US, Turkey part ways over Syria
President Barack Obama’s strategy in the fight against the Islamic State in Syria gets considerable clarity with the 4-line announcement by the US Central Command that American military aircraft have made multiple drops of weapons, ammunition and medical supplies to the Kurdish fighters defending the northern Syrian city of Kobane facing the Turkish border.
In sum, Washington has parted ways with Ankara. Obama telephoned President Recep Erdogan on Saturday and discussed “steps that could be taken to counter” the IS offensive against Kobane. Presumably, he took Erdogan into confidence about the need to arm and support the Kurdish fighters in Kobane.
But Erdogan stuck to his guns and on Sunday reiterated that Turkey considered the Syrian Kurdish group [PYD] as every bit a “terrorist organization like the Iraqi Kurds belonging to the PKK”. He took a tough stance: “It would be very wrong for America — with whom we are allies and with whom we are together within the NATO — to expect us to say ‘yes’ after openly announcing such support for a terrorist organization. It [US] cannot expect such a thing from us and we cannot say ‘yes’ to such a thing either.”
Erdogan also parried on the pending issue of Ankara making available Turkish air bases on the Syrian-Iraqi border for the US operations. He said, “What are they [US] asking for with regard to Incirlik [air base]? That’s not clear yet. If there is something we deem appropriate, we would discuss it with our security forces and we would say ‘yes’. But if it is not appropriate, then saying ‘yes’ is not possible for us either.” (Hurriyet).
Suffice to say, Obama made a last-ditch attempt to carry Erdogan along, but the endeavor failed, and he has since left the Turkish leader behind on his own.
To be sure, the Kurdish fighters in Kobane are in dire straits and US supplies have become vital. Time is of the essence of the matter.
But there are political dimensions, too, to Obama’s decision to arm the Syrian Kurds. One, Obama has openly rejected Erdogan’s notion of the Syrian Kurds being ‘terrorists’ who allegedly enjoyed the covert backing of the Syrian regime.
Two, Obama is unwilling to link the fight against the IS with the Turkish agenda of ‘regime change’ in Syria. Three, Obama disfavors Erdogan’s pet idea of creating a ‘buffer zone’ and a ‘no-fly zone’ in Syria from Aleppo northward to the Turkish border.
Indeed, Obama is wary of getting entangled with Erdogan’s pipe dream of riding the wings of Arab Spring and bringing about a democratic transformation of the Middle East spearheaded by the Muslim Brotherhood — under Turkish tutelage, of course.
Broadly speaking, the above put together would suggest that Obama is finessing his Syrian strategy to one of containment of IS in immediate terms rather than getting into grandiose plans of seeking political settlements in Iraq and Syria. (See my blog Crunch time for Obama in Syria.)
But the interplay of the above three dimensions will still impact the future developments in a major way. The open US backing for the PYD (which is no doubt allied with the PKK and is fighting Turkey, US’ NATO ally) will resonate all over the Kurdish homelands in Iraq, Syria and Turkey and could give fillip to the Kurdish national aspirations of self-determination. That is to say, Ankara may soon have to grapple with a resurgent Kurdish insurgency.
The bottom line is that Turkey is having to pay a heavy price for its dubious role in fomenting the civil war in Syria over the past 3-year period and for its covert support of the IS in particular. In last week’s bid for the ‘European seat’ in the UN Security Council, Turkey suffered a humiliating defeat ending with just 60 votes. Turkey’s regional and international credibility has hit rock bottom.
Obama would see that an overt Turkish military role would trigger disquiet in the Arab minds, given the huge backlog of Ottoman history in the region’s collective consciousness. However, the most important point here is as regards Obama’s game plan for the Syrian regime. Evidently, he has so far neatly sidestepped the Syrian regime and has gone for the IS.
The ‘missing link’ here so far has been the Iran nuclear deal and the removal of sanctions against Iran, which will open the way for a US-Iranian effort to seek a political settlement in Syria in a near future.
Meanwhile, the US-Iranian dealings over Iraq have ‘matured’ over a relatively short period of time already starting with the efforts to replace former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. Iraq became a test case of the efficacy of US-Iranian cooperation over issues of regional security and stability. And it stands to reason that the US is increasingly viewing Iran as a factor of stability in Iraq.
Interestingly, in Iraq the US is not being prescriptive about the exact composition of an “inclusive” government. If at all, the latest appointment of a Shi’ite politician from the Badr Organization to the post of Interior Minister in Baghdad and the visit by the Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi leading a high-powered delegation to Tehran later today would suggest that Iran’s influence in Iraqi affairs has if anything only increased.
All in all, therefore, aside the profound symbolism of Obama’s decision to arm the Syrian Kurds even at the cost of annoying Turkey, he could be “dialing back” his Syria strategy, realizing that any escalation of US military action against the Syrian regime is fraught with the danger of triggering “chaos and unintended consequences” and, therefore, a political element, which is non-existent today, is ultimately needed.
It is only Iran that could provide that non-existent political element kickstarting a political settlement in Syria — not Turkey, not Saudi Arabia, not even Russia. The recent Iranian statements at different levels of leadership (Irna, FNA) would suggest that Tehran is positioning itself to play such a role in Syria.
Posted in Diplomacy, Military, Politics.
Tagged with Arab spring, Iran nuclear issue, ISIL, Kobane, Kurdish problem, Syria's civil war.
By M K Bhadrakumar – October 20, 2014