the past. Payload, sensors and signature management are likely to be the other major priority areas. The result is likely to be an aircraft that is notably larger than J-35 and, coupled with USA's more advanced engine technology, is likely to comprehensively overmatch that aircraft. Hence it is my contention that while J-35 is a sensible, risk-constrained project to get China into the carrier-based VLO game, that it alone will not suffice as a long-term solution, but will need to be augmented from late 2030s with a probably larger and perhaps more developmentally risky aircraft, one that would replace J-15 in the inventory.

While I would agree with this logic in the context of USN operations, I would hesitate to mirror-image the same logic onto PLAN operations. Expanding the "bubble" as you put it, makes plenty of sense for a navy seeking to project force in a strategically offensive position with limited support from land-based assets and a long logistical tail. By necessity, the US will rely on its CSGs to do lots of heavy lifting.

However, I am not convinced that the PLAN will be operating under similar conditions or face similar requirements in the foreseeable future. While it obviously remains to be seen how CSGs will fit into PLA operational doctrine, I would argue that the tradeoffs of larger size for carrier aircraft are much less one-sided for a navy seeking to win space and time from a strategically defensive position with a heavy reliance on land-based support close to its home ports. The PLAAF already fields several types of long-range aircraft in-theatre. I'm not so certain that larger carrier-based ones are necessarily the best way forward for the PLAN.