Issues/Problems the PLA needs to address

Totoro said:

Importance of air power has been rising for decades, that much is clear. And with the end of the Cold war many nations cut their air forces in half or even more. Chinese air forces included. Sure, quality of training and planes skyrocketed in the last 20 or so years but it seems chinese air forces are happy with the current 1800-ish to 2000-ish tactical combat aircraft. The number of j-7 and other older planes left to be replaced is such that the production levels of the last decade can't really be counted upon to increase the inventories further than the mentioned figure.

And yet... should the chinese air forces be larger? Of course, it depends on long term strategic requirements and possible/probable threats. But I believe some long term goal should be a considerably larger figure than today's inventories and today's orbat. Specifically, some notional 2040 roster might be well advised to have as many as 3000 tactical combat planes. That figure is not taken out of thin air. It is a product of projected combined enemy fleets. Several countries in China's neighborhood can plausibly make an alliance in a future war. And even one country that's not technically a neighbor but can project considerable power abroad. Looking at the number of possible bases and aircraft availability over the long distances (half the world away) i would say China needs to counter a possible combined force of some 2800 (700+1000+300+350+450) enemy planes, most of which are projected to be technologically as capable as then-year average chinese combat plane.

It is not just about defence. If it was just about that, a smaller figure would suffice. Once a country is only defending it usually means the war is lost. Active defense, including regular offensive action is required, which requires larger number of planes to make up for more complex strike packages and longer distances involved, less sorties per plane achieved and so on.

Realistically though, even if an increase is on the cards, a 50% increase in mere quarter of a century seems impossible, short of a cold war style arms race, which would then surely mean the opponents would be increasing their fleets as well.

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3000+ combat aircraft seems excessive (assuming you are only counting manned assets, if you are also counting UAVs and UCAVs, then that number could be a lot higher). But for clarity, all my comments and analysis will be directed at manned aircraft only.

If anything, I predict the Chinese air force numbers to further decrease by 2040.

China does not, and will not make the mistakes of the USSR and bankrupt their economy trying to win an arms race.

I question where you got your 2800 enemy aircraft number from, but even that kind of misses the point, ironically - bases and offensive capabilities.

Anyone country close enough to host enemy tac air to be fielded against mainland targets will themselves be within range of significant Chinese offensive assets of all sorts, from cruise missiles to ballistic missiles to manned and unmanned strikers and bombers.

There are only two or three countries and territories close enough to China to be able to offer up a meaningful number of bases to be used against China, with one or two island bases that could potentially be called upon as well.

But all of those countries and bases will be amply covered by Chinese strike options, which would make air operations from those bases problematic at best, and suicidal at worst.

Similarly, even today hostile carriers will have a hard and dangerous time trying to conduct offensive ops within the combat radius of their naval fighters. But 2040, the situation is likely to get worse not better for them, far worse.

So, a coalition of potential enemies may have 2800+ combat aircraft available to be used against China, but they do not have the bases from which to operate so many aircraft from, and any bases and assets they do have which can launch air power against China will be the subject of intensive attack, thus the number of fighters those bases could deploy and keep alive are going to be significantly lower than that theoretical maximum.

You are also not fully factoring in China's biggest strength - its industrial strength.

In any scenario where China is facing attack from a coalition of enemies, we are basically looking at a total war situation at best, and WWIII more likely. Either way, its not a war that will end quickly.

Assuming everyone has the sense to hold off on the nukes, China's strategy in such a situation would be to largely hold with its existing forces while it turns its enormous manufacturing capacity towards the manufacture of war goods.

The longer China can hold, the more the odds shift in their favour. Once a tipping point has been reach, China will go on the offensive and basically steamroll all opposition much like how the US fought WWII.

As such, China is far more interested in maintaining the manufacturing capacity over having a huge standing force. This would favour a slow but steady acquisition policy to keep factories running for the majority of the life of key combat aircraft, which would be good at keeping force levels more or less at present levels by matching production rates of new aircraft with the pace of retirement for older types,.

How will China bankrupt its economy if it keeps its spending (gdp ratio) at half the US spending? USSR was closing in at 20% of its GDP near the end - China is nowhere even close to that point. Increasing the manned combat plane fleet by 50%, even if all other expenses remain the same, would require at most one sixth of current military expenses. So a jump to, say, 2,5% of GDP. At most.

Realistically though, PLA's ground force will be downsized and a few hundred thousand people on salary will be cut in a matter of a decade. That in itself might be enough for a few dozen planes extra to be bought AND operated per year.

I am not saying that will necessarily happen, i am just pointing out it is possible.

I don't see why would it be prudent for Chinese air forces to further decrease numbers by 2040 when it's pretty evident the neighboring countries and US are not planning to decrease their numbers by a significant margin.

2800 figure is combined figure of S. Korea, Taiwan, Japan and realistically available inventories of USN, USMC and USAF for overseas missions. Give or take a few hundred. Again, that is not saying such an alliance will necessary happen, but it is a possibility that should not be taken lightly and should planned against.

The same way China can use its missiles against bases, the opponents can use their sizeable inventories (10.000+ cruise missiles) against Chinese bases near the coastline. It's always a two way street.

To be frank, 10.000 cruise missiles, even if all were used against air bases, isn't enough to neutralize even 50% of chinese bases for a month or more (as daily re-attacks are needed). In the same way, chinese missile force (less numerous by half at least) is not enough to neutralize opponent's bases.

So there won't be ample coverage of enemy's bases by chinese missiles. That missile force is a small part of the attacking force with a relatively short span of effectiveness. Continued and persistant air strikes by planes are going to be needed by both sides to keep the other side neutralized.

If the mentioned alliance materializes (which it may not) there may indeed be many bases available, enough for the mentioned 2800 figure. Actually, with civilian airports being used as well, the limiting factor to the 2800 figure will be support crews and not lack of airstrips.

I shall not go into multi-year war and industrial capacity discussion as it is way too broad of a topic and is subject to far too many variables. (China's allies? markets available to china, supporting its economy during world war?)

I have tried not to mention any specific countries as enemies in the previous post and their mention in this post is purely for clarification purpose. There is no intention of dragging any nationalistic discussion into this thread. I am merely trying to argue for a percieved need of a larger combat aircraft fleet, due to possible (But realistic) future threat/requirement set.

Totoro said:

How will China bankrupt its economy if it keeps its spending (gdp ratio) at half the US spending? USSR was closing in at 20% of its GDP near the end - China is nowhere even close to that point. Increasing the manned combat plane fleet by 50%, even if all other expenses remain the same, would require at most one sixth of current military expenses. So a jump to, say, 2,5% of GDP. At most.

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The US is spending too much on "defence", more than its economy can afford in fact, so their figure is hardly one you want to emulate.

The problem is that with your line of reasoning, you are advocating that China spend enough to be able to outnumber the combined forces of 3 countries and Taiwan, one of which is the US. How can China do that and still spend less than the US alone? Your stated aims and your expected expenditure simply do not match up.

If you want China to be able to fight all those foes on level footing at the drop of a hat, China will probably have to spend 15, 20% or more of its GDP on defence.

If you want China to spend 2.5% of its GDP on defence, its not going to be remotely enough to buy and sustain the kind of force you want.

You need to decide what it is you want, and then we can discuss it.

Realistically though, PLA's ground force will be downsized and a few hundred thousand people on salary will be cut in a matter of a decade. That in itself might be enough for a few dozen planes extra to be bought AND operated per year.

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I think you may be being optimistic there. Most of those troops and facilities will be cut, but a significant part of that will be pensioned off, so those costs, while reduced (or not depending on what kind of pension scheme they are on) will continue for the foreseeable future.

The downsizing will save costs, but not as much as you may think/wish.

But, TBH, I think its more to do with curbing potential future costs as much as it is about saving money now.

I don't see why would it be prudent for Chinese air forces to further decrease numbers by 2040 when it's pretty evident the neighboring countries and US are not planning to decrease their numbers by a significant margin.

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Numbers isn't everything. The primary reason for the PLAAF to cut numbers is so they can have higher quality assets.

If given the choice between 3 J20s or 5 J10s, which would you prefer?

By 2040, the PLAAF will be operating hundreds of J20s, far more than there will be F22s (who may be nearing retirement age by then). With the J20 expected to be in the same league as the F22 and distinctly superior to the F35 in air combat, the PLAAF should be able to maintain parity or even achieve local superiority with fewer, but better aircraft.

Both sides may be fielding 6th gens by that timeframe, but since little is known about 6th gens at present, I am just discounting them for now.

2800 figure is combined figure of S. Korea, Taiwan, Japan and realistically available inventories of USN, USMC and USAF for overseas missions. Give or take a few hundred. Again, that is not saying such an alliance will necessary happen, but it is a possibility that should not be taken lightly and should planned against.

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Planned against is not the same as being ready to take on and fight right away.

As I already explained at length in my last post, if faced with such a scenario, China would seek to use its greatest strength - its industrial might against its enemies.

In that respect, the PLA standing force is primarily expected to perform holding actions and protect China's industrial heartland as it transforms itself from consumer to military production.

The PLA force structure is not, and should not be used on what numbers are necessary to outright defeat such a mighty combined force at the start of war, but rather, the minimum required to fend them off long enough to allow Chinese industry to retool and retask itself and turn the tide.

The same way China can use its missiles against bases, the opponents can use their sizeable inventories (10.000+ cruise missiles) against Chinese bases near the coastline. It's always a two way street.

To be frank, 10.000 cruise missiles, even if all were used against air bases, isn't enough to neutralize even 50% of chinese bases for a month or more (as daily re-attacks are needed). In the same way, chinese missile force (less numerous by half at least) is not enough to neutralize opponent's bases.

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Have a look at the map. Just how many military bases within range of the Chinese mainland do you think those countries have?

So there won't be ample coverage of enemy's bases by chinese missiles. That missile force is a small part of the attacking force with a relatively short span of effectiveness. Continued and persistant air strikes by planes are going to be needed by both sides to keep the other side neutralized.

If the mentioned alliance materializes (which it may not) there may indeed be many bases available, enough for the mentioned 2800 figure. Actually, with civilian airports being used as well, the limiting factor to the 2800 figure will be support crews and not lack of airstrips.

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The problem with civilian airports is they are civilian airports. No hardened shelters or munitions storage bunkers. Western military air bases are not much better tbh, but Chinese air bases are a completely different beast.

Not only are Chinese air bases designed from the round up with the ability to withstand enemy air attacks a top priority, the major ones are also mainly located a fair distance from the coast whenever possible (a reason why long legs is such a priority for Chinese fighters).

Any air or missile attack aimed at primary Chinese air bases on the mainland will have to run the gauntlet of China's integrated air defence network, which is already one of, it not the best in the world. With fighter top cover, that is going to be a very very hard nut to crack, and extremely costly to even try to take down. And we are not even taking into consideration the air defence screen the PLAN can put up before those enemy fighters and missiles even get close to shore.

The primary air bases of that coalition you mentioned which could be used against China are mainly located close to the coast, none of which were designed to with stand air strikes.

The two sides can launch the same number of missiles at each other, but the results are going to be vastly different.

I shall not go into multi-year war and industrial capacity discussion as it is way too broad of a topic and is subject to far too many variables. (China's allies? markets available to china, supporting its economy during world war?)

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Well, since China's primary strategy when faced with the prospect of such a conflict is to hold and build and only advance once Chinese industry starts churning out an unstoppable tsunami of war machines of every size and type, of course its current and planned force structure is going to seem inadequate to you.

But that is China's strategy. It is not even going to try and develop and deploy the standing forces needed to win a fight against even the US' standing forces by itself, never mind the US and friends' combined standing force altogether. To try would see China repeat the mistakes of the Soviets.

Instead, China only seeks to have standing forces sufficient to be able to ideally make conflict so costly as to deter such an enemy force from attacking at all, or at least stop them from being able to defeat China quickly or do significant damage to its industrial heartland if deterrence isn't enough.

plawolf said:

Well, since China's primary strategy when faced with the prospect of such a conflict is to hold and build and only advance once Chinese industry starts churning out an unstoppable tsunami of war machines of every size and type, of course its current and planned force structure is going to seem inadequate to you.

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I agree with everything else in your previous posts, but I can't say I fully agree with this.

I think that in event of a high intensity regional conflict, China would likely face its trade and energy shipping routes blockaded, which would likely drastically hinder China's ability to transition to a wartime economy where they can outproduce its opponents.

There is also the fact to consider that China's factories and production centres could be held at risk by the opposing side's air and missile forces, while China would be unable to hold the opfor's productionc centres at similar risk (namely CONTUS in this case). This isn't to say China's production centres are sitting ducks, because the military will obviously still seek to do its best to defend them, but some will still likely be very juicy targets, and China would have to hustle to defend its airspace well. China will develop better early warning, better SAMs, better command/control, better fighters, and possibly even lasers, but they will have to contend with stealth fighters, stealth bombers, conventional EMP type weapons (like CHAMP), and also the risk of hypersonic cruise missiles (by 2040) which would substantially reduce warning time. All in all, the risk to China's production centres imho are going to be considerable.

Those two above factors together, are the key reasons why I don't think we can predict that China rely on a "wartime economy" to simply outproduce its adversaries.

But I strongly agree with your position that China would seek to deter conflict by making the price of conflict for potential adversaries too high for them to take lightly, and also your position regarding the number of airbases that the opfor has to their access for military forces and the relative vulnerability of both side's ability to deploy airpower (airbases available vs missiles used)

Bltizo said:

I agree with everything else in your previous posts, but I can't say I fully agree with this.

I think that in event of a high intensity regional conflict, China would likely face its trade and energy shipping routes blockaded, which would likely drastically hinder China's ability to transition to a wartime economy where they can outproduce its opponents.

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That is one of the key reasons why China is seeking to develop its overland lines of communication with planned direct road, rail and pipeline links to Europe, the ME and Africa.

In the meantime, China is using its economic importance as a credible deterrence.

If anyone tied to blockade China now, the economic damage to the rest of the world's economy would be such that others will probably step in to safeguard their own economic and social needs.

They won't fight for China, but they will apply all the political and diplomatic pressures they can to stop any blockade, and may go as far as sending in their own flagged ships to Chinese ports to deliver and collect goods their economies need for example.

There are also friendly neighbouring countries China could turn to as 3rd party transit sites, namely Russia and the central Asia republics, who could act as an intermediary and facilitate trade between China and Europe, the Middle East and beyond.

There is also the fact to consider that China's factories and production centres could be held at risk by the opposing side's air and missile forces, while China would be unable to hold the opfor's productionc centres at similar risk (namely CONTUS in this case). This isn't to say China's production centres are sitting ducks, because the military will obviously still seek to do its best to defend them, but some will still likely be very juicy targets, and China would have to hustle to defend its airspace well. China will develop better early warning, better SAMs, better command/control, better fighters, and possibly even lasers, but they will have to contend with stealth fighters, stealth bombers, conventional EMP type weapons (like CHAMP), and also the risk of hypersonic cruise missiles (by 2040) which would substantially reduce warning time. All in all, the risk to China's production centres imho are going to be considerable.

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Its far from an ideal strategy and there will be losses, probably quite considerable losses, before China builds up the critical mass needed to take the fight to the enemy.

I think China's main defences before that will be scale and secrecy. China will probably have more factories it can convert to making military goods than an opponent will have bombs and missiles.

I would expect enemy satellites to be the first to be taken out in such a war (which will loose its own satellites in return, but I think China will consider that a worth while trade).

That will make it very hard for any opfor to know what factor has been converted to making what.

Those two above factors together, are the key reasons why I don't think we can predict that China rely on a "wartime economy" to simply outproduce its adversaries.

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Those are significant problems, but not insurmountable.

But I strongly agree with your position that China would seek to deter conflict by making the price of conflict for potential adversaries too high for them to take lightly, and also your position regarding the number of airbases that the opfor has to their access for military forces and the relative vulnerability of both side's ability to deploy airpower (airbases available vs missiles used)

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As I touched upon early, I think China's primary deterrence weapon is economic rather than military. But I discounted that initially to try and keep things more focused.

plawolf said:

That is one of the key reasons why China is seeking to develop its overland lines of communication with planned direct road, rail and pipeline links to Europe, the ME and Africa.

In the meantime, China is using its economic importance as a credible deterrence.

If anyone tied to blockade China now, the economic damage to the rest of the world's economy would be such that others will probably step in to safeguard their own economic and social needs.

They won't fight for China, but they will apply all the political and diplomatic pressures they can to stop any blockade, and may go as far as sending in their own flagged ships to Chinese ports to deliver and collect goods their economies need for example.

There are also friendly neighbouring countries China could turn to as 3rd party transit sites, namely Russia and the central Asia republics, who could act as an intermediary and facilitate trade between China and Europe, the Middle East and beyond.

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Yes, I agree with all of this, but in the situation that was described previously, it is difficult to say whether the new overland silk road would be able to mitigate enough of the reduction in trade and energy that a naval blockade would cause for China to maintain a significant enough wartime output to "outproduce" its opfor.

Also, we have to consider whether the US may use its geopolitical influence to try and cut off some of China's overland routes as well.

We obviously can't rule out the new overland routes in any future conflict to help keep China supplied, but I think we also cannot assume they will be able to pick up the slack that a naval blockade will cause nor can we assume that the overland routes would necessarily be invulnerable to disruption.

Its far from an ideal strategy and there will be losses, probably quite considerable losses, before China builds up the critical mass needed to take the fight to the enemy.

I think China's main defences before that will be scale and secrecy. China will probably have more factories it can convert to making military goods than an opponent will have bombs and missiles.

I would expect enemy satellites to be the first to be taken out in such a war (which will loose its own satellites in return, but I think China will consider that a worth while trade).

That will make it very hard for any opfor to know what factor has been converted to making what.

Those are significant problems, but not insurmountable.

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Well, the reason I list those as significant problems, is because the impact of them will be on a continuum -- obviously, during such a conflict China's shipping would be effected and China would also likely lose shipyards and factories.... The question we have to ask is how much of a reduction in trade and energy they will lose access to (vs how much the overland new silk road can potentially mitigate), + how many factories and shipyards they will lose (vs how many can they save, how quickly can they rebuild, how well they can hide and redistribute them etc).

It's difficult to project too far into the future to 2040 with anything near real accuracy, but I believe that if the geopolitical dispersion of opposing forces near China's mainland do not change in the next few decades, then I think it will have a meaningful negative effect on China's ability to wage a war of attrition (aka a war of outproducing the opfor). That doesn't mean China will not be able to produce a significant amount of war goods, but I also think we have to remember that the US will be a world away with intact factories and shipyards that China cannot target with conventional weapons in the same way that the US can attack China's.

Putting it in other words, if the US is still able to out produce China or even simply match China in production, then we can't really say that China would have an "advantage" in being able to outproduce its potential foes, per se.

Taking all the above into consideration, I think we cannot seriously consider the idea of China being able to produce a "tsunami" of war products to overwhelm the enemy, when its key production facilities are held at a degree risk and when its supply of resources and energy is also held at a degree of risk -- all while its main opponent's own production facilities and supply of energy and resources will likely remain minimally disrupted (relatively speaking).
Being able to match the opposition in a similar number of war output with the above circumstances would be challenging for China to achieve to begin with.

As I touched upon early, I think China's primary deterrence weapon is economic rather than military. But I discounted that initially to try and keep things more focused.

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Yes, I agree.

Bltizo said:

Also, we have to consider whether the US may use its geopolitical influence to try and cut off some of China's overland routes as well.

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I doubt that. In such a scenario, with the exception of Russia, any country that bends to US pressure and tries to strangle China's overland supply lines will quickly find a Chinese army at its boarder asking them to reconsider.

When the gloves really come off, any government stupid enough to pick an angry superpower on the other side of the world over one right on its doorstep shouldn't be in power anyways.

When national survival is at stake, any government that is so stupid will quickly find itself on the receiving end of the full range of a superpower's coercion toolkit, ranging from a quiet regime change/coup all the way to outright invasion and occupation.

We obviously can't rule out the new overland routes in any future conflict to help keep China supplied, but I think we also cannot assume they will be able to pick up the slack that a naval blockade will cause nor can we assume that the overland routes would necessarily be invulnerable to disruption.

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We also need to consider that with a situation such as this, China will not be making much if anything for export, thus its energy and raw materials demands are going to be a fraction of what it is now, even with significant increases in military procurement.

Either 3rd parties intervene directly to make a blockade untenable, in which case China will keep some of its commercial manufacturing capacity to make it worthwhile for those countries to keep doing so (but the inward flow of raw materials will more than cover that expenditure), or the blockade holds, in which case there would be no way to sell any commercial goods anyways.

It's difficult to project too far into the future to 2040 with anything near real accuracy, but I believe that if the geopolitical dispersion of opposing forces near China's mainland do not change in the next few decades, then I think it will have a meaningful negative effect on China's ability to wage a war of attrition (aka a war of outproducing the opfor). That doesn't mean China will not be able to produce a significant amount of war goods, but I also think we have to remember that the US will be a world away with intact factories and shipyards that China cannot target with conventional weapons in the same way that the US can attack China's.

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Perhaps I confused things with my previous description of China's overall strategy being primarily one of defence, when I said that, maybe I should have clarified that I include active defence as well, and means of enemy attacks as much as, if not more so, than simply seeking to shoot down incoming missiles and fighters. The Chinese would not just sit back and endure attacks without taking measures to try and redress the source of the problem.

First and foremost, I see the PLA putting great efforts into neutralising and eliminating any enemy forces' ability to attack China, namely enemy forward military bases and carriers.

It should be able to do a pretty good job of that even now, so by 2040, China should be able to significantly degrade any enemy's ability to mount offensive operations against the Chinese mainland.

As you say, China is on the other side of the world to America, without its forward bases and carriers, America will find it as hard to disrupt Chinese production as China will find to reach out and touch American manufacturing bases.

To be honest, since we are even discussing this, we are already assuming the source and cause of the conflict is not too great as to be insurmountable nor would total victory or defeat be the only acceptable outcomes. If that were the case, this theoretical conflict with start and end with nukes in pretty quick order.

China's goal thus would not be to eventually plant its flag on Capital Hill, nor would America's to do the same over Tiananmen.

China will seek to "win" it by being willing and able to go further than the enemy.

There is little doubt that China will be willing and able to transform much if not its whole economy to make war goods, and that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people would be willing to endure the hardship that would cause willingly, if grudgingly. Could the same be same of the US?

If things really went so far, China would no doubt be making new nukes and ICBMs in great numbers to achieve true MAD with the US.

All China needs to do is build up sufficient forces to destroy or push US naval forces out beyond the 3rd island chain, launching amphibious invasions of any and all US or Japanese held island bases within range to be used to attack the Chinese mainland while at the same time building up its nuclear forces to be able to achieve true MAD with America and show its cards - either we call it quits now, or we just start launching nukes and get this over with.

Either way, the war is done, and even if China does not win, at least it would not have lost.

That is, essentially where conflict between any two major nuke powers will end up sooner or later. Which is why no clear power have thus far been crazy enough to go to war with another.

In essence, this entire scenario is a non-starter - no matter how you plan or fight it, barring some miracle or unlikely calamitous screw up by one side or the other, it will ultimately end up with nukes either being threatened to be used, or actually used. Either way, the war ends with that.

plawolf said:

I doubt that. In such a scenario, with the exception of Russia, any country that bends to US pressure and tries to strangle China's overland supply lines will quickly find a Chinese army at its boarder asking them to reconsider.

When the gloves really come off, any government stupid enough to pick an angry superpower on the other side of the world over one right on its doorstep shouldn't be in power anyways.

When national survival is at stake, any government that is so stupid will quickly find itself on the receiving end of the full range of a superpower's coercion toolkit, ranging from a quiet regime change/coup all the way to outright invasion and occupation.

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The problem is that the US will be willing to use coercion, regime change/coup and its whole array of military capabilities to try and bend those nations to its will as well. And it would probably be in a better position to do so given it will likely still maintain a string of global bases and also have allies in the middle east and europe to help facilitate those actions... though we really don't know what US geopolitical influence will look like by 2040.

Overall, I'm not saying the US will be able to cut off all of China's overland routes, but I think we also have to be realistic and accept that a portion would likely be susceptible to US influence.

We also need to consider that with a situation such as this, China will not be making much if anything for export, thus its energy and raw materials demands are going to be a fraction of what it is now, even with significant increases in military procurement.

Either 3rd parties intervene directly to make a blockade untenable, in which case China will keep some of its commercial manufacturing capacity to make it worthwhile for those countries to keep doing so (but the inward flow of raw materials will more than cover that expenditure), or the blockade holds, in which case there would be no way to sell any commercial goods anyways.

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To be honest, I don't think any of us would really know how China (or any nation) would really fund itself during a war of this scale... but I do think in this scenario it would be a stretch to say that China would retain a production advantage relative to its opponents. A production parity at best, imo, if it is able to successfully defend against its opponents (or neutralize the opponent's capabilities in the first place).
I elaborate on this more below.

Perhaps I confused things with my previous description of China's overall strategy being primarily one of defence, when I said that, maybe I should have clarified that I include active defence as well, and means of enemy attacks as much as, if not more so, than simply seeking to shoot down incoming missiles and fighters. The Chinese would not just sit back and endure attacks without taking measures to try and redress the source of the problem.

First and foremost, I see the PLA putting great efforts into neutralising and eliminating any enemy forces' ability to attack China, namely enemy forward military bases and carriers.

It should be able to do a pretty good job of that even now, so by 2040, China should be able to significantly degrade any enemy's ability to mount offensive operations against the Chinese mainland.

As you say, China is on the other side of the world to America, without its forward bases and carriers, America will find it as hard to disrupt Chinese production as China will find to reach out and touch American manufacturing bases.

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I did understand and consider the possibility that you meant China would likely actively try and neutralize US offensive capabilities in the western pacific as well. If China are able to successfully neutralize US offensive assets to a partial degree, then naturally it would significantly inhibit US abilities to conduct offensive strikes into China (although they would retain some "harder to neutralize" assets such as SSGNs and very long range bombers stationed beyond the western pacific -- but overall it would indeed inhibit US offensive abilities).

However, on the flip side, the US may also choose to conduct successful strikes against Chinese defences and China's own offensive capabilities, which would allow them to conduct strikes against Chinese production centres more easily.
Obviously, in a real conflict both sides would score some offensive wins, and both sides would lose some assets as well.
But that doesn't erase the fundamental challenge for China, is that the closer proximity of US assets to China's production and economic centres means the US has the forward advantage whereas China is unable to strike at US production and economic centres in a similar way.
Now, the proximity of US offensive assets close to China doesn't guarantee that they will be able to successfully attack or significantly damage China's production capabilities, just like how the offensive capabilities of China doesn't mean China can successfully neutralize or significantly damage the offensive airbases and carriers in westpac that the US would use against China...
However, the very long distance of Chinese offensive assets from US production centres in CONTUS means China will be unable to have any chance at all of even mildly damaging (let alone successfully attacking) US production centres in the same way that the US could attack China's.

It is an open question as to how much the US could damage China's production centres when accounting for China's attempts to attack US offensive capabilities and China's own defensive capabilities (but also keeping in mind US offensive capabilities against China's own offensive capabilities... etc) -- and it may well be that whatever damage the US could inflict is only relatively minor and would not significantly impair China's production capabilities, but on the flipside it may also be somewhat significant as it depends on how well both sides use their equipment, who has the initial strategic advantage, all sorts of things.

What is not an open question, is that China would lack similar options to attack US production centres like how the US can attack China's production centres, simply due to geographic positioning.

This differential, is why I think it is a stretch to say that China would have a significant advantage in its ability to outproduce its opponents. We must remember that China's own production centres would be at a degree of possible risk from the opponent, while the opponent's own production centres would not be at any risk from China at all.

(Pharsing this entire thing another way, the US would require a relatively small string of successes to be able to inflict meaningful damage against China's production centres due to the forward positioning of its offensive capabilities to China's mainland at the beginning of this hypothetical conflict -- whereas China would require a relatively much longer string of consecutive successes to be able to merely gain the capability to attack US production centres due to the lack of forward bases near CONTUS)

To be honest, since we are even discussing this, we are already assuming the source and cause of the conflict is not too great as to be insurmountable nor would total victory or defeat be the only acceptable outcomes. If that were the case, this theoretical conflict with start and end with nukes in pretty quick order.

China's goal thus would not be to eventually plant its flag on Capital Hill, nor would America's to do the same over Tiananmen.

China will seek to "win" it by being willing and able to go further than the enemy.

There is little doubt that China will be willing and able to transform much if not its whole economy to make war goods, and that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people would be willing to endure the hardship that would cause willingly, if grudgingly. Could the same be same of the US?

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In essence, this entire scenario is a non-starter - no matter how you plan or fight it, barring some miracle or unlikely calamitous screw up by one side or the other, it will ultimately end up with nukes either being threatened to be used, or actually used. Either way, the war ends with that.

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A war of this scale would inevitably dance on the line of nuclear exchange -- which is why I often don't find "all out war" scenarios between China and the US to be very interesting topics, however in this case I ventured in because I was interested in addressing a few specific premises regarding certain capabilities of both sides.

PS: I wouldn't strongly challenge the will of the US populace in willing to make sacrifices in a war against China anymore than I would challenge the will of China's populace in willing to make sacrifices in a war against the US... mostly because the power of US and affiliated media has an ability to portray China and its actions and the US and its actions in a light where such a conflict could be framed as a "battle for righteousness" or whatever. The US populace is very proud and nationalistic in similar ways to China's populace, and both sides believe in certain values that could be whipped up to help support the cause of war.

In addition to being against forum rules, direct conflict, or even proxy conflict, between US and China is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Unlike Russia, China does not have overseas military interests to defend. China's military is also strong enough to deter any armed conflict near its borders.

Of course, deterrence itself is a major goal of the PLA. Aside from that though, I think the PLA will see more action in peacekeeping and anti-terrorism missions. Just look at what the PLA trains in these days (counter terrorism with the SCO), compared to what they trained in in the 90's (amphibious assaults), and we can clearly see priorities have shifted.