J-20 5th Generation Fighter VII

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Overbom

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The kill ratios for a 5th gen versus 4th gen is more towards 10 times. That is because a 5th gen can snipe with BVR missiles at long range and then disengage. But a 4th gen has to get much closer for its missiles to track.
I think the focus on purely the 4th vs 5th gen platforms is a bit misguided when trying to compare 5th gens kill-ratios against 4th gen aircraft.

I would like to see how these ratios change depending on if AWACS and EW aircraft variants are included and if the 4th gen aircraft formations had a couple of stealth aircraft as well.

So in my mind the 1 to 12 or whatever kill ratios are not very meaningful because they don't take into account their real world application with force multipliers, tactics when mixed with a mixed 4/5th gen composition

I would imagine that if such a large scale, complex test was done, I imagine the the kill ratio between opposing sides would be more balanced
 

Gloire_bb

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The kill ratios for a 5th gen versus 4th gen is more towards 10 times.
This is not the case. Or, to be exact, while such modeling results did appear between 4th and 5th gen fighters - it wasn't about generation, it was about the choice of opponents and conditions. Otherwise, the continued proliferation of teen series(neither F-, nor J- ) doesn't make any sense. F-22A v. Iraqi Mig-29A(downgraded, analog PD radar that simply filters away returns of F-22 magnitude even when sees them, WVR-focused IRST not even meant for stealth detection) is one thing, F-22A v. J-10C is something completely different.

You could actually see it right now, stealth or no stealth - Ukrainian fighters(4th gen) engaging Russian fighters(4th gen, 5th gen). A year and a half of war, not a single confirmed kill in one direction, dozens of kills in the opposite. We don't even see a practical(kill ratio) difference b/n su-57 and su-30sm right now(a2a), because the ridiculously unfair situation isn't just about generation.

Conclusion: when true /revolutions/ happen, you immediately see it in the form of an urgent arms race - for example, HMS Dreadnought. No one procured - much less designed - pre-dreadnoughts half a century later.
Stealth aircraft, as of yet, is a big, important, but ultimately evolutionary step in survivability and ambiguity. Big enough to not be hissed upon(overall stealth>good EW, stealth+good EW>>EW without stealth), but it shall be taken with a cold head.

Sorry, could you expand on what you mean by this?
When single fighter patrols remote airspace - it's 100% reliant on its own onboard equipment(which it has to use, and has to use over long time - which is a huge condition for any powerful electronics). The more armament it can carry, the more economically - the better. It only has onboard fuel - thus the more, the better. And if your fighter will be detected - it's survival(jamming, dashing away) is up to itself.

Thus - you spend as much as you can on the fighter, which will gather as much data as possible by itself, and do as good as possible by itself. Even at a cost of sortie rate - sending dumb aircraft for such sorties is simply pointless.


When you have 50 networked fighters - you have 50 sets of sensors, armament, and so on - so just by that alone, individual sensor suite is 50 times less important (and in fact most of them won't emit, because why should they). Then, because it's 50 fighters (whole airforce!) - you have AWACS, which easily gives a better, more complete, and more nuanced tactical picture than any of those 50 - so they only start using their suites when it's necessary for engagement - yet in more favorable modes (narrow cued search, for example).

It's 50 fighters - so you may dedicate part of your force to both stand-off and stand-in (escort) jammer support.

They don't really give much f about fuel - because there are a couple of tankers on orbit behind them - no worries that closest airfield will be unavailable due to weather, spend as much as you can, as long as you can somehow cruise those 100-200 kms to the boom.

In this case - you can afford to get away with a rather simple aircraft - and instead of all the unnecessary complexity, concentrate on mission rate, serviceability, networking...and, say, more individual and group protection(stealth, ew, decoys).
If you will get 50 aircraft (1) to the situation (2) - you won't really get 50 times better force. It probably won't be that much stronger at all - added flexibility will be more than offset by scores of unnecessary optimizations.

That is because a 5th gen can snipe with BVR missiles at long range and then disengage.
The whole point of stealth is its ability to come(survive) closer, and go for a sure kill. Moreover, this way you can get higher Pk from smaller(=more numerous) missiles.
To snipe with BVR missiles you don't really need any stealth. Moreover, it hinders you, because the capability of long-range munition is ultimately tied to its size.
 

tphuang

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I would be very careful about making assumptions about maintenance and operational costs of j20 just because it's twin engines and f22 costs are high.

Keep in mind that j20 came out later and plaaf put extra emphasis and sustainment practices and maintenance costs and such.

If anything, having single fleet of j20 as 5th gen aircraft should make it a lot easier to maintain and sustain. Ws10 and ws15 will be the two most common engine types with plaaf, so should be easier and cheaper to support also.

Btw, I just saw an article that said ngad program won't pick a design until 2024.

How can they possibly have it in service by 2029 if it takes this long to just pick a winner?

And program run for ngad is said to be 250 aircraft.

From that perspective, usaf will be procuring f35s for a long time. Plaaf would want an aircraft that can match up against that. Having large numbers of j20 is very important
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
I think the focus on purely the 4th vs 5th gen platforms is a bit misguided when trying to compare 5th gens kill-ratios against 4th gen aircraft.

I would like to see how these ratios change depending on if AWACS and EW aircraft variants are included and if the 4th gen aircraft formations had a couple of stealth aircraft as well.

So in my mind the 1 to 12 or whatever kill ratios are not very meaningful because they don't take into account their real world application with force multipliers, tactics when mixed with a mixed 4/5th gen composition

I would imagine that if such a large scale, complex test was done, I imagine the the kill ratio between opposing sides would be more balanced

I agree completely.

But remember the original argument, which is that Gloire believes that the Chinese are over-committing on J-20 production at say 100 per year.

So in 2030, there would be 1000 J-20s, but this would only comprise one-third of the Chinese combat aircraft fleet (circa 3000).
The US will also have about 3000 combat aircraft as well.

The next step is to make an assumption that China is aiming for a military equivalent to the US.
This is based on China having a larger economy than the US and there also being bad US-China relations.

And if you look at the US military, they are going with stealth fighters as a much higher proportion of their combat air fleet.

So I don't see this China over-committing on J-20 production.
 

ACuriousPLAFan

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And program run for ngad is said to be 250 aircraft.

From that perspective, usaf will be procuring f35s for a long time. Plaaf would want an aircraft that can match up against that. Having large numbers of j20 is very important
The USAF mentioned that the current notional decision to procure only 200-250 NGADs is also (at least partly) driven by the requirements to pair each of the NGADs with two Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) loyal wingman UCAVs. The CCA is expected to be much cheaper than the NGADs on a per-unit basis. (I guess that also lean towards being a cost-saving measure)

That means the 200-250 NGADs would therefore be paired with 400-500 CCAs. The rest of the CCAs (out of around 1000 total) will be paired with the F-35s (also two CCAs per F-35) and/or 4.5th-gen fighters.
 
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AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
This is not the case. Or, to be exact, while such modeling results did appear between 4th and 5th gen fighters - it wasn't about generation, it was about the choice of opponents and conditions. Otherwise, the continued proliferation of teen series(neither F-, nor J- ) doesn't make any sense. F-22A v. Iraqi Mig-29A(downgraded, analog PD radar that simply filters away returns of F-22 magnitude even when sees them, WVR-focused IRST not even meant for stealth detection) is one thing, F-22A v. J-10C is something completely different.

I don't see F-22 versus J-10 being a great situation for the J-10, with the exception of WVR combat.

You could actually see it right now, stealth or no stealth - Ukrainian fighters(4th gen) engaging Russian fighters(4th gen, 5th gen). A year and a half of war, not a single confirmed kill in one direction, dozens of kills in the opposite. We don't even see a practical(kill ratio) difference b/n su-57 and su-30sm right now(a2a), because the ridiculously unfair situation isn't just about generation.

I wouldn't call any Russian fighters 5th gen.
And remember that the Chinese Air Force potentially does have to face off against very large numbers of stealth fighters

Conclusion: when true /revolutions/ happen, you immediately see it in the form of an urgent arms race - for example, HMS Dreadnought. No one procured - much less designed - pre-dreadnoughts half a century later.
Stealth aircraft, as of yet, is a big, important, but ultimately evolutionary step in survivability and ambiguity. Big enough to not be hissed upon(overall stealth>good EW, stealth+good EW>>EW without stealth), but it shall be taken with a cold head.

You also need to have a threat environment for an arms race to occur. And arguably China ramping to 100+ J-20 per year is part of such an arms race.


When single fighter patrols remote airspace - it's 100% reliant on its own onboard equipment(which it has to use, and has to use over long time - which is a huge condition for any powerful electronics). The more armament it can carry, the more economically - the better. It only has onboard fuel - thus the more, the better. And if your fighter will be detected - it's survival(jamming, dashing away) is up to itself.

Thus - you spend as much as you can on the fighter, which will gather as much data as possible by itself, and do as good as possible by itself. Even at a cost of sortie rate - sending dumb aircraft for such sorties is simply pointless.


When you have 50 networked fighters - you have 50 sets of sensors, armament, and so on - so just by that alone, individual sensor suite is 50 times less important (and in fact most of them won't emit, because why should they). Then, because it's 50 fighters (whole airforce!) - you have AWACS, which easily gives a better, more complete, and more nuanced tactical picture than any of those 50 - so they only start using their suites when it's necessary for engagement - yet in more favorable modes (narrow cued search, for example).

It's 50 fighters - so you may dedicate part of your force to both stand-off and stand-in (escort) jammer support.

Completely agree.

But now it is a case of saying what proportion should be J-20 versus other aircraft types.

I'm saying that having one-third being J-20 is not excessive from either the perspective of
1. Funding
2. Over-commitment in terms of the overall fleet


They don't really give much f about fuel - because there are a couple of tankers on orbit behind them - no worries that closest airfield will be unavailable due to weather, spend as much as you can, as long as you can somehow cruise those 100-200 kms to the boom.

I don't quite follow.

I see the next stage of Chinese Air Force development as power projection over the 1st Island Chain and deeper into the Western Pacific (Japan up to 1300km away and Philippines up to 2100km away). It simply is not feasible to operate tankers too far from the Chinese coast.

So you need something like the Flanker Airframe which is designed around the practical maximum of a 3.75 hour mission and therefore combat radius of 1800km. Presumably the J-20 is similar and would also have a longer range due to supercruise in the future.

In this case - you can afford to get away with a rather simple aircraft - and instead of all the unnecessary complexity, concentrate on mission rate, serviceability, networking...and, say, more individual and group protection(stealth, ew, decoys).
If you will get 50 aircraft (1) to the situation (2) - you won't really get 50 times better force. It probably won't be that much stronger at all - added flexibility will be more than offset by scores of unnecessary optimizations.

Agreed. And the logical outcome of your statement is to have large numbers of networked low-cost Loyal Wingman UCAVs for example.
And with a J-20, you get a 2nd seat for a dedicated UCAV controller.

The whole point of stealth is its ability to come(survive) closer, and go for a sure kill. Moreover, this way you can get higher Pk from smaller(=more numerous) missiles.
To snipe with BVR missiles you don't really need any stealth. Moreover, it hinders you, because the capability of long-range munition is ultimately tied to its size.

My read is that the "optimal" air-to-air strategy is a "few" J-20/F-22 stealth fighters acting as sensor platforms. But the J-20/F-22 doesn't actually carry that many missiles internally. But they can guide in larger numbers of AAMs launched from elsewhere (eg. from J-16, J-10C or UCAVs)

And I don't see size being the key attribute as to the effectiveness of long-range AAMs.
We now have dual-pulse missiles (PL-15) and ramjet missiles (like Meteor) which are only 200kg, and which are powered during the terminal phase.
 

AndrewS

Brigadier
Registered Member
The USAF mentioned that the current notional decision to procure only 200-250 NGADs is also (at least partly) driven by the requirements to pair each of the NGADs with two Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) loyal wingman UCAVs. The CCA is expected to be much cheaper than the NGADs on a per-unit basis. (I guess that also lean towards being a cost-saving measure)

That means the 200-250 NGADs would therefore be paired with 400-500 CCAs. The rest of the CCAs (out of around 1000 total) will be paired with the F-35s (also two CCAs per F-35) and/or 4.5th-gen fighters.

We can expect CCAs to go up against Chinese equivalents.

So my gut tells me that CCAs will be treated like munitions and that it will make sense to field much large numbers of them.

Think battles between drone swarms.
 

Gloire_bb

Captain
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So in 2030, there would be 1000 J-20s, but this would only comprise one-third of the Chinese combat aircraft fleet (circa 3000).
The US will also have about 3000 combat aircraft as well.
This is a valid calculation, but here is also the problem.

Tac. USAF ca. 2030 setup can be roughly described as
F-16 - F-15EX - F-35 - F-22(maybe early NGAD). Of those F-16 is an affordable platform, F-35 is a semi-affordable LO strike platform. And those together compromise no less than 70% percent of the fleet.

PLAAF, built around J-20, Flankers, some JH-7s and <1000 J-10s (roughly), give us at best up to 1/3 of the fleet composed of economic aircraft.

So, first point: US setup, if anything, is potentially significantly cheaper(relatively, of course). This is important, because while PPP China is going to be quite handily better than the US - this isn't the case with all of the "combined West". Furthermore, US still vastly outspends China %-wise.
"long money"(investment over years) will be on the US side in 2030 - so the point of going for a fancier setup is up to debate. Saved money can be better allocated to multipliers - tankers above all.

At the same time, in the majority of the missions, the full capability of those heavy fighters will not be utilized: Su-34 fullbacks flying around with 1(one) ARM shall be a stark reminder of how wrong "all heavy" setups may go.

Moreover, using world experience as a reference, it's quite fair to say, that not only simpler aircraft are absolutely fine for wast majority of the missions (and shouldn't be seen as inferior in a2a combat) - they also generate many - easily two times as many - more sorties per time. They're easier to get ready for the next sortie, they do it with less people, add less logistical strain, and so on.

And this is the second point: 80% of the most frequent, mundane missions is better served by simpler aircraft. It isn't just about price, it's about lt Wang getting his air support - getting it on time, and getting it without strain.
Advantage in daily missions is ultimately an advantage in harmful deliveries ratio - and this is an advantage on the macro scale of war.
 

Gloire_bb

Captain
Registered Member
I don't quite follow.

I see the next stage of Chinese Air Force development as power projection over the 1st Island Chain and deeper into the Western Pacific (Japan up to 1300km away and Philippines up to 2100km away). It simply is not feasible to operate tankers too far from the Chinese coast.

So you need something like the Flanker Airframe which is designed around the practical maximum of a 3.75 hour mission and therefore combat radius of 1800km. Presumably the J-20 is similar and would also have a longer range due to supercruise in the future.
Tankers aren't just a tool to extend range (thou they indeed can).

They're a tool to extend time on station - including aircraft, for those this time isn't that big(so bigger fuel tank, in this case, becomes not overly relevant). Moreover - when calculating in fuel - time on station extends disproportionally: almost all the fuel we add in-flight goes to "productive" part of the flight, instead of the transfer.
They're a tool to extend reaction time, of course - plane is already in the air, next to the operational zone.
They're a tool to "open" untouchable fuel reserve for combat - because the pilot can expect to get more, just a dozen minutes away, on his cruise altitude. For example, that may mean much more liberal use of reheat.
They're finally another tool to get more effective time out of aircraft - because actual flight isn't the most straining part of the sortie for equipment, airframe and pilot - it's take offs and landings.

The difference can also be seen now - Russia technically has enough AEW and SIGINT aircraft for continuous, 24/7 coverage of Ukraine - in fact, many of its multipliers are quite fresh from big upgrades, i.e. their material state shall be better than corresponding NATO assets.
Yet the actual picture is the opposite - and the reason behind this opposite is exactly in-flight refuel.

And I don't see size being the key attribute as to the effectiveness of long-range AAMs.
We now have dual-pulse missiles (PL-15) and ramjet missiles (like Meteor) which are only 200kg, and which are powered during the terminal phase.
Same solutions can be applied to the larger missiles, too.

p.s. also, I'd be careful with Meteor - ramjet(airbreathing) missile isn't a straight-on improvement over a solid-fuel rocket engine, it's much more of a different subtype of a weapon, with its own set of pros and cons.
 
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banjex

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I doubt there will be major issues with workforce. Russia graduates more STEM students every year than the US does. And unlike the US, Russia puts a lot more emphasis into technical training with special schools for machinists and the like
You're operating with legacy information. The Soviets used to be good at all this. Russia's let all these systems fall apart over the years. Like I said, I have doubts to put it mildly. They struggle to produce even relatively optronics for their armored fleets in sufficient numbers.
 
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