Issues on Intercepting Hypersonic Missile.

lilzz said:

actually, all the track record of missiles got intercepted so far have "No intelligence". They have no awareness of incoming interceptor and no counter measures. Even their "maneuvered evasive actions" are preprogrammed.

I just watched a movie about submarine shooting torpedo at another sub.
The sub that got attacked, when active homing torpedo approached, it try countermeasured by changing direction, dive deeper, speed up and shoot out a bunch of decoys. So, it survived the attack.

Likewise, whether the future missiles are hypersonic or slower stealth mode attack, if they have the sensors and feedback and have evasive countermeasure actions base on the actual situation, "Smart Missile" . It will alot harder to intercept them.

Because the interceptor is coming toward the target missile. Even thought the target missile has lesser sensor capability than the ship, but if the interceptor is close enough, it should be able to be detected.

Click to expand...

see, that's the problem with what you are saying. You keep on putting these extra maneuverability factor and intelligence on AShM, but ignore the EW suite and tracking ability of the ship which has much more processing power.

The AShM has the hard task of having to make maneuvers, pick up the ship again, making another maneuver, picking up the ship again and so forth. It doesn't have the processing power to also tracking incoming SAMs and try to avoid them. Let alone coming up with these fantasy measures you are mentioning.

Roger604 said:

Is that supposed to be an argument? You point out that there are certain details I do not know to try to refute the fact that I do know this:

Harpoons and other sea-skimming subsonic missiles are harder to intercept than a Moskit (or Vandals and Coyotes that the USN practices on) because they are more difficult to detect, difficult to track and can engage in more violent maneuvers. They also lock on to a ship more accurately and have better EW resistance.

Therefore, the kind of practices that works on Moskits (2 interceptors) is not going to be enough.

Click to expand...

Roger, you speak with overwhelming confidence as though you were the star student at SWO school, yet I can tell you that your info is based on speculative internet guesses only. You speak confidently about what fire control, and salvo considerations are used aboard USN ships, yet I've served on two different ships in two different fleets and I can tell you, you're completely incorrect about your guesses. Also, the USN practices on both subsonic and supersonic drone targets for good reason. But both missile profiles have their advantages and disadvantages. You have some facts correct above for the most part, but generalize that those characteristics work the same way against every system in current operation today.

LOL. Again, just because I don't know the details doesn't mean you can hide a fundamental fact:

Because in the absence of the range restriction of ESSM, escorts usually try to stay further away from the carrier than 50 km, therefore, when escorts are forced to stick to 50 km of the carrier, this creates limitation on their tactics.

Click to expand...

Operationally, pure bogus. No such restrictions exists. They have longer ranged missiles as well. ESSM, however, has the range to deal with medium ranged threats itself. What limitation on tactics do they create by providing an umbrella of 50 km vs. 200 km? Please elaborate. And although it's of no real tactical consideration, 50 km is only the unclassified data on ESSM. This idea on tactical limitations is something you have either made up in your mind, or you have put it together from some flawed internet article. The distance maintained between members of a battlegroup are comprised from many factors. If you're so concerned over the amount of ESSM missiles used, the BG as a whole still has well over 100 Standard missiles. If you would need more Standard missiles, it's actually no problem to add 1 single Oscar Austin DDG loaded with nothing but Standard missiles. They certainly have that flexibility. And don't forget the judicious amount of carrier based support in the air as well.

My numbers are based on the fact that using relying mostly on ESSM (as in having 50 quad packs on an AB and 70 quad packs on a Tico) is going to have tactical limitations. On top of that, the ships now don't really do anything except defend area air ship -- now they have very limited land-attack capabilities.

Click to expand...

What tactical limitations? Defending the battlegroup is what they're designed to do. I guess you think these CSG's operate in a vacuum. This is where you do not understand the US military's operational concepts of joint warfare. Even when adding the number of ESSM and Standards I used in the examples above as part of their missile loads, 4 ships in the battlegroup could still operationally carry 40-50 Tomahawks in the strike role. Not 40-50 each, but in total. Even though that many may not be needed, the VLS still shows space for that. Not to mention, the carrier can also carry out strike warfare, and ASuW missions as well. The big addition of the Ohio SSGN, which carries up to 154 Tomahawks will be the unit that will launch most of the Tomahawks in the strike role. Maybe even two or three of them. These are the pieces of the puzzle that fit nicely into place for the USN to defend, and then provide offensive strikes against whatever they need to destroy. If all the USN had was 1 CSG with 4 AAW ships you would be right. But your considerations are a fantasy when you put together the whole picture. And when analyzing the USN, you have to at least consider the pieces, or you will be flawed in how they think about their own mission requirements. This is the direction you've taken in every post.

Of course, if you're willing to accept this trade off (all ships staying within 50 km radius and lack of space for LACM), then the carrier group is going to be pretty safe from any feasible attack, just on the basis of having too many point defense missiles for an attacker to overcome.

Click to expand...

As said above, with the amount of other pices in the puzzle, like the Ohio SSGN's etc., the space savings is an acceptable tradeoff. In fact, depending on what the mission requirement is, surface ship based Tomahawks may not be needed in the strike role at all. Oh, and I forgot to mention the 12 Tomahawk VLS silos on 688(I) and Virginia class submarines. Seawolf can fire 8 of them from their torpedo tubes. And no, ESSM will not provide point defense only protection. It's a medium ranged AAW missile. Although it can handle the point defense role as well.

But any time the number of missiles in a battle group falls below 800 or so, the risk of incoming attackers firing in waves up to 180 sea skimming, highly maneuverable missiles to exhaust those defenses becomes very dangerous.

And yes, despite the lack of information on this subject because all data is secret, this is a very reasonable calculation.

Click to expand...

There are no current threats out there that can saturate this type of battlegroup where they operate very easily. China and Russia and others field very capable missiles. And missiles in a VLS cell is a finite resource. They will deplete in any battle scenario. However, China or Russia both would find it very difficult in fielding a saturation level attack against 3 Burke DDG's and 1 Ticonderoga CG. And the whole battlegroup running at full strength, full alert, and on a war footing. The numbers are not there at all. ESSM is a system designed to saturate the offensive spectrum entirely. And please, while you're making up your hypothetical battle, don't forget the AEW, EW, and fighter protection. And to compound your problems, consider that this massive type of scenario would see more than 3 of these battlegroups. That's 3 or more actually.

tphuang said:

see, that's the problem with what you are saying. You keep on putting these extra maneuverability factor and intelligence on AShM, but ignore the EW suite and tracking ability of the ship which has much more processing power.

The AShM has the hard task of having to make maneuvers, pick up the ship again, making another maneuver, picking up the ship again and so forth. It doesn't have the processing power to also tracking incoming SAMs and try to avoid them. Let alone coming up with these fantasy measures you are mentioning.

Click to expand...

The difference is the AshM doesn't need to track and lock , and compute a firing solution against the interceptor. None of that. It just need a "rough idea" of interceptors coming to its neighborhood. So, this way it still can accomplish what it wants despite lacking processing power. Actually it doesn't need to process much because it doesn't need to intercept anything.

It can have for example to have independent sources, the radar to lock on to the ship and the IR imaging sensors to detect incoming interceptors.

Just like when you are driving, and you look around your surroundings, side mirror, back mirrors, and you change lanes, or change speed, manuver around. but your final destination is still the same.

Sea Dog said:

You speak confidently about what fire control, and salvo considerations are used aboard USN ships, yet I've served on two different ships in two different fleets and I can tell you, you're completely incorrect about your guesses. Also, the USN practices on both subsonic and supersonic drone targets for good reason. But both missile profiles have their advantages and disadvantages. You have some facts correct above for the most part, but generalize that those characteristics work the same way against every system in current operation today.

Click to expand...

I know you're privy to a lot of information we are not privy to. But you cannot simply explain away the laws of physics with claims about "inside information."

It's extremely easy to figure out how many missiles need to be fired in a salvo to destroy an incoming missile. If you know the flight characteristic of the anti-ship missile, you know it's flight envelope -- all the possible points in space it can be in within some period of time after T=0.

There will inevitably be a delay in the reaction of the interceptor toward maneuvers by the anti-ship missile. The reason is because the radars cannot detect the anti-ship missile's movement until after it has overcome its inertia. And after that it must give the proper commands to the intercepting missile, and the intercepting missile itself must mechanically move its controls, and then overcome its inertia to finally adjust its course.

This will take about 0.5 second. The anti-ship missile always has the initiative by 0.5 second.

The envelope of the missile in T=0.5 second is the area that must be covered by the interceptor. The speed of sound is 340 meters per second. A hypothetical subsonic sea skimmer would fly about 0.8x the speed of sound, or 272 meters per second.

So in 0.5 seconds, a subsonic sea skimmer would cover 136 meters. The volume of a sphere with radius of 136 meters is 232 thousand cubic meters. The actual flight envelope may be only a third of that.... so about 77 thousand cubic meters.

The kill radius of an intercepting missile is about 15 meters. A sphere with 15 meters radius has a volume of 14 thousand cubic meters.

77 thousand cubic meters divided by 14 thousand cubic meters is 5.5. So it would take more than 5 missiles to totally cover the possible flight envelope of an incoming anti-ship missile traveling at 0.8x the speed of sound.

crobato said:

Well there is one kind of missile that the tests could not cover and did not cover, because Coyotes and Vandals are incapable of mimicking it. Basically this missile approaches its target in subsonic, sea skimming fashion, low altitude. Then when its terminal, it drops its an entire stage containing its engine and empty fuel tanks, leaving its last stage heading to the target. That last stage is powered by a rocket motor, boosting the missile from subsonic to supersonic in one big massive acceleration.

Click to expand...

Interesting that you brought this up. There was a computer graphic on military forums some time ago that showed a sea skimming missile (with fins like a Tomahawk) that looked like a lipstick. It had a section sticking out from the front. The part in the front is probably supposed to be a rocket powered missile or a torpedo.

Roger604 said:

It's extremely easy to figure out how many missiles need to be fired in a salvo to destroy an incoming missile. If you know the flight characteristic of the anti-ship missile, you know it's flight envelope -- all the possible points in space it can be in within some period of time after T=0.

..................................etc.

Click to expand...

Roger. You're just demonstrating what is already known about missiles traveling in a volume of airspace. And we all know that the defending platform's systems will need to react and adjust to the missile's motion. All that's obvious. But you're considerations are still completely flawed. Why? Because you're assuming something about anti-ship missile performance that is not realistic or true. Simply put, an anti-ship missile, if even set correctly (range/bearing/enable) will not evade or maneuver constantly from radar horizon to ship target. They couldn't do this without serious trade offs in it's performance envelope. Nor could these missiles "see" an interceptor in this phase and react as though they have human intuition or conscience. I've watched what these things can do, and you might be disappointed if you actually saw how some of these terminal maneuvers were actually executed. As I've said before, they do help in increasing the probability of a hit. And you're also right, they may help result in the defending platform having to commit to more than one interceptor for a successful intercept. But they are not magic, as in they can't overcome the positive inertia from their initial point of movement in an instantaneous timeframe, and they guarantee nothing as the more they maneuver, the flight performance characteristics are negatively tweaked. It appears your model (as attempted mathematically) of 5 missiles is wildly flawed. You seem to be assuming that all interceptors are fired at the same time, or they'll arrive at the same point in relation to the anti-ship missile motion, at the same time as well. That's the only way it could work with your above model in mind. Things don't work that way in reality.

5 or more missiles to intercept one in your mathematical model doesn't correct for a single defending missile following an interceptor, at a time frame that would have the ability to adjust to a single terminal maneuver in it's flight envelope. In other words, that will allow it to get in the same amount of airspace to ensure a proximity warhead detonation or even a skin-to-skin kill based on time and distance. Typically, if the first one misses, barring of course a mechanical failure of the second interceptor, the second one has a pretty high probability of intercept due to the short yet adequate time frame that it follows the first interceptor to adequately readjust it's intercept. ESSM and RAM have both demonstrated this ability against a realistic type of terminal maneuver. Not the instantaneous, inertia avoiding, performance limit avoiding, radar horizon to ship target weaving you envision. The anti-ship missile you speak of doesn't exist. Nor do the defending systems have the extent of limitations you speak of. Some of your thinking is correct about how a missile moves through a volume of airspace, but your time, distance, inertia and other characteristics in your formulations are incomplete. So are your views of the relationship of all of it to actual intercept geometry. And no, I simply won't elaborate. I think it's simple enough to see for the purposes required in an internet forum.

Sea Dog said:

Simply put, an anti-ship missile, if even set correctly (range/bearing/enable) will not evade or maneuver constantly from radar horizon to ship target. They couldn't do this without serious trade offs in it's performance envelope. Nor could these missiles "see" an interceptor in this phase and react as though they have human intuition or conscience.

Click to expand...

There are plenty of open source literature on missile flight control on the internet. None say that an turbofan anti-ship missile, like a Harpoon, cannot maneuver throughout its terminal phase!

Of course it can't continuously perform violent 20+ G maneuvers from radar horizon to target, but there are formulas for the optimal maneuvers they can take that balance the trade-off in speed with lateral movement. For example, a sea skimming missile can weave left and right continuously. This means that an intercepting missile cannot intercept them with a straight flight pattern but must make a high G turn right before the plane of interception.

Because missiles are significantly less accurate when they make a high G turn than when they are traveling straight toward a particular point in point (and can make minute course corrections along the way), this maneuver greatly decreases the probability of intercept.

Sea Dog said:

I've watched what these things can do, and you might be disappointed if you actually saw how some of these terminal maneuvers were actually executed.

Click to expand...

Again, Coyotes and Vandals mimic the capability of the US Navy's adversaries in the 70's and 80's, not today! Testing AEGIS with these drones do not represent true capabilities today.

Air resistance for supersonic objects is much harder to overcome than for subsonics. That's why a subsonic sea skimmer can perform much more effective terminal maneuvers.

Sea Dog said:

5 or more missiles to intercept one in your mathematical model doesn't correct for a single defending missile following an interceptor, at a time frame that would have the ability to adjust to a single terminal maneuver in it's flight envelope.

Click to expand...

That's an air-to-air combat tactic, not a missile intercept tactic. You pointed out yourself that an anti-ship missile cannot detect an interceptor and turn away to evade them. So your ripple fire tactic makes no sense since in a missile intercept the antiship missile will be maneuvering before the first interceptor arrives, and continue to maneuver after the first intercept misses (if it misses). Your tactic can only work if the antiship missile maneuvers in response to the first interceptor, which slows it down, and makes it vulnerable to the next one.

Sea Dog said:

ESSM and RAM have both demonstrated this ability against a realistic type of terminal maneuver. Not the instantaneous, inertia avoiding, performance limit avoiding, radar horizon to ship target weaving you envision. The anti-ship missile you speak of doesn't exist.

Click to expand...

You greatly underestimate the capabilities of real world threats that AEGIS could face. Vandals and Coyotes are not the only "realistic" terminal maneuvering missiles.

Against a sea skimmer flying a mathematically optimized weaving maneuver, you will need to fire a LOT of interceptors to raise the probability of kill to 99% or above. You don't have the option to wait to see whether the first one, or the second one, etc. kill the missile. You need to fire all of the interceptors at nearly the same time.

Roger604 said:

There are plenty of open source literature on missile flight control on the internet. None say that an turbofan anti-ship missile, like a Harpoon, cannot maneuver throughout its terminal phase!

Of course it can't continuously perform violent 20+ G maneuvers from radar horizon to target, but there are formulas for the optimal maneuvers they can take that balance the trade-off in speed with lateral movement. For example, a sea skimming missile can weave left and right continuously. This means that an intercepting missile cannot intercept them with a straight flight pattern but must make a high G turn right before the plane of interception.

...

Against a sea skimmer flying a mathematically optimized weaving maneuver, you will need to fire a LOT of interceptors to raise the probability of kill to 99% or above. You don't have the option to wait to see whether the first one, or the second one, etc. kill the missile. You need to fire all of the interceptors at nearly the same time.

Click to expand...

Roger, in Sea Dog you are talking to someone who actually works in this field and is involved with the testing and training. The US employs drones that mimick the known threats that are out there at the current time. Some of the opfor systems are still based on 80's technology and therefore tests against that level of technology continue. The US Navy also programs and sets drones to act in accordance with the lastest technologies and incorporates those into the training and operational exercises.

As to having to shoot five missiles at a single target nearly simultaneously, you are proving by such statements that you have no experience or real knowledge of how these tests, exercises, or actual engagements would be conducted. Right now the exercises are conducted to mimick the real world so that the vessels and their crews are prepared to meet the actual chalenges they are apt to face if the balloons go up. They test against real world, mordern threats in those exercises. I know of know existing threat that would require what you are suggesting.

Jeff Head said:

The US employs drones that mimick the known threats that are out there at the current time.

Click to expand...

Unless you're lost in the 80's, Vandals and Coyotes certainly do not represent the "known threats" out there. It's almost cute to really think that the USN has such mastery that everything "out there" can neatly be mimicked by these drones.

Can the Vandal or Coyote mimic the latest block Harpoon or the latest block Exocet? These sea-skimmers are much smaller, harder to detect and are better able to maneuver in the terminal phase than the 70's era Soviet ramjets.

Jeff Head said:

As to having to shoot five missiles at a single target nearly simultaneously, you are proving by such statements that you have no experience or real knowledge of how these tests, exercises, or actual engagements would be conducted.

Click to expand...

Do you know how many missiles you need to fire at an incoming late block Harpoon to have a 99% probability of hit? If you don't, then I suggest you give this line of argument a rest.

Some forum members have observed actual exercises, but that doesn't mean they are going to tell the whole truth.... there are many reasons for them to want to hide a potential weakness, for example.

Roger604 said:

Unless you're lost in the 80's, Vandals and Coyotes certainly do not represent the "known threats" out there. It's almost cute to really think that the USN has such mastery that everything "out there" can neatly be mimicked by these drones.

Some forum members have observed actual exercises, but that doesn't mean they are going to tell the whole truth.... there are many reasons for them to want to hide a potential weakness, for example.

Click to expand...

Roger, you keep spouting the same stuff over and over as though by repeating it it makes it so. You have had ample discussion and explanation from people on these boards who actually work with these things and have shared great insight and knowledge with you regarding the same...and specifically to these issues you raise again.

Clearly, you have made up your mind, and that's fine,you have every right to believe whatever you want...but that does not square with the hard test of reality and experience which has been speaking to you on this thread.

No need to rehash it...my suggestion (and that is all that it is) is that you read again what Man overboard and Sea Dog have said throughout this thread.

Best of luck to you.

Roger604 said:

Can the Vandal or Coyote mimic the latest block Harpoon or the latest block Exocet?

Click to expand...

??? The Harpoon is produced by a US manufacturer and used by the USN, why do you even bother to doubt those missiles can't be perfectly mimiced by drones. They can just use their own missiles for those tests.
I guess that may also be true for Exocets.