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As for the last part where the author point out that the so called "quietist" Salafists may be an ideological counter to ISIS. I think is an interesting point worthy of consideration.
here is an article on that subject.
This overall concept is wishful thinking and inertia for staying the course on the part of those who buy into maintaining the Saudi line or strategy, perhaps learning the wrong lessons from what happened to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the development of political Islam in Turkey, and even how Israel manages the Judaic extremist segment of its population.
Let's be clear that firsthand political activism, making a difference, being independent by creating a "new land", are as much of a major attraction to ISIS for its young supporters as religious "idealism". Not coincidentally the same age demographic who were behind the Arab Spring which was against all political old guards: elected, military strongmen, and monarchies alike. The only difference was how different countries managed to, or didn't, suppress, undermine, co-opt, or actually provide better opportunities for their youths.
Let's also understand that this should be an expected historical social evolution for the region where democratic republics, military strongmen, and monarchies alike have been toppled by, or rely on, foreign patronage to a great extent, and more importantly few of which have been able to provide its youth with the societal achievements and opportunities (or just personal wealth in the case of oil state handouts) commensurate with the political adherence demanded and the natural social pride in their heritage.
It is logical then that theocracy, the only political model not having had its turn and disappointed the Sunni populace of the region in modern times is now taking up the mantle. For the religious Sunni this ironically means the sole longstanding example of Iran despite its shortcomings, the encouraging position of political Islamists in Turkey tempered by the fate of the overall non-violent Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere. The above examples, the violent nature of revolutions, and the myriad policies facilitating violence by states in the region and foreign powers practically guaranteed the emergence of a Sunni theocracy attempt resembling IS.
So what can we, as in the US, do about it now? Change course! Like it or not an unsuppressed Muslim Brotherhood and the Turkish Islamist parties are the most benign and appealing alternative models respectively for those targeted by the IS and those supporting the IS. Making these alternatives worthier to fight for than the IS is the most constructive way forward, anything else is just holding down the lid on a pot already boiling over.