Footage of the fall of an Israeli Hermes-900 tactical UAV shot down by Iranian air defense has been published. The Hermes-900 UAV was shot down near the city of Khorramabad, the administrative center of the Lorestan province. This is the third Hermes-900 UAV shot down in Iran. The Hermes-900 UAV was developed by the Israeli company Elbit Systems in 2011. Drones of this type are equipped with satellite communication systems, optical-electronic surveillance systems and other components for reconnaissance. It is possible to install strike weapons. The take-off weight of the Hermes-900 UAV is up to 900 kg, the payload weight is 300 kg. The drone's flight speed is up to 220 km / h at altitudes of up to 9150 meters. The flight range of the Hermes-900 UAV is up to 1500 kilometers, the duration is up to 36 hours. The price of the Hermes-900 UAV is about 25 million dollars.
Iranian Military News, Reports, Data, etc.
- Thread starter ShahryarHedayat
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wrong thread
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This is a crazy post:
Why Iran Still Has No Functional Air Defense People often say Iran lacks proper air defense because of U.S. and Western sanctions, and while that’s partly true, it’s far from the whole truth. The deeper issue lies in strategic indecision, deep-seated mistrust—especially toward China and a long series of missed opportunities. Iran had multiple windows to build up a credible aerial defense system, but time and again, it chose not to act. One of the clearest chances came in October 2020, when the UN arms embargo on Iran officially expired. This opened the door for Tehran to legally purchase advanced weapons systems from Russia and China, including fighter jets, air defense platforms, and integrated battle networks. Iran made moves it explored options, visited factories but in the end, failed to commit to a workable solution. In 2021 and 2022, Iranian military officials visited China to inspect the J-10CE, a modern 4.5-generation fighter jet that Pakistan had recently acquired. The J-10CE is more than just a plane: it comes as part of a networked warfare doctrine, including radar, electronic warfare systems, data-link infrastructure, and full pilot training support. In short, it’s a plug-and-play combat package. Pakistan recognized this and placed full trust in the Chinese system. That trust paid off. In the 2025 Indo-Pakistani aerial confrontation, Pakistan used this integrated system specifically the J-10CE armed with the PL-15 long-range missile to devastating effect. Pakistani officials later claimed they had downed six Indian aircraft, including four Rafales, and that they had radar locks on at least fifteen Indian jets but chose to hold back. Iran, despite being offered the same system, walked away. It wasn’t just the J-10 it rejected. Iranian officials also inspected the JF-17 “Thunder” (known as 枭龙 in Chinese), a jointly developed fighter jet by China and Pakistan, and again passed on the opportunity.
Instead, Iran turned to Russia in 2023, at a time when Moscow was already bogged down in the war in Ukraine, which had begun on February 24, 2022. Tehran tried to acquire Su-35s and, more ambitiously, wanted to purchase the entire production line for domestic assembly. But two years later, by mid-2025, not a single Su-35 has arrived in Iran. No planes. No production line. No training systems. No change in combat readiness. By this point, one would expect Iran to reassess its options and consider buying from China. But it didn’t. Iran preferred to go without any new fighters at all rather than rely on Chinese technology.
The reason? A deeply ingrained belief that Chinese defense equipment is of inferior quality. Take the case of the C-802 anti-ship missile, a Chinese system Iran had acquired in the early 2000s. Iranian engineers, convinced there were flaws in the original Chinese design, modified the missile’s guidance system without consulting China. Subsequent test launches failed: the missiles missed their targets every time. When Chinese technicians were called in for after-sales support, they found the issue wasn’t with the original system it was with Iran’s modifications. Once restored to factory settings, the missiles performed exactly as intended. Iran's attitude toward Chinese arms: suspicion, second-guessing, and ultimately, rejection. Yet the irony is this: Iran wasn’t short on cash. With the money it had, it could have very easily built up its aerial defense system. According to estimates from the U.S. State Department and various intelligence sources, Iran has spent roughly $15–20 billion supporting the Syrian government since 2011 averaging about $2 billion per year in military aid, fuel subsidies, logistics, and training. On top of that, Hezbollah receives an estimated $700 million annually, with some years seeing even higher flows. These are massive, long-term investments in foreign partners.
Why Iran Still Has No Functional Air Defense People often say Iran lacks proper air defense because of U.S. and Western sanctions, and while that’s partly true, it’s far from the whole truth. The deeper issue lies in strategic indecision, deep-seated mistrust—especially toward China and a long series of missed opportunities. Iran had multiple windows to build up a credible aerial defense system, but time and again, it chose not to act. One of the clearest chances came in October 2020, when the UN arms embargo on Iran officially expired. This opened the door for Tehran to legally purchase advanced weapons systems from Russia and China, including fighter jets, air defense platforms, and integrated battle networks. Iran made moves it explored options, visited factories but in the end, failed to commit to a workable solution. In 2021 and 2022, Iranian military officials visited China to inspect the J-10CE, a modern 4.5-generation fighter jet that Pakistan had recently acquired. The J-10CE is more than just a plane: it comes as part of a networked warfare doctrine, including radar, electronic warfare systems, data-link infrastructure, and full pilot training support. In short, it’s a plug-and-play combat package. Pakistan recognized this and placed full trust in the Chinese system. That trust paid off. In the 2025 Indo-Pakistani aerial confrontation, Pakistan used this integrated system specifically the J-10CE armed with the PL-15 long-range missile to devastating effect. Pakistani officials later claimed they had downed six Indian aircraft, including four Rafales, and that they had radar locks on at least fifteen Indian jets but chose to hold back. Iran, despite being offered the same system, walked away. It wasn’t just the J-10 it rejected. Iranian officials also inspected the JF-17 “Thunder” (known as 枭龙 in Chinese), a jointly developed fighter jet by China and Pakistan, and again passed on the opportunity.
Instead, Iran turned to Russia in 2023, at a time when Moscow was already bogged down in the war in Ukraine, which had begun on February 24, 2022. Tehran tried to acquire Su-35s and, more ambitiously, wanted to purchase the entire production line for domestic assembly. But two years later, by mid-2025, not a single Su-35 has arrived in Iran. No planes. No production line. No training systems. No change in combat readiness. By this point, one would expect Iran to reassess its options and consider buying from China. But it didn’t. Iran preferred to go without any new fighters at all rather than rely on Chinese technology.
The reason? A deeply ingrained belief that Chinese defense equipment is of inferior quality. Take the case of the C-802 anti-ship missile, a Chinese system Iran had acquired in the early 2000s. Iranian engineers, convinced there were flaws in the original Chinese design, modified the missile’s guidance system without consulting China. Subsequent test launches failed: the missiles missed their targets every time. When Chinese technicians were called in for after-sales support, they found the issue wasn’t with the original system it was with Iran’s modifications. Once restored to factory settings, the missiles performed exactly as intended. Iran's attitude toward Chinese arms: suspicion, second-guessing, and ultimately, rejection. Yet the irony is this: Iran wasn’t short on cash. With the money it had, it could have very easily built up its aerial defense system. According to estimates from the U.S. State Department and various intelligence sources, Iran has spent roughly $15–20 billion supporting the Syrian government since 2011 averaging about $2 billion per year in military aid, fuel subsidies, logistics, and training. On top of that, Hezbollah receives an estimated $700 million annually, with some years seeing even higher flows. These are massive, long-term investments in foreign partners.
Iran ordered the S-300. Russia dragged its feet nine years to deliver it. At that same point Israel got the F-35. The S-300 system Iran got was basically obsolete on delivery. Having been burned they developed their own air defense systems. Which at least on paper are fairly good.
Having gotten a couple dozen fighters since 2020 wouldn't have been enough to fight off either Israel or the US.
Russia and China should have never gone along with the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran and North Korea to butter up the West.
Having gotten a couple dozen fighters since 2020 wouldn't have been enough to fight off either Israel or the US.
Russia and China should have never gone along with the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran and North Korea to butter up the West.
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Not looking to derail the "2025 Israel - Iranian conflict" thread, so injecting some commentary to a few posts from said thread and this thread here . . .
TBF minus the shoeshines, the above comparison more or less reflect reality, even if the numbers are imprecise.
Once Islamabad's access to is factored in, merchandise like the J-10C make for a significantly more expensive proposition for Tehran than Islamabad.
The UNSC enacted an arms embargo against Tehran in the late 2000s, which both Beijing and Moscow adhered to, in visible and significant ways, at least until the West took a harder stance against Russia in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
As a result, Iran ended up receiving S-300s they had ordered from Russia in the mid-2000s in the mid-2010s.
When the UN arms embargo against Iran finally expired in 2020, Iran was in the midst of a severe multi-year economic recession which precluded a rebound in arms imports . . .
There's a good amount to digest here. The OP is much more informed than most, but there's quite a bit of nuance that she's ignoring.
The principal reason Tehran sought fighters from Moscow rather than Beijing in 2023 was because Iran was providing Russia with OWA drones that Moscow desperately needed at the time for ongoing operations in Ukraine.
This gave the Iranians a much stronger hand in arms sales negotiations with the Russians than what they had or could achieve with the Chinese.
While this story might be true, it's complete nonsense to think the Iranians look down on Chinese arms.
Besides the fact that Iran's treasured missile program sources a significant number of critical components like fiber-optic gyroscopes and M-code compatible GNSS receivers from China, one ought to consider Iran's principal source for technical military assistance in recent years: North Korea.
If North Korean arms technology is good enough for Iran, the Iranians aren't going to be too stuck up to accept Chinese arms so long as they can reasonably afford the cost of admission.
Given where things stand with Hezbollah and in Syria, an argument can be made that Iran should have prioritized even more funding to those proxies, but no point talking about that now . . .
One thing the OP failed to acknowledge is that Iranian aid to its foreign proxies more often than not manifested in the form of arms rather than cash, especially hard currency like USD, and for a number of years in the case of Syria, a big chunk of it materialized as services rendered by Iranian, Iraqi and even Hezbollah soldiers, militants and operatives.
OTOH not only do Chinese defense exporters need to be paid in cash, but payments will also have to be processed by willing financial institutions unafraid of (secondary) US sanctions.
Not sure what the numbers look like now, but following the expiration of the UN imposed arms embargo against Iran in 2020, .
So if the Chinese authorities really, really wanted to sell Iran HQ-9s or J-10s, they could have leveraged frozen Iranian assets, even if not as payment, as collateral for financing. However, Chinese banks didn't want to risk getting cut off from USD denominated transactions by the US Treasury, and there obviously wasn't enough political will for Beijing to go out of its way to "make things work" for cash poor Iran.
TBF minus the shoeshines, the above comparison more or less reflect reality, even if the numbers are imprecise.
Once Islamabad's access to is factored in, merchandise like the J-10C make for a significantly more expensive proposition for Tehran than Islamabad.
The UNSC enacted an arms embargo against Tehran in the late 2000s, which both Beijing and Moscow adhered to, in visible and significant ways, at least until the West took a harder stance against Russia in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014.
As a result, Iran ended up receiving S-300s they had ordered from Russia in the mid-2000s in the mid-2010s.
When the UN arms embargo against Iran finally expired in 2020, Iran was in the midst of a severe multi-year economic recession which precluded a rebound in arms imports . . .
There's a good amount to digest here. The OP is much more informed than most, but there's quite a bit of nuance that she's ignoring.
The principal reason Tehran sought fighters from Moscow rather than Beijing in 2023 was because Iran was providing Russia with OWA drones that Moscow desperately needed at the time for ongoing operations in Ukraine.
This gave the Iranians a much stronger hand in arms sales negotiations with the Russians than what they had or could achieve with the Chinese.
While this story might be true, it's complete nonsense to think the Iranians look down on Chinese arms.
Besides the fact that Iran's treasured missile program sources a significant number of critical components like fiber-optic gyroscopes and M-code compatible GNSS receivers from China, one ought to consider Iran's principal source for technical military assistance in recent years: North Korea.
If North Korean arms technology is good enough for Iran, the Iranians aren't going to be too stuck up to accept Chinese arms so long as they can reasonably afford the cost of admission.
Given where things stand with Hezbollah and in Syria, an argument can be made that Iran should have prioritized even more funding to those proxies, but no point talking about that now . . .
One thing the OP failed to acknowledge is that Iranian aid to its foreign proxies more often than not manifested in the form of arms rather than cash, especially hard currency like USD, and for a number of years in the case of Syria, a big chunk of it materialized as services rendered by Iranian, Iraqi and even Hezbollah soldiers, militants and operatives.
OTOH not only do Chinese defense exporters need to be paid in cash, but payments will also have to be processed by willing financial institutions unafraid of (secondary) US sanctions.
Not sure what the numbers look like now, but following the expiration of the UN imposed arms embargo against Iran in 2020, .
So if the Chinese authorities really, really wanted to sell Iran HQ-9s or J-10s, they could have leveraged frozen Iranian assets, even if not as payment, as collateral for financing. However, Chinese banks didn't want to risk getting cut off from USD denominated transactions by the US Treasury, and there obviously wasn't enough political will for Beijing to go out of its way to "make things work" for cash poor Iran.